

Household structures, income, education and vote in France. Evidence using historical census data (1856-2014) and electoral results (1968-2012)

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June 21, 2018

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Abstract

This study attempts to explore the relation between household structures, income, education and voting attitudes in France. Firstly, historical data from the French censuses is collected to build consistent long-term series on household structures at the departmental level and document a considerable reduction in heterogeneity between *départements* over the last 150 years. As voting outcomes have not been collected in a consistent manner for elections before 1958, and that census results have been digitised only from 1968 on, the analysis of electoral results is then restricted to the period 1968-2012 for which both voting outcomes and data for control variables are available. As a first step, we make use of results of legislative elections available at the departmental level (1968-2012) and do not find significant, robust relationships between average household structures and voting attitudes, while we find a small, positive correlation between average income in the *département* and vote for the centre-right. We then use available data at the municipal level for two recent legislative elections (2002 and 2012) and find negligible effects of prevailing household structures as compared to the role of average income or education in the municipality for predicting the vote. We report indeed a very high positive correlation between average income per adult in the municipality and vote for the centre-right, robust to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables. We also find a negative correlation between average income per adult and vote for the left. Finally, municipality with the highest concentration of university graduates tend all things being equal to vote less for the extreme-right, while there are no significant patterns for the relationship between education and vote for the left at the municipal level. Due to the well-known ecological fallacy, and residential selection according to preferences correlated with voting attitudes, determinants of individual voting choices should not be inferred from these results. In any case, we interpret this as evidence that prevailing household structures are a relatively minor dimension relative to income and education at the municipal level for the contemporary political cleavage in France for the recent past. Further research is needed to extend this study and use election results at a more local level for the 19th Century and early 20th Century.

Keywords: Demographic History, Household History, Family Structure, Political Economy
JEL Classification: J12, N34, Z130

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Thomas Piketty for his insightful comments and for his guidance throughout the pursuit of this study. I also thank Gilles Postel-Vinay for accepting to be referee. I am grateful to Florian Bonnet for his advice regarding census data collection and historical maps, as well as for the estimates of income from fiscal sources for the 1960-1990 period. I am also indebted to staff members of the INSEE, INED and ENS libraries for their help regarding data gathering from the census archives.

Contents

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Contents | 3 |
| 1 Introduction and research question | 5 |
| 2 Household structures in France (1856-2014) | 7 |
| 2.1 Methodological considerations and literature review | 7 |
| 2.1.1 Laslett and the methodology of the history of the household | 7 |
| 2.1.2 Review of the existing literature | 8 |
| 2.1.3 Todd and Le Bras' contribution on household structures | 10 |
| 2.2 Data on households from the French censuses and family statistics | 12 |
| 2.2.1 General considerations on historical French census data | 12 |
| 2.2.2 Overview of the main methodological principles (1856-2014) | 13 |
| 2.2.3 The French family statistics | 15 |
| 2.3 Building consistent time series series on household structures | 16 |
| 2.3.1 Demographic time series | 16 |
| 2.3.2 Mean household size | 20 |
| 2.3.3 Indicators for household complexity | 22 |
| 3 Analysis of electoral results in France (1968-2012) | 30 |
| 3.1 Literature review | 30 |
| 3.1.1 Electoral geography and ecological analysis | 30 |
| 3.1.2 Income, education and political cleavages | 32 |
| 3.1.3 Prevailing household structures and localised electoral preferences | 34 |
| 3.2 Analysis using data at the departmental level (1968-2012) | 37 |
| 3.2.1 Data | 37 |
| 3.2.2 Specifications | 38 |
| 3.2.3 Results | 39 |
| 3.3 Analysis using data at the municipal level (2002 and 2012) | 46 |
| 3.3.1 Data | 46 |
| 3.3.2 Specifications | 47 |
| 3.3.3 Results | 47 |
| 4 Conclusion | 67 |
| References | 68 |
| A Appendices | 72 |
| A.1 French census methodology 1856-2014 | 72 |
| A.2 Census results: sources | 73 |
| A.2.1 Available databases | 73 |
| A.2.2 List of printed volumes of the census results used as sources | 74 |
| A.3 Historical demographic series: Additional figures and maps | 77 |
| A.3.1 Households | 77 |
| A.3.2 Legal and present population | 79 |
| A.3.3 Population counted separately | 81 |
| A.3.4 Age groups | 86 |
| A.3.5 Servants | 89 |
| A.3.6 Marital status | 95 |
| A.3.7 Mean household size | 101 |
| A.3.8 Single households | 108 |
| A.4 Household complexity in the 1962 to 1990 census results | 111 |
| A.5 Indicators for household complexity | 121 |
| A.5.1 Adults per household (APH) | 121 |
| A.5.2 Marital units per household (MUH) | 129 |
| A.5.3 Correlations between variables of household complexity, 1962 to 1990 | 134 |
| A.6 Census and voting data at the departmental level (1968-2012) | 137 |
| A.6.1 Census data used for electoral analysis | 137 |

| | | |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| A.6.2 | Electoral results at the departmental level (1968-2012) | 137 |
| A.7 | Results at the departmental level: cross-sectional regressions (1968-2012) | 146 |
| A.7.1 | Without controls | 146 |
| A.7.2 | With control variables | 159 |
| A.8 | Results at the departmental level: panel regressions (1968-2012) | 172 |
| A.9 | Data at the municipal level (2002 and 2012) | 182 |
| A.10 | Results at the municipal level: cross-sectional regressions (2002 and 2012) | 207 |
| A.10.1 | Household structures | 207 |
| A.10.2 | Marriage, income and education | 238 |
| List of Figures | | 269 |
| List of Tables | | 275 |

1 Introduction and research question

Investigating complex household structures has been a popular field of study for social scientists at least since the French sociologist Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882) developed a theory of a relationship between family structures and general social attitudes in France. In particular, he introduced the famous, though highly controversial, concept of the stem-family, in which one of the sons stays in his parents' home after marriage, thus creating a situation of intergenerational cohabitation favourable to integral land property transmission. Le Play's evolutionist theories were later dismissed as ideological and flawed by serious methodological deficiencies, in particular by historians from the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, including Peter Laslett, who developed a systematic analytical framework for studying household structures in the 1960s. This framework was subsequently adopted for the study of the intertwined relationship between household structures, attitudes towards inheritance sharing and rural land property type in historical metropolitan France, which became increasingly fashionable from the 1960s to the 1980s. Following a wave of monographs as well as quantitative works on France produced during this period, the historical and geographical extent of complex household and family structures, i.e. household structures in which several couples or several generations of adults of the same family were cohabiting, was established on more solid bases.

Based on this academic literature, an original theory of a persisting influence of complex family structures on contemporary social attitudes, and in particular on voting outcomes, was introduced by [Le Bras and Todd](#) in 1981. They argued that these variables were of greater importance for the voting attitudes and the political cleavage than standard socio-economic indicators such as income level or educational attainment. Their analytical work, which they further developed in subsequent books, was based on a large set of maps presenting different variables per *département*, including the share of complex households. This methodological approach, which favoured suggestive narratives over the use of systematic empirical analysis, has drawn substantial criticism for its lack of robustness and its strong essentialism. However, there has been to this day few attempts to examine empirically the validity of their theory with quantitative econometric methods. Indeed, given the availability of historical census results containing data on household structures, as well as standardised data on voting outcomes, an empirical test of these arguments appears to be today implementable.

Standard academic research on the dimensions of the political cleavage in France has rather highlighted the relevance of economic and socio-demographic variables such as religion, age, education level, occupational categories, income and wealth for explaining voting attitudes. Most of the existing evidence has relied on post-electoral surveys, whose limited number of observations does not allow for exploring in detail the distribution of such variables. Beyond testing the theory of a relation between household structures and voting attitudes, our contribution to standard electoral analysis is therefore to make use of data at the municipal level for the recent past, namely about 36,000 data points for each election available since 2002. Even though this approach presents substantial limits due to the well-documented ecological fallacy, it brings complementary information to that obtained through usual post-electoral surveys and allows to explore the dimensions of the political cleavage observable at an aggregated level.

The purpose of the present study is thus to investigate whether the theory of a relevance for voting attitudes of household structures relative to standard socio-economic categories can be substantiated with historical data for contemporary France, using consistent time series from the 20th Century and standard econometric tools.

A first issue relates to the availability of time series on household structures. Since the mid-19th Century, French censuses have included data on the number of households, the number of married men and women, as well as figures on the average number of children per family per *département*. From 1901 on, the *Statistiques des familles*, followed by the *Enquêtes Familles* after 1954, have provided more detailed data on French families' characteristics. However, definitions in use have varied considerably from one census to another along with the evolution of the very notion of family, which complicates the historical characterisation of local territories according to a prevalent household structure. Our first contribution is therefore to build a consistent database spanning the 1856-2014 period by means of census data at the departmental level, using digitised sources as well as archives of *Statistique Générale de France* available at the libraries of INSEE,

INED and École Normale Supérieure. We restrict ourselves to metropolitan France due to the lack of available data for overseas territories. Using indicators for complex households first developed by [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#), we provide evidence of a persisting heterogeneity in family structures between French *départements* in the 19th and 20th Centuries.

In a second step, we take advantage of the collected data on household structures to investigate a potential correlation with voting outcomes, contrasting the results obtained with regressions on standard socio-economic variables, with the use of aggregated data for local territories in metropolitan France. Unfortunately, this study had to be restricted to the period 1968-2012 because electoral results have not been collected in a consistent manner at a local level for elections taking place before 1958, and census data series have been properly digitised only starting with the 1968 census. We thus focus in the first instance on the 1968-2012 period for which consistent time series on voting results at the departmental level for legislative elections are available thanks to the *Centre de données socio-politiques* (CDSP). Secondly, we take advantage of detailed data on voting outcomes at the municipal level for the first round of the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections to further examine whether household and family structures matter for contemporary political cleavages. Beyond the use of a newly constructed dataset, our contribution is to make use of standard econometric tools allowing us to test the potential impact of observable household structures on voting attitudes, controlling for other socio-demographic characteristics. We do not find meaningful effects of prevailing household structures on the voting results neither at the departmental level nor at the municipal level, and we suspect that a wealth effect or a religious effect lies behind the few significant results found, as we were not able to control for these two variables. We contrast these findings by documenting the high significance of average income level per adult and educational attainment for the political cleavage at the municipal level in France in the recent past.

The rest of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 examines historical statistical data on household structures in modern France (1856-2014), presents original time series based on newly collected historical census data, and discusses the relevance of several indicators for the characterisation of household structures. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on the relationship between households structures, socio-economic context and political cleavages, and presents empirical analyses based on historical census data and electoral results at the departmental level (1968-2012) and at the municipal level for the very recent past (2002-2012). Section 4 concludes.

2 Household structures in France (1856-2014)

In order to be able to examine whether household structures correlate with voting outcomes and property structures, a first step is to document the diversity of the existing household structures in France in the 19th-20th Centuries as well as their evolution over time. After general methodological considerations and a review of the existing literature (Section 2.1), we present the methodology and limits for historical research of the available family statistics and data from the French censuses implemented by the *Statistique Générale de la France* and INSEE (Section 2.2). We subsequently present an original database spanning the 1856-2014 period using census data at the departmental level, which documents the evolution of the heterogeneity in household structures in France in the 19th-20th Centuries (Section 2.3).

2.1 Methodological considerations and literature review

2.1.1 Laslett and the methodology of the history of the household

Founded in 1964, the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure developed a reference framework for the systematic study of the household, which served as a basis for a large part of the subsequent academic literature. As exposed in Laslett (1972), their starting point was a strong rejection of the pervasive evolutionist theories of the family. The paramount example of such theories was in France the schematic view of Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882), which had portrayed three stages of the history of the family, initially "patriarchal" (keeping all married sons in the household), then "stem" (keeping only one designed heir son in the household), and finally "unstable" (growing and shrinking with marriages and deaths). Strongly marked by conservative ideological foundations, his theory postulated an universal historical development scheme going from complex, numerous households to what has come to be called the nuclear family. Laslett (1972) denounced this theory as a "matter of ideology" (p.73), which did not correspond to:

a system of norms and ideals present in the minds of the men and the women of the past who actually made the decisions giving their domestic group structures their characteristics forms. It has existed rather in the heads of the social scientists themselves. It came into being, and has been nurtured by a wish to be able to believe in a doctrine of familial history [...] (p.73)

On the contrary, Laslett (1972) defines a *null hypothesis in the history of the family*:

the null hypothesis in the history of the family [...] is that the present state of evidence forces us to assume that its organization was always and invariably nuclear unless the contrary can be proven [...] (p.xi)

Laslett defined his object of study as "a group of persons living together, a household, what we shall call a coresident domestic group" (p.1). This ensured that comparisons were possible over time and across regions and countries, as soon as the composition of the coresident domestic group was defined in a systematic way. Given this definition, the crucial issue at stake for the historian of household and family structures confronted with listings or census data is the following:

All we have is some knowledge of the law and custom of our chosen areas and a few documents left behind by a handful of the myriads of communities which have consisted of such domestic groups. These documents consist of lists of inhabitants, and the task is to exploit them in such a way that the exactest comparisons can be made. For this purpose it is essential to lay down who is to be included in the coresident domestic group and who excluded from it. [...] If faced with the challenge to answer the question what exactly is meant here by the terms family and household the only appropriate response would be an appeal to the past persons who created that evidence. (p.24)

For Laslett, past lists of inhabitants had defined coresident domestic groups using three types of criteria: (1) a *locational criterion*, i.e. having a commonplace of residence; (2) a *functional criterion*, i.e. sharing a number of activities; (3) a *kinship criterion*, i.e. blood or marriage relations. He underlined that the third criterion has always been problematic, as servants, visitors,

boarders and lodgers may have been assigned to a domestic group without meeting the kinship criterion. Before the introduction of modern standardised census processes, the persons in charge of establishing the lists of inhabitants always had to use such criteria to establish lists of domestic groups - and there remained room for interpretation, which implied a variability across regions and time. This explains Laslett's emphasis on careful examination of the definition explicitly or implicitly used by the persons which have established lists of inhabitants in the past. In order to systematise this examination, he built a methodical descriptive typology presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Structure of households, classificatory table by Laslett (1972)

| Category | Class |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| 1. Solitaries | (a) Widowed |
| | (b) Single, or of unknown marital status |
| 2. No family | (a) Coresident siblings |
| | (b) Coresident relatives of other kinds |
| | (c) Persons not evidently related |
| 3. Simple family households | (a) Married couples alone |
| | (b) Married couples with child(ren) |
| | (c) Widowers with child(ren) |
| | (d) Widows with child(ren) |
| 4. Extended family households | (a) Extended upwards |
| | (b) Extended downwards |
| | (c) Extended laterally |
| | (d) Combinations of 4a-4c |
| 5. Multiple family households | (a) Secondary unit(s) up |
| | (b) Secondary unit(s) down |
| | (c) Units all on one level |
| | (d) <i>Frères</i> (siblings) |
| | (e) Other multiple families |
| 6. Indeterminate | - |
| For each class, distinction between households with and without servants | |

Source: [Laslett \(1972\)](#), p.31

This classificatory table introduced a noteworthy distinction between *extended family households*, which consists of "a conjugal family unit with the addition of one or more relatives other than offspring" ([Laslett \(1972\)](#), p.29) and *multiple family households*, which are "all forms of domestic group which include two or more conjugal family units connected by kinship or y marriage" ([Laslett \(1972\)](#), p.30). Moreover, each class of households can be duplicated according to the presence or not of servants. In the classification, stem families can be understood as either (5b), (5b)+(5a) or (5b)+(5a)+(4a). In the rest of our study, we will strive to follow this classification and define complex households as (4)+(5).

2.1.2 Review of the existing literature

As reported by [Adams \(1979\)](#), the empirical academic literature on the household structures in France in the 19th-20th Centuries was initially divided between (1) detailed parish monographs based on a quantitative use of parish and civil registers; and (2) regional and national studies covering the 19th Century using official statistics from the *Bureau de la Statistique Générale*, with a focus on very general social developments. An example of a study of type (1) was [Segalen \(1985\)](#) for a group of municipalities in Brittany in the 18th,19th and 20th Centuries. Detailed statistics on the prevailing household types were presented for the municipality of Saint-Jean-Trolimon for the period 1800-1975, including mean household size (Table 9, p.72) and times series on the evolution of the share of the five main household structures according to Laslett's classification (Table 10, p.74). An example of a study of type (2) was [Corbin \(1975/1998\)](#), whose comprehensive socio-historical study of Limousin asserted a strong cohesiveness of family communities by presenting in a unique table (p.279) the number of households made of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and more than 6 individuals for the three *départements* of Corrèze, Creuse and Haute-Vienne in 1861.

Regarding the more specific topic of the quantitative evolution of household types, the first and to this date the most comprehensive systematic study using census data was provided by [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#), which investigated the existence of complex households in rural France in the second half of the 19th Century. They used the French census data at the departmental level for 1856, 1876 and 1901, restricting their analysis to the 67 least urbanized *départements*, as they expected complex households to persist only in rural, agricultural households. They also used the 1962 census data to confirm the persistence of regional disparities. They started with a vindication of the construction of alternative indicators to mean household size:

Because fertility varies greatly from region to region within France and because number of children helps determine household size, we cannot use household size to indicate complexity. A region with mostly nuclear households and large numbers of children could appear the same as a region with stem families and fewer children. Hence, we have chosen two indices of complexity, both of which exclude children. (p.157)

Their first indicator for measuring complexity in household structures is the **average number of adults aged more than 20 per household** (noted **APH**): figures higher than 2.0 are interpreted as evidence of more complex household structures than strict nuclear families. They find for 1876 figures ranging from 2.25 to 3.14. Their second indicator is the **average number of marital units per household**, i.e. the number of married, widowed and divorced men, widowed and divorced women, divided by the number of households (noted **MUH**): figures higher than 1.0 are interpreted as evidence of more complex household structures than strict nuclear families. In 1876, they find figures ranging from 0.95 to 1.29. They reckon that the inclusion of servants in the household definition of the French censuses could bias these indicators, but dismiss them as being negligible. They argue in particular that in the rural *départements* they considered, two-third of servants were younger than 20 and thus not different from households' children. Comparing their results with 1962 census data on the proportion of households containing a secondary family, ascendants or descendants, they find a high, positive correlation, which they interpret as a confirmation of the relevance of their indicators APH and MUH for quantifying the existence of complex families. They then examine Le Play's claims over regional family types. They firstly underline that although Le Play theorised distinctively stem families and patriarchal families, he was often liable to refer indifferently to either term for characterising non-nuclear regions. As a result, the authors conclude that their indicators are adequate measures of households complexity but should be used with caution for distinguishing between stem and patriarchal families. They nevertheless argue that MUH can be used as a proxy for the presence of stem families (several marital units in the same household) while APH reflects more the presence of patriarchal families (families with unmarried adult children and unmarried siblings). Finally, the authors investigate potential correlations between their indicators of household complexity and several other variables. They find a positive correlation between household complexity and landholding, long-term leasing of land, significance of agriculture in the *département* and illiteracy.

As [Adams \(1979\)](#) pointed out, Parish and Schwartz' major limitation pertains to the use of data at the *département* level.

The problem is that by depending almost exclusively on the departmental data, they unavoidably fall into the ecological fallacy. Each department combined within its boundaries groups with divergent characteristics. In vain do Parish and Schwartz exclude twenty urban departments because of their "heterogeneity." Every department contained at least one major urban center, and to that extent at least was heterogeneous. But urbanization is not the only consideration. As the regional monographs of Armengaud, Dupeux, et alia demonstrate forcefully, every department, rural as well as urban, contained an awesome heterogeneity of different social classes, different geographic zones with distinctive economic structures, and even different linguistic and ethnic cultures. These factors defined local and regional demographic zones, which existed within and cut across departmental boundaries. No matter how clever and technically sophisticated, ecological regression simply can not disaggregate statistical tendencies that cancel out each other. [...] [T]hey swamp social realities in totals that cancel out opposite tendencies, leaving the false illusion of a rural France that was culturally homogeneous and unchanging. (pp.117-118)

To overcome this issue, Adams (1979) suggests the use of *archives départementales* to investigate census archives at a smaller level than the *département*:

[...] any departmental data that appear in a printed volume of the Statistique generale were first gathered at the communal level, then aggregated by stages, first cantons (though this stage was occasionally skipped), then arrondissements, and finally departments. (p.124)

Unfortunately, the framework of our study did not allow us to implement such a method, notably due to a lack of resources and time. We will therefore follow Parish and Schwartz for the use of data at the departmental level, bearing in mind Adams' critique of a likely underestimation of the actual level of heterogeneity in household structures. In fact, Parish and Schwartz' seminal work gave rise to new monographs which used their indicators for studying household structures in local territories, for example Lehning (1992) for the *département* of Loire. However, there has been to our knowledge no attempt to systematically reproduce their results for other census years; this is the purpose of subsequent sections.

2.1.3 Todd and Le Bras' contribution on household structures

Emmanuel Todd and Hervé Le Bras stand out for their contribution since the 1980s to the theory of household structures in France. We review in this section their methodological approach and data regarding historical household structures (see section 3.1 for a review of their hypothesis of an influence of household structures on social attitudes and in particular on voting outcomes).

In order to characterise household structures prevailing in the different French regions, Le Bras and Todd (1981/2012) presented different maps for selected variables and years. They did not present times series, which was consistent with their claim of a persistence of anthropological attitudes over history: in their view, signs of a given social structure in the 1850s or in the 1930s were equally significant for characterising a locality. In fact, they mostly used data from the 1975 census results. The number of families per household was used to characterise complex households. In order to differentiate between complex household types, they used average marriage age and the rate of single adults. These variables led them to define three family types (p.33):

- The nuclear family, prevailing in Normandie, Champagne, Lorraine, Bourgogne
- Complex households without marriage control, prevailing in South-Western France, Provence, Nord
- Complex households without marriage control, prevailing in Brittany, Southern *Massif Central*, Savoy, Alsace

This typology rejected Le Play's claim over a significant difference between patriarchal and stem families:

Ce qui compte est donc moins l'opposition de la famille patriarcale et de la famille souche, que celle de la famille patriarcale, institution souple, laxiste dans le domaine du mariage, d'une part, et d'une *variété* de systèmes familiaux - dont la famille souche et la famille bretonne - permettant le *retardement* du mariage et imposant une certaine discipline aux individus d'autre part. (p.32)

They admitted that such differences in household structures were only observable in rural areas, while urban households appeared to be quite homogeneous through the national territory. However, they claimed (p.34) that the observable rural household structures were in a sense symptoms of kinship patterns which were maintained even in urban areas, though they were not observable for statisticians as there was no cohabitation. The authors derived this classification from a few maps presenting variables by *département*. The following list of examples illustrates the absence of systematic time series:

- Share of the agricultural households with more than one family in 1975 (p.113)
- *Départements* with the highest share of nuclear households in 1975 (p.119)
- Share of agricultural households in which a couple cohabits with an ascendant in 1975 (p.121)

- *Départements* with an average marriage age higher than 26 / lower than 26 in 1955 (p.134)
- Share of unmarried women aged 15 to 45 in 1830 and 1901 (p.142)
- Share of childless households after 25 years of marriage in 1906 (p.308)

A narrative approach was also implemented in [Todd \(1983\)](#), which proposed a classification at the world level, occasionally using selected statistics for illustration purposes. [Todd \(2011\)](#) was a general synthesis incorporating results from many monographs, which brought a methodical classification of family structures at the world level; however, there was no systematic quantification of the presented household forms.

Regarding France, [Le Bras \(1986\)](#) provided more orderly evidence on the historical evolution of household structures than was the case in [Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#). In particular, Hervé Le Bras presented six maps showing the average number of adults per household in the French *départements* in 1856, 1891, 1911, 1936, 1954 and 1975 (p.117), and a map of the share of households with more than one nuclear family in 1982 (p.104). He commented on these maps by stressing the spectacular progression of the nuclear family between 1856 and 1911: at the beginning of the 20th Century, complex family structures were said to persist only in poor, "archaic" regions. Then, a stability was noted from 1911 to 1954, which Le Bras interpreted as the effect of efficient birth control. Finally, he affirmed that complex households have disappeared in 1982, as only *Gers* had a ratio of adults per household higher than 2.25. This narrative contrasts with the stress by [Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#) on the persistence of complex household structures, and explicitly rejects its conclusions on political attitudes (p.120).

Finally, [Le Bras and Todd \(2013\)](#) put less emphasis on complex family structures, acknowledging their loss of significance since the 1980s. Using data at the municipal level from the 1999 census, they presented (p.41) a map of France with the share of households with more than one couple in 1999, highlighting the persisting specificity of South-Western France (where this share is close to 2%) with respect to North-Western France (where this share is close to 0.5%). They equally presented a map of the share of individuals aged more than 80 which cohabit with at least an additional individual other than their spouse. They summarised their classification in a map presenting ten different family types (p.55), partially based on [Todd \(2011\)](#). No historical evolution of household structures was provided, excepting a table presenting the correlation between family complexity and share of non-marital births between 1911 and 2009.

2.2 Data on households from the French censuses and family statistics

2.2.1 General considerations on historical French census data

As pointed out by [Laslett \(1972\)](#), historical national censuses have to be studied as historical documents not exempt from methodological issues:

[...] it must not be assumed that once national censuses are available, problems of deciding who was and who was not a member of a family or household are no longer troublesome. Definitions change so often from census to census in the same country, and census-takers in the past were sometimes so inefficient, that all statements about differences between the sizes of household at succeeding census dates have to be made with caution [...] (p.28)

Hence, in order to take advantage of these statistical sources, we first have to look into the methodology employed for their construction, as recommended by [Laslett \(1972\)](#) (see Section 2.1). The first modern census took place in 1801 and was repeated on a quinquennial basis until 1946. The 1851 census was the first to be implemented with "a scientific character" ([Godinot \(2005\)](#), Chapter A, p.5). In particular, this was the first year in which detailed individual questions were asked, such as age; it was also the first census for which the number of households per *département* was estimated. The 1856 census introduced the household form, which considerably improved the precision of the data collected. As claimed in [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#):

[...] the 1856 census was the first true French census, for it abandoned the practice of using estimates based on vital statistics and established a single day as the effective day of the census. (p.156)

We will thus consider census data starting with the 1856 census. In fact, the quality of French census data improved progressively over time, as statisticians from the *Statistique Générale de la France* corrected flaws in the census design. This means that there are still substantial remaining inaccuracies in the census results from the 19th Century and the early 20th Century. For instance, the age-distribution data for the censuses of the years 1870s and 1880s was described by [Adams \(1979\)](#) as "surprisingly inaccurate - a demographer's quagmire" (p.127). [Bienfait \(1968\)](#) has established the unreliability of census data for Lyon over the 1911-1936 period, as Lyon's population was overstated by 58,000 to 120,000 inhabitants with egregious manipulations by municipal employees in charge of the census. [Van de Walle \(1974\)](#) has identified inaccurate data in the historical census results from *Statistique Générale de la France* and proposed methods to correct these inaccuracies for the women population. Even though these challenges appear to be non-negligible, census data results remain the best available consistent estimates with a large geographical coverage and over a long time period for demographic variables. In addition to this, the methodology employed did not change much between 1856 and 1946, as we shall present below.

The sources for our study are the following. Firstly, census results at the departmental level for the years 1851 to 1921 have been partially digitised in the 1980s by a French-American research team from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR, Ann Arbor, Michigan). They were subsequently treated by INSEE and Centre de recherches historiques which provide free access to the resulting Excel tables on their respective websites. However, due to the incompleteness of these tables for specific census years, as well as some inconsistencies for some variables, we had to use the printed volumes of the census results for further data collection and data checking. Moreover, there does not exist a digitised version of the census results for the years 1926 to 1954; the digitised data for the 1962 census presents serious data deficiencies. Hence, we relied exclusively on printed volumes of the census results for the years 1926 to 1962 to collect data at the departmental level. Most census results were available either at the library of the *École Normale Supérieure*, INSEE or INED. Regarding the most recent historical census data, INSEE has developed consistent, standardised series at the municipal and departmental levels for the period 1968-2014 which are freely available online. We also used more detailed tables at the municipal and departmental levels containing a wide range of socio-demographic variables from census results of this period available from INSEE on request. Finally, for some specific variables (such as the number of domestic servants), we completed these series with data available either at the library of the *École Normale Supérieure*, INSEE or INED. Further details on the availability of historical census results and a list of the printed volumes used for the present study are provided in Appendix A2.

2.2.2 Overview of the main methodological principles (1856-2014)

For the 1856-1946 period, the sources presenting the census methodology are the ex-ante guidelines contained in executive decrees, listed by [Legiard \(1966\)](#), as well as descriptions of these guidelines included in the printed volumes of the census results. In particular, the 1901 and the 1946 printed volumes of the census results presented a detailed account of the evolution of the methodology in use. From 1856 to 1946, the general methodological principles remained unchanged. After the creation of INSEE in 1946, documents presenting the methodology became more comprehensive and were systematically included the documents produced with the census results. The methodology became slightly more complex and experienced some variations with respect to the previous censuses.

Firstly, the **definition of households** was stable from 1856 to 1946 but experienced noticeable changes thereafter. It was defined in [Statistique de la France \(1859\)](#) as the married and non-married individuals, with or without children, living in a distinct dwelling (p.xxiiij). The guidelines insisted on the fact that an individual living alone in a distinct dwelling was a household, and that servants were to be included in the household. This definition was repeated for each census with some slightly different expressions: in [Statistique de la France \(1883\)](#), a household was said to be any individual or group of individuals living in a distinct dwelling (p.xxxv); in [Statistique de la France \(1894\)](#), a household was the collection of several individuals living together under the direction of the same head. [Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes \(1907\)](#) precised that a family could form several households, in a castle for example; the household was defined by the existence of a household head, who was legally in charge of the payment of taxes (p.13). In 1954, the definition changed with the introduction of the distinction between *ordinary households* and *collective households*. Collective households were hospitals, boarding schools and large hotels, which had been in previous censuses included in institutions counted separately (see below): as a result, the figures consistent with the previous censuses were the number of ordinary households. However, [INSEE \(1956\)](#) precised that the methodology had slightly changed (p.7): it became impossible to consider that several households cohabited in the same dwelling (for example, a young couple living with the parents, or lodgers taking their meals separately). This change was said to leave less room for arbitrariness in case of cohabitation of several family nucleus; with respect to the previous definition, it led to a decrease in the number of household which represented a break in the series. Moreover, [INSEE \(1960\)](#) also introduced the notion of *main place of residence*, which corresponded to the number of ordinary households minus the number of mobile homes. The number of mobile homes being relatively low, the difference between ordinary households and main places of residences was quite small. In 1962, figures were also provided for both concepts of ordinary households and main place of residence. The standardised figures we use for the census 1968 to 2014 only provide the number of main places of residence: there is exactly the same number of households, as households are defined as group of individuals living in the same dwelling corresponding to their main place of residence ([Godinot \(2005\)](#)). To sum up, Table 2 presents the household definitions we use as a basis of our analysis. Although the definitional changes occurring in 1954 imply a methodological break in our series on the number of households, we have at our disposal consistent series for the 1856-1946 and the 1954-2014 periods. Moreover, this definitional change led to a slight decrease in the number of households with respect to the previous definition; thus, if we expect the number of adults per household to decrease over time, this methodological change only leads to a small underestimation of the actual historical decreasing trend.

Table 2: Household definitions, 1856 to 2014 censuses

| Census years | Available variables | Variable adopted |
|--------------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 1856 to 1946 | (A) Household | (A) |
| 1954 | (B) Ordinary household | (C) |
| | (C) Main place of residence | |
| 1962 | (B) Ordinary household | (C) |
| | (C) Main place of residence | |
| 1968 to 2014 | (C) Main place of residence | (C) |

Sources: 1856 to 1962 census results and [Godinot \(2005\)](#)

The definition of the **population counted separately** presents furthermore an interest for our analysis of household structures. Indeed, individuals living in institutions such as boarding schools, religious communities, hospitals, prisons, military quarters were always counted separately over the 1856-1946 period. They were included in the present and the legal population, which means that the reported number of individuals of each age group included them. However, we should not take them into account when computing ratios over the number of households because they would drive them up artificially, while not representing *per se* household structures. The exact definition varied slightly from one census to another but always included the following categories of populations: individuals in hospitals, prisons and boarding schools, military personnel living in military quarters, members of religious communities and charitable institutions. Census results reckoned the existence of double counting and measurement errors for this population, which were partially corrected for from 1906 on, in particular to exclude the personnel of these institutions which had also been counted in the municipal population. Here again, 1954 represented a definitional change. According to [INSEE \(1956\)](#), the 1954 census classified members of religious communities and retirement homes among the municipal population under the denomination of *communities*, while they had previously been classified among the population counted separately. This corresponded to a decrease in the population counted separately, which resulted in an increase in the mean household size (excluding population counting separately). Moreover, [INSEE \(1960\)](#) presented figures for the population of the main places of residences and for the total population: the difference between these two measures corresponded to the population outside of the main places of residence. In the 1962 census, a new approach was developed to prevent double counts: as reported in [INSEE \(1964a\)](#) (p.7), some population groups of the population counted separately were reattached to the municipal population of the municipality in which they held a personal residence. This concerned the military, individuals temporarily in hospitals, school boarders and workers of temporary public works. This new approach explicitly introduced a break in the population series with respect to previous censuses (p.10). The 1968 to 2014 standardised series do not present an explicit figure for population counted separately, which can simply be defined as the difference between municipal population and population of the main places of residence for consistency with the earlier censuses. Finally, the age structure of the population counted separately was never reported in the census results; for the censuses 1856 to 1954, the share of school boarders can be used as a very crude proxy for the share of the population counted separately aged less than 20. From 1962 to 2014, only boarders without personal residence (orphans for example) are included in the population counted separately, as other under-age individuals of the population counted separately are reattached to a personal residence in the municipal population. To sum up, Table 3 presents the definitions of the population counted separately we use as a basis of our analysis.

Table 3: Population counted separately, definitions, 1856 to 2014 censuses

| Census years | Available variables | Variable adopted |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| 1856 to 1946 | (A) Population counted separately (standard consistent definition over the period) | (A) |
| 1954 | (B) Population counted separately (without members of the religious communities and retirement homes) (C) Total population (including double counts) minus population of the main places of residence | (B) |
| 1962 | (B) Population counted separately (without members of the religious communities and retirement homes) (D) Residual population counted separately not double counted in another municipality (E) Total population (without double counts) minus population of the main places of residence | (E) |
| 1968 to 2014 | (E) Total population (without double counts) minus population of the main places of residence | (E) |

Sources: 1856 to 1962 census results and [Godinot \(2005\)](#)

A third issue relates to the definition of households concerns the treatment of **domestic servants**. As mentioned above, they are included in the household as soon as they live with their employer, in all censuses from 1856 to 2014. This does not pose any issue if we are strictly interested in the evolution of the household structures to which they belong undoubtedly in case they cohabit with their employers. However, the importance of servants has decreased during our period of study, in particular in rural areas. In order to disentangle the decrease in household complexity induced by this fall in the number of domestic servants from the decrease in household complexity induced by a fall in intergenerational or multiple-family cohabitation, we study in appendix more precisely the evolution of the number of domestic servants. In this respect, we are not convinced by the assertion by [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#) that "The problem of servants in the household, then, seems negligible" (p.158), arguing that domestic servants were not so numerous and that the heterogeneity between *départements* was not significant. Unfortunately, data on domestic servants is of relatively low quality and subject to substantial definitional changes, as presented in Appendix A1. We thus implemented several adjustments, in particular to make the data prior to 1896 consistent with the definition in use from 1896 to 1936 (see Appendix A3).

More details on the methodology employed in the historical French censuses are also provided in Appendix A1.

2.2.3 The French family statistics

The historical family statistics present additional issues compared to the methodological changes experienced by census data collection over time exposed in the previous section. The main purpose of *Statistique des familles* and *Enquêtes Famille* has been to provide reliable estimates for fertility and number of children, as presented in [Bée \(2017\)](#), and they were not primarily designed to examine household and family structures in detail. This subsection presents the main related issues, which explain our focus on census results.

Statistique générale de France has published volumes presenting statistics on families based on census data since 1886, which were called *Statistique des familles* from 1886 to 1946. The definition of a family was quite stable during this period. [Statistique de la France \(1888\)](#) stated that the number of families was equal to the number of married men, widowed men, divorced men and widowed women (p.121). This definition was in use from 1886 to 1896, and then from 1906 to 1926. In 1901, the question on the number of children was asked to all household heads ([Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes \(1904\)](#), pp.1-2), making the comparison with other census results problematic. In 1931, families were defined as the number of married women, widowed women, divorced women and widowed men ([Statistique générale de la France \(1939\)](#), pp.5-6). In 1936 and 1946, the previous definition of families as the number of married men, widowed men, divorced men and widowed women was used again. For each of these years, families were classified according to the number of children; for some years these were defined as the number of legitimate children ever born alive, for other years as the number of legitimate children still alive. In 1946 these statistics were only provided for the married women. In addition to this substantial volatility in the definitions in use, the family statistics were always flawed by a high non-response rate. As highlighted by [Vincent \(1946\)](#) and presented in [INSEE \(1953\)](#), there was a persistent ambiguity for the question on the number of surviving children, which led many families without children to give no answer instead of answering "zero child" (p.xiii).

[Henry \(1953\)](#) exposed clearly the main limits of these pre-World War II French family statistics, which led to the creation of specific surveys on a restricted sample of women called *Enquêtes Famille* since 1954. [Bée \(2017\)](#) provides a clear presentation of these sources. In 1954 and 1975, a sample of married, divorced and widowed women was surveyed. In 1982 and 1990, a sample of women aged 18 to 60 was surveyed. In 1999 and 2011, a sample of men and women aged more than 18 was surveyed. Therefore, *Enquêtes Familles* appear to be a less reliable source for the construction of consistent historical time series on family structures than the census results themselves. Given the limited character of the data, we will not make use of these statistics in the present study.

2.3 Building consistent time series series on household structures

2.3.1 Demographic time series

This subsection presents and comments on the main demographic time series constructed using historical census results. Additional graphs and tables of descriptive statistics at the departmental level can be found in Appendix A3.

A first observation is that the total number of **households** increased by c. 40% from 1856 to 1946, though there were two periods of decrease: firstly between 1866 and 1872 due to the Franco-Prussian war and the associated loss of the Alsace-Lorraine, and secondly between 1936 and 1946 due to World War II, in particular following large outflows of foreign households from France as mentioned by [Casevitz \(1947\)](#). In spite of World War I, the absolute number of households increased from 1911 to 1921, as Alsace-Lorraine was French again. From 1954 to 2014, the number of households doubled: this steady increase is related both to faster population growth and to an increase in single households.

Secondly, we collected data on the **population counted separately**. As previously exposed in Table 3, definitions changed between 1946 and 1954, and between 1954 and 1962. There was no report on the population counted separately for the census years 1861 and 1866. The irregular character of this time series reflects the evolution of military enrolment as well as trends in the number of school boarders and prisoners. Although the share of the population counted separately remained in the same order of magnitude (between 2% and 3.5%) at the national level over our period of interest, it presented substantial variability at the departmental level. For instance, it ranged from 0.91% in *Creuse* to 10.94% in *Belfort* in 1891, and from 1.05% in *Corse* to 7.75% in *Var* in 1954. Tables, figures and maps on the population counted separately, including series on the share of school boarders in the population counted separately for the 1856-1954 period, can be found in Appendix A3.

Data on the **number of individuals aged more than 20** are required for computing the APH ratio as defined by [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#). This share increased slowly from 64% to 66% between 1856 and 1911, then jumped to 68% in 1921 following the deaths and the birth deficit of World War I, and reached 70% in 1954. It then decreased to reach a trough of 66% in 1968 due to the baby-boom, and then increased steadily from 66% to 76% between 1968 and 2014, due to population ageing and lower birth rate. We also computed the share of individuals aged more than 60 in the population, as an increasing share of older individuals is a factor which can favour multi-generational cohabitation. This share has increased continuously from 10% in 1856 to 14% in 1931, 18% in 1962 and 25% in 2014. Corresponding descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A3.

Data on **servants** at the departmental level were available from 1861 to 1982, though with substantial changes in methodology, as exposed above in Table 13. To build consistent historical series, we applied the 1896-1936 definition for the 1861-1881 period, i.e. we subtracted part of the servants from agriculture, industry, commerce and transport from the total. We did not use data from the 1886 and 1891 census results as methodological changes were unevenly respected in different regions, which led to unreliable figures according to subsequent printed volumes of census results. We also corrected the figures for 1954 for consistency with the definition adopted for 1962-1982. Tables, figures and maps on servants, including more details on the corrections applied for the 1861-1891 period, can be found in Appendix A3.

Data on **marital status** were consistently available throughout the period for the population aged 15 and more. From 1856 to 1881, census results presented for each *département* the share of married, widowed, and single men and women. Following the law of 27 July 1884 (so-called *loi Naquet*) on divorce, censuses taking place after 1886 also collected the number of divorced men and women. Figure 1 and Figure 2 present the evolution of the share of men and women by marital status over the period of interest. Over the entire period, most individuals are married. The share of widowed individuals is approximately twice higher for women than for men, reflecting the structural positive average age gap between spouses as well as a higher life expectancy for


women. The number of widowed women increased and the number of married women decreased in the aftermath of both World Wars. Divorced individuals represented a negligible share of the total until the 1970s and their share has increased notably thereafter. The number of single individuals has increased considerably at the end of the period; however, one should keep in mind these statistics report on the legal marital status and not on living together as a couple. Therefore, they do not take into consideration the increase in non-married couples, and in particular the *Civil Solidarity Pacts* (PACS) which was created in 1999. INSEE (2017) estimated that there were in 2015 four civil solidarity pacts contracted for five marriages; contracting a PACS does not change the marital status of the individuals concerned, which remain singles according to the law. Thus, in the late 20th Century and in the early 21st Century, a substantial share of the individuals which appear as singles in the statistics are non-married couple and thus not singles strictly speaking. Buisson and Lapinte (2013) estimated with 2011 data that only 73% of the couples were married; 4% had contracted a PACS and 23% were living together as a couple without marriage nor PACS.

Moreover, a reduction in heterogeneity between *départements* is observed over the period, as presented in Figure 4 and Figure 4. Paris, where the low share of married men and women has diverged from the rest of France since the 1970s, stands out as the only exception to the general convergence towards the median value. This corresponds both to an increase in the actual share of individuals living alone as well as an increase in non-married couples.

To conclude on marital status, it is noteworthy to stress that the share of single households and the share of single individuals are not *a priori* correlated. The former is a measure of household structures, indicating whether individuals live alone or with other adults or children. The latter is a measure of marital status, which indicates whether individuals get married or not. As a result, there may be areas with a high share of single households and a low share of single individuals in case there are many widowed and divorced individuals living alone, or if there are married individuals living separately from their spouse (for instance if the spouse lives abroad). There may be areas with a low share of single households and a high share of single individuals in case many unmarried children live with their parents and if there are many non-married couples. In the study of the effect of household structures on the vote presented below in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, marital status is thus controlled for.


Appendix A3 presents additional figures and tables on historical demographic series.

Figure 1: Marital status of the women aged more than 15 in France (1856-2009)



Source: Census results


Figure 2: Marital status of men aged more than 15 in France (1856-2009)



Source: Census results


Note: 1906 census results did not distinguished between widowed and divorced. 2014 census results only distinguished between married and non-married.

Figure 3: Married women as a share of the female population aged more than 15, by *département* (1856-2014)



Source: Census results

Figure 4: Married men as a share of the male population aged more than 15, by *département* (1856-2014)



Source: Census results

2.3.2 Mean household size


Using the census data presented above, we present the mean household size for France in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Domestic servants, dwellers in institutions, as well as *inmates* (occasional visitors, boarders, lodgers) are included in the census lists and therefore can drive up the mean household size. The ratio of the number of residents divided by the number of households is thus a *crude mean household size* (A). The mean household size (B) is the total population minus the population counted separately, divided by the number of households. The mean household size excluding servants (C) excludes population counted separately and servants, and is thus the closer measure to a mean family size. Laslett (1972) reckons that "[...] only in exceptional circumstances does it turn out that these differing ratios make much difference to the figure for the mean size of the domestic group" (p.39). For all measures (A), (B) and (C), a clear decreasing trend is observed throughout the period, with a pause in the 1950s-1960s due to the baby-boom. While mean household size was progressively reduced from approximately 3.8 in 1856 to 3.1 in 1946, it experienced a much more rapid reduction in the second half of the 20th Century to reach about 2.2 individuals per household in 2014. We cannot determine whether the increase observed between 1946 and 1954 is entirely due to the change in methodology or also to real demographic changes (fertility increase, more intergenerational cohabitation due to a higher life expectancy). As might have been expected, excluding population counted separately decreases the mean household size (by about 0.1 to 0.2 individuals per household on average), though it does not change the general trend observed at the national level. At the departmental level however, this has more impact for *départements* such as Var or Belfort, in which the military population changed from a census to another.

A mean household size excluding servants is also presented. Indeed, we observed that servants represented a significant part of the household population at the end of the 19th Century. However, excluding servants does not change the trend at the national level for the 1856-1946 period, i.e. the reduction in mean household size can unquestionably be interpreted as a simplification of family structures rather than a decrease in the number of non-family members counted within the household.

To conclude, the spectacular reduction in mean household size observed from 1968 to 2014 is related to the reduction in fertility and the increase in the share of single households. This decrease in mean household size from 1856 to 2014 is observed in all French *départements*. A striking feature is the reduction in the heterogeneity between *départements* over the period, which is confirmed by the decrease in the standard-error over time.

Additional material on mean household size is provided in Appendix A3 (in particular, maps of mean household size over the period).


Figure 5: Mean household size in France (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is number of main places of residence.

Figure 6: Mean household size in France (1954-2014)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is number of main places of residence. Definitions adopted for the population counted separately, for the total population and for servants are detailed in Section 2.2.2.

2.3.3 Indicators for household complexity


We follow Parish and Schwartz (1972) and compute two indicators of households complexity over the 1856-2014 period: (1) the average number of adults aged more than 20 per household (noted APH) and (2) the average number of marital units per household (noted MUH). Contrary to Parish and Schwartz (1972), we use data for all *départements*, including urban ones.

The evolution of the **average number of adults aged more than 20 per household (APH)** is presented for France in Figure 7 and Figure 8 over the period 1856-2014. Crude APH (A) is the total number of adults aged more than 20 divided by the number of households. As there are individuals aged more than 20 belonging to the population counted separately, which are not part of ordinary households, it results in a high ratio in *départements* with many institutions and military quarters, such as Territoire de Belfort or Var; although this issue was not explicitly considered in Parish and Schwartz (1972), it seems to be the case that crude APH (A) is not precisely characterising the actual household structures. As a result, we construct a second ratio which excludes the adult population belonging to population counted separately. We have unfortunately no data on the age structure of the population counted separately; as presented in Appendix A5 (Figure 52 and Table 10), school boarders represented from 22% to 48% of the total population counted separately, with considerable variations over the period and in each *département* (for example, figures for 1856 ranged from 3.0% to 92.8%). To deal with this uncertainty on the age structure of the population counted separately, we present bounds, making assumptions for the share of individuals aged more than 20 in the population counted separately. APH (B) is thus given for different assumptions (namely 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%).

From Figure 7 and Figure 8, we can reasonably conclude that the average number of adults has steadily decreased over the period, firstly from around 2.4 adults to 2.1 adults per household between 1856 and 1946, and then much more rapidly from 2.1 to 1.7 adults per household between 1954 and 2014. This can reflect several underlying developments. As reported in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the share of married individuals has decreased since the mid-20th Century, while the share of single and divorced individuals has increased. There has also been an increase in the share of single households, i.e. households made up of one individual, since 1968 (see Appendix A.3.8). Moreover, the number of servants has sharply decreased from 1900 to the post-World War II period (see Appendix A.3.5). From the tentative analysis presented in Appendix A5, we conclude that this decrease in the number of servants does not account for a significant share of the decrease in APH before World War II. This conclusion is robust to different assumptions on the age structure of the servants counted within households. Finally, a third explanation for the decreasing APH over the period is a decrease in intergenerational cohabitation, i.e. a progressive disappearance of complex household structures. We investigate this argument below by presenting a second indicator for household complexity (MUH), and then by using available data on complex households for the census years 1962 to 1990.

There has been a considerable reduction in heterogeneity of the APH ratio between *départements* over time, with the notable exception of Paris (*Seine département* before 1968), which has remained persistently below all other territories. Figure 9 and Figure 10 present the average number of adults per household by *département* from 1856 to 2014, using the conservative assumption that 75% of the population counted separately was aged more than 20 in all censuses. We add lines for the (unweighted) percentiles p10, p25, p75 and p90, in order to show graphically the convergence towards a homogeneous ratio in quasi all *départements* by the early 21st Century. Moreover, the geography of the highest APH ratio remained quite stable from 1856 to the 1980s: South-Western *départements* such as Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Gers, Cantal, Tarn-et-Garonne, Ariège and Lot are always in the top decile of APH, while the Parisian Basin appears to be the region with the lowest APH. Alsace and Corsica equally display a high APH ratio over the entire period. This geography experienced a substantial change at the end of the 20th Century, as APH becomes inferior to 2.0 in all *départements*. Indeed, *Île de France* (excluding Paris) becomes the region with the highest APH, which might be related to the high number of families in this region relative to the rest of France, which brings APH closer to 2.0. Throughout the period studied, Paris stands out with an APH ratio well below the average. Maps and tables presenting more detail on the distribution of the APH ratio can be found in Appendix A5.


Figure 7: Average number of adults per household in France (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is total number of households.


Figure 8: Average number of adults per household in France (1954-2014)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is number of main places of residence.


Figure 9: Average number of adults per household by *départements* (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Note: Assumption for the share of the population counted separately aged more than 20: 75%. Definition adopted for the denominator is total number of households.

Figure 10: Average number of adults per household by *départements* (1954-2014)




Source: Census results

Note: Assumption for the share of the population counted separately aged more than 20: 75%. Definition adopted for the denominator is number of main places of residence.

The evolution of the **average number of marital units per household (MUH)** is presented for France in Figure 11 and Figure 12 over the period 1856-2009. We present two alternative MUH: MUH1 uses married men to count married couples, while MUH2 uses married women to count married couples. Both measures are very close, except in 1946, due to the high number of married men serving abroad which were not properly censused. In the 1960s and 1970s, MUH2 is always slightly lower than MUH1: this might be the effect of the arrival of married immigrants living in France without their spouse, which was particularly the case for migrants from Portugal according to [Borrel and Tavan \(2004\)](#). For simplicity we keep only the MUH2 in the following tables and graphs. The overall pattern differs from the one of APH presented above. Before 1954, there is a relative stability between 1.0 and 1.04, except in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war in the 1870s: there is no evidence of a decrease in MUH. This can be interpreted as the stability of the standard model of the nuclear family (on average, an household contains only one couple). After 1954, the decrease in MUH is quite substantial from 1.06 in 1954 to 0.74 in 2009, and constant from one census year to another, which can be related to the increase in single individuals presented above. As we cannot distinguish between non-married couples and singles, a share of the decrease might simply be a statistical artefact, corresponding to a substitution between non-married couples and married ones.

Exactly as was the case with APH, we observe a considerable reduction in heterogeneity of this MUH ratio between *départements* over time, with the notable exception of Paris (Seine *département* before 1968), which remains persistently below all other territories. Figure 13 and Figure 14 present the evolution of MUH by *département* for our period of interest. The decrease in the standard-error only takes place after World War II. The geography of the highest MUH is similar to the one of the highest APH until World War II: South-Western *départements* such as Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Gers, Corrèze, Tarn-et-Garonne, Tarn and Lot are always in the top decile of MUH. However, the region with the lowest MUH is not the Parisian Basin, but rather Northern Brittany and Normandy, as well as Lorraine and Franche-Comté. Moreover, contrary to APH, South-Western *départements* cited above remain in 2009 the ones with the highest MUH, and *Île de France* (excluding Paris) does not present a specifically high MUH in the recent past. As was the case with APH, Paris (the Seine *département* before 1968) stands out as the *département* with an MUH ratio well below the average throughout the period studied. Corresponding maps and tables can be found in Appendix A5.


Figure 11: Average number of marital units per household in France (1856-1954)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is total number of households.


Figure 12: Average number of marital units per household in France (1954-2009)



Source: Census results

Note: Figures for the number of widowed and divorced men and women were not available for 2014. Definition adopted for the denominator is number of main places of residence.


Figure 13: Average number of marital units per household by *départements* (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Note: Marital units defined as the sum of married women, widowed men and women, divorced men and women. Definitions adopted for the number of households is total number of households.

Figure 14: Average number of marital units per household by *départements* (1954-2009)



Source: Census results

Note: Marital units defined as the sum of married women, widowed men and women, divorced men and women. Definitions adopted for the number of households is number of main places of residence.

Finally, the relevance of the APH and MUH ratios can be tested for the 1962-1990 using census data on specific forms of household complexity which were presented for each *département* during this period. [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#) presented this data in the following terms:

For the first time in France, the 1962 census presents data not only on the number of households, but also on the number of secondary families, ascendants, descendants, and other kin in the household. It is, thus, possible to check whether our two indexes do indeed measure household complexity. In the census, primary and secondary families are distinguished by whether the family head is also the household head. A family is either (1) a couple and any unmarried children aged less than 25 or (2) one person with at least one unmarried child under 25. Hence, a family is composed of at least two persons. Other household members, considered "isolates" rather than parts of families, are classified according to their link to the household head. Ninety percent of these are adults aged 25 or over. "Ascendants" are single parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents. "Descendants" are unmarried children over 25, married children without spouse, or grandchildren without parent or spouse. "Other kin" are any kin outside the preceding two categories, most likely unmarried brothers. (p.159)

Maps and figures presenting these variables can be found in Appendix A.4. Between 1962 to 1990, there is a clear decreasing trend for each of these variables, reflecting a fall in intergenerational cohabitation. Indeed, the average number of secondary families decreased from about 4 for 100 households in 1962 to about 1 for 100 households in 1982. The number of other kin and ascendants experienced a similar decrease from 1962 to 1990. The number of adult descendants also decreased over time, though the fall between 1982 and 1990 was also partly due to changes in methodology for counting adult children cohabiting with their parents.

Following [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#), which implemented this test for the census year 1962 (for rural *départements* only), we present cross-correlation tables for our indicators of household complexity and these specific variables for household complexity, using all *départements*, from 1962 to 1990. Tables can be found in Appendix A.5.3. As might have been expected, APH and MUH are very strongly correlated for all census years (0.82 to 0.88) and are both negatively correlated with the share of single households (-0.56 to -0.69). We confirm [Parish and Schwartz's](#) finding that APH is more highly correlated with the prevalence of cohabiting descendants and other kin than MUH. [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#) interpretation was the following:

[...] families with many adults per household are more likely to contain unmarried siblings and unmarried children over 25, or to occur in areas where more people never marry or marry late. (p.160)

According to [Parish and Schwartz \(1972\)](#), regions with a high APH ratio could thus be described as presenting *patriarchal* families, i.e. families in which many unmarried adult individuals remain part of a household led by a family head. Moreover, they interpreted the high correlation between ascendants and secondary families as a sign that both variables revealed a similar social fact, the cohabitation between two married couples:

most secondary families occur in stem family situations with the secondary family usually the son and daughter-in-law of the parent family. This would occur as follows: Parents are considered ascendants only if the parent's spouse and unmarried children are absent. Otherwise, parents are considered part of a primary or secondary family. Quite probably, until one spouse dies, the father is considered the household head, the parent couple being the primary family, and a married child the secondary family. Or the father may almost always remain household head; the widowed mother may be counted as ascendant while her son is elevated to household head. In either event, if secondary families and ascendants are but different stages in the same stem family cycle, then they should appear in the same departement(p.160) (...)

Finally, the weakening of the correlation between MUH/APH and variables of household complexity observed in 1990 suggest that caution should be exercised on the use of APH/MUH indicators for characterising household structures in the most recent periods. Further research would be needed to check the existence of a correlation in the recent census results, which would require the use of individual data that we did not consider in the present study. Due to the sharp decrease in

complex household structures over the course of the 20th Century, such ratios may have lost in relevance for the present censuses and may rather indicate young-age cohabitation or be simply related to the prevalence of marriage.

To conclude this section, the collected data appear to confirm that MUH and APH are relevant variables for characterising complex household structures in France. We provided evidence of a steady decrease in complex household forms in France from the 19th to the 21st Century. An important level of heterogeneity can be observed historically even at the departmental level, with South-Western France standing out as the region where complex household forms had the highest prevalence in the past, even though there has been a general convergence towards the mean value over the last 40 years.

3 Analysis of electoral results in France (1968-2012)

Having documented the evolution of household structures in France in the 19th-20th Centuries in Section 2, we turn to the investigation of the potential correlation between these and voting outcomes, as compared to the influence of education and income, using aggregated data for local territories. Unfortunately, as voting outcomes have not been collected in a consistent manner before the 1958 elections, and that census results have been properly digitised only after the 1968 census, the present study had to be restricted to the period 1968-2012 for which both voting outcomes and data for control variables were available. We start by reviewing the existing literature on electoral geography in France (Section 3.1), then present an econometric analysis at the departmental level for the legislative elections of the 1968-2012 period (Section 3.2), and finally implement a similar analysis at the municipal level for the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections (Section 3.3).

3.1 Literature review

3.1.1 Electoral geography and ecological analysis

Electoral geography in France

The seminal work by [Siegfried](#) (1913/1995) on voting outcomes in Western France in the Third Republic inaugurated the emergence of electoral geography in France, as reported by [Denni and Bréchon](#) (1985). Siegfried was indeed the first to investigate the persistence of voting outcomes over time with the use of statistical analysis. He assumed that electoral results in a given constituency were an accurate reflection of political preferences and values of the constituents. Moreover, he attempted to explain the observed geographical distribution of voting outcomes with social variables such as land property structure, population density and religiosity. To this extent, he was a pioneer in what became known as the *ecological analysis*. Many regional monographs were subsequently produced, including another study by Siegfried himself on *Ardèche* ([Siegfried](#), 1949). This second study proposed a type of analysis very close to his previous work on Western France and stressed not only the influence on political attitudes of religion and social classes, but also that of geographical factors such as the opposition between mountain and plain constituencies. Other works of this early literature include for instance the analysis of the Northern French Alps provided by [Hugonnier](#) (1954) or of *Bouches-du-Rhône* by [Olivesi and Roncayolo](#) (1961). [Goguel](#) (1951) was unique in providing a study covering the entire national territory and many historical elections. Due to the high number of small political parties and independent candidates in the Third Republic, his major contribution was to carefully code the elected representatives by political affiliation (right, left and extreme-left). He then presented commented maps of French electoral results by *départements*. This contrasted with the approach of most political historians such as René Rémond, which paid relatively little attention to geographical factors in their analysis of the political cleavage in France. For example, in his seminal work on the right-wing parties in France ([Rémond](#), 1954), only four pages with very general considerations out of 300 were devoted to a *géographie de la droite* (pp.242-245), though these notes were developed in a subsequent edition of the same work ([Rémond](#), 1982).

Over the second half of the 20th Century, electoral geography became increasingly overshadowed by sheer sociological analysis at the national level, as reported by [Sainty](#) (2014). Indeed, the modern academic literature on electoral results in France appears to be mostly focused on the impact of sociological categories such as employment sector, age or education, on individual voting choices. The disregard of many political scientists for geographical factors has theoretical underpinnings, notably the influence of economic theories of the vote such as [Downs](#) (1957), presenting the voter as a consumer maximising a utility function while the political parties strategically decide on political propositions to maximise their expected votes. It has also a practical rationale, in particular due to the absence of localised post-electoral surveys in France, thus favouring analyses with nationally representative samples. This is typically the case in reference comprehensive studies such as [Gaxie](#) (1985). The study of rural political attitudes appears to be the only subfield of political sociology which remained persistently attached to ecological analysis. For example, [Klatzmann](#) (1958) presented a descriptive study of the 1956 legislative elections results in rural *cantons*. [Derivry and Dogan](#) (1971) and [Derivry](#) (1972) pointed out religiosity as the main explanatory variable for voting attitudes in rural France in the 1956 to 1968 legislative elections, using census data and

data on religious observance from Fernand Boulard. [Brustein \(1988\)](#) stands out for his historical works on the social origins of political regionalism in France, using data ranging from 1849 to 1981. He developed a structural theory of modes of production, which stressed the underlying economic rationality of voting choices. Modes of production were described as shaping the local social structures which in turn determine voters' rational interests. Therefore, he accounted for voting attitudes by describing settlement forms, property types, land concentration and relation to national markets. He concluded that religious observance and voting results were both consequences of local modes of production.

Starting in the 1980s, electoral geography was revived in France by geographers with three volumes directed by [Lacoste \(1986\)](#), which in a sense provided a modern equivalent to [Siegfried \(1995\)](#) for each of the French administrative *régions*. They focused on recent electoral results of the Fifth Republic, with a resolutely interdisciplinary approach refusing any deterministic analysis of local territories. However, they did not attempt to summarise their results for the entire national territory and adopted a quite narrow historical period of study. Geographers such as [Bussi \(1998\)](#) or [Rivière et al. \(2012\)](#) have subsequently provided studies of electoral geography with a similar stress on very recent history.

More recently, [Goux and Maurin \(2004\)](#) have used voting results at the municipal level, which they associated to census data on socio-demographic characteristics of the local population, to analyse electoral results. The interest of this work reside in the use of fine-grained occupational categories available in the census results, which allow more precise conclusions on voting attitudes by social groups than post-electoral surveys. In particular, they provide striking graphs showing the vote for right-wing parties according to quartiles of the share of occupational categories in the municipality. In a subsequent work, [Goux and Maurin \(2005\)](#) use the *canton* level to implement a simple OLS analysis of the vote in the Maastricht referendum. We will use these two articles as a model for our own analysis of electoral results, bearing in mind the methodological issues posed by such ecological approach.

Ecological analysis of electoral results: methodology and challenges

[Denni and Bréchon \(1985\)](#) listed the main challenges posed by the ecological analysis of electoral results. Firstly, political outcomes need to be classified into categories such as right, left, extreme-right, or extreme-left which can prove challenging for some elections for which many candidates come up with unclear political labels, as was the case in France in the Third Republic. Moreover, even though the use of data at the departmental level appears to be inevitable when working with historical series, it poses challenges in terms of artificial homogenisation of local differences, and may lead to insignificant results as opposing trends cancel each other out. Finally, one should of course remain extremely cautious of potential causal interpretations for observed correlations between some voting outcomes and socio-demographic variables, and strive to explicit the assumed mechanism driving the correlation. This is all the more important as a correlation at the local level may not be observed when looking at individual data. This issue of *ecological fallacy* was famously pointed out by [Robinson \(1950\)](#), and his conclusions were quite clear:

The relation between ecological and individual correlations which is discussed in this paper provides a definite answer as to whether ecological correlations can validly be used as substitutes for individual correlations. They cannot. While it is theoretically possible for the two to be equal, the conditions under which this can happen are far removed from those ordinarily encountered in data. From a practical standpoint, therefore, the only reasonable assumption is that an ecological correlation is almost certainly not equal to its corresponding individual correlation. [...] The purpose of this paper will have been accomplished [...] if it prevents the future computation of meaningless correlations and stimulates the study of similar problems with the use of meaningful correlations between the properties of individuals. (p.357)

Given this strong, negative assessment of ecological studies, it would have been interesting to look into localised individual survey data to test the hypothesis of a relationship between household structures and voting outcomes at the individual level. However, this does not mean that looking for correlations between household structures and voting outcomes at an aggregate level is meaningless.

Indeed, as we expect the presence of complex household structures to be a feature of a more general social environment, we are not primarily interested in concluding on individual causality, but rather on the influence of the social context on voting outcomes. In other words, our goal is not to make inferences about the electoral behaviour of individuals conditional on their own, individual experience of household structures: we would like to explore electoral behaviours of social groups which evolve in a similar social context (the presence or the absence of many complex households). As developed by [Goodman \(1959\)](#) in response to Robinson's article,

It has been shown that ecological correlations cannot be used as substitutes for individual correlations. However, ecological correlations may be of interest in themselves (p.611)

Regarding the more specific area of electoral analysis, [Johnston et al. \(1988\)](#) provided similar arguments in favour of ecological electoral studies, based on evidence for Great-Britain:

there is very substantial spatial variation in voting patterns that cannot be accounted for by spatial variations in the composition of the population [...] Thus people in the same compositional category but socialised in different contexts (or places) may become part of very different local cultures, with consequences for their political attitudes and voting habit (p.308)

To sum up, the ecological analysis of electoral results appears to be a valid method as long as there is no straightforward inference of the aggregated relations on the individuals. As pointed out by [Bussi \(1998\)](#), observing a high vote for the extreme-right in municipalities with a high share of individuals of foreign nationality does not automatically mean that these individuals of foreign nationality tend to vote more for the extreme-right. It means that voters living in a social context with a high share of individuals of foreign nationality tend to vote more for the extreme-right, which is a statement of interest impossible to test with standard post-electoral surveys. The same goes for the tested assumption of a correlation between household structures and voting outcomes.

3.1.2 Income, education and political cleavages

[Lipset and Rokkan \(1967\)](#) first developed a systematic theory of the dimensions of the political cleavage in Western democracies. They identified four dimensions varying according to the period and the country: centre vs. periphery; workers vs. employers/owners; agriculture vs. industry; state vs. religious authorities. Their key contribution was to underline the multidimensionality of the political cleavage: there are different potential coalitions of interests as voters are never fully aligned with a party on all dimensions of the political cleavage.

Regarding **income and wealth**, the seminal work by [Lipset \(1960\)](#) stressed the overarching significance of income for the political cleavage before the 1960s:

The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issues; they favor more welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated income taxes, support of trade-unions, and so forth. (p.92)

However, [Clark and Lipset \(1991\)](#) acknowledged the decreasing relevance of the concept of social stratification for explaining vote in the late 20th Century, as traditional hierarchies had lost in significance. Investigating this decline in the French case, [Cautrès and Mayer \(2004\)](#) affirm that income has nowadays less significance for predicting the vote than the occupational category or the diploma. Furthermore, [Mayer \(2007\)](#) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on class voting, stressing the lack of robustness of many analyses depending on the measure used (occupational categories, education, subjective class). She uses post-electoral survey data from 1978 to 2002 national French elections and concludes on a weakening of the link between vote for the left and workers. Although occupational categories matter for the vote, they represent general trends rather than a class voting as limits between such categories are highly porous. More recently, [Nadeau et al. \(2012\)](#) have provided a comprehensive analysis of the socio-demographic and socio-economic determinants of the vote in the French presidential elections from 1988 to 2007. For all elections, they report a positive correlation between vote for the centre-right and income, as well as a negative correlation between income and vote for the extreme-left. However, they

contend that wealth, and in particular the ownership of risky assets, is a better predictor of the vote for the right than the income level. Finally, [Piketty \(2018\)](#) presents a systematic analysis of post-electoral surveys for France for the period 1958-2017, which documents the existence of an income and wealth gradient of the vote. Regarding income, he finds no specific relationship up to the 10th decile of income; the top 10% according to the income distribution is however more likely to vote for the right:

If we look at the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile in France over the 1956-2017 period, we find that the curve is relatively flat within the bottom 90% of the income distribution: one needs to enter the group of top 10% incomes (and especially the top 5% and top 1% incomes) to see a significantly lower vote share for the left (p.19)

The implications for the present study are that income data at the departmental level would thus in all likelihood be too aggregated to detect income effects taking place only in the top 10%. However, the income distribution at the municipal level presents a substantial variance in France and allows therefore such a detailed inquiry. Regarding wealth, [Piketty](#) finds a strong relationship between wealth level and vote for the right:

If we look at the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile (rather than by income percentile), then we find a much steeper curve: the percentage of left-wing vote is systematically much higher in lower wealth deciles than among voters in the middle of the distribution, and much higher in the middle than among top 10% wealth holders [...]. These findings also show how critical it is to have information about wealth and asset ownership (and not only about income) in order to analyze political cleavages.

Unfortunately for the present study, we were not able to collect systematic local data on the wealth level of the resident population and we will not be able to control by the wealth dimension to analyse voting outcomes.

Regarding education, [Bornschieur \(2010\)](#) has pointed out the emergence of a new dimension of the political conflict linked to the rise in higher education: the opposition between "libertarian-universalistic" values and "traditionalist-communitarian" values. He contends that this new dimension explains the rise of populist parties in Western Europe in the late 20th Century. [Inglehart and Norris \(2016\)](#) provided further evidence that the rise of populist parties is more related to progressive value change (the adherence to which is itself highly correlated with higher education) than classic economic redistribution issues. For France, [Mayer \(2007\)](#) concluded that the vote for the extreme-right was significantly correlated with a lower educational background. Her conclusions are supported by [Nadeau et al. \(2012\)](#), which stress that voters with the higher education level tend to support more the centre-right or the centre-left, and to shun the extreme-right. Moreover, they contend that this cleavage has been increasing over time, and interpret this as evidence of the emergence of a new ideological cleavage as was the case in [Bornschieur \(2010\)](#). More recently, [Piketty \(2018\)](#) has also studied the difference between the share of university graduates voting for the left and the share of non-university graduates voting for the left, as well as the vote by educational attainment (primary degrees, secondary degrees, university degrees). He concludes on a reversal of the education cleavage over this period:

At the beginning of the period, i.e. in the 1950s-1960s, the more educated voters systematically vote more for the right: the higher the education level, the higher the right-wing vote. At the end of the period, i.e. in the 2000s-2010s, I observe the complete opposite pattern: the higher the education level, the higher the left-wing vote. This complete reversal takes place in a gradual manner over more than half a century and appears to be extremely robust. (p.16)

A last well-established dimension of the political cleavage in France appears to be religiosity. This was stressed in the pioneer studies by [Siegfried \(1913/1995\)](#) or [Rémond \(1954\)](#). [Michelat and Simon \(1977\)](#) is the reference study on the relevance of the religious cleavage for voting choices in modern France. They underlined a high positive correlation between being a regular catholic churchgoer and vote for the right, and conversely a positive correlation between atheism or agnosticism and vote for the extreme-left (communist party). More recently, [Nadeau et al. \(2012\)](#) have

confirmed the persisting relevance of religious observance for predicting vote for the right, though they underline that the effect is quasi-entirely driven by the vote for the centre-right rather than the right (including extreme-right) as a whole. [Piketty \(2018\)](#) also explores this dimension when analysing post-electoral survey data and concludes on the persistence of a strong effect of religion on voting patterns:

[...] even after controlling for all observable characteristics, practicing Catholics vote a lot more for the right, while Atheists (individuals who report no religion vote) a lot more for the left.[...] Although the magnitude of the impact has declined over time, it is still of the order of 10-20 points in recent years, i.e. comparable or higher than the effects associated to education, income or wealth. (pp.24-25)

Due to the lack of systematically available data at the local level on religious background and religious practices, we are not be able to consider this dimension in the present study. As a result, one should bear in mind that religion may play a role as an omitted variable in the results we subsequently observe.

3.1.3 Prevailing household structures and localised electoral preferences

The theory of a link between household structures and the vote is non-standard in the academic literature and remains to this date quite controversial. [MacFarlane \(1978\)](#) was one of the first to present the theory of an influence of household and family structures on political attitudes for England. His basic assertion was that individualistic family structures prevailing in England for centuries were unique in Europe and thus explained (along with associated social features) the specific political and economic development of the country in the 18th-19th Centuries.

if the family system pre-existed, rather than followed on industrialization, the causal link may have to be reversed, with industrialization as a consequence, rather than a cause, of the basic nature of the family (pp.270-271)

Though rejected by many critics such as [White and Vann \(1983\)](#) or [Delbos \(1980\)](#) for its lack of scientific, empirical underpinnings and its reliance on anecdotal evidence, this theory was introduced in France by [Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#), in what they called an *anthropological and political atlas*. Their claim, further developed subsequently in [Todd \(1983\)](#) for other countries, and also presented in [Le Bras and Todd \(2013\)](#), was that the heterogeneous prevalence of complex household structures in France corresponded to an anthropological diversity in France which had an influence of political attitudes. They summarised this as follows:

[...] la simple constance dans le temps du vote des diverses régions de France suggère l'existence d'une dimension anthropologique du phénomène politique. Il est effectivement facile d'établir, par l'intermédiaire de la cartographie, un rapport entre l'orientation politique des régions françaises et leurs systèmes de parenté. (p.25)

This statement illustrates the strong, controversial assumption used by these authors: if there is a persistence of preferences (as expressed by voting outcomes) over a given territory over time, this can only be attributed to their *anthropological type*, which is a synonym for kinship system. For example, they claim (p.134) that the regions with the highest marriage age in 1955, the highest number of unmarried children in 1975 and the highest religious observance overlap perfectly with the vote for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the 1974 presidential elections, which is explained by a "local significance of the principle of authority". Moreover, they hold that each family system corresponds to a psychological type and an *affective style*. (p.27). To substantiate this assumption of a diversity of anthropological types, these authors present maps of the share of complex households in the French *départements*, taken from the 1975 census, as well as maps of the average marriage age by *département*, as mentioned above in Section 2.1.3. They oppose three family types (p.33):

- The nuclear family, prevailing in Normandie, Champagne, Lorraine, Bourgogne, which they associate to a psychological type of "independence and isolation"
- Complex households without marriage control, prevailing in South-Western France, Provence, Nord, which they associate with "a desire for community and dependence"

- Complex households without marriage control, prevailing in Brittany, Southern *Massif Central*, Savoy, Alsace, which they associate with a "net adherence to the principle of authority"

As already mentioned in Section 2.1.3, the authors claimed that observed modern rural household structures are symptoms of general kinship patterns which are maintained in urban areas and thus still weigh on social attitudes and thus on voting attitudes. In [Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#):

Ce qui lie solidement le système familial au système politique et religieux, c'est la notion d'autorité qui fonde l'un et l'autre. Différents types d'autorités produisent des modèles familiaux distincts et des choix politico-religieux divergents. Il y a là une relation simple et sans ambiguïté. (p.59)

Their hypothesis is that the nuclear family is associated to the right and the large households are associated to the left. The nuclear family is described as "weak" and thus incapable of resisting the domination by privileged socio-economic groups (p.41), while large kinship networks are favourable to a questioning of external domination in the left-wing regions. As an illustration, the authors claim that the vote for François Mitterand (left) in the second round of the 1974 presidential elections corresponds to regions of household type II, while the vote for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing corresponds to regions of household type I and III. In a more recent work based on the same approach, [Le Bras and Todd \(2013\)](#) claim in this vein that the electorate of François Hollande was composed of the *départements* with remaining complex household structures, because of prevailing values promoting mutual assistance which are transposed at the political level into a vote for the left. On the other hand, nuclear families of the Paris Basin are described as individualistic and thus favouring economically liberal political propositions.

A first issue with this theory is that the dimensions of the political cleavage in France are extremely simplified, with a focus on the principle of authority. It appears problematic to claim that the right/left opposition had the same meaning in 1881, in 1936 and in 2007. In fact, the presentation by the authors of a great variety of maps and socio-economic variables seems to attest that they implicitly reckon the existence of very different explanatory factors of the vote. Moreover, the deterministic characterisation of anthropological/family types associated to psychological traits is not substantiated in any manner whatsoever. The authors admit in [Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#) (p.91) that the maps used are selected illustrations of their theses. As highlighted by [Caveng \(2012\)](#), this is the major blind spot in [Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#): while family structures are used to explain most regional specificities for a wide range of social practices, there is no attempt to understand why family structures of a given type persist in some territories and not in others. As stated in [Le Bras and Todd \(2012\)](#):

[...] la famille n'est pas une variable seconde, déterminée par d'autres paramètres sociaux, plus fondamentaux. (p.29)

The only reference to the origin of family structures in [Le Bras and Todd \(2012\)](#) is the following passage (as highlighted by [Caveng \(2012\)](#)):

Il n'y a pas d'explication, mieux, de "cause", à l'existence des systèmes de parenté occitan, franc, breton ou lorrain. Chaque peuple doit avoir un système de parenté, régulateur des relations humaines fondamentales. Mais le choix de tel ou tel modèle tient à des idiosyncrasies originelles, dont l'apparition est aléatoire et dont les conséquences sont démesurées. (p.85)

As a result, they sometimes ignore the historical dimension of family structures and their evolution over time, qualifying all historical structures as *traditional*. For instance, they claim that the domination of feudal property structures in Western France was caused by an incapacity of nuclear households to resist to the nobility ([Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#), p.40). [Lagrange and Roché \(1988\)](#) have denounced this schematic determinism, which takes family types and domestic structures as an initial invariant local characteristic influencing both individuals' representations and voting attitudes over the entire course of history. Indeed, taking most geographical characteristics as historically invariant disregards the potential evolution of family structures over the course of history: this amounts to postulating that these have been stable *in the past* or *in the pre-industrial times*, i.e. that the family structures observed indifferently in 1890 or in 1850 or in 1975 (in rural areas) reflect the long-term stable *typical* family structures.

Moreover, a well-established stylized fact of the history of the family (Laslett, 1972) is that complex family structures (i.e. multiple family households and extended family households) have always been a small minority among the population in Western Europe, even in areas traditionally showcased as presenting those structures, such as Tuscany, Cévennes or Allier. As a result, even in those regions, the majority of the individuals never directly experienced more complex family structures than the nuclear family - which means that it proves problematic to assume that attitudes towards abstract values such as equality or authority were directly shaped by experiences in the family, and all the more to assume a persistence long after the initial complex household structures have become insignificant in the entire national territory. Admittedly, one could assume family forms to be a symptom of general social values prevalent in a given local territory, i.e. that observing even a small minority of original family forms can be interpreted as insightful information on specific local values and attitudes. In fact, Le Bras (1986) distances himself from essentialistic theories of the family and household structures: he stresses that family structures, inheritance customs and agricultural production systems (including rural property structures) form a system in which the causal interpretation of one specific factor is not to be distinguished. In this respect, he presents a rather old-fashioned theory of regional *tempéraments* (a term which was present in Goguel (1951)), in which family structures are only one aspect. In any case, a first step before interpreting the presence of such family forms as a symptom or a cause of prevailing values and attitudes, which can to some extent be reflected in voting outcomes, would be to firmly establish the existence of a significant empirical correlation between these family structures and voting outcomes.

To conclude, to this date, it seems that no academic research has attempted to test this theory to confirm or infirm it. Even though substantial flaws exist in Todd and Le Bras' theoretical approach and interpretations, we cannot reject *a priori* that there may exist a correlation between complex household structures and voting outcomes - an hypothesis we will examine and confront to the influence of education and income in the following sections for the recent history.

3.2 Analysis using data at the departmental level (1968-2012)

3.2.1 Data

The Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP) has collected data on French electoral results of the Fifth Republic (1958-2012). Based on initial data from the Ministry of the Interior, this unique database provides harmonised results with a consistent political coding of electoral lists, which facilitates the historical analyses. We use results from the first round of the legislative elections. Indeed, the institutional setting of the Fifth Republic makes presidential election results less reliable to infer general political preferences, as strategic voting appears to be a key element of the votes on the one hand, and as the personality of the candidates can have as much significance as their political stance on the other hand. Moreover, the frequent alliances between various political parties in the presidential elections would have made it more difficult to study separately votes cast for the extreme-left, the centre-left, the centre-right and the extreme-right. Some political parties (such as regionalists or hunters federations) have no clear positioning on the left-right traditional political axis: we have thus ignored them for the analysis. As a result, voting shares are computed excluding votes for such diverse parties. Our classification for each legislative elections of the political parties as available in the CDSP data by affiliation, as well as graphs and descriptive statistics on voting outcomes for the 11 legislative elections considered, can be found in Appendix A.6.2. It should be noted that we consider voting shares based on cast votes, and thus did not attempt to explore the determinants of the rate of abstention, which in fact varies a lot according to the local territories considered (see for instance the analysis by [Percheron et al. \(1987\)](#) opposing rural and urban areas, or more recently the model study by [Braconnier and Dormagen \(2007\)](#) on the logics of abstention in Seine-Saint-Denis).

Regarding data on household structures as well as other socio-demographic variables, consistent census results at the departmental level are easily available for the 1968-2014 period, as mentioned in Section 2.2. Unfortunately, data from the 1962 census are only partially available in the databases provided by INSEE, and data from the 1954 census have not been digitised. We shall therefore focus on the 1968-2012 period for which consistent and comprehensive data are at our disposal. Moreover, taking this time period simplifies the analysis as there was no change in departmental boundaries except the creation of the split of Corsica into two *départements* in 1976.

Over this period, censuses took place in 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999 and every year from 2006 on. Legislative elections took place in 1968, 1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012. We make use of weighted average of two successive census results to provide control variables for each election year. To be consistent, we apply this method to all election years, including for the first election year following a census year. For example, we compute a weighted average of the 1975 and 1982 census results for the 1978 elections. More precisely, the formula we use for the weight is simply derived from the number of years between the census and the election years: we weight more the census results closer to the election years. The general formula for the weights is the following, for an election year E taking place between a first census year $C1$ and a second census year $C2$: $\frac{C2-E}{C2-C1}$ for the census year 1 and $\frac{E-C1}{C2-C1}$ for the census year 2. For example, for the 1978 elections, we sum $4/7$ of the 1975 figure and $3/7$ of the 1982 figure). Appendix A.6.1 give explicit precisions on the census results used for each election considered.

Two different sources are used to control for the average income per adult per *département*. Firstly, for the period 1968-1990, we thank Florian Bonnet and Aurélie Sotura ("Computations of Departmental Distributions of Income: Methods for the Period 1960-2014", ongoing) for the provision of estimates of average income per adult (without capital gains) for the years 1960 to 1969 and 1986 to 1986. These estimates are based on data from the archives of the Ministry of Finance. We used linear extrapolations based on this data for the elections taking place in 1973, 1978 and 1981. Secondly, for the period 1990-2012, we used historical fiscal data from the French Ministry of Finance, which are available on request for the years 1990 to 2014. For 1993, the only data available were total net revenues of fiscal households. For 1997, we used total taxable income of all fiscal households (taxed and non-taxed). For 2002, 2007 and 2012, we considered total revenues of all fiscal households before tax. To make income level comparable across *départements* and over time, we computed the average income per adult as the ratio of total income on the number of adults aged more than 20 years old.

3.2.2 Specifications

We start by looking at potential correlations observable in cross-section, using simple OLS independently for each election year. We do not use weights as the sheer size of each *département* forces us to consider them only as ecological units, bringing us the same level of information whatever the number of individuals living in it. The very simple specification is the following:

$$y_{it} = \beta \cdot h_{it} + \theta \cdot X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

with i the *département*, t the year, y the voting outcome considered, h the variable of interest (household structures, income or education) and X a set of control variables (including income and education except when it is the variable of interest).

Due to the limited number of observations for each year (95 *départements*, as we consider Corsica as a whole throughout the period for consistency), results become insignificant as soon as too many control variables are introduced. Moreover, we cannot exclude the presence of omitted variables explaining both voting outcomes and the variables of interest. We turn thus to a linear panel specification which makes use of the time variation. Moreover, we expect individual effects to be correlated, as there remains omitted variables such as cultural determinants potentially common to several *départements*, and most importantly, average religious observance and practices, for which we did not find systematic, reliable data. As a result, we use a within/fixed-effect estimator (with robust standard errors), which does not require individual fixed effects to be correlated and amounts to controlling for individual unobserved characteristics. The basic specification of the within model is the following:

$$y_{it} - \bar{y}_i = \beta \cdot (h_{it} - \bar{h}_i) + \theta \cdot (X_{it} - \bar{X}_i) + (\epsilon_{it} - \bar{\epsilon}_i) \quad (2)$$

with i the *département*, t the year, y the voting outcome considered, h the variable of interest (household structures, income or education) and X a set of control variables (including income and education).

β is equal to the fixed-effect estimator resulting from an OLS regression of y_{it} on x_{it} and D individual *département* dummies:

$$y_{it} = \beta \cdot h_{it} + \theta \cdot X_{it} + \sum_{d=1}^D \gamma_d \cdot 1_{d=i} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

(2) and (3) are thus similar estimations.

We always use a standardised voting outcome to ensure comparability across years, i.e. y_{it} is defined for each political affiliation P as following:

$$y_{Pit} = \frac{s_{Pit} - \bar{s}_{Pt}}{\sigma_{s_{Pt}}}$$

with s_{Pit} the voting share obtained by P in the *département* i in the year t , \bar{s}_{Pt} the voting share obtained by P at the national level in the year t , and $\sigma_{s_{Pt}}$ the standard-deviation of the voting share obtained by P in the year t .

In addition to this, we test three different specifications, which differ in the definition of the variables of interest and the control variables:

- (A) For each variable are defined 5 dummies corresponding to the 5 quintiles of the variable distribution across *départements*; the effect is interpreted with respect to the third quintile (p40-p60).
- (B) *Départements* are ranked from 1 to 95 according to each variable, and the ranks are used in the regression; the effect is interpreted as the impact of gaining one rank in the variable distribution.
- (C) Standardised values (z -scores) are standardised to have zero as a mean and a standard-deviation of 1; the effect is interpreted as the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in the variable. This specification facilitates thus the comparison of the magnitude of the effects of different variables.

3.2.3 Results

We start by simple cross-sectional OLS for each year, to investigate the existence of a cross-sectional correlation between voting outcomes and complex household structures, income and education. The specification used is described above with equation (1). The variable of interest for household structures is either the number of marital units per household (*MUH*) or the number of adults per household, using the assumption of 75% of the population counted separately aged more than 20 (*APH*). The variable of interest for income is the average income (as reported to fiscal authorities by the fiscal households of the *département*) per adult, and the variable of interest for education is the share of university graduates. Detailed tables presenting the results are to be found in Appendix A.7.

3.2.3.A. Cross-sectional OLS

As a first step, we regress voting outcomes separately on indicators for household structures, average income and share of university graduates **without control variables**.

Firstly, we do not find any significant correlation between vote for the left and the **share of single households**, except for the 2002, 2007 and 2012 elections, for which we find a small positive correlation. For these three elections, we also observe a significant, negative correlation between vote for the extreme-right and the share of single households: the effect found is significant at the 1%-level in specifications (B) and (C). We do not find any significant, meaningful pattern for the vote for the centre-right, the centre-left or the extreme-left.

Regarding **complex household structures**, we find a significant, positive correlation between complex household structures and share of vote for the left for all elections from 1968 to 1988 for all specifications when using *MUH*, significant at the 1%-level in specifications (B) and (C). To give orders of magnitude, in 1968, a *département* in the 5th quantile according to the *MUH* ratio has on average a higher share of vote for the left of 0.7647 standard-deviations (significant at the 5%-level) (A); 10 more ranks in terms of *MUH* corresponds to a higher share of vote for the left of 0.139 standard-deviations (significant at the 1%-level) (B); an increase in 1 standard-deviation of the *MUH* ratio corresponds to a higher share of vote for the left of 0.3763 standard-deviations (significant at the 1%-level) (C). Results are of a similar order of magnitude for the elections taking place in 1973, 1978, 1981, 1986 and 1988. We also find a positive correlation between the vote the left and the *APH* ratio for these elections, though of smaller magnitude and only significant at the 5%- or at the 10%-levels. These results are mainly driven by the vote for parties of the centre-left: indeed, when decomposing the left between extreme-left and centre-left, we do not find a significant relationship for the extreme-left share of vote, while there is still a significant, positive relationship between the vote for the centre-left and *MUH* or *APH*. Hence, these first correlations appear to confirm the tested hypothesis of a positive relation between complex household structures and vote for the left for the period before 1990, even though this correlation appears to be entirely driven by the centre-left and not by the vote for extreme-left parties such as the communist party. Turning to the two components of the right, there is no significant pattern of correlation between the *APH* ratio and the vote for either the centre-right or the extreme-right, even though occasionally the coefficients are significantly negative for some elections before 1990. The *MUH* ratio is negatively correlated with the vote for the centre-right in all elections, although the regression coefficients appear to be significant at the 1%-level only for the years 1968, 1978 and 1981, in the (B) and (C) specifications. Finally, voting for the extreme-right does not present a uniform pattern in cross-section: we find a rather negative correlation between complex household structures and vote for the extreme-right at the beginning of the period and a rather positive correlation for the most recent elections.

Regarding average **income** per adult, we find significant, negative correlations with the vote for the left for the elections post-1986 although these correlations are often only significant at the 10%-level. We do not find significant results for the extreme-left except a positive correlation in 1968 and 1973, as the high-income *départements* were also those with the highest share of industrial workers back then. When looking at the vote for the centre-left, we find a negative correlation for the entire period, significant at the 5%-level for all years except 1993. Vote for the centre-right is significantly correlated with income only in the last two elections, for which the coefficients are positive and significant in the three specifications (A), (B) and (C) at the 5%-level. Although very probably driven by other variables at the departmental level, we report positive

correlations between average income per adult in the *département* and vote for the extreme-right for elections in 1986, 1988 and 1997. We do not comment on results for the 1968, 1973, 1978 and 1981 elections as vote for the extreme-right was inferior to 1% on average. The positive correlation between extreme-right and income in the 1980s-1990s is to be interpreted as the fact that for these elections, there was a higher share of vote for the extreme-right in *départements* with a higher average income. We should not infer any individual voting behaviour due to the ecological fallacy exposed above.

Regarding **education**, we do not find any meaningful correlation between the share of vote and the share of university graduates for the any of the considered political affiliations over the period.

To conclude, when looking at correlations without controls, we find some support for the theory of a greater significance of the complex household structures for voting attitudes than income or education. In particular, we find a significant positive correlation between vote for the left and complex household structures from the 1960s to the late 1980s. However, one should bear in mind that cross-sectional OLS on 95 observations is not a very robust estimation method, as there are undoubtedly omitted variables potentially driving the observed correlations.

The second step is consequently to introduce **standard control variables** to check whether the observed correlation between the share of vote for the left and in particular for the centre-left and the prevalence of complex household structures is robust. We use the following controls: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals. Detailed tables presenting the results can be found in Appendix A.7.

When controls are added, we find a significant, negative relationship between share of **single households** and vote for the left in specification (C), significant at the 1%-level for all elections between 1981 and 2007. However, there are no significant results for specifications (A) and (B). We checked that the results for (C) were robust to the exclusion of *Paris*. Moreover, we observe a significant, negative correlation between vote for the centre-left and the share of single households for all elections between 1978 and 2012, although coefficients are mostly only significant at the 5%-level and not in the three specifications except in 1986 and 1988. Conversely, we find a positive, significant relationship between vote for the centre-right and share of single households for all elections after 1978, although only in the (C) specification. Finally, we do not find any significant pattern for the vote for the extreme-left and the extreme-right.

Regarding **complex household structures**, be it for the left or for the centre-left, the coefficient for household structure turns insignificant in the specifications (A) for most years. To our surprise, the coefficients remain nevertheless significant and positive for the MUH ratio in the specification (C) from 1968 to 1993 and for the APH ratio in the specification (C) from 1978 to 1993. We checked the impact of the *département* of Paris and conclude that this outlier was not driving the observed correlation. Results are also positive and significant for the specification (B) for the MUH ratio from 1978 to 1993. Consistently, we find a similar pattern for the vote for the centre-left, and an inverse relationship for the vote for the centre-right. In particular, the negative correlation between vote for the centre-right and complex household structures for the specification (C) is observed from 1968 to 2002 for the MUH ratio and from 1978 to 1988 for the APH ratio. There are no significant results for the extreme-left or the extreme-right, except a significant positive relationship between MUH and vote for the extreme-right from 2002 to 2012.

Regarding **income**, the results indicate a clear negative, significant correlation between vote for the left and average income per adult in the specifications (B) and (C). The effect is large: in 1981 for example, an increase in one standard-deviation of the average income decreases the vote for the left by -1.0581 standard deviation. In 2007, an increase in one standard-deviation of the average income decreases by -1.7561 standard-deviations the vote for the left. When decomposing between centre-left and extreme-left, we also observe a negative relationship although results are much less significant. Conversely, we observe a significant, positive correlation between average income and vote for the centre-right in the years 1978, 1981, 2002, 2007 and 2012 in the specifications (B) and (C). For example, in 1978, an increase in one standard-deviation of the average income increases by 1.1852 standard-deviation the vote for the centre-right. In 2012, an increase

in one standard-deviation of the average income increases by 1.0188 standard-deviation the vote for the centre-right. There is no meaningful pattern for the relationship between the vote for the extreme-right and the average income, although we find a positive significant correlation for the 1988 and 1997 elections.

Regarding **education**, adding control does not result in finding meaningful correlations between the share of university graduates and the share of vote for the any of the considered political affiliations over the period. For the 2002-2012 however, we can observe a negative correlation significant at the 5%-level between the share of university graduates and the vote for the left in the (B) and (C) specifications, which is also observed for the centre-left considered separately. We also observe a positive correlation between the share of university graduates in the *département* and the vote for the extreme-right for the elections 1997 to 2012, although with low levels of significance. All these results are to be interpreted with caution due to the ecological fallacy.

The third step is to determine whether household complexity is more than the equivalent of a **dummy for regions** of South-Western France. Indeed, as presented in the previous sections, complex household structures were historically geographically concentrated in South-Western France. In particular, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, most of the *départements* with the highest MUH or APH ratios are located in this region. We thus create 13 dummies for administrative regions of metropolitan France (using the definition in place since 2016). We use the same cross-sectional OLS specification as previously, using no control variable except the regional dummies. The results for the three specifications (A), (B) and (C) confirm that the effect of the variables for complex household structures is similar to including two dummies for South-Western regions (Nouvelle-Aquitaine and Occitanie). Indeed, the coefficients for complex household structures are all either insignificant or of a very small magnitude as soon as regional dummies are included. This contrasts with the robustness of the relationship between income and vote to the inclusion of these regional dummies. We interpret this as evidence that the correlation between complex household structures and vote for the left in the 1960s-1970s-1980s found by [Le Bras and Todd \(1981/2012\)](#) and confirmed by the analysis in cross-section might simply have been a proxy for a regional dummy. Such a regional fixed effect can correspond to other variables such as land and property structures, specific cultural values or regional traditions, that we are not able to directly observe. To further explore whether this correlation might be driven by an omitted variable, we turn to panel regressions which allow to get rid of the effect of the fixed omitted variables.

3.2.3.B. Panel regressions

As mentioned in the specification section, we cannot exclude the presence of omitted variables explaining both voting outcomes and household structures, and we expect individual effects to be correlated, as there remains omitted variables such as cultural determinants potentially common to several *départements*. As a result, it would not be appropriate to use a pooled OLS estimator. We use a within/fixed-effect estimator (with robust standard errors), which does not require individual fixed effects to be correlated and amounts to controlling for individual unobserved characteristics. Tables presenting the results can also to be found in Appendix A.8.

Firstly, we do not find any significant results for the share of **single households** for any of the political affiliations considered, with the exception of the centre-right. The effect is however negligible: on average, an increase by 1 standard-deviation in the share of single households in the *département* is associated with an increase by 0.1195 standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right.

Regarding **complex household structures**, we observe a significant negative correlation between vote for the left in the three specifications when there is no control variable, be it for MUH or APH. They remain significant when controlling by the share of married individuals in the population. When controlling by the entire set of control variables, coefficients for APH turn insignificant, while coefficient for MUH remain significantly negative at the 1%-level. Figure 15 presents graphically the results from the specification (A) (using quintiles) for the variables MUH. The point estimates seems to indicate a negative relationship between complex household structures and vote for the left. As the model uses the variation within *départements* over time, and we know from previous sections that household complexity has been decreasing in all *départements* across this period, this can be interpreted as following: a *département* experiencing a slower decrease in complex household structures with respect to the other *départements* has an average a lower

standardised vote for the left. The other way round, it means that *départements* in which the complex household structures have decreased relatively more rapidly have on average a higher share of vote for the left. More specifically, the order of magnitude for the MUH ratio and the three specifications when controlling by the entire set of control variables is the following:

- A *département* in the 5th quantile according to the MUH ratio has on average a lower share of vote for the left of 0.2337 standard-deviations (significant at the 5%-level) (A)
- 10 more ranks in terms of MUH corresponds to a lower share of vote for the left of 0.066 standard-deviations (significant at the 1%-level) (B)
- An increase in 1 standard-deviation of the MUH ratio corresponds to a lower share of vote for the left of 0.2882 standard-deviations (significant at the 1%-level) (C).

Overall, these results appear to differ from the initial positive correlation between vote for the left and complex household structures found in cross-section. However, they are consistent with the absence of correlation observed in cross-section when introducing regional fixed effects. Indeed, the introduction of *département* individual fixed effects in the panel specification removes the impact of idiosyncratic, unobservable variables correlated with the vote for the left. In any case, we should remain cautious while interpreting these aggregated results at the departmental level.

We then distinguish between four political affiliation (extreme-left, centre-left, centre-right and extreme-right) instead of two (left and right) to investigate more precisely the relationship between complex household structures and voting outcomes. Tables presenting the results can also be found in Appendix A.8. There are no significant results for the correlation between vote for the extreme-left, centre-left or centre-right and complex household structures. Vote for the extreme-right appears to be positively correlated with the average number of marital units per household in the three specification at the 1%-level. Figure 16 presents graphically the results for the specification (A). This does not come entirely as a surprise, as we have seen above that starting in the 1980s, many *départements* with relatively high MUH ratios are located in Hauts-de-France and Alsace, which are regions known for their high share of vote for the Front National. However, as a robustness check, we also found such a positive relationship for MUH when considering separately the 1968-1988 and the 1993-2012 elections. The fact that only the average number of marital units per household is significant, and not the average number of adults per household, may be interpreted as the sign that this positive correlation is not driven by the prevalence of complex household in itself, but rather by the importance of marriage, even though we control by the share of married individuals in the *département*.


Regarding **income**, the panel regressions yield very significant results for the centre-right in the three specifications, although a quite small magnitude: vote for the centre-right appears to be positively correlated with average income per adult. Figure 17 presents graphically the results for the specification (A). More specifically, the order of magnitude for the three specifications when controlling by the entire set of control variables is the following:

- A *département* in the 1st quantile of average income per adult has on average a lower share of vote for the centre-right of 0.2296 standard-deviations (significant at the 1%-level) (A)
- 10 more ranks in terms of average income per adult corresponds to a higher share of vote for the right of 0.048 standard-deviations (significant at the 1%-level) (B)
- An increase in 1 standard-deviation of the average income per adult corresponds to a higher share of vote for the centre-right of 0.1029 standard-deviations (significant at the 1%-level) (C).

On the other hand, vote for the extreme-right appears to be negatively correlated with income, although results are also of relatively limited magnitude. Finally, there are no significant results regarding the relations between income and vote for the left, neither as a whole, nor for its two components (extreme-left/centre-left).


Regarding education, the panel regressions do not yield significant results for any of the political affiliations.

Figure 15: Marginal effect of complex household structures (MUH) on the vote for the left, by quintiles of *département* (1968-2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Figure 16: Marginal effect of complex household structures (MUH) on the vote for the extreme-right, by quintiles of *département* (1968-2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Figure 17: Marginal effect of income on the vote for the centre-right, by quintiles of *département* (1968-2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Education is the share of university graduates. Control variables: share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Figure 18: Marginal effect of income on the vote for the extreme-right, by quintiles of *département* (1968-2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Education is the share of university graduates. Control variables: share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

3.2.3.C. Conclusions on the analysis at the departmental level

To conclude on this section, we do not find support for the assumption of a systematic, consistent relationship between complex household structures and vote by political affiliation. Although we find a positive, significant correlation between vote for the centre-left and our indicators of household complexity in cross-section from the 1960s to the 1980s, it proves to be not robust to the inclusion of regional dummies. The high vote for the centre-left observed in South-Western France during this period could thus be inducing what we may call a spurious correlation between complex household structures and vote for the left, and might be explained by other socio-demographic and historical factors. Results from the panel regression present a negative relationship between complex household structures and vote for the left, while the two indicators for household complexity are somewhat positively correlated with the vote for the extreme-right, thus further challenging the initial tested hypothesis. The main limit of this analysis is on the one hand the limited period covered, as we did not use results of elections taking place before 1968, and the choice of the *département* as geographical level. Indeed, the initial claim of most of the literature mainly concerned the 19th Century and the early 20th Century; this was for instance the case in [Le Bras \(1986\)](#) and even more recently in [Le Bras and Todd \(2013\)](#). To this extent, our study does not exclude the existence of a meaningful correlation for earlier historical periods and is thus only a partial rebuke to such usual theories. Moreover, it may be the case that our indicators for household complexity (MUH and APH) are not meaningful for the post-1990 period, as we were only able to check their relevance with data on cohabiting ascendants, adult descendants, secondary families and other kin for 1968-1990.

The significant positive correlation between income and vote for the centre-right provides evidence that economic variables might be as much if not more relevant for explaining political cleavages than prevailing family structures. The consistency between cross-sectional correlations and results from the panel estimations attests from the robustness of this relationship, even though the magnitude of the effect is rather limited. On the other hand, we did not find evidence of the significance of education for the political cleavage of this period. We also cannot exclude that controlling for religious observance and wealth level would have changed the estimates, as these two dimensions were found to be significant predictors for the vote in France in the literature. Further research could explore this by collecting systematic, consistent historical data on these variables, which we were not able to find within the framework of the present study.

Using *départements* as units of observation might finally be too coarse to detect very significant effects. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the academic literature has been critical of the use of data at the departmental level for the study of prevailing household and family structures as strong local effects may cancel each other out. We cannot thus exclude that an analysis at the *canton* or the municipal levels would produce other results, as local variations in the variables of interest might cancel out at the departmental level. Unfortunately, voting outcomes at the *canton* or municipal levels are only available for the recent past, thus restricting the present study. The following section will therefore make use of municipal data for the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections to investigate the significance of household structures, income and education for the political cleavage with data at a finer geographical level.

3.3 Analysis using data at the municipal level (2002 and 2012)

This section is devoted to the analysis of municipal voting outcomes of the first round of the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections, using respectively the 1999 and 2009 census results. Due to the complications related to numerous changes in municipal boundaries, we did not attempt to analyse the 2007 legislative elections. Electoral results at the municipal level are not available for the elections prior to 2002. As was the case in the previous section, we restrict ourselves to data for metropolitan France.

3.3.1 Data

The Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP) provides electoral results for all national elections of the Fifth Republic (see Section 3.2), mostly at the level of legislative constituencies. For elections taking place between 1986 and 1997 it provides data at the municipal level only for municipalities with more than 9,000 inhabitants. Data at the municipal level for all municipalities are provided for the first round of the 2002 legislative elections, while there are no data at the municipal level for the 2007 and 2012 legislative elections. Therefore, we used data from the Ministry of the Interior freely available on data.gouv.fr at the level of polling stations for the 2012 elections, which we aggregated at the municipal level. We used the same definitions for political affiliations as we did for the analysis at the departmental level, computing voting shares which exclude unclassifiable parties such as regionalists or hunters federations. Maps and descriptive statistics presenting voting outcomes at the municipal level for the two legislative elections considered can be found in Appendix A.9.

Regarding data on household structures as well as other socio-demographic variables, consistent census results at the municipal level are easily available from the same time series presented in Section 2.2. We also made use of additional socio-demographic variables available in census results for 2002 and 2012 from INSEE available on request. Maps and descriptive statistics presenting indicators of household complexity as well as the share of university graduates at the municipal level for the two legislative elections considered can be found in Appendix A.9.

Fiscal data at the municipal level was obtained from the Ministry of Finance both for 2002 and 2012. Exactly as was the case for the analysis at the departmental level, we use the total income of fiscal households (sum of *Montant cumulé des traitements et salaires de l'ensemble des foyers fiscaux* and *Montant cumulé des traitements et salaires de l'ensemble des foyers fiscaux*) for each municipality that we divide by the number of adults aged more than 20 to get the average income per adult for each municipality. Maps and descriptive statistics presenting average income per adult at the municipal level for the two legislative elections considered are presented in Appendix A.9.

As we are making use of data from different sources, a crucial issue pertains to changes in municipal boundaries. Indeed, French municipalities have experienced substantial changes over the last 20 years, either by splitting or by merging, in particular since the coming into effect of the laws 2010-1563 of 16 December 2010 and 2015-292 of 16 March 2015. Census results are presented with municipality boundaries from 1999, 2009 or 2016 (for the consistent historical time series). Fiscal data and electoral results are presented with municipality boundaries for 2002 and 2012. We used *Code officiel géographique* for 1st January 2012 (*Historique des communes*) to identify the merges and splits occurring during the period. As we strive to keep the maximum number of municipalities for maximising the power of our estimates, we keep the smallest possible unit consistently available in the different data sources. As a result, we end up with a number of observations slightly smaller than the historical official number of municipalities for metropolitan France:

- 35,718 observations in 2002 vs. officially 36,565 municipalities according to *Code officiel géographique* for 1st January 2002.
- 35,758 observations in 2012 vs. officially 36,571 municipalities according to *Code officiel géographique* for 1st January 2012.

In particular, we were not able to keep data at the *arrondissements* level for Marseille and Lyon, which means that these two municipalities appear in our database as two observations instead of 25 if we could have kept consistent data at the *arrondissement* level. This is due to the substantial

differences between constituency limits and *arrondissements*' limits in Lyon and Marseille. For Paris, we are able to keep data at the *arrondissement* level in 2012 (20 data points) and at the level of 9 groups of *arrondissement* compatible with constituency limits in 2002.

3.3.2 Specifications

We use simple OLS independently for both elections considered (2002 and 2012). We weight each observation by the number of registered voters of the municipality, as we would otherwise mostly find relations valid for rural, little populated municipalities which represent the majority of the observations. The very simple specification is the following:

$$y_{mt} = \beta \cdot h_{mt} + \theta \cdot X_{mt} + \epsilon_{mt} \quad (4)$$

with m the *municipality*, t the year, y the voting outcome considered, h the variable of interest (household structures, income or education) and X a set of control variables (including income and education except when it is the variable of interest). We include in the control variables 13 regional dummies to capture potential omitted variables related to regional historical or cultural specificities.

As was the case for the analysis at the departmental level, we use a standardised voting outcome to ensure comparability over time, i.e. y_{mt} is defined for each political affiliation P as following:

$$y_{Pmt} = \frac{s_{Pmt} - \overline{s_{Pt}}}{\sigma_{s_{Pt}}}$$

with s_{Pmt} the voting share obtained by P in the municipality m in the year t , $\overline{s_{Pt}}$ the voting share obtained by P at the national level in the year t , and $\sigma_{s_{Pt}}$ the standard-deviation of the voting share obtained by P in the year t .

We use three different specifications similar to the ones used for *départements*, which differ in the definition of the variables of interest and the control variables:

- (A) For each variable are defined 12 dummies corresponding to the 9 bottom deciles of the variable distribution across municipalities, the group from p90 to p95 (top 10% excluding top 5%), the group from p95 to p99 (top 5% excluding top 1%) and the group above p99 (top 1%); the effect is interpreted with respect to the 6th decile (i.e. p50 to p60). Given the presence of large municipalities, we have to make adjustments when a municipality is located at the limit between two deciles to ensure a consistent definition of deciles.
- (B) Municipalities are ranked according to each variable, and the ranks are used in the regression; the effect is interpreted as the impact of gaining one rank in the variable distribution. For simplicity we divided the rank-variables by 1,000, so that the effects can be interpreted in terms of 1,000 additional ranks (out of about 36,000).
- (C) Standardised values (z-scores) are standardised to have zero as a mean and a standard-deviation of 1; the effect is interpreted as the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in the variable.

3.3.3 Results

We investigate the potential cross-sectional correlations between voting outcomes and complex household structures, income and education, using the specification described above with equation (4). The variable of interest for household structures is either the number of marital units per household (MUH) or the number of adults per household, using the assumption of 75% of the population counted separately aged more than 20 (APH). We also present additional results with the share of married individuals as the variable of interest, as it proved to be an important control for the estimates on household structures. The variable of interest for income is the average income per adult. The variable of interest for education is the share of university graduates with a diploma higher than Bac+2; this differs from the variable used in the regressions at the departmental level, which was the share of university graduates. For the recent past, due to the general increase in educational attainment, using a more restrictive definition of higher educational level is indeed more meaningful. Detailed tables presenting the results can be found in Appendix A.10.


Household structures

The share of **single households** appears to be negatively correlated with the vote for the left, both in 2002 and 2012, but the magnitude of the effect is small. An increase in one standard-deviation in the share of single households in the municipality is associated on average with a drop by 0.23 and 0.18 standard-deviation of the vote for the left in respectively 2002 and 2012 when controlling for the entire set of control variables (specification (C)). In voting shares, 0.2 standard-deviation of the vote for the left corresponds to an increase by respectively 2.3 percentage points and 2.5 percentage points of the share of the vote for the left, which is small, given that the mean vote share for the left was 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Using deciles, we find that this negative correlation is explained by the significant lower vote for the left in the municipalities with the highest shares of single households, which only appears when the share of married individuals is controlled for. Figure 19 and Figure 20 present graphically these results.

Dividing between extreme-left and centre-left, we find a similar pattern for the former and rather insignificant results for the latter. Moreover, the vote for the extreme-right is also negatively correlated with the share of single households in both elections, although the effects are very small. As presented in Figure 23 and Figure 24, municipalities with the highest share of individuals living alone vote less for the extreme-right by more than 0.5 standard-deviation of the vote. However, when controls are introduced such as the share of university graduates, this relation turns insignificant in 2002 and much weaker in 2012. On the other hand, vote for the centre-right is significantly, positively correlated with the share of single households in the municipality: an increase in one standard-deviation in the share of single households in the municipality is associated on average with a increase by 0.25 and 0.41 standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right in respectively 2002 and 2012 when controlling for the entire set of control variables (specification (C)). Figure 21 and Figure 22 present graphically the results for the specification (A). The effects found cannot be attributed to age, rurality or prevalence of marriage, as we control by the share of married individuals, share of individuals aged more than 80, the share employed in agriculture and the population density.


Our preferred interpretation is that for a given share of married individuals, a higher share of single households is correlated with the average wealth level. As wealth is found in post-electoral surveys to be positively correlated with vote for the right (Piketty, 2018), wealth would thus be the omitted variable behind this correlation between the share of single households and the vote for the centre-right. In fact, the effect of single households turns significant only when controlling for the share of married individuals: we suspect that the combination of the share of married individuals and the share of single households is similar to transforming the share of single households as a variable correlated with wealth. To illustrate this with concrete examples, Villepinte (93), Bussy-Saint-Georges (77), Epinay-sur-Orge (91), Rueil-Malmaison (92), Mandelieu-la-Napoule (06) and Les-Sables-d’Olonne (85) are six municipalities with a similar share of married individuals (between 47.5% and 48.0%). In 2009, the share of single households in these municipalities was respectively 21.3%, 25.3%, 28.5%, 34.0%, 38.6%, and 50.5%. Vote for the centre-right in 2012 was respectively 32.1%, 43.2%, 44.3%, 57.0%, 47.3% and 57.8%. Given the age structure of these municipalities (in particular the share of the population aged more than 80), and the share of widowed and divorced observed, we interpret this as the impact of the presence of wealthier populations in the last municipalities. The share of married individuals is similar in these six municipalities because in the former there are many young unmarried individuals (cohabiting with their parents or living together as a couple), while there are many widowed, divorced and old individuals in the latter. As pointed out in the literature on couples, married couples are on average wealthier than non-married couples (Sarma, 1988) and have on average higher income levels (Costemalle, 2017). In particular, Legendre and Thibault (2007) claim that there is a selection into marriage: couples with higher wealth and income have more fiscal incentives to get married than couples with lower wealth and income. In any case, this attests of the need for future research to find indicators for average wealth at the municipal level; caution should be exercised when interpreting these results on the share of single households.

Figure 19: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 20.

Figure 20: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Single households is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the municipal population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. All control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residences.

Figure 21: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 22.

Figure 22: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Single households is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 23: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 24.

Figure 24: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Single households is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Regarding the **average number number of marital units per household** (MUH ratio), we do not find meaningful significant correlations with the vote for the left, for the extreme-left or the centre-left. We find a significant negative correlation between the MUH ratio and the vote for the centre-right for both elections, which only appears when we control for the share of married individuals, consistent with the results observed for the share of single households. The magnitude of this correlation is rather small (inferior to 0.2 standard-deviation of the vote in the specification (C)). As was the case at the departmental level, we find a positive, significant correlation between the vote for the extreme-right and the number of marital units per household. An increase in one standard-deviation in the share of single households in the municipality is associated on average with a increase by 0.11 and 0.52 standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right in respectively 2002 and 2012 when controlling for the entire set of control variables (specification (C)). This pattern is also found in the specifications (A) and (B). However, given the small magnitude of the effect found, these results should not be over-interpreted. Previous remarks on the potential wealth effect uncovered by the combination of the share of married individuals and the household structures also applied.


The **average number of adults per household** (APH ratio) is our second measure for household complexity. We do not find a significant relationship between vote for the left and the APH ratio in both elections in either of the specifications (A), (B) and (C), except a significant lower vote for the left for the bottom 20% of the distribution of municipalities according to APH, as presented graphically in Figure 25 and Figure 26. This effect only appears when controlling for the share of married individuals, as there is in fact a rather higher vote for the left in the municipalities with the lowest APH ratios. Indeed, as we will present below, the share of married individuals is negatively correlated with vote for the left (even when controlling for other socio-demographic variables). This effect at the bottom of the distribution of the APH ratio is also found for the extreme-left, while vote for the centre-left is uncorrelated with the APH ratio. On the other hand, we find a significant higher vote for the centre-right for the municipalities with the lowest APH ratios. Thus, it seems to be the case that municipalities with the smallest shares of adults per household tend to vote more for the centre-right and less for the extreme-left. For example, being a municipality in the bottom 10% in terms of APH ratio rather than in the median category results in a higher vote for the centre-right by 0.51 standard-deviation in 2002 and by 0.65 standard-deviation in 2012, and in a lower vote for the extreme-left by respectively 0.47 to 0.66 standard-deviation. As was the case for the MUH ratio, we find a positive, significant relationship between this indicator for household complexity and vote for the extreme-right, although of a quite limited magnitude in 2002. The same potential effect of wealth as an omitted variable could explain these results.

Figure 25: Marginal effect of the average number of adults per household on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 26.

Figure 26: Marginal effect of the average number of adults per household on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged more than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Then, we examine the effect of **marriage** on the vote. The share of married individuals is not in itself an indicator of family structures, as two families with the exact same structure can contain either couples or non-married couples. However, given the significance of this control variable for the results we have found for household structures, it can be interesting to precise the relation it entertains with the vote. We observe a negative relationship between vote for the left and share of married individuals, which is more marked in 2012 than in 2002, as presented for the specification (A) in Figure 27 and Figure 28. We find this negative relationship for the extreme-left only in 2012 and for the centre-left in both years. Conversely, we find a positive correlation between the share of married individuals and the vote for the centre-right in 2002 and 2012 and for the extreme-right in 2012. Overall, the effects found seem to appear consistently on either side of the left/right political cleavage. Given that marriage is related with wealth as well as with religious attitudes, the results we found appear to be quite meaningful.


To sum up, we do not find support of a positive correlation between vote for the left and the prevalence of complex household structures. As soon as we control by the share of married individuals, we observe a negative relationship between vote for the left and the share of single households at the municipal level. On the other hand, we observe a significant, positive relationship between vote for the centre-right and the share of single households in the municipality, as well as a significantly higher vote for the centre-right in the municipalities with the lowest prevalence of complex household structures. We suspect wealth and religion to be potential driving these results, as the effects turn significant only when controlling for the prevalence of marriage. Assuming that our estimates are not too much biased by such variables, and given the limited magnitude of the effects found when not controlling for the share of married individual (except for the extreme-right), we can interpret this as evidence that household structures may matter for the political cleavage, although the limited magnitude of the effects found indicates that they cannot be considered as a main dimension of the political cleavage. In particular, they appear to be negligible as compared to the effect of income on the vote that we will present below.

Figure 27: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 28.

Figure 28: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the municipality. Aged 20 to 35 is the share of residents aged between 20 and 35 years old. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Income

Regarding the average level of **income** in the municipality, we observe a negative relationship with the vote for the left, which is presented graphically in Figure 29 and Figure 30 for specification (A). More specifically, the order of magnitude for the three specifications when controlling by the entire set of control variables is the following:

- A municipality in the top 1% according to average income per adult has on average a lower share of vote for the left of 2.08 standard-deviations in 2002 and 2.33 in 2012 than the municipalities of the median category. A municipality in the bottom 10% according to average income per adult has on average a higher share of vote for the left by 0.54 standard-deviations in 2002 and 0.70 in 2012 than the municipalities of the median category. (A)
- 1000 more ranks (out of c.35,000 municipalities) in terms of average income per adult correspond to a lower share of vote for the left by 0.038 standard-deviation in 2002 and 0.048 in 2012 (B)
- An increase in 1 standard-deviation of the average income per adult corresponds to a lower share of vote for the left by 0.55 and 0.62 standard-deviation in 2002 and 2012 (C).

The magnitude of these effects is large, all the more since the set of control variables includes many other socio-economic indicators such as the share of *cadres* or the unemployment rate. Two standard-deviations in terms of vote for the left corresponds to 23 percentage points in 2002 (for a national share of vote of 42.37%) and 25 percentage points in 2012 (for a national share of vote of 49.11%).

This negative income gradient is also observed when considering the extreme-left and the centre-left separately, both in 2002 and 2012, as presented in respectively Figure 32 and Figure 32 for the former, and Figure 34 and Figure 34 for the latter. This negative relation is more marked for the centre-left than for the extreme-left.


Turning to the two components of the right, we conclude firstly that the vote for the extreme-right does not present a meaningful relationship with average income. In fact, we observe a very lower vote for the extreme-right in the municipalities with high average income levels, but this relation disappears as soon as the share of university graduates is controlled for. When all controls are introduced, there is no significant pattern except the negative correlation with for the bottom 20% of the income distribution, i.e. the poorest municipalities tend to vote less for the extreme-right, as presented in Figure 38 and Figure 38. On the other hand, the vote for the centre-right is highly positively correlated with the average income per adult, as presented graphically in Figure 36 and Figure 36 for specification (A). These findings are consistent with results presented by [Nadeau et al. \(2012\)](#) for the presidential elections from 1988 to 2007. More specifically, the order of magnitude for the three specifications when controlling by the entire set of control variables is the following:

- A municipality in the top 1% according to average income per adult has on average a higher share of vote for the centre-right of 1.94 standard-deviations in 2002 and 2.34 in 2012 than the municipalities of the median category. A municipality in the bottom 10% according to average income per adult has on average a lower share of vote for the left of 0.29 standard-deviations in 2002 and 0.59 in 2012 than the municipalities of the median category. (A)
- 1000 more ranks (out of the c.35,000 municipalities) in terms of average income per adult correspond to a higher share of vote for the centre-right of 0.024 standard-deviation in 2002 and 0.045 in 2012 (B)
- An increase in 1 standard-deviation of the average income per adult corresponds to a higher share of vote for the centre-right of 0.39 standard-deviation in 2002 and 0.55 standard-deviation in 2012 (C).

To conclude, as our observations are municipalities, we should not infer individual voting patterns from these correlations. Indeed, the variable of interest is the average income per adult at the municipal level and not at the individual level, which may be correlated with preferences for residential segregation for instance. Hence, we cannot exclude that at the individual level, the preference for residential segregation is the variable driving the vote for the centre-right, rather the


individual income, i.e. that high-income individuals in low-income municipalities do not vote more for the centre-right, or conversely that low-income individuals living in high-income municipalities tend to vote more for the centre-right. In any case, the gradient between vote for the centre-right and average income per adult at the municipal level is stronger in 2012 than 2012, which may suggest an increased significance of income for the political cleavage, or alternatively, may also be related to the increase in residential differentiation according to income which makes this dimension more salient at the municipal level.

Figure 29: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 30.

Figure 30: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Employed in agriculture is the share of the labour force aged 25 to 54 employed in the agricultural sector. All control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 31: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 32.

Figure 32: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Aged more than 80 is the share of residents aged more than 80 years old. All control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 33: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 34.

Figure 34: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Aged 20 to 35 is the share of residents aged 20 to 35. All control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 35: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 36.

Figure 36: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Employed in agriculture is the share of the labour force aged 25 to 54 employed in the agricultural sector. Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 37: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 38.

Figure 38: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. The share of foreigners is the share of residents of foreign nationality in the municipality. Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Education


We do not find a significant relationship between vote for the left and the average level of education in the municipality (as measured by the share of university graduates), as presented in Figure 39 and Figure 40. Indeed, while there is a lower vote for the left in the municipalities with the highest concentration of university graduates, we find a positive relation between education and vote for the left as soon as income is controlled for. However, adding a control for population density turns the relationship insignificant. The decomposition between extreme-left and centre-left indicates a small negative correlation with the former and a small positive correlation with the latter, which thus cancel out when considering the left as a whole. On the other hand, we find a small positive relationship between the concentration of university graduates and the vote for the centre-right, although the effect is of limited magnitude as compared to income level, as presented in Figure 41 and Figure 42.

The most noticeable effect of the share of university graduates on voting attitudes relates to the vote for the extreme-right. Indeed, we find a very strong negative relation between vote for the extreme-right and share of university graduates, as presented graphically in Figure 43 and Figure 44 for specification (A), which is consistent with the literature (see for instance [Mayer \(2007\)](#)). The magnitude of the effect is the following:

- A municipality in the top 1% according to the share of university graduates has on average a lower share of vote for the extreme-right of 0.67 standard-deviations in 2002 and 0.65 in 2012 than the municipalities of the median category. A municipality in the bottom 10% according to the share of university graduates has on average a higher share of vote for the extreme-right of 0.30 standard-deviations in 2002 and 0.45 in 2012 than the municipalities of the median category. (A)
- 1000 more ranks (out of the c.35,000 municipalities) in terms of the share of university graduates corresponds to a lower share of vote for the extreme-right of 0.014 standard-deviation in 2002 and 0.015 in 2012 (B)
- An increase in 1 standard-deviation of the average income per adult corresponds to a lower share of vote for the extreme-right of 0.36 standard-deviation in 2002 and 0.27 standard-deviation in 2012 (C).


Finally, one should bear in mind that these results hold at the municipal level, which means that the relationship at the individual level may be different. For instance, university graduates living in municipalities with a lower share of them may vote more for the left than university graduates living in municipalities with a high share of university graduates. As was the case for income, preferences for residential segregation may be correlated with voting attitudes and thus prevent us from inferring individual behaviours, which would require individual data. In fact, using post-electoral survey data at the individual level, [Piketty \(2018\)](#) has found a positive relationship between education level and vote for the left for France since the end of the 1990s (see in particular Figure 2.b. p.89 on the vote for the left by education in France in 1995 and 2012). Further research is thus needed to clarify the articulation between voting patterns by education at the municipal level and at the individual level.

Figure 39: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 40

Figure 40: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Population density is the ratio of the total number of municipal residents over the municipal surface area. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 41: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 42

Figure 42: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Population density is the ratio of the total number of municipal residents over the municipal surface area. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 43: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 44

Figure 44: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of *cadres* is the share of the labour force classified as *cadres* in the PCS occupational classification. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

4 Conclusion

To conclude, the present empirical study does not find significant empirical evidence for the hypothesis of a large role of household or family structures for shaping voting attitudes in France in the 1968-2012 period. In that respect, this supports the claim by [Laslett \(1972\)](#) that

Notwithstanding, nothing is yet known to me which would finally sanction the assumption that the size and character of the family necessarily represents a value, a norm of belief and of attitude fundamental to human society. [...] It seems rather to be a circumstance incidental to the practice of agriculture, to the customs of land distribution and redistribution, to the laws and traditions of land inheritance, and of succession in the patriline. My conviction remains, that the form of the domestic group cannot yet be demonstrated to be capable of doing all the work which social scientists have seemed to expect it to do. (p.xii)

Of course, we cannot exclude that the insignificance of our results for the departmental level comes from the ecological fallacy pointed out by [Adams \(1979\)](#) or to the period considered, as it may have been valid in periods prior to the 1960s. Further checks using more localised data at the *arrondissement*, *canton* or municipal level, with data from *archives départementales*, would allow a more precise empirical investigation of the historical importance of household structures. Another potential avenue for research would be to explore fiscal archives to document quantitatively the potential relationship between complex household structures and inheritance sharing customs, which in turn may have been important for political attitudes in the 19th Century.

Regarding the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections, we document a high relevance of the average income level for explaining the vote at the municipal level, with a striking negative correlation between vote for the left and a positive correlation with the vote for the centre-right. Higher education is also significant for predicting average voting outcomes, with a clear negative correlation between the share of university graduates and vote for the extreme-right. Even after controlling by average income, municipalities with the highest concentrations of university graduates are found to vote on average more for the centre-right. We also find a significant, positive correlation between the share of single households and vote for the centre-right, which appears only when we control by the share of married individuals. We suspect this relation to be driven by wealth and religion acting as omitted variables. Future research would gain by including data on the average wealth at the municipal level as well as localised data on religious observance which are found to be significant variables for predicting the vote in the literature using individual post-electoral surveys.

Due to the issue of ecological fallacy, determinants of individual voting choices should not be inferred from these findings. In particular, they may rather attest of the impact of marked residential selection according to education and income, which in turn is correlated with voting preferences. In any case, income and education levels in the municipality appear to be of much higher relevance than prevailing household structures for characterising the political cleavage in France.

In conclusion, the present study could naturally be expanded to other recent legislative elections (2007 and 2017) as well as to other national elections for which data is available at the municipal level in France. Even though the number of municipalities is particularly high in France with respect to what is the case in other Western democracies, an interesting avenue for future research would be to replicate this analysis in other geographical settings.

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A Appendices

A.1 French census methodology 1856-2014

The definition of the population in use in census results in France has evolved over time. The 1856 to 1876 censuses reported figures on the number of inhabitants without further specifications, which [Godinot \(2005\)](#) mentions to correspond to the total present population in the municipality on the census day, including short-stay visitors. The 1881 census introduced a **difference between legal and present population**. [Statistique de la France \(1883\)](#) describes the two distinct operations (p.xv): (1) the census at a fixed date of all present individuals in the municipality, using individual forms mentioning name, sex, marital status, normal place of residence and profession; (2) the census of the resident (also called official or legal) population, which includes individuals normally living in the municipality, including the absent ones. As mentioned p.xv, the second definition was the one used in the previous censuses and thus is the only one allowing for consistent comparisons. However, statistics on the population by age groups, marital status and professions are systematically presented for the present population only. [Statistique de la France \(1888\)](#) summarises the distinction between legal and present population in a table p.1 which we reproduce in Table 4. Present population is always found to be lower than legal population, except in specific *départements*; it amounts to a difference of 0.7% for the 1881 census, which is interpreted as omissions for travelling individuals ([Statistique de la France \(1883\)](#), p.xvii). [Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes \(1907\)](#) provides an additional interpretation of this gap (p.303): while some individual forms are unfortunately omitted, thus leading to an underestimation of the present population, double counts in the resident populations result in an overestimation of the legal population. As a result, these two population figures offer bounds between which is comprised the effective number of inhabitants of the country. The same issue appears each year until 1946, in which the census results still note that present population is lower than legal population by 3.6% in Cantal, 3.9% in Seine and even 12.9% in Corsica. The 1954 results introduces a change in methodology: the only population reported was supposed to be the resident, legal population. However, as reported in [INSEE \(1960\)](#), the detailed results introduced a distinction between legal and total population: even though they have the same formal definition, they differ due to counting errors, corrections for individuals travelling during the census and unusable forms. As a result, the reference population for socio-demographic statistics is in fact the total population. The 1962 census reintroduced a difference between total population and municipal population, which was in use until the 2004 census (see [Godinot \(2005\)](#)). Total population corresponds to all resident individuals, including individuals in institutions, which also have a personal residence outside of the municipality. Municipal population is said to be *without double counts*, as individuals living in institutions are rattaché to the municipality of their personal residence. [Godinot \(2005\)](#) states that the differences between the two were in most cases quite negligible. The current census methodology in place since 2004 has adopted a unified definition of the total and municipal populations.

Table 4: Present and legal population in the historical censuses (1881-1946)

| Present population | | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| A | B | C |
| Present residents | Population counted separately | Present passing guests |

| Legal population | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|
| A | B | D |
| Present residents | Population counted separately | Absent residents |

Source: [Statistique de la France \(1888\)](#), p.1

A.2 Census results: sources

A.2.1 Available databases

Census results at the departmental level for the years **1851 to 1921** have been partially digitised in the 1980s by a French-American research team from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR, Ann Arbor, Michigan). These were subsequently treated by INSEE and Centre de recherches historiques (CRH). They are made freely available to download on the INSEE website ("Données historiques de la Statistique générale de France", "Recensements de 1851 à 1921") for the data treated by INSEE, and on the website of the CRH ("La Statistique générale de France"). These databases are provided in separate Excel files containing from c. 70 to c. 400 variables each. These tables are numbered from T01 to T259. They contain most of the variables presented in the printed volumes of the census results but not all of them, in particular for the 1921 census. Moreover, they do not present texts and comments available in the printed volumes, which are in fact necessary for understanding the exact definition in use for each census. As a result, consulting the printed volumes proves to be necessary for a detailed use of these databases.

For the **1926 to 1954** census results, there is no existing available database, so that collecting data from the printed volumes is necessary.

The **1962** census results by municipality are available from INSEE (Recensement de la population 1962 : tableaux standards par commune, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)) but the data presents serious deficiencies. Results at the individual level are available only for variable extraction (Recensement de la population 1962 : fichier détail individus au 1/20, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)).

Regarding the most recent historical census data, INSEE has developed consistent, standardised series at the municipal and departmental levels for the period **1968-2014** which are freely available online:

- Chiffres détaillés - Séries historiques (1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2009 and 2014)
- Secteur d'activité des actifs - Données harmonisées RP1968-2014
- Position vis-à-vis de l'emploi - Données harmonisées RP1968-2014
- Catégories Socioprofessionnelles/Diplômes - Données harmonisées RP1968-2014
- Âge quinquennal - Données harmonisées RP1968-2014
- Diplômes - Données harmonisées RP1968-2014

. We also used more detailed tables containing a wide range of socio-demographic variables at the municipal and departmental levels from census results of this period available on request:

- Recensement de la population 1968 : tableaux standards par communes, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)
- Recensement de la population 1975 : tableaux standards par communes, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)
- Recensement de la population 1982 : tableaux standards, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)
- Recensement de la population 1990 : tableaux standards, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)
- Recensement de la population 1999 : tableaux analyses, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)
- Recensement de la population 2009 : tableaux détaillés, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)

- Recensement de la population 2014 : tableaux détaillés, INSEE (producteur), ADISP-CMH (diffuseur)

As the census takes place every year since 2006, similar results are also available for all years between 2006 and 2014. We chose to consider only results for 2009 and 2014 as the consistent historical series (Chiffres détaillés - Séries historiques) were available for this period for these two years only. Finally, for some specific variables (such as the number of domestic servants), we completed these series with printed volumes from 1968, 1975, 1982 and 1990 census results at the departmental level available either at the library of the École Normale Supérieure, INSEE or INED.

A.2.2 List of printed volumes of the census results used as sources

- 1856** Statistique de la France (1859) Résultats du dénombrement de 1856, Tome IX, 2e série, ed. Strasbourg : Imprimerie administrative de Veuve Berger-Levrault
- 1861** Statistique de la France (1864) Résultats généraux du dénombrement de 1861, ed. Strasbourg: Imprimerie administrative de Veuve Berger-Levrault
- 1866** Statistique de la France (1869) Résultats généraux du dénombrement de 1866, ed. Strasbourg: Imprimerie administrative de Veuve Berger-Levrault
- 1872** Statistique de la France (1873) Résultats généraux du dénombrement de 1872, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1876** Statistique de la France (1878) Résultats généraux du dénombrement de 1876, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1881** Statistique de la France (1883) Résultats généraux du dénombrement de 1881, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1886** Statistique de la France (1888) Résultats statistiques du dénombrement de 1886, Première partie – France, ed. Paris : Berger-Levrault and Cie.
- 1891** Statistique de la France (1894) Résultats statistiques du dénombrement de 1891, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1896** Statistique générale de la France (1899) Résultats statistiques du dénombrement de 1896, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes (1899) Résultats statistiques du recensement des industries et professions, dénombrement général de la population du 29 mars 1896, Tome 1, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1901** Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes (1904) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 24 mars 1901, Tome 1, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes (1907) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 24 mars 1901, Tome 5, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1906** Statistique générale de la France (1908) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 4 mars 1906, Tome 1, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
Ministère du Travail et de la prévoyance sociale (1912) Statistiques des familles, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1911** Statistique générale de la France (1913) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 5 mars 1911, Tome 1, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
Statistique générale de la France (1915) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 5 mars 1911, Tome I, Deuxième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
Statistique générale de la France (1916) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 5 mars 1911, Tome I, Troisième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
Statistique générale de la France (1918) Statistiques des familles et des habitations en 1911, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale

- 1921** Statistique générale de la France (1923) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 6 mars 1921, Tome 1, Première partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1927) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 6 mars 1921, Tome 1, Deuxième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1927) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 6 mars 1921, Tome 1, Troisième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1926** Statistique générale de la France (1928) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 7 mars 1926, Tome 1, Première partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1930) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 7 mars 1926, Tome 1, Deuxième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1931) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 7 mars 1926, Tome 1, Troisième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1932) Statistique des familles en 1926, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1931** Statistique générale de la France (1933) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 8 mars 1931, Tome 1, Première partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1935) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 8 mars 1931, Tome 1, Deuxième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1935) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 8 mars 1931, Tome 1, Troisième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1939) Recensement de 1931 – Statistique des familles, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1936** Statistique générale de la France (1938) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 8 mars 1936, Tome 1, Première partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1942) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 8 mars 1936, Tome 1, Deuxième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Statistique générale de la France (1943) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 8 mars 1936, Tome 1, Troisième partie, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
 Direction de la Statistique générale (1945) Statistique des familles en 1936, ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1946** INSEE (1948) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 10 mars 1946, Volume I, ed. Paris : Imprimerie nationale
 INSEE (1953) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 10 mars 1946, Volume II, ed. Paris : Imprimerie nationale
 INSEE (1952) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 10 mars 1946, Volume III, ed. Paris : Imprimerie nationale
 INSEE (1953) Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population effectué le 10 mars 1946, Volume IV, Familles, ed. Paris : Imprimerie nationale
- 1954** INSEE (1956), Recensement général de la population de 1954, Résultats du sondage au 1/20ème, Population-Ménages-Logements, France entière, ed. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale
 INSEE (1956), Recensement général de la population de 1954, Population légale, ed. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale
- 1962** INSEE (1964) Recensement de 1962, Population légale, Résultats statistiques, ed. Paris : Direction des Journaux Officiels
 INSEE (1964) Recensement général de la population de 1962, Résultats du sondage au 1/20ème pour la France entière, Population active, ed. Paris : Direction des Journaux Officiels

- INSEE (1965) Recensement général de la population de 1962, Résultats du sondage au 1/20eme pour la France entière, Logements-Immeubles, ed. Paris : Direction des Journaux Officiels
- INSEE (1966) Recensement général de la population de 1962, Résultats du dépouillement exhaustif, Fascicules départementaux, ed. Paris : Direction des Journaux Officiels
- 1968** INSEE (1971) Recensement général de la population de 1968, Résultats du sondage au 1/4, Population-ménages-logements-immeubles (fascicules par département), ed. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale
- 1975** INSEE (1975) Recensement général de la population de 1975, Résultats du sondage au 1/5, Population-ménages-logements-immeubles (Fascicules par département), ed. Paris: INSEE
- 1982** INSEE (1982) Recensement général de la population de 1982, Résultats du sondage au 1/4, Population-Emploi-Ménages-Familles-Logements (Fascicules par région), ed. Paris: INSEE
- 1990** INSEE (1994) Recensement de la population de 1990, Structure des ménages par région et département, résultats du sondage au quart, INSEE Résultats numéro 336-Démographie - Société Numéro 35, Septembre 1994

A.3 Historical demographic series: Additional figures and maps

A.3.1 Households

Figure 45 and Figure 46 shows the absolute number of **households** at the national level from 1856 to 2014. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5.


Table 5: Absolute number of households, summary statistics (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 108,048 | 67,016 | 28,979 | 72,344 | 96,192 | 125,546 | 591,285 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 109,630 | 76,077 | 28,712 | 73,803 | 92,794 | 126,003 | 692,969 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 112,330 | 83,356 | 27,894 | 76,598 | 94,926 | 131,366 | 768,645 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 111,790 | 87,005 | 13,363 | 72,072 | 95,792 | 125,146 | 787,660 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 115,956 | 95,471 | 15,544 | 75,054 | 99,408 | 137,064 | 865,476 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 119,538 | 110,111 | 15,821 | 77,486 | 99,174 | 138,481 | 1,013,429 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 121,635 | 114,161 | 17,314 | 78,048 | 98,820 | 136,378 | 1,049,098 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 122,781 | 122,716 | 18,094 | 76,819 | 97,709 | 134,372 | 1,124,820 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 124,278 | 130,819 | 19,358 | 76,614 | 97,332 | 134,649 | 1,196,307 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 125,736 | 142,229 | 21,132 | 78,115 | 97,006 | 136,297 | 1,303,946 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 131,467 | 166,722 | 25,043 | 77,702 | 97,739 | 137,978 | 1,528,610 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 131,778 | 179,039 | 23,469 | 74,485 | 95,706 | 132,638 | 1,667,291 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 139,117 | 193,714 | 22,950 | 75,265 | 96,575 | 150,287 | 1,784,225 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 144,255 | 209,499 | 23,277 | 73,901 | 97,492 | 148,947 | 1,923,532 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 146,117 | 215,659 | 24,066 | 74,828 | 97,376 | 148,520 | 1,977,807 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 143,569 | 207,009 | 24,158 | 75,170 | 100,787 | 147,768 | 1,888,988 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 148,899 | 218,360 | 23,796 | 75,346 | 100,859 | 150,307 | 1,984,831 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 162,272 | 242,490 | 23,849 | 79,062 | 109,180 | 161,323 | 2,173,495 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 185,241 | 163,017 | 24,105 | 88,052 | 136,803 | 226,942 | 1,113,295 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 204,847 | 172,005 | 25,660 | 97,922 | 160,069 | 261,636 | 1,114,400 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 224,380 | 179,914 | 27,420 | 106,170 | 179,375 | 290,960 | 1,095,090 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 248,066 | 193,513 | 30,153 | 115,091 | 200,744 | 326,158 | 1,111,721 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 279,857 | 213,195 | 33,652 | 128,138 | 229,770 | 365,426 | 1,159,952 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 292,132 | 221,401 | 34,462 | 130,381 | 239,920 | 382,043 | 1,147,991 |

Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for 1856-1946 is the total number of households. No data was available for 1906. Definition adopted for 1954-2014 is the number of main places of residence.


Figure 45: Number of households in France (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for 1856-1946 is the total number of households. No data was available for 1906.

Figure 46: Number of households in France (1954-2014)




Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for 1954-2014 is the number of main places of residence.

A.3.2 Legal and present population

Figure 47 presents the total population in France from 1856 to 2014. Definitions adopted are the present population from 1856 to 1946, total population in 1954, municipal population without double counts from 1962 to 2014. Descriptive statistics for the total population are provided in Table 6. Figure 48 presents both the legal and the present populations for the years 1881 to 1946, the period during which figures for both definitions were presented.

Figure 47: Total population in France (1856-2014)



Note: Present population for 1856 to 1946, total population for 1954, municipal population without double counts for 1962 to 2014

Source: Census results


Table 6: Total population, summary statistics (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 419,062 | 212,804 | 129,556 | 304,497 | 372,946 | 484,179 | 1,727,419 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 420,071 | 234,492 | 125,100 | 298,053 | 370,305 | 501,687 | 1,953,660 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 427,720 | 255,157 | 122,117 | 298,072 | 372,589 | 502,673 | 2,150,916 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 414,976 | 268,891 | 56,781 | 284,717 | 353,021 | 480,141 | 2,220,060 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 424,204 | 288,451 | 68,600 | 283,546 | 359,232 | 489,848 | 2,410,849 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 429,946 | 321,606 | 73,593 | 283,426 | 356,848 | 492,525 | 2,762,537 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 435,986 | 335,789 | 79,239 | 281,682 | 359,033 | 487,633 | 2,868,326 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 438,315 | 361,925 | 83,748 | 283,856 | 356,008 | 475,116 | 3,113,674 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 439,874 | 384,420 | 88,169 | 281,543 | 347,269 | 468,336 | 3,308,007 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 441,963 | 413,745 | 91,859 | 276,882 | 342,782 | 485,875 | 3,591,306 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 446,490 | 434,851 | 95,000 | 272,170 | 342,817 | 484,625 | 3,788,566 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 450,484 | 468,379 | 101,287 | 269,486 | 339,051 | 478,180 | 4,090,028 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 431,084 | 481,318 | 86,488 | 249,173 | 319,580 | 466,457 | 4,325,609 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 446,983 | 512,237 | 85,319 | 250,906 | 323,289 | 485,289 | 4,530,850 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 458,094 | 545,117 | 84,350 | 247,027 | 323,982 | 492,007 | 4,793,398 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 457,591 | 552,591 | 82,724 | 245,836 | 319,903 | 476,967 | 4,859,652 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 442,758 | 520,910 | 81,180 | 245,638 | 321,605 | 459,643 | 4,590,676 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 475,302 | 589,769 | 82,391 | 247,436 | 329,851 | 503,178 | 5,154,834 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 516,892 | 661,625 | 81,868 | 251,432 | 368,680 | 524,486 | 5,646,446 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 547,829 | 435,225 | 74,825 | 275,336 | 435,374 | 675,201 | 2,511,478 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 565,988 | 438,021 | 74,294 | 279,670 | 464,101 | 712,648 | 2,520,526 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 589,741 | 452,181 | 72,825 | 283,622 | 482,203 | 770,446 | 2,531,855 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 609,567 | 466,204 | 73,509 | 288,077 | 503,220 | 809,430 | 2,555,020 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 650,684 | 494,372 | 77,163 | 297,754 | 532,573 | 847,713 | 2,571,940 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 666,958 | 508,519 | 76,360 | 297,611 | 537,247 | 862,268 | 2,603,472 |

Note: Present population for 1856 to 1946, legal population for 1954, municipal population without double counts for 1962 to 2014

Source: Census results

Figure 48: Legal vs. present population in France (1881-1946)




Source: Census results

A.3.3 Population counted separately

The absolute numbers for the population counted separately are presented in Figure 50. Corresponding statistics are provided in Table 8. The share of the population counted separately in the total population is presented in Figure 49 and Table 7 presents corresponding descriptive statistics. Figure 51 and Figure 52 present the school boarders included in the population counted separately (1851-1954) respectively in absolute terms and as a share of the total population counted separately. Corresponding statistics at the departmental level are provided in Table 9 and Table 10 respectively.

Figure 49: Share of the population counted separately in France (1856-2014)



Source: Computed using census results

Note: Definitions adopted for the population counted separately are Population counted separately for 1856-1946 [A], Population counted separately without members of religious communities and retirement homes in 1954 [B], Total population (without double counts) minus population of the main places of residence [E] for 1962-2014. Definitions adopted for the total population are Present population [A] for 1856 to 1946, Total population [B] for 1954, Municipal population without double counts [C] for 1962 to 2014. See Section 2.2.2 for more details.


Table 7: Share of the population counted separately by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.0308 | 0.0238 | 0.0036 | 0.0164 | 0.0235 | 0.0367 | 0.1343 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.0195 | 0.0157 | 0.0018 | 0.0108 | 0.0156 | 0.0232 | 0.1232 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.0225 | 0.0122 | 0.0063 | 0.0144 | 0.0203 | 0.0264 | 0.0859 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.0269 | 0.0128 | 0.0080 | 0.0195 | 0.0240 | 0.0306 | 0.0980 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.0272 | 0.0124 | 0.0076 | 0.0199 | 0.0240 | 0.0308 | 0.0915 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.0293 | 0.0153 | 0.0091 | 0.0205 | 0.0248 | 0.0331 | 0.1094 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.0296 | 0.0170 | 0.0074 | 0.0205 | 0.0257 | 0.0317 | 0.1046 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.0307 | 0.0163 | 0.0091 | 0.0214 | 0.0271 | 0.0334 | 0.1113 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 0.0259 | 0.0148 | 0.0070 | 0.0178 | 0.0228 | 0.0289 | 0.1042 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.0273 | 0.0151 | 0.0075 | 0.0195 | 0.0244 | 0.0310 | 0.1156 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.0228 | 0.0099 | 0.0085 | 0.0165 | 0.0209 | 0.0258 | 0.0708 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.0226 | 0.0082 | 0.0089 | 0.0176 | 0.0216 | 0.0261 | 0.0750 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.0237 | 0.0102 | 0.0090 | 0.0178 | 0.0224 | 0.0266 | 0.0908 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.0278 | 0.0121 | 0.0102 | 0.0207 | 0.0249 | 0.0314 | 0.0884 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.0276 | 0.0083 | 0.0099 | 0.0222 | 0.0275 | 0.0327 | 0.0633 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.0263 | 0.0097 | 0.0105 | 0.0200 | 0.0252 | 0.0303 | 0.0775 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 0.0231 | 0.0062 | 0.0102 | 0.0193 | 0.0225 | 0.0264 | 0.0430 |
| Y1968 | 96 | 0.0269 | 0.0064 | 0.0139 | 0.0225 | 0.0266 | 0.0300 | 0.0441 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 0.0278 | 0.0060 | 0.0141 | 0.0237 | 0.0272 | 0.0310 | 0.0513 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.0249 | 0.0055 | 0.0130 | 0.0218 | 0.0245 | 0.0269 | 0.0552 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.0230 | 0.0046 | 0.0117 | 0.0200 | 0.0228 | 0.0253 | 0.0464 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.0231 | 0.0046 | 0.0126 | 0.0204 | 0.0226 | 0.0253 | 0.0506 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.0253 | 0.0055 | 0.0145 | 0.0219 | 0.0252 | 0.0273 | 0.0580 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 0.0246 | 0.0052 | 0.0157 | 0.0210 | 0.0243 | 0.0270 | 0.0543 |

Source: Computed using census results

Note: See Figure 49 for definitions adopted.

Figure 50: Population counted separately in France (1856-2014)



Source: Census results


Table 8: Population counted separately by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|---------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 14,334 | 17,223 | 1,012 | 5,334 | 8,758 | 15,887 | 120,809 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 9,080 | 12,607 | 104 | 3,842 | 5,146 | 9,543 | 88,633 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 9,892 | 9,987 | 1,538 | 4,978 | 6,741 | 11,256 | 78,126 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 11,459 | 10,816 | 1,775 | 6,381 | 8,938 | 13,546 | 90,379 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 11,675 | 10,426 | 1,992 | 6,363 | 9,122 | 14,030 | 84,042 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 12,547 | 12,082 | 2,372 | 6,589 | 9,755 | 15,115 | 100,448 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 12,641 | 12,063 | 1,908 | 6,317 | 8,784 | 14,828 | 95,299 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 13,097 | 12,440 | 2,364 | 6,509 | 8,989 | 15,457 | 98,436 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 11,306 | 12,392 | 1,821 | 5,570 | 7,895 | 13,432 | 103,640 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 11,963 | 12,671 | 1,875 | 5,899 | 8,278 | 14,534 | 103,659 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 10,029 | 11,577 | 1,240 | 5,000 | 6,787 | 11,833 | 95,723 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 10,020 | 10,612 | 1,826 | 4,877 | 6,741 | 12,308 | 85,297 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 10,678 | 11,374 | 1,721 | 4,895 | 7,291 | 12,310 | 89,570 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 12,365 | 13,115 | 1,999 | 5,513 | 8,323 | 14,113 | 100,446 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 11,576 | 10,039 | 1,897 | 6,399 | 8,757 | 13,739 | 68,811 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 11,145 | 9,227 | 2,297 | 6,424 | 8,197 | 13,666 | 57,613 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 11,957 | 14,188 | 2,012 | 5,187 | 8,028 | 12,427 | 110,427 |
| Y1968 | 96 | 13,906 | 11,514 | 2,227 | 6,347 | 10,596 | 17,625 | 60,344 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 14,896 | 11,453 | 2,476 | 6,622 | 11,322 | 19,727 | 58,590 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 13,596 | 10,118 | 2,622 | 6,715 | 10,318 | 18,582 | 49,347 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 13,115 | 9,858 | 2,510 | 6,399 | 9,868 | 17,264 | 50,792 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 13,552 | 9,947 | 1,496 | 6,932 | 10,501 | 18,442 | 48,056 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 15,290 | 10,503 | 2,218 | 8,503 | 12,003 | 21,670 | 51,200 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 15,248 | 10,555 | 2,381 | 8,118 | 12,126 | 21,887 | 53,573 |

Note: Definitions adopted are Population counted separately for 1856-1946 [A], Population counted separately without members of religious communities and retirement homes in 1954 [B], Total population (without double counts) minus population of the main places of residence [E] for 1962-2014

Source: Census results

Figure 51: Number of school boarders in the population counted separately in France (1856-1954)




Source: Census results

Table 9: Number of school boarders in the population counted separately by *département* (1856-1954)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 6,213 | 9,180 | 536 | 1,400 | 3,241 | 5,322 | 43,299 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 2,574 | 3,367 | 316 | 1,170 | 1,790 | 2,652 | 28,625 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 2,784 | 3,421 | 332 | 1,257 | 1,916 | 3,018 | 29,262 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 3,222 | 3,634 | 476 | 1,479 | 2,263 | 3,616 | 28,702 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 3,477 | 3,570 | 519 | 1,630 | 2,629 | 3,815 | 28,503 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 3,251 | 3,601 | 577 | 1,586 | 2,336 | 3,401 | 29,071 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 3,506 | 3,216 | 676 | 1,933 | 2,529 | 3,880 | 22,896 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 4,079 | 3,188 | 576 | 2,107 | 3,107 | 5,006 | 17,255 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 5,294 | 3,912 | 836 | 3,020 | 4,385 | 6,602 | 25,805 |

Source: Census results

Figure 52: Share of school boarders in the population counted separately in France (1856-1954)



Source: Census results

Table 10: Share of school boarders in the population counted separately by *département* (1856-1954)


| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.4126 | 0.2047 | 0.0301 | 0.2430 | 0.3980 | 0.5693 | 0.9283 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 0.2433 | 0.1073 | 0.0409 | 0.1773 | 0.2287 | 0.2989 | 0.5444 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.2497 | 0.1025 | 0.0331 | 0.1971 | 0.2374 | 0.2873 | 0.5681 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.3546 | 0.1325 | 0.0797 | 0.2771 | 0.3438 | 0.4327 | 0.6710 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.3780 | 0.1229 | 0.0869 | 0.3024 | 0.3753 | 0.4444 | 0.7090 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.3324 | 0.1132 | 0.0606 | 0.2599 | 0.3269 | 0.3928 | 0.6621 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.3252 | 0.1188 | 0.0574 | 0.2463 | 0.3129 | 0.3924 | 0.5981 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.3799 | 0.1248 | 0.1342 | 0.3059 | 0.3737 | 0.4634 | 0.6711 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.5121 | 0.1348 | 0.1018 | 0.3971 | 0.5261 | 0.6026 | 0.7941 |

Source: Census results

A.3.4 Age groups


The share of the total population aged more than 20 and more than 60 are presented in Figure 53 and Figure 54. Descriptive statistics on the share of the population aged more than 20 and more than 60 by *département* are provided in Table 11 and Table 12 respectively.

Figure 53: Share of total population aged more than 20 in France (1856-2014)



Source: Census results

Figure 54: Share of total population aged more than 60 in France (1856-2014)



Source: Census results

Note: Definitions adopted for the total population are Present population [A] for 1856 to 1946, Total population [C] for 1954, Municipal population without double counts [D] for 1962 to 2014. See Section 2.2.2 for more details.

Table 11: Share of total population aged more than 20 by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.6327 | 0.0380 | 0.5666 | 0.6033 | 0.6319 | 0.6560 | 0.7234 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.6373 | 0.0354 | 0.5636 | 0.6127 | 0.6366 | 0.6595 | 0.7245 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.6336 | 0.0363 | 0.5530 | 0.6060 | 0.6341 | 0.6564 | 0.7131 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.6421 | 0.0377 | 0.5718 | 0.6107 | 0.6424 | 0.6726 | 0.7179 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.6415 | 0.0376 | 0.5710 | 0.6099 | 0.6396 | 0.6717 | 0.7201 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.6439 | 0.0404 | 0.5629 | 0.6063 | 0.6465 | 0.6746 | 0.7245 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.6441 | 0.0428 | 0.5411 | 0.6053 | 0.6477 | 0.6759 | 0.7178 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.6473 | 0.0403 | 0.5470 | 0.6181 | 0.6536 | 0.6814 | 0.7211 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.6515 | 0.0405 | 0.5439 | 0.6249 | 0.6566 | 0.6847 | 0.7232 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.6501 | 0.0392 | 0.5411 | 0.6260 | 0.6543 | 0.6777 | 0.7303 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 0.6563 | 0.0384 | 0.5428 | 0.6350 | 0.6591 | 0.6879 | 0.7345 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.6584 | 0.0370 | 0.5469 | 0.6364 | 0.6618 | 0.6855 | 0.7300 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.6782 | 0.0347 | 0.5756 | 0.6570 | 0.6805 | 0.7015 | 0.7471 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.6843 | 0.0313 | 0.5980 | 0.6668 | 0.6864 | 0.7049 | 0.7561 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.6913 | 0.0291 | 0.6181 | 0.6745 | 0.6902 | 0.7116 | 0.7640 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.6924 | 0.0287 | 0.6257 | 0.6742 | 0.6935 | 0.7155 | 0.7652 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.6943 | 0.0285 | 0.6423 | 0.6707 | 0.6937 | 0.7172 | 0.7673 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.6950 | 0.0284 | 0.6436 | 0.6713 | 0.6929 | 0.7177 | 0.7678 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 0.6730 | 0.0376 | 0.4627 | 0.6457 | 0.6751 | 0.6971 | 0.7609 |
| Y1968 | 96 | 0.6625 | 0.0340 | 0.6041 | 0.6350 | 0.6607 | 0.6841 | 0.7809 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 0.6821 | 0.0340 | 0.6322 | 0.6538 | 0.6769 | 0.7031 | 0.8010 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.7034 | 0.0298 | 0.6535 | 0.6784 | 0.6993 | 0.7261 | 0.8029 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.7297 | 0.0281 | 0.6765 | 0.7085 | 0.7274 | 0.7517 | 0.8017 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.7514 | 0.0250 | 0.6965 | 0.7343 | 0.7486 | 0.7691 | 0.8109 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.7621 | 0.0215 | 0.7123 | 0.7479 | 0.7622 | 0.7785 | 0.8103 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 0.7650 | 0.0216 | 0.7116 | 0.7499 | 0.7641 | 0.7825 | 0.8149 |

Source: Census results

Table 12: Share of total population aged more than 60 by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.1027 | 0.0204 | 0.0627 | 0.0880 | 0.1025 | 0.1150 | 0.1519 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.1099 | 0.0206 | 0.0691 | 0.0945 | 0.1092 | 0.1220 | 0.1682 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.1144 | 0.0219 | 0.0735 | 0.0993 | 0.1134 | 0.1271 | 0.1742 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.1195 | 0.0213 | 0.0756 | 0.1054 | 0.1184 | 0.1330 | 0.1698 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.1225 | 0.0219 | 0.0682 | 0.1095 | 0.1226 | 0.1354 | 0.1761 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.1283 | 0.0245 | 0.0635 | 0.1095 | 0.1274 | 0.1459 | 0.1889 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.1277 | 0.0252 | 0.0574 | 0.1098 | 0.1288 | 0.1468 | 0.1773 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.1329 | 0.0247 | 0.0796 | 0.1152 | 0.1351 | 0.1515 | 0.1795 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.1332 | 0.0256 | 0.0815 | 0.1137 | 0.1362 | 0.1496 | 0.1896 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.1334 | 0.0233 | 0.0819 | 0.1158 | 0.1357 | 0.1477 | 0.1827 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 0.1359 | 0.0237 | 0.0835 | 0.1196 | 0.1381 | 0.1491 | 0.1866 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.1371 | 0.0238 | 0.0818 | 0.1209 | 0.1389 | 0.1510 | 0.1912 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.1510 | 0.0278 | 0.0885 | 0.1338 | 0.1530 | 0.1705 | 0.2120 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.1529 | 0.0278 | 0.0899 | 0.1343 | 0.1550 | 0.1723 | 0.2120 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.1554 | 0.0282 | 0.0879 | 0.1391 | 0.1559 | 0.1741 | 0.2142 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.1619 | 0.0278 | 0.0970 | 0.1433 | 0.1644 | 0.1814 | 0.2235 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.1711 | 0.0249 | 0.1196 | 0.1524 | 0.1738 | 0.1884 | 0.2327 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.1793 | 0.0263 | 0.1159 | 0.1593 | 0.1801 | 0.1967 | 0.2488 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 0.1909 | 0.0285 | 0.1232 | 0.1693 | 0.1899 | 0.2117 | 0.2692 |
| Y1968 | 96 | 0.1893 | 0.0328 | 0.1247 | 0.1657 | 0.1852 | 0.2135 | 0.2848 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 0.1988 | 0.0397 | 0.1115 | 0.1693 | 0.1940 | 0.2289 | 0.3115 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.1907 | 0.0389 | 0.1094 | 0.1586 | 0.1857 | 0.2176 | 0.2966 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.2087 | 0.0419 | 0.1189 | 0.1759 | 0.2047 | 0.2404 | 0.3164 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.2257 | 0.0422 | 0.1351 | 0.1919 | 0.2244 | 0.2546 | 0.3337 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.2459 | 0.0406 | 0.1506 | 0.2154 | 0.2462 | 0.2774 | 0.3372 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 0.2690 | 0.0433 | 0.1618 | 0.2385 | 0.2707 | 0.3039 | 0.3625 |

Source: Census results

Note: Definitions adopted for the total population are Present population [A] for 1856 to 1946, Total population [B] for 1954, Municipal population without double counts [C] for 1962 to 2014. See Section 2.2.2 for more details.

A.3.5 Servants

Definitions of servants have experienced a high variability over time, which require us to treat the raw figures with caution. In 1856, there were no figures on the number of domestic servants. For the 1861 to 1881 censuses, the number of domestic servants is reported for each sector and profession of their employer; it also includes the family (if any) of these domestic servants, as mentioned in [Statistique de la France \(1869\)](#), p.xlij. In 1886 and 1891, the classification of servants changes: guidelines exposed in [Statistique de la France \(1888\)](#) require the domestic servants of the agricultural sector to be reclassified as agricultural workers. This reclassification was in fact only partially respected, as mentioned by the statisticians themselves in subsequent census results. Moreover, the 1891 census presents the population of domestic servants by age category, showing that one third of them were aged under 20. From 1896 to 1906 is introduced a new methodology for reporting occupational categories, which presents domestic servants in the group 8B, as exposed in [Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes \(1899\)](#), p.125. Servants of the agricultural sector, as well as many of the industry, commerce and transport sector, are reclassified as workers, which makes the comparison with previous censuses difficult, as explicitly stated in [Statistique générale de la France \(1908\)](#), p.57. In 1911, the report on professions does not differentiate between servants and non-servants: for instance, cooks are placed in the same category as the personnel of restaurants - which means that we cannot use these figures for the recovery of household structures. From 1921 to 1936, the 1896 methodology is used. In 1946, a new classification is introduced (see [INSEE \(1952\)](#)), defining domestic services (p.8 and pp.120-121); however, no figures are available at the departmental level. In 1954, two different statistics are available: (1) domestic services, as was the case in 1946; (2) domestic servants (*gens de maison*). In 1954, figures for *gens de maison* are also available, and these are explicitly defined as servants living with their employers (in [INSEE \(1964c\)](#), p.45). A new variable is also introduced in the 1962 census results by *département* ([INSEE \(1964b\)](#)), which corresponds to the number of domestic servants and employees housed by the household head. In 1968 and 1975, both *gens de maison* and housed domestic servants and employees are available; in 1982, only housed domestic servants and employees are available. We did not find figures on domestic servants at the departmental level for the following censuses. To sum up, Table 13 presents the definitions we will use as a basis of our analysis: the numerous definitional changes remain problematic. Raw statistics on the absolute number of servants as presented in historical census results are provided in Table 14. Figures were not available for 1856 and for 1946 at the departmental level. For the 1861-1891 period, Table 15 presents statistics on the share of servants in agriculture, Table 16 present the share in industry and Table 17 the share in commerce and transport.

To build consistent historical series, we applied the 1896-1936 definition for the 1861-1881 period, i.e. we subtracted part of the servants from agriculture, industry, commerce and transport from the raw total number of servants for the 1861-1881 period. We present a central estimate as well as an upper bound and a lower bound, depending on the assumption adopted for the share of servants to be reclassified as workers.

- 80% to 100% of servants in agriculture are reclassified as workers (central assumption: 90%)
- 50% to 100% of servants in industry are reclassified as workers (central assumption: 75%)
- 50% to 100% of servants in commerce and trade are reclassified as workers (central assumption: 75%)

We did not use data from the 1886 and 1891 census results as methodological changes were unevenly respected in different regions, which led to unreliable figures. We also corrected the figures for 1954 for consistency with the definition adopted for 1962-1954: we assumed that the ratio between *gens de maison* (available both in 1954 and 1962) and housed domestic servants and employees was the same in each *département* in 1954 and 1962. The formula is the following:

$$servants_{1954} = gensdemaison_{1954} * \frac{servants_{1962}}{gensdemaison_{1962}}$$

The share of servants in the total population (after the corrections detailed above) is presented in Figure 55. We observe an increasing trend in the share of servants in the total population from 1861 to 1881, consistent with conclusions from the reference work by [Marchand and Thélot \(1991\)](#). They

estimated that the total number of servants was around 3% of total population at the beginning of the 1880s (see [Marchand and Thélot \(1991\)](#), p.103, for a detailed discussion of the evolution of the share of servants in the active population in the 19th and 20th Centuries, and pp.182-187 for corresponding data series from 1851 to 1982). Although their estimates are very reliable for estimating the number of servants as members of the labour force, they do not correspond the measure we need, as they consider that house cleaners not leaving with their employers are servants, while we are only interested in estimating the number of servants considered as household members and thus included in their employers' household in the census results. Depending on the corrections implemented to make the 1861-1891 data consistent with the subsequent definitions in use, we find a maximum share of servants in the population is reached between the 1880s and 1900. The share of servants in the total population decreases then continuously and becomes insignificant in the 1980s. Both World Wars were periods of acceleration of this decreasing trend. Moreover, the heterogeneity between *départements* decreased over time, as presented in Table 18.

Finally, Figure 56 presents the age distribution of the servants for the year 1891, which is the only year for which it was available. Figure for all servants, servants of the agriculture sector and figures from the non-agriculture sectors are provided, showing that there is a higher share of servants aged less than 20 in the agriculture sector than in other sectors. Corresponding statistics at the departmental level are displayed in Table 19.

Table 13: Domestic servants and housed employees, definitions, 1856 to 2014 censuses

| Census years | Available variables | Variable adopted |
|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| 1856 | <i>No variable available</i> | - |
| 1861 to 1881 | (A) Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including agricultural and industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants | (A) |
| 1886, 1891 | (B) Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants (agricultural servants partially reclassified) | (B) |
| 1896 to 1906 | (C) Occupational group 8B | (C) |
| 1911 | <i>No variable available</i> | - |
| 1921 to 1936 | (C) Occupational group 8B | (C) |
| 1946 | <i>No variable available at the departmental level</i> | - |
| 1954 | (D) Employed in the sector of domestic services (E) <i>Gens de maison</i> | (E) |
| 1962 to 1975 | (E) <i>Gens de maison</i> (F) Housed domestic servants and employees | (F) |
| 1982 | (F) Housed domestic servants and employees | (F) |

Sources: 1856 to 1982 census results

Table 14: Raw number of servants by *département*, as presented in the historical census results (1861-1982)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| Y1861 | 89 | 23,129 | 15,704 | 2,910 | 14,178 | 19,668 | 27,381 | 118,298 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 24,767 | 17,663 | 3,907 | 12,788 | 20,592 | 30,069 | 126,727 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 25,064 | 18,464 | 1,998 | 12,782 | 21,080 | 29,337 | 125,660 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 26,889 | 19,433 | 3,506 | 15,278 | 24,674 | 32,662 | 144,086 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 29,365 | 25,865 | 3,136 | 14,143 | 23,434 | 37,702 | 203,212 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 22,416 | 21,035 | 1,959 | 10,448 | 14,665 | 32,215 | 161,793 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 18,499 | 19,567 | 1,114 | 8,787 | 13,229 | 22,918 | 161,431 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 10,528 | 25,795 | 943 | 3,856 | 6,581 | 9,435 | 241,081 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 10,993 | 25,757 | 902 | 3,912 | 7,216 | 10,030 | 240,783 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 10,877 | 26,220 | 770 | 3,455 | 6,684 | 10,012 | 244,235 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 10,684 | 25,547 | 958 | 3,590 | 6,458 | 10,203 | 237,387 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 8,535 | 23,376 | 547 | 2,742 | 4,964 | 7,281 | 221,830 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 8,669 | 24,511 | 583 | 2,501 | 4,846 | 7,088 | 232,757 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 8,819 | 24,848 | 608 | 2,554 | 4,829 | 7,626 | 235,765 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 8,436 | 22,738 | 636 | 2,503 | 4,658 | 7,584 | 215,465 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 3,564 | 7,660 | 312 | 1,407 | 2,276 | 3,152 | 72,320 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 4,824 | 6,035 | 405 | 2,278 | 3,870 | 5,270 | 55,207 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 3,270 | 3,245 | 292 | 1,628 | 2,776 | 3,796 | 29,672 |
| Y1975 | 95 | 1,404 | 1,349 | 125 | 810 | 1,135 | 1,575 | 12,510 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 572 | 624 | 52 | 340 | 464 | 685 | 5,928 |

Source: Census results

Definitions adopted are Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including agricultural and industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants in 1861-1881 [A], Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants (agricultural servants partially reclassified) in 1886-1891 [B], Occupational group 8B in 1896-1936 [C], *Gens de maison* in 1954 [E], Housed domestic servants and employees in 1962-1982 [F]

Table 15: Share of servants in agriculture by *département* (1861-1891)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.5449 | 0.1683 | 0.0191 | 0.4278 | 0.5661 | 0.6807 | 0.8809 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.5915 | 0.1702 | 0.0142 | 0.4788 | 0.6222 | 0.7203 | 0.8876 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.5666 | 0.1746 | 0.0238 | 0.4579 | 0.6008 | 0.6921 | 0.8779 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.5806 | 0.1725 | 0.0138 | 0.4640 | 0.5943 | 0.7136 | 0.8839 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.5597 | 0.1766 | 0.0172 | 0.4425 | 0.5689 | 0.7078 | 0.8615 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.4649 | 0.1796 | 0.0226 | 0.3390 | 0.4573 | 0.6115 | 0.8619 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.4437 | 0.1674 | 0.0172 | 0.3135 | 0.4548 | 0.5371 | 0.8060 |

Source: Census results

Note: Census results before corrections. Definitions adopted are Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including agricultural and industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants in 1861-1881 [A], Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants (agricultural servants partially reclassified) in 1886-1891 [B].

Table 16: Share of servants in industry by *département* (1861-1891)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.1745 | 0.0795 | 0.0366 | 0.1177 | 0.1555 | 0.2128 | 0.4281 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.1378 | 0.0656 | 0.0347 | 0.0971 | 0.1244 | 0.1768 | 0.3535 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.0816 | 0.0449 | 0.0084 | 0.0454 | 0.0753 | 0.1050 | 0.2467 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.0888 | 0.0518 | 0.0042 | 0.0525 | 0.0819 | 0.1085 | 0.2919 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.0867 | 0.0473 | 0.0064 | 0.0575 | 0.0756 | 0.1106 | 0.3226 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.0991 | 0.0673 | 0.0128 | 0.0579 | 0.0835 | 0.1269 | 0.3902 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.0965 | 0.0471 | 0.0172 | 0.0616 | 0.0893 | 0.1223 | 0.2579 |

Source: Census results

Note: Census results before corrections. Definitions adopted are Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including agricultural and industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants in 1861-1881 [A], Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants (agricultural servants partially reclassified) in 1886-1891 [B].


Table 17: Share of servants in commerce and transport by *département* (1861-1891)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.0413 | 0.0245 | 0.0094 | 0.0231 | 0.0370 | 0.0531 | 0.1316 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.0440 | 0.0250 | 0.0012 | 0.0255 | 0.0389 | 0.0553 | 0.1256 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.1193 | 0.0778 | 0.0216 | 0.0668 | 0.1051 | 0.1369 | 0.5014 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.1015 | 0.0642 | 0.0173 | 0.0557 | 0.0873 | 0.1232 | 0.4340 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.1329 | 0.0729 | 0.0223 | 0.0701 | 0.1175 | 0.1710 | 0.3225 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.1405 | 0.0688 | 0.0208 | 0.1000 | 0.1271 | 0.1747 | 0.3476 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.1507 | 0.0577 | 0.0446 | 0.1151 | 0.1424 | 0.1798 | 0.3477 |

Source: Census results

Note: Census results before corrections. Definitions adopted are Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including agricultural and industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants in 1861-1881 [A], Domestic servants attached to the household head, by sector and profession, including industrial servants and the family of the domestic servants (agricultural servants partially reclassified) in 1886-1891 [B].

Figure 55: Servants as a share of total population in France (1861-1982)



Source: Computed using census results


Table 18: Servants as a share of total population by *département* (1861-1982)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.0176 | 0.0061 | 0.0069 | 0.0136 | 0.0164 | 0.0199 | 0.0445 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.0175 | 0.0058 | 0.0075 | 0.0132 | 0.0166 | 0.0201 | 0.0438 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.0188 | 0.0064 | 0.0075 | 0.0140 | 0.0180 | 0.0223 | 0.0454 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.0200 | 0.0069 | 0.0082 | 0.0146 | 0.0192 | 0.0236 | 0.0469 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.0206 | 0.0074 | 0.0071 | 0.0158 | 0.0201 | 0.0240 | 0.0449 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.0187 | 0.0094 | 0.0072 | 0.0127 | 0.0168 | 0.0212 | 0.0729 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.0199 | 0.0092 | 0.0081 | 0.0143 | 0.0190 | 0.0238 | 0.0670 |
| Y1906 | 87 | 0.0192 | 0.0095 | 0.0074 | 0.0133 | 0.0166 | 0.0226 | 0.0645 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.0187 | 0.0084 | 0.0076 | 0.0129 | 0.0164 | 0.0225 | 0.0580 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.0152 | 0.0075 | 0.0042 | 0.0102 | 0.0129 | 0.0191 | 0.0513 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.0147 | 0.0071 | 0.0055 | 0.0101 | 0.0123 | 0.0182 | 0.0514 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.0147 | 0.0068 | 0.0045 | 0.0102 | 0.0128 | 0.0176 | 0.0492 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.0143 | 0.0059 | 0.0056 | 0.0108 | 0.0123 | 0.0165 | 0.0443 |
| Y1954 | 89 | 0.0114 | 0.0046 | 0.0040 | 0.0077 | 0.0114 | 0.0142 | 0.0243 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 0.0106 | 0.0061 | 0.0035 | 0.0071 | 0.0095 | 0.0132 | 0.0494 |
| Y1968 | 94 | 0.0069 | 0.0034 | 0.0017 | 0.0042 | 0.0063 | 0.0089 | 0.0172 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.0030 | 0.0015 | 0.0005 | 0.0017 | 0.0027 | 0.0037 | 0.0072 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.0012 | 0.0007 | 0.0003 | 0.0007 | 0.0011 | 0.0015 | 0.0033 |

Source: Computed using census results

Note for tables : Figures for 1861-1881 were corrected for consistency with the following period, i.e. part of the domestic servants attached to the household head from agriculture, industry, commerce and transport, were subtracted from the raw figures presented in census results [A. Definitions adopted are then Occupational group 8B in 1896-1936 [C] and Housed domestic servants and employees in 1962-1982 [F]. Figures for 1954 were corrected for consistency with the 1962-1982 definition. See Section 2.2.2 for more details.

Figure 56: Age distribution of servants in France in 1891



Source: Census results

Table 19: Age distribution of servants by *département* in 1891


| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| All servants | 87 | 0.6553 | 0.0665 | 0.4890 | 0.6048 | 0.6580 | 0.7026 | 0.8275 |
| Agriculture | 87 | 0.5843 | 0.0839 | 0.3769 | 0.5266 | 0.5755 | 0.6489 | 0.7588 |
| Non-agriculture | 87 | 0.7167 | 0.0516 | 0.5860 | 0.6825 | 0.7170 | 0.7437 | 0.8964 |

Source: Census results

A.3.6 Marital status


Figure 57 and Figure 58 present the evolution of the number of women and men by marital status over the period of interest. Figure 59 and Figure 60 present the share of married individuals in the female and male population aged more than 15 by *département* for 1856-2014. Table 20 and Table 21 present corresponding descriptive statistics. Figure 59 and Figure 60 present the share of single individuals in the female and male population aged more than 15 by *département* for 1856-2009. Table 22 and Table 23 present corresponding descriptive statistics.

Figure 57: Number of women aged more than 15 by marital status in France (1856-2009)



Source: Census results


Figure 58: Number of men aged more than 15 by marital status in France (1856-2009)



Source: Census results


Note: 1906 census results did not distinguished between widowed and divorced. 2014 census results only distinguished between married and non-married.

Figure 59: Share of married the female population aged more than 15, by *département* (1856-2014)



Source: Census results

Figure 60: Share of married in the male population aged more than 15, by *département* (1856-2014)



Source: Census results

Table 20: Share of married women by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.5393 | 0.0617 | 0.4174 | 0.4964 | 0.5447 | 0.5841 | 0.6528 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.5471 | 0.0612 | 0.4229 | 0.5077 | 0.5459 | 0.5910 | 0.6498 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.5541 | 0.0610 | 0.4285 | 0.5163 | 0.5556 | 0.6010 | 0.6593 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.5534 | 0.0571 | 0.4089 | 0.5188 | 0.5629 | 0.5973 | 0.6597 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.5624 | 0.0544 | 0.4456 | 0.5274 | 0.5727 | 0.6076 | 0.6512 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.5509 | 0.0574 | 0.4268 | 0.5093 | 0.5528 | 0.6029 | 0.6516 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.5398 | 0.0837 | 0.0012 | 0.4962 | 0.5478 | 0.6009 | 0.6664 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.5363 | 0.0542 | 0.3949 | 0.4991 | 0.5409 | 0.5756 | 0.6196 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.5462 | 0.0500 | 0.4315 | 0.5089 | 0.5579 | 0.5879 | 0.6286 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.5531 | 0.0461 | 0.4501 | 0.5143 | 0.5643 | 0.5910 | 0.6397 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.5676 | 0.0424 | 0.4586 | 0.5340 | 0.5683 | 0.6027 | 0.6429 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.5342 | 0.0374 | 0.4403 | 0.5070 | 0.5399 | 0.5672 | 0.6023 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.5569 | 0.0373 | 0.4521 | 0.5319 | 0.5619 | 0.5893 | 0.6405 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.5721 | 0.0375 | 0.4460 | 0.5483 | 0.5786 | 0.6020 | 0.6286 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.5863 | 0.0355 | 0.4549 | 0.5601 | 0.5945 | 0.6137 | 0.6512 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.5494 | 0.0289 | 0.4431 | 0.5290 | 0.5557 | 0.5742 | 0.6077 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.5753 | 0.0288 | 0.4723 | 0.5549 | 0.5802 | 0.5969 | 0.6302 |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.5915 | 0.0241 | 0.5285 | 0.5730 | 0.5959 | 0.6091 | 0.6511 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.5856 | 0.0316 | 0.4261 | 0.5735 | 0.5902 | 0.6040 | 0.6506 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.5980 | 0.0248 | 0.4557 | 0.5851 | 0.6011 | 0.6124 | 0.6588 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.5834 | 0.0258 | 0.4162 | 0.5712 | 0.5870 | 0.5976 | 0.6289 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.5398 | 0.0264 | 0.3753 | 0.5321 | 0.5426 | 0.5539 | 0.5899 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.4995 | 0.0277 | 0.3469 | 0.4861 | 0.5058 | 0.5142 | 0.5554 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.4678 | 0.0276 | 0.3257 | 0.4527 | 0.4724 | 0.4829 | 0.5308 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 0.4411 | 0.0265 | 0.3067 | 0.4245 | 0.4439 | 0.4566 | 0.5043 |


Source: Census results

Table 21: Share of married men by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.5604 | 0.0593 | 0.4575 | 0.5070 | 0.5645 | 0.6006 | 0.7077 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.5583 | 0.0578 | 0.4357 | 0.5042 | 0.5602 | 0.6005 | 0.6673 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.5744 | 0.0541 | 0.4568 | 0.5298 | 0.5786 | 0.6155 | 0.6743 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.5681 | 0.0552 | 0.4224 | 0.5233 | 0.5723 | 0.6122 | 0.6691 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.5734 | 0.0522 | 0.4180 | 0.5295 | 0.5790 | 0.6138 | 0.6664 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.5572 | 0.0554 | 0.3669 | 0.5183 | 0.5620 | 0.6032 | 0.6604 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.5461 | 0.0597 | 0.4088 | 0.5081 | 0.5480 | 0.5988 | 0.6636 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.5502 | 0.0581 | 0.3943 | 0.5116 | 0.5665 | 0.5914 | 0.6415 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.5520 | 0.0550 | 0.4145 | 0.5202 | 0.5609 | 0.5937 | 0.6424 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.5699 | 0.0513 | 0.4367 | 0.5328 | 0.5787 | 0.6086 | 0.6563 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.5841 | 0.0501 | 0.4583 | 0.5519 | 0.5860 | 0.6227 | 0.6618 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.5949 | 0.0441 | 0.4902 | 0.5649 | 0.6016 | 0.6289 | 0.6719 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.6103 | 0.0402 | 0.4882 | 0.5863 | 0.6172 | 0.6400 | 0.6781 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.6195 | 0.0396 | 0.4771 | 0.5953 | 0.6273 | 0.6469 | 0.6885 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.6374 | 0.0437 | 0.4907 | 0.6173 | 0.6547 | 0.6677 | 0.7009 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.6118 | 0.0329 | 0.4882 | 0.5957 | 0.6200 | 0.6345 | 0.6766 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.6349 | 0.0318 | 0.5309 | 0.6218 | 0.6408 | 0.6567 | 0.6937 |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.6418 | 0.0309 | 0.4845 | 0.6312 | 0.6474 | 0.6575 | 0.7223 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.6372 | 0.0223 | 0.5563 | 0.6267 | 0.6384 | 0.6501 | 0.6869 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.6435 | 0.0263 | 0.4893 | 0.6363 | 0.6476 | 0.6574 | 0.6905 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.6283 | 0.0200 | 0.5320 | 0.6196 | 0.6293 | 0.6410 | 0.6603 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.5824 | 0.0195 | 0.4715 | 0.5734 | 0.5847 | 0.5945 | 0.6192 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.5392 | 0.0203 | 0.4280 | 0.5280 | 0.5420 | 0.5526 | 0.5815 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.5086 | 0.0232 | 0.3895 | 0.4961 | 0.5105 | 0.5232 | 0.5622 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 0.4796 | 0.0230 | 0.3662 | 0.4665 | 0.4818 | 0.4937 | 0.5360 |


Source: Census results

Figure 61: Share of singles in the female population aged more than 15, by *département* (1856-2009)



Source: Census results

Figure 62: Share of singles in the male population aged more than 15, by *département* (1856-2009)



Source: Census results

Table 22: Share of single women by *département* (1856-2009)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.3299 | 0.0654 | 0.1997 | 0.2837 | 0.3256 | 0.3847 | 0.4598 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.3224 | 0.0660 | 0.2046 | 0.2757 | 0.3246 | 0.3709 | 0.4564 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.3129 | 0.0653 | 0.1911 | 0.2661 | 0.3061 | 0.3631 | 0.4437 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.3003 | 0.0635 | 0.1694 | 0.2535 | 0.2988 | 0.3476 | 0.4808 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.2894 | 0.0599 | 0.1758 | 0.2458 | 0.2788 | 0.3337 | 0.4080 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.3064 | 0.0654 | 0.1782 | 0.2567 | 0.2976 | 0.3584 | 0.4558 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.3154 | 0.0702 | 0.1833 | 0.2573 | 0.3086 | 0.3663 | 0.4584 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.3202 | 0.0656 | 0.2056 | 0.2721 | 0.3119 | 0.3727 | 0.5114 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.3052 | 0.0625 | 0.2031 | 0.2577 | 0.2937 | 0.3443 | 0.4835 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.2832 | 0.0537 | 0.1720 | 0.2460 | 0.2684 | 0.3227 | 0.3964 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.2637 | 0.0517 | 0.1609 | 0.2228 | 0.2606 | 0.3054 | 0.4037 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.2789 | 0.0511 | 0.1770 | 0.2410 | 0.2705 | 0.3165 | 0.4111 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.2633 | 0.0493 | 0.1561 | 0.2245 | 0.2602 | 0.2979 | 0.4157 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.2469 | 0.0472 | 0.1639 | 0.2093 | 0.2409 | 0.2801 | 0.4216 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.2234 | 0.0443 | 0.1455 | 0.1878 | 0.2180 | 0.2533 | 0.4108 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.2539 | 0.0386 | 0.1916 | 0.2247 | 0.2441 | 0.2844 | 0.4046 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.2333 | 0.0354 | 0.1795 | 0.2048 | 0.2256 | 0.2635 | 0.3703 |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.2212 | 0.0270 | 0.1786 | 0.1993 | 0.2139 | 0.2431 | 0.2920 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.2365 | 0.0365 | 0.1897 | 0.2127 | 0.2298 | 0.2502 | 0.4405 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.2251 | 0.0228 | 0.1864 | 0.2081 | 0.2251 | 0.2402 | 0.3207 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.2344 | 0.0247 | 0.1891 | 0.2178 | 0.2315 | 0.2500 | 0.3578 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.2684 | 0.0295 | 0.2159 | 0.2475 | 0.2635 | 0.2848 | 0.4170 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.2952 | 0.0340 | 0.2409 | 0.2700 | 0.2878 | 0.3190 | 0.4601 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.3170 | 0.0357 | 0.2672 | 0.2924 | 0.3070 | 0.3373 | 0.4961 |

Source: Census results

Table 23: Share of single men by *département* (1856-2009)


| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 0.3686 | 0.0582 | 0.2241 | 0.3322 | 0.3630 | 0.4199 | 0.4731 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 0.3705 | 0.0577 | 0.2613 | 0.3278 | 0.3654 | 0.4247 | 0.4917 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 0.3516 | 0.0539 | 0.2537 | 0.3073 | 0.3479 | 0.3930 | 0.4679 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 0.3522 | 0.0571 | 0.2486 | 0.3090 | 0.3465 | 0.4003 | 0.5117 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 0.3501 | 0.0550 | 0.2515 | 0.3087 | 0.3453 | 0.3968 | 0.5285 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 0.3661 | 0.0570 | 0.2573 | 0.3211 | 0.3628 | 0.4042 | 0.5920 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 0.3782 | 0.0636 | 0.2549 | 0.3226 | 0.3762 | 0.4238 | 0.5381 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 0.3723 | 0.0622 | 0.2633 | 0.3262 | 0.3555 | 0.4158 | 0.5596 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 0.3716 | 0.0595 | 0.2730 | 0.3286 | 0.3660 | 0.4107 | 0.5366 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 0.3555 | 0.0546 | 0.2656 | 0.3122 | 0.3441 | 0.3981 | 0.5134 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 0.3424 | 0.0536 | 0.2612 | 0.3000 | 0.3389 | 0.3809 | 0.4898 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 0.3282 | 0.0487 | 0.2440 | 0.2882 | 0.3185 | 0.3638 | 0.4610 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 0.3184 | 0.0439 | 0.2427 | 0.2834 | 0.3098 | 0.3449 | 0.4344 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 0.3125 | 0.0437 | 0.2395 | 0.2795 | 0.3025 | 0.3389 | 0.4560 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 0.2922 | 0.0464 | 0.2269 | 0.2590 | 0.2753 | 0.3138 | 0.4433 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 0.3193 | 0.0356 | 0.2631 | 0.2924 | 0.3086 | 0.3459 | 0.4492 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 0.3027 | 0.0345 | 0.2455 | 0.2769 | 0.2949 | 0.3251 | 0.4084 |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.3024 | 0.0335 | 0.2064 | 0.2835 | 0.2959 | 0.3125 | 0.4707 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.3108 | 0.0228 | 0.2654 | 0.2947 | 0.3073 | 0.3250 | 0.3900 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.3040 | 0.0273 | 0.2585 | 0.2885 | 0.3017 | 0.3143 | 0.4698 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.3137 | 0.0211 | 0.2723 | 0.3006 | 0.3123 | 0.3245 | 0.3900 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.3495 | 0.0212 | 0.3011 | 0.3386 | 0.3468 | 0.3627 | 0.4530 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.3773 | 0.0231 | 0.3317 | 0.3622 | 0.3754 | 0.3935 | 0.4936 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.3956 | 0.0272 | 0.3551 | 0.3760 | 0.3914 | 0.4104 | 0.5336 |

Source: Census results

A.3.7 Mean household size


Figure 63 and Figure 64 present mean household size (definition (B)) by *département*, as well as the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles and again the figures at the national level. Table 65 presents corresponding descriptive statistics. We present maps of the mean household size by *département* for 1856 (Figure 66), 1876 (Figure 67), 1911 (Figure 68), 1936 (Figure 69), 1962 (Figure 70), 1982 (Figure 71), 2014 (Figure 73). We observe a substantial continuity from 1856 to the mid-20th Century in the geography of mean household size: South-West France, Corsica and Brittany are the regions with the highest number of individuals per household, while Paris and the surrounding *départements* of the Paris Basin always present the lowest figures. However, starting in the 1960s, this geography experienced a noticeable change. Parisian suburban areas as well as Northern France became progressively the areas with the highest ratios, while the South-Western region of France lost its specificity. This development can to a some extent be related to the changing age structure of the French population, ageing being particularly marked in the rural regions of the centre of the country.

Figure 63: Mean household size by département (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Figure 64: Mean household size by département (1954-2014)



Source: Census results


Figure 65: Mean household size by département (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 3.8740 | 0.4989 | 2.7171 | 3.4662 | 3.8601 | 4.2979 | 4.8931 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 3.7484 | 0.4753 | 2.7060 | 3.3605 | 3.6574 | 4.1410 | 5.0603 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 3.6942 | 0.4432 | 2.6953 | 3.3536 | 3.6110 | 4.0725 | 4.6826 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 3.6285 | 0.4268 | 2.6367 | 3.2903 | 3.5509 | 3.9481 | 4.6954 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 3.5993 | 0.4054 | 2.6540 | 3.2564 | 3.5068 | 3.9354 | 4.5631 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 3.5860 | 0.4003 | 2.6789 | 3.2713 | 3.5185 | 3.9115 | 4.5621 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 3.5513 | 0.3860 | 2.6855 | 3.2496 | 3.4945 | 3.8289 | 4.4918 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 3.5289 | 0.3813 | 2.6787 | 3.2282 | 3.4622 | 3.7649 | 4.5153 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 3.4594 | 0.3415 | 2.6078 | 3.2007 | 3.3876 | 3.6879 | 4.4249 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 3.3114 | 0.3126 | 2.5370 | 3.0911 | 3.2438 | 3.4876 | 4.3252 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 3.2615 | 0.2943 | 2.4916 | 3.0543 | 3.2029 | 3.4482 | 4.2900 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 3.2221 | 0.2427 | 2.4454 | 3.0343 | 3.1990 | 3.3818 | 3.8387 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 3.1801 | 0.2570 | 2.4063 | 3.0249 | 3.1486 | 3.3077 | 4.2844 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 3.1385 | 0.2168 | 2.3938 | 3.0002 | 3.1194 | 3.2735 | 4.0615 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 3.2215 | 0.2076 | 2.5681 | 3.0982 | 3.2079 | 3.3342 | 4.1697 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 3.2143 | 0.1923 | 2.5471 | 3.1068 | 3.2166 | 3.3118 | 4.0448 |
| Y1968 | 96 | 3.1242 | 0.1774 | 2.1968 | 3.0303 | 3.1319 | 3.2343 | 3.5131 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 2.9290 | 0.1684 | 2.0214 | 2.8554 | 2.9526 | 3.0393 | 3.2701 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 2.7390 | 0.1443 | 1.9086 | 2.6844 | 2.7559 | 2.8224 | 2.9799 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 2.5815 | 0.1327 | 1.9191 | 2.5180 | 2.5827 | 2.6481 | 2.8698 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 2.3958 | 0.1267 | 1.8684 | 2.3177 | 2.3900 | 2.4474 | 2.7438 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 2.2507 | 0.1169 | 1.8830 | 2.1764 | 2.2344 | 2.3010 | 2.6308 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 2.2055 | 0.1176 | 1.8935 | 2.1295 | 2.1896 | 2.2572 | 2.6062 |

Source: Census results


Note: Definitions adopted for the population counted separately, for the total population and for servants are detailed in Section 2.2.2.

Figure 66: Map of the mean household size by département in 1856




Source: Census results

Figure 67: Map of the mean household size by *département* in 1881




Source: Census results

Figure 68: Map of the mean household size by *département* in 1911




Source: Census results

Figure 69: Map of the mean household size by *département* in 1936




Source: Census results

Figure 70: Map of the mean household size by *département* in 1962




Source: Census results

Figure 71: Map of the mean household size by *département* in 1982




Source: Census results

Figure 72: Map of the mean household size by *département* in 1999



Source: Census results

Figure 73: Map of the mean household size by *département* in 2014




Source: Census results

A.3.8 Single households

Figure 74 presents the share of single households in the total number of households for the 1968-2014 period, by *département*. Corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Table 24. Figure 75, Figure 76, Figure 77 and Figure 78 present maps of the share of single households by *département* for respectively 1968, 1982, 1999 and 2014.

Figure 74: Share of single households by *département* (1968-2014)



Source: Census results

Note: Single households are households composed of one person. The share of single households is the number of single households divided by the total number of households. Corse represents one observation (Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud grouped).


Table 24: Share of single households by *département* (1968-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.2249 | 0.0701 | 0.1340 | 0.1828 | 0.2013 | 0.2246 | 0.4299 |
| Y1975 | 95 | 0.2091 | 0.0310 | 0.1489 | 0.1949 | 0.2084 | 0.2198 | 0.4189 |
| Y1982 | 95 | 0.2310 | 0.0336 | 0.1718 | 0.2173 | 0.2305 | 0.2424 | 0.4677 |
| Y1990 | 95 | 0.2613 | 0.0351 | 0.1965 | 0.2459 | 0.2604 | 0.2736 | 0.4985 |
| Y1999 | 95 | 0.3014 | 0.0361 | 0.2293 | 0.2840 | 0.3002 | 0.3177 | 0.5232 |
| Y2009 | 95 | 0.3329 | 0.0326 | 0.2583 | 0.3162 | 0.3342 | 0.3498 | 0.5125 |
| Y2014 | 95 | 0.3490 | 0.0317 | 0.2730 | 0.3302 | 0.3519 | 0.3673 | 0.5069 |

Source: Census results


Note: Single households are households composed of one person. The share of single households is the number of single households divided by the total number of households. Corse represents one observation (Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud grouped).

Figure 75: Map of the share of single households by *département* in 1968




Source: Census results

Figure 76: Map of the share of single households by *département* in 1982




Source: Census results

Figure 77: Map of the share of single households by *département* in 1999



Source: Census results

Figure 78: Map of the share of single households by *département* in 2014



Source: Census results

A.4 Household complexity in the 1962 to 1990 census results

Figure 79 presents the evolution of indicators for household complexity available at the departmental level in the census results from 1962 to 1990. Table 25 presents corresponding descriptive statistics. Figure 80 presents the number of cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* over the 1962-1990 period. Figure 84, Figure 88 and Figure 92 present respectively the number of cohabiting ascendants, other kin and secondary families per 100 ordinary households for the same period.

Figure 79: Cohabiting secondary families, adult descendants, ascendants and other kin per 100 ordinary households in France (1962-1990)




Table 25: Cohabiting secondary families, adult descendants, ascendants and other kin per 100 ordinary households by *département* (1962-1990)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|--------------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Descendants | | | | | | | | |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.1012 | 0.0234 | 0.0588 | 0.0855 | 0.0959 | 0.1089 | 0.1670 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.0803 | 0.0212 | 0.0482 | 0.0669 | 0.0768 | 0.0846 | 0.2071 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.0732 | 0.0136 | 0.0474 | 0.0645 | 0.0719 | 0.0778 | 0.1113 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.0645 | 0.0143 | 0.0348 | 0.0557 | 0.0620 | 0.0699 | 0.1283 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.0116 | 0.0033 | 0.0048 | 0.0091 | 0.0114 | 0.0132 | 0.0253 |
| Ascendants | | | | | | | | |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.0654 | 0.0250 | 0.0314 | 0.0458 | 0.0572 | 0.0764 | 0.1348 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.0592 | 0.0242 | 0.0204 | 0.0399 | 0.0498 | 0.0700 | 0.1311 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.0476 | 0.0232 | 0.0147 | 0.0303 | 0.0390 | 0.0551 | 0.1180 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.0461 | 0.0195 | 0.0179 | 0.0314 | 0.0403 | 0.0530 | 0.1091 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.0231 | 0.0115 | 0.0080 | 0.0151 | 0.0190 | 0.0273 | 0.0616 |
| Other kin | | | | | | | | |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.0481 | 0.0162 | 0.0213 | 0.0353 | 0.0450 | 0.0545 | 0.0975 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.0468 | 0.0201 | 0.0216 | 0.0345 | 0.0425 | 0.0519 | 0.1815 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.0393 | 0.0121 | 0.0250 | 0.0299 | 0.0362 | 0.0443 | 0.0840 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.0305 | 0.0158 | 0.0127 | 0.0217 | 0.0264 | 0.0329 | 0.1176 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.0191 | 0.0081 | 0.0099 | 0.0140 | 0.0168 | 0.0217 | 0.0580 |
| Secondary | | | | | | | | |
| Y1962 | 89 | 0.0544 | 0.0310 | 0.0176 | 0.0325 | 0.0453 | 0.0680 | 0.1543 |
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.0375 | 0.0249 | 0.0094 | 0.0203 | 0.0278 | 0.0466 | 0.1229 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.0242 | 0.0184 | 0.0049 | 0.0120 | 0.0163 | 0.0286 | 0.0886 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.0102 | 0.0089 | 0.0016 | 0.0047 | 0.0065 | 0.0113 | 0.0472 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.0075 | 0.0050 | 0.0019 | 0.0043 | 0.0057 | 0.0082 | 0.0291 |

Source: Census results

Figure 80: Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* (1962-1990)




Figure 81: Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1962






Figure 82: Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1975



Source: Census results

Figure 83: Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1990



Source: Census results

Figure 84: Number of cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* (1962-1990)






Figure 85: Cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1962




Source: Census results

Figure 86: Cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1975



Source: Census results

Figure 87: Cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1990



Source: Census results

Figure 88: Number of cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by *département* (1962-1990)




Figure 89: Cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1962




Figure 90: Cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1975




Figure 91: Cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1990




Figure 92: Number of cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by *département* (1962-1990)





Figure 93: Cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1962



Source: Census results

Figure 94: Cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1975





Figure 95: Cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by *département* in 1990



A.5 Indicators for household complexity

A.5.1 Adults per household (APH)

Table 26 presents descriptive statistics for the crude average number of adults (APH) aged more than 20 by *département* over the 1856-2014 period. Table 27 presents similar figures for the average number of adults aged more than 20, using the assumption of 75% of the population counted separately being aged more than 20. Maps of the APH (using the 75%-assumption) by *département* are provided for 1856 (Figure 96), 1876 (Figure 97), 1911 (Figure 98), 1936 (Figure 99), 1962 (Figure 100), 1982 (Figure 101), 2014 (Figure 103).

In Section 2.3 was presented an average number of adults per household, which includes *de facto* servants. In addition to this, we might be interested in computing an average number of adults per household excluding adult servants. We have data on the age structure of servants for the census year 1891 as exposed in Figure 56 and Table 19. At the national level, two-thirds of the servants are aged more than 20; figures for *départements* range from 48.9% to 82.8%. Therefore, we present in Figure 104 and Figure 105 the crude average number of adults per household excluding servants with different assumptions for the share of servants aged more than 20. This ratio is crude as it does not correct for the share of the population counted separately aged more than 20. Finally, Figure 106 and Figure 107 present the average number of adults per household excluding servants, with bounds for the assumptions on the share of population counted separately and of the servants aged more than 20.

Table 26: Crude average number of adults per household by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 2.5138 | 0.2200 | 2.0878 | 2.3771 | 2.5286 | 2.6336 | 3.1185 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 2.5073 | 0.2223 | 2.0426 | 2.3471 | 2.4997 | 2.6331 | 3.2165 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 2.4791 | 0.2365 | 1.9725 | 2.2971 | 2.4565 | 2.6118 | 3.3006 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 2.4413 | 0.2205 | 2.0040 | 2.2466 | 2.4416 | 2.6194 | 2.9991 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 2.4113 | 0.1985 | 1.9581 | 2.2445 | 2.3849 | 2.5460 | 2.8053 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 2.3877 | 0.1933 | 1.9143 | 2.2328 | 2.3781 | 2.5319 | 2.8365 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 2.3698 | 0.1790 | 1.9568 | 2.2267 | 2.3628 | 2.4954 | 2.8353 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 2.3784 | 0.1681 | 1.9700 | 2.2425 | 2.3819 | 2.4908 | 2.9165 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 2.3726 | 0.1765 | 1.9771 | 2.2316 | 2.3745 | 2.4987 | 2.8984 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 2.3555 | 0.1705 | 1.9693 | 2.1983 | 2.3428 | 2.4755 | 2.8020 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 2.3331 | 0.1650 | 1.9286 | 2.1983 | 2.3237 | 2.4403 | 2.8220 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 2.2915 | 0.1669 | 1.9383 | 2.1722 | 2.2864 | 2.3967 | 2.8133 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 2.2788 | 0.1750 | 1.8933 | 2.1360 | 2.2519 | 2.4016 | 2.8587 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 2.2786 | 0.1578 | 1.9039 | 2.1443 | 2.2834 | 2.3967 | 2.7042 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 2.2617 | 0.1656 | 1.8802 | 2.1262 | 2.2503 | 2.3764 | 2.7802 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 2.2383 | 0.1435 | 1.8646 | 2.1160 | 2.2102 | 2.3012 | 2.6901 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 2.2969 | 0.1404 | 1.9864 | 2.2045 | 2.2727 | 2.3908 | 2.8864 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 2.2103 | 0.1218 | 1.8909 | 2.1225 | 2.1923 | 2.3004 | 2.5407 |
| Y1968 | 96 | 2.1234 | 0.1072 | 1.7548 | 2.0502 | 2.1088 | 2.1766 | 2.4325 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 2.0507 | 0.0889 | 1.6546 | 1.9965 | 2.0383 | 2.0891 | 2.3341 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 1.9732 | 0.0878 | 1.5679 | 1.9243 | 1.9588 | 2.0084 | 2.2851 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 1.9252 | 0.0644 | 1.5757 | 1.8903 | 1.9105 | 1.9669 | 2.0889 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 1.8401 | 0.0557 | 1.5421 | 1.8067 | 1.8344 | 1.8774 | 1.9504 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 1.7575 | 0.0527 | 1.5499 | 1.7237 | 1.7502 | 1.7819 | 1.9158 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 1.7276 | 0.0518 | 1.5592 | 1.6925 | 1.7208 | 1.7475 | 1.9007 |

Source: Census results

Note: Crude average number of adults per household is the number of adults aged more than 20 divided by the number of households.


Table 27: Average number of adults per household by *département* (1856-2014)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 2.4243 | 0.2422 | 1.8441 | 2.2584 | 2.4281 | 2.5880 | 3.0830 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 2.3856 | 0.2203 | 1.8759 | 2.1962 | 2.3917 | 2.5524 | 2.8607 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 2.3481 | 0.1975 | 1.8904 | 2.1860 | 2.3202 | 2.4998 | 2.7431 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 2.3128 | 0.1882 | 1.8474 | 2.1792 | 2.3100 | 2.4591 | 2.7532 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 2.2944 | 0.1705 | 1.8967 | 2.1615 | 2.2900 | 2.4332 | 2.7651 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 2.2970 | 0.1567 | 1.9031 | 2.1723 | 2.3025 | 2.4125 | 2.6729 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 2.2912 | 0.1672 | 1.9173 | 2.1593 | 2.2893 | 2.4040 | 2.8289 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 2.2716 | 0.1652 | 1.9127 | 2.1204 | 2.2674 | 2.3973 | 2.7642 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 2.2600 | 0.1607 | 1.8778 | 2.1212 | 2.2504 | 2.3659 | 2.7159 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 2.2335 | 0.1668 | 1.8952 | 2.1155 | 2.2120 | 2.3379 | 2.7369 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 2.2224 | 0.1741 | 1.8257 | 2.0856 | 2.1843 | 2.3426 | 2.8005 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 2.2198 | 0.1553 | 1.8690 | 2.0826 | 2.2244 | 2.3180 | 2.6599 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 2.1934 | 0.1637 | 1.8421 | 2.0614 | 2.1594 | 2.3085 | 2.7265 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 2.1713 | 0.1391 | 1.8373 | 2.0684 | 2.1471 | 2.2398 | 2.6566 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 2.2315 | 0.1371 | 1.9646 | 2.1266 | 2.2063 | 2.3007 | 2.8533 |
| Y1962 | 90 | 2.1533 | 0.1196 | 1.8596 | 2.0685 | 2.1348 | 2.2373 | 2.4968 |
| Y1968 | 96 | 2.0586 | 0.1054 | 1.7171 | 1.9852 | 2.0422 | 2.0996 | 2.3714 |
| Y1975 | 96 | 1.9880 | 0.0875 | 1.6213 | 1.9366 | 1.9724 | 2.0158 | 2.2676 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 1.9207 | 0.0825 | 1.5347 | 1.8756 | 1.9077 | 1.9488 | 2.1580 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 1.8796 | 0.0619 | 1.5409 | 1.8474 | 1.8715 | 1.9206 | 2.0330 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 1.7978 | 0.0547 | 1.5097 | 1.7668 | 1.7945 | 1.8315 | 1.9081 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 1.7139 | 0.0532 | 1.5176 | 1.6821 | 1.7049 | 1.7373 | 1.8773 |
| Y2014 | 96 | 1.6861 | 0.0530 | 1.5287 | 1.6513 | 1.6758 | 1.7067 | 1.8638 |

Source: Census results


Note: The average number of adults per household is the number of adults aged more than 20, minus the share of the population counted separately aged more than 20, divided by the number of households. The assumption is here that 75% of the population counted separately is aged more than 20.

Figure 96: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 1856




Source: Census results

Figure 97: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 1881




Source: Census results

Figure 98: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 1911




Source: Census results

Figure 99: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 1936




Source: Census results

Figure 100: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 1962




Source: Census results

Figure 101: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 1982




Source: Census results

Figure 102: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 1999




Source: Census results

Figure 103: Map of the average number of adults per household by *département* in 2014



Source: Census results


Figure 104: Crude average number of adults per household, excluding servants (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is total number of households. The number of servants is corrected for the 1861-1881 period for consistency with the definition in use in 1896-1936 (central estimate). See Appendix A3 for more details.


Figure 105: Crude average number of adults per household, excluding servants (1954-2014)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is number of main places of residence. The number of servants is corrected for 1954 for consistency with the definition in use in 1962-1982. See Appendix A3 for more details.


Figure 106: Average number of adults per household excluding servants (1856-1946)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is total number of households. The number of servants is corrected for the 1861-1881 period for consistency with the definition in use in 1896-1936 (central estimate). See Appendix A3 for more details.

Figure 107: Average number of adults per household excluding servants (1954-2014)



Source: Census results

Note: Definition adopted for the denominator is number of main places of residence. The number of servants is corrected for 1954 for consistency with the definition in use in 1962-1982. See Appendix A3 for more details.

A.5.2 Marital units per household (MUH)

Table 108 presents descriptive statistics for the average number of marital units per household (MUH) by *département* over the 1856-2009 period. Maps of the MUH (using the MUH2 indicator, i.e. with married women as the variable for married couples) by *département* are provided for 1856 (Figure 109), 1876 (Figure 110), 1911 (Figure 111), 1936 (Figure 112), 1962 (Figure 113), 1982 (Figure 114), 2014 (Figure 116).


Figure 108: Average number of marital units per household by *département* (1856-2009)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1856 | 86 | 1.0709 | 0.0878 | 0.8172 | 1.0218 | 1.0545 | 1.1280 | 1.3063 |
| Y1861 | 89 | 1.0725 | 0.0892 | 0.7884 | 1.0147 | 1.0542 | 1.1194 | 1.3092 |
| Y1866 | 89 | 1.0835 | 0.0901 | 0.7872 | 1.0294 | 1.0677 | 1.1280 | 1.3634 |
| Y1872 | 87 | 1.0837 | 0.0957 | 0.8054 | 1.0279 | 1.0678 | 1.1295 | 1.2932 |
| Y1876 | 87 | 1.0792 | 0.0896 | 0.8100 | 1.0252 | 1.0605 | 1.1103 | 1.2920 |
| Y1881 | 87 | 1.0436 | 0.0944 | 0.7617 | 0.9788 | 1.0327 | 1.0953 | 1.2672 |
| Y1886 | 87 | 1.0168 | 0.1400 | 0.2998 | 0.9628 | 1.0068 | 1.0696 | 1.6411 |
| Y1891 | 87 | 1.0399 | 0.0831 | 0.8121 | 0.9888 | 1.0268 | 1.0767 | 1.2552 |
| Y1896 | 87 | 1.0404 | 0.0837 | 0.8245 | 0.9913 | 1.0285 | 1.0744 | 1.2469 |
| Y1901 | 87 | 1.0692 | 0.0869 | 0.8296 | 1.0155 | 1.0548 | 1.1064 | 1.3045 |
| Y1911 | 87 | 1.0746 | 0.0855 | 0.8308 | 1.0163 | 1.0474 | 1.1251 | 1.3090 |
| Y1921 | 90 | 1.0815 | 0.0871 | 0.8785 | 1.0219 | 1.0560 | 1.1243 | 1.3509 |
| Y1926 | 90 | 1.0773 | 0.0887 | 0.8526 | 1.0205 | 1.0505 | 1.1181 | 1.3104 |
| Y1931 | 90 | 1.0721 | 0.0856 | 0.8624 | 1.0153 | 1.0536 | 1.1164 | 1.3089 |
| Y1936 | 90 | 1.0724 | 0.0813 | 0.8693 | 1.0194 | 1.0484 | 1.1190 | 1.2901 |
| Y1946 | 90 | 1.0689 | 0.0666 | 0.8821 | 1.0273 | 1.0484 | 1.1039 | 1.2593 |
| Y1954 | 90 | 1.0896 | 0.0646 | 0.9318 | 1.0470 | 1.0739 | 1.1272 | 1.2770 |
| Y1962 | 89 | 1.0608 | 0.0605 | 0.9007 | 1.0199 | 1.0484 | 1.0863 | 1.2367 |
| Y1968 | 94 | 1.0307 | 0.0579 | 0.7906 | 0.9949 | 1.0211 | 1.0556 | 1.1855 |
| Y1975 | 94 | 0.9921 | 0.0538 | 0.7202 | 0.9689 | 0.9828 | 1.0136 | 1.1215 |
| Y1982 | 96 | 0.9458 | 0.0513 | 0.6512 | 0.9254 | 0.9408 | 0.9678 | 1.0521 |
| Y1990 | 96 | 0.8839 | 0.0483 | 0.5950 | 0.8638 | 0.8872 | 0.9084 | 0.9615 |
| Y1999 | 96 | 0.8211 | 0.0470 | 0.5397 | 0.7954 | 0.8319 | 0.8494 | 0.8910 |
| Y2009 | 96 | 0.7607 | 0.0433 | 0.5040 | 0.7403 | 0.7733 | 0.7890 | 0.8233 |

Source: Census results


Note: Marital units defined as the sum of married women, widowed men and women, divorced men and women.

Figure 109: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 1856




Source: Census results

Figure 110: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 1881




Source: Census results

Figure 111: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 1911




Source: Census results

Figure 112: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 1936




Source: Census results

Figure 113: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 1962




Source: Census results

Figure 114: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 1982




Source: Census results

Figure 115: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 1999



Source: Census results

Figure 116: Map of the average number of marital units per household by *département* in 2009



Source: Census results

A.5.3 Correlations between variables of household complexity, 1962 to 1990

Table 28, Table 29, Table 30 and Table 31 present correlations between different variables for household complexity respectively for 1962, 1975, 1982 and 1990.

Table 28: Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1962

| Variables | APH | MUH | Secondary | Descendants | Ascendants | OtherKin |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------|
| APH | 1.000 | | | | | |
| MUH | 0.828 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | | |
| Secondary | 0.940 (0.000) | 0.885 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | |
| Descendants | 0.691 (0.000) | 0.270 (0.010) | 0.590 (0.000) | 1.000 | | |
| Ascendants | 0.889 (0.000) | 0.912 (0.000) | 0.942 (0.000) | 0.473 (0.000) | 1.000 | |
| OtherKin | 0.777 (0.000) | 0.372 (0.000) | 0.689 (0.000) | 0.914 (0.000) | 0.576 (0.000) | 1.000 |
| Nb. Obs. | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | |

Source: Census results

Note: Data from census results, for 89 *départements* (Seine-et-Oise and Seine were only divided into Paris, Yvelines, Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne and Val-d'Oise in 1968; no data available for Corse). APH is the average number of adults per household, assuming that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20. MUH is the average number of marital units per household, using married women for counting married couples. Secondary is the average number of secondary families per ordinary household. Descendants, Ascendants and OtherKin are the average number of adult children and grandchildren, ascendants and other kin per ordinary household. The significance level of each pairwise correlation is provided in parenthesis.

Table 29: Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1975

| Variables | APH | MUH | Secondary | Descendants | Ascendants | OtherKin |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| APH | 1.000 | | | | | |
| MUH | 0.884 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | | |
| Secondary | 0.885 (0.000) | 0.789 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | |
| Descendants | 0.677 (0.000) | 0.417 (0.000) | 0.600 (0.000) | 1.000 | | |
| Ascendants | 0.890 (0.000) | 0.807 (0.000) | 0.974 (0.000) | 0.613 (0.000) | 1.000 | |
| OtherKin | 0.715 (0.000) | 0.416 (0.000) | 0.751 (0.000) | 0.818 (0.000) | 0.769 (0.000) | 1.000 |
| SingleHH | -0.562 (0.000) | -0.602 (0.000) | -0.191 (0.065) | -0.072 (0.492) | -0.205 (0.047) | 0.004 (0.970) |
| N | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 |

Source: Census results

Note: Data from census results, for 94 *départements* (no data available for Corse). APH is the average number of adults per household, assuming that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20. MUH is the average number of marital units per household, using married women for counting married couples. Secondary is the average number of secondary families per ordinary household. Descendants, Ascendants and OtherKin are the average number of adult children and grandchildren, ascendants and other kin per ordinary household. SingleHH is the share of single households. The significance level of each pairwise correlation is provided in parenthesis.

Table 30: Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1982

| Variables | APH | MUH | Secondary | Descendants | Ascendants | OtherKin |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| APH | 1.000 | | | | | |
| MUH | 0.860 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | | |
| Secondary | 0.732 (0.000) | 0.653 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | |
| Descendants | 0.793 (0.000) | 0.591 (0.000) | 0.718 (0.000) | 1.000 | | |
| Ascendants | 0.774 (0.000) | 0.679 (0.000) | 0.952 (0.000) | 0.826 (0.000) | 1.000 | |
| OtherKin | 0.603 (0.000) | 0.281 (0.006) | 0.607 (0.000) | 0.849 (0.000) | 0.706 (0.000) | 1.000 |
| SingleHH | -0.666 (0.000) | -0.691 (0.000) | -0.194 (0.060) | -0.235 (0.022) | -0.179 (0.082) | -0.021 (0.839) |
| N | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Source: Census results

Note: Data from census results, for 95 *départements* (Corse represents one observation). APH is the average number of adults per household, assuming that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20. MUH is the average number of marital units per household, using married women for counting married couples. Secondary is the average number of secondary families per ordinary household. Descendants, Ascendants and OtherKin are the average number of adult children and grandchildren, ascendants and other kin per ordinary household. SingleHH is the share of single households. The significance level of each pairwise correlation is provided in parenthesis.

Table 31: Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1990

| Variables | APH | MUH | Secondary | Descendants | Ascendants | OtherKin |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| APH | 1.000 | | | | | |
| MUH | 0.812 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | | |
| Secondary | 0.635 (0.000) | 0.513 (0.000) | 1.000 | | | |
| Descendants | 0.368 (0.000) | 0.424 (0.000) | 0.398 (0.000) | 1.000 | | |
| Ascendants | 0.627 (0.000) | 0.606 (0.000) | 0.945 (0.000) | 0.386 (0.000) | 1.000 | |
| OtherKin | 0.318 (0.002) | 0.014 (0.893) | 0.614 (0.000) | 0.374 (0.000) | 0.553 (0.000) | 1.000 |
| SingleHH | -0.796 (0.000) | -0.695 (0.000) | -0.143 (0.168) | -0.267 (0.009) | -0.126 (0.222) | 0.148 (0.151) |
| N | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Source: Census results

Note: Data from census results, for 95 *départements* (Corse represents one observation). APH is the average number of adults per household, assuming that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20. MUH is the average number of marital units per household, using married women for counting married couples. Descendants, Ascendants and OtherKin are the average number of adult children and grandchildren, ascendants and other kin per ordinary household. SingleHH is the share of single households. The significance level of each pairwise correlation is provided in parenthesis.

A.6 Census and voting data at the departmental level (1968-2012)

A.6.1 Census data used for electoral analysis

Table 32 summarises the census results used for each legislative elections.

Table 32: Census results used for the analysis of legislative electoral results at the departmental level (1968-2012)

| Election year | Census results used |
|---------------|---------------------------------------------|
| 1968 | 1968 |
| 1973 | $\frac{5}{10} * 1968 + \frac{5}{10} * 1978$ |
| 1978 | $\frac{4}{7} * 1975 + \frac{3}{7} * 1982$ |
| 1981 | $\frac{1}{7} * 1975 + \frac{6}{7} * 1982$ |
| 1986 | $\frac{4}{8} * 1982 + \frac{4}{8} * 1990$ |
| 1988 | $\frac{2}{8} * 1982 + \frac{6}{8} * 1990$ |
| 1993 | $\frac{6}{9} * 1990 + \frac{3}{9} * 1999$ |
| 1997 | $\frac{2}{9} * 1990 + \frac{7}{9} * 1999$ |
| 2002 | $\frac{3}{10} * 1999 + \frac{7}{10} * 2009$ |
| 2007 | $\frac{2}{10} * 1999 + \frac{8}{10} * 2009$ |
| 2012 | $\frac{2}{5} * 2009 + \frac{3}{5} * 2014$ |

A.6.2 Electoral results at the departmental level (1968-2012)

Table 33 presents the national share of vote for the left, the right, the centre-left, the centre-right, the extreme-left and the extreme-right for the first round of each legislative elections from 1968 to 2012. Figure 117 presents the evolution of the voting shares of the right and the left at the national level for the first round of these 11 legislative elections. Figure 118, Figure 119, Figure 120, Figure 121, Figure 122 and Figure 123 present the evolution of the voting shares by *département* and at the national level for each of the six defined political affiliations (left, right, extreme-left, centre-left, centre-right, extreme-right) for the first round of these 11 legislative elections. Table 34, Table 35, Table 36, Table 37, Table 38 and Table 39 present the related descriptive statistics at the departmental level, without weights. Table 40 presents the classification of political parties by political affiliation for the 11 French legislative elections between 1968 and 2012.


Table 33: National share of vote of the different political affiliations in the first round of French legislative elections (1968-2012)

| year | Left | Right | Extreme-left | Centre-left | Centre-right | Extreme-right |
|------|-------|-------|--------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| 1968 | .4111 | .5889 | .2412 | .1699 | .5881 | .0009 |
| 1973 | .4584 | .5416 | .2460 | .2124 | .5354 | .0062 |
| 1978 | .5145 | .4855 | .2391 | .2754 | .4778 | .0076 |
| 1981 | .5668 | .4332 | .1741 | .3928 | .4300 | .0031 |
| 1986 | .4532 | .5468 | .1123 | .3409 | .4477 | .0991 |
| 1988 | .4978 | .5022 | .1159 | .3818 | .4033 | .0990 |
| 1993 | .4057 | .5943 | .1135 | .2922 | .4590 | .1353 |
| 1997 | .4821 | .5179 | .1264 | .3557 | .3628 | .1551 |
| 2002 | .4236 | .5764 | .0782 | .3454 | .4340 | .1423 |
| 2007 | .4060 | .5940 | .0809 | .3251 | .5451 | .0488 |
| 2012 | .4911 | .5089 | .0816 | .4094 | .3660 | .1429 |

Source: CDSP

Note: see Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 117: National share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, left vs. right (1968-2012)



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 118: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, left (1968-2012)



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 119: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, right (1968-2012)



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 120: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-left (1968-2012)



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 121: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-left (1968-2012)



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 122: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-right (1968-2012)



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Figure 123: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-right (1968-2012)



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Table 34: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, left (1968-2012)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.4078 | 0.1052 | 0.1635 | 0.3387 | 0.4151 | 0.4752 | 0.5989 |
| Y1973 | 95 | 0.4534 | 0.0950 | 0.2188 | 0.3994 | 0.4580 | 0.5099 | 0.6508 |
| Y1978 | 95 | 0.5108 | 0.0733 | 0.3309 | 0.4735 | 0.5109 | 0.5638 | 0.6859 |
| Y1981 | 95 | 0.5627 | 0.0816 | 0.3708 | 0.5133 | 0.5594 | 0.6228 | 0.7316 |
| Y1986 | 95 | 0.4552 | 0.0622 | 0.3170 | 0.4149 | 0.4549 | 0.4893 | 0.6430 |
| Y1988 | 95 | 0.5020 | 0.0749 | 0.3483 | 0.4554 | 0.5040 | 0.5550 | 0.7044 |
| Y1993 | 95 | 0.4039 | 0.0654 | 0.2566 | 0.3615 | 0.3990 | 0.4556 | 0.5603 |
| Y1997 | 95 | 0.4809 | 0.0587 | 0.3516 | 0.4357 | 0.4810 | 0.5153 | 0.6417 |
| Y2002 | 95 | 0.4253 | 0.0663 | 0.2819 | 0.3743 | 0.4334 | 0.4709 | 0.6107 |
| Y2007 | 95 | 0.4097 | 0.0744 | 0.2327 | 0.3491 | 0.4108 | 0.4574 | 0.5968 |
| Y2012 | 95 | 0.4926 | 0.0768 | 0.3269 | 0.4359 | 0.4966 | 0.5536 | 0.6578 |

Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Table 35: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, right (1968-2012)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.5922 | 0.1052 | 0.4011 | 0.5248 | 0.5849 | 0.6613 | 0.8365 |
| Y1973 | 95 | 0.5466 | 0.0950 | 0.3492 | 0.4901 | 0.5420 | 0.6006 | 0.7812 |
| Y1978 | 95 | 0.4892 | 0.0733 | 0.3141 | 0.4362 | 0.4891 | 0.5265 | 0.6691 |
| Y1981 | 95 | 0.4373 | 0.0816 | 0.2684 | 0.3772 | 0.4406 | 0.4867 | 0.6292 |
| Y1986 | 95 | 0.5448 | 0.0622 | 0.3570 | 0.5107 | 0.5451 | 0.5851 | 0.6830 |
| Y1988 | 95 | 0.4980 | 0.0749 | 0.2956 | 0.4450 | 0.4960 | 0.5446 | 0.6517 |
| Y1993 | 95 | 0.5961 | 0.0654 | 0.4397 | 0.5444 | 0.6010 | 0.6385 | 0.7434 |
| Y1997 | 95 | 0.5191 | 0.0587 | 0.3583 | 0.4847 | 0.5190 | 0.5643 | 0.6484 |
| Y2002 | 95 | 0.5747 | 0.0663 | 0.3893 | 0.5291 | 0.5666 | 0.6257 | 0.7181 |
| Y2007 | 95 | 0.5903 | 0.0744 | 0.4032 | 0.5426 | 0.5892 | 0.6509 | 0.7673 |
| Y2012 | 95 | 0.5074 | 0.0768 | 0.3422 | 0.4464 | 0.5034 | 0.5641 | 0.6731 |

Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Table 36: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-left (1968-2012)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.2204 | 0.0836 | 0.0664 | 0.1612 | 0.2116 | 0.2719 | 0.4577 |
| Y1973 | 95 | 0.2280 | 0.0798 | 0.0642 | 0.1719 | 0.2261 | 0.2737 | 0.4686 |
| Y1978 | 95 | 0.2281 | 0.0705 | 0.0878 | 0.1752 | 0.2246 | 0.2791 | 0.4328 |
| Y1981 | 95 | 0.1625 | 0.0758 | 0.0353 | 0.1061 | 0.1495 | 0.2075 | 0.3931 |
| Y1986 | 95 | 0.1082 | 0.0474 | 0.0226 | 0.0753 | 0.0967 | 0.1378 | 0.2675 |
| Y1988 | 95 | 0.1098 | 0.0528 | 0.0249 | 0.0719 | 0.1012 | 0.1382 | 0.2816 |
| Y1993 | 95 | 0.1083 | 0.0438 | 0.0309 | 0.0792 | 0.1025 | 0.1305 | 0.2612 |
| Y1997 | 95 | 0.1209 | 0.0432 | 0.0411 | 0.0927 | 0.1119 | 0.1435 | 0.2676 |
| Y2002 | 95 | 0.0750 | 0.0317 | 0.0253 | 0.0526 | 0.0684 | 0.0901 | 0.1868 |
| Y2007 | 95 | 0.0783 | 0.0284 | 0.0248 | 0.0604 | 0.0714 | 0.0888 | 0.1737 |
| Y2012 | 95 | 0.0789 | 0.0310 | 0.0312 | 0.0564 | 0.0733 | 0.0904 | 0.2013 |

Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Table 37: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-left (1968-2012)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.1874 | 0.0904 | 0.0290 | 0.1162 | 0.1770 | 0.2687 | 0.3949 |
| Y1973 | 95 | 0.2254 | 0.0698 | 0.0993 | 0.1670 | 0.2197 | 0.2769 | 0.4246 |
| Y1978 | 95 | 0.2827 | 0.0527 | 0.1674 | 0.2448 | 0.2784 | 0.3093 | 0.4296 |
| Y1981 | 95 | 0.4002 | 0.0582 | 0.2913 | 0.3613 | 0.3875 | 0.4328 | 0.5571 |
| Y1986 | 95 | 0.3470 | 0.0501 | 0.2376 | 0.3203 | 0.3396 | 0.3731 | 0.5431 |
| Y1988 | 95 | 0.3922 | 0.0661 | 0.2579 | 0.3402 | 0.3858 | 0.4327 | 0.6241 |
| Y1993 | 95 | 0.2956 | 0.0520 | 0.1873 | 0.2619 | 0.2932 | 0.3288 | 0.4382 |
| Y1997 | 95 | 0.3601 | 0.0513 | 0.2481 | 0.3196 | 0.3614 | 0.4006 | 0.4990 |
| Y2002 | 95 | 0.3503 | 0.0580 | 0.2255 | 0.3076 | 0.3506 | 0.3870 | 0.5094 |
| Y2007 | 95 | 0.3314 | 0.0662 | 0.2022 | 0.2816 | 0.3330 | 0.3801 | 0.5021 |
| Y2012 | 95 | 0.4138 | 0.0647 | 0.2774 | 0.3670 | 0.4135 | 0.4587 | 0.5289 |

Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Table 38: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-right (1968-2012)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.5916 | 0.1054 | 0.4011 | 0.5248 | 0.5796 | 0.6593 | 0.8365 |
| Y1973 | 95 | 0.5424 | 0.0963 | 0.3492 | 0.4852 | 0.5416 | 0.5922 | 0.7812 |
| Y1978 | 95 | 0.4829 | 0.0732 | 0.3141 | 0.4325 | 0.4840 | 0.5247 | 0.6687 |
| Y1981 | 95 | 0.4350 | 0.0820 | 0.2684 | 0.3772 | 0.4365 | 0.4860 | 0.6292 |
| Y1986 | 95 | 0.4564 | 0.0633 | 0.3243 | 0.4098 | 0.4589 | 0.4938 | 0.6080 |
| Y1988 | 95 | 0.4092 | 0.0765 | 0.2386 | 0.3553 | 0.4087 | 0.4573 | 0.5980 |
| Y1993 | 95 | 0.4716 | 0.0731 | 0.3247 | 0.4190 | 0.4694 | 0.5104 | 0.6864 |
| Y1997 | 95 | 0.3723 | 0.0607 | 0.2363 | 0.3363 | 0.3633 | 0.4072 | 0.5356 |
| Y2002 | 95 | 0.4361 | 0.0642 | 0.2641 | 0.3935 | 0.4404 | 0.4748 | 0.5846 |
| Y2007 | 95 | 0.5430 | 0.0693 | 0.3675 | 0.5005 | 0.5473 | 0.6001 | 0.7025 |
| Y2012 | 95 | 0.3676 | 0.0676 | 0.2217 | 0.3178 | 0.3616 | 0.4114 | 0.5063 |

Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Table 39: Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-right (1968-2012)

| | count | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Y1968 | 95 | 0.0006 | 0.0023 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0151 |
| Y1973 | 95 | 0.0042 | 0.0068 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0060 | 0.0287 |
| Y1978 | 95 | 0.0063 | 0.0079 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0045 | 0.0099 | 0.0524 |
| Y1981 | 95 | 0.0023 | 0.0040 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0030 | 0.0189 |
| Y1986 | 95 | 0.0883 | 0.0389 | 0.0267 | 0.0588 | 0.0814 | 0.1065 | 0.2253 |
| Y1988 | 95 | 0.0888 | 0.0407 | 0.0108 | 0.0589 | 0.0811 | 0.1089 | 0.2453 |
| Y1993 | 95 | 0.1245 | 0.0443 | 0.0391 | 0.0896 | 0.1215 | 0.1541 | 0.2445 |
| Y1997 | 95 | 0.1467 | 0.0504 | 0.0644 | 0.1039 | 0.1454 | 0.1878 | 0.2629 |
| Y2002 | 95 | 0.1386 | 0.0477 | 0.0593 | 0.1001 | 0.1355 | 0.1721 | 0.2719 |
| Y2007 | 95 | 0.0473 | 0.0177 | 0.0070 | 0.0325 | 0.0468 | 0.0613 | 0.0908 |
| Y2012 | 95 | 0.1397 | 0.0468 | 0.0551 | 0.1085 | 0.1379 | 0.1700 | 0.3051 |

Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Table 40 for the classification of political parties.

Table 40: Classification of the political parties by affiliation (1968-2012)

| Year | Extreme-left | Centre-left | Centre-right | Extreme-right | Diverse |
|------|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1968 | PC, app. au PC, PSU, ext. gauche | FGDS, Radicaux-socialistes | UDR, RI, RI/UDR, PDM, div. gaullistes, Radicaux de droite, Modérés | Alliance républicaine, div. ext. droite | Mouv. pour la réf., divers, Tech. et dém., régionalistes |
| 1973 | PC, PSU, LO, LCR, OCR | PS, MRG, div. gauche | Radicaux réformateurs, div. réformateurs, RI-URP, UDR-URP, CD-URP, divers URP, UDR, RI, div. gaullistes, div. droite | ext. droite | - |
| 1978 | PC, Front autogestionnaire, ext. gauche | PS-MRG, div. gauche, écologistes | UDF, RPR, gaullistes d'opposition, div. droite | ext. droite | - |
| 1981 | PC, ext. gauche | PS, Radicaux de gauche, écologistes, div. gauche | UDF, RPR, div. droite | Front National, ext. droite | régionalistes |
| 1986 | PC, ext. gauche | PS, Radicaux de gauche, écologistes, div. gauche | UDF, RPR, UDF/RPR, div. droite | FN | régionalistes |
| 1988 | PC, ext. gauche | PS, Majorité présid., Radicaux de Gauche, écologistes | UDF, RPR, div. droite | FN, ext. droite | régionalistes |
| 1993 | PC, ext. gauche | PS, Majorité présid., MRG, Verts, Génération Ecologie | UDF, RPR, div. droite | FN, ext. droite | divers, régionalistes |
| 1997 | PC, ext. gauche | PS, PRG, écologistes, div. gauche | UDF, RPR, div. droite | FN, ext. droite | divers |
| 2002 | PC, LO, LCR, div. ext. gauche | PS, PRG, Verts, écologistes, Pole republicain, div. gauche | UDF, UMP, Démocratie Libérale, div. droite | FN, MPF, MNR, RPF, ext. droite | divers, CPNT, régionalistes |
| 2007 | PC, ext. gauche | PS, PRG, écologistes, div. gauche | MODEM, UMP, PSLE, div. droite | FN, ext. droite | divers |
| 2012 | Front de gauche, ext. gauche | PS, PRG, EELV, écologistes, div. gauche | IMP, All. Cent., Le Centre pour la France, Nouv. Cent., Parti radical, div. droite | FN, ext. droite | régionalistes, autre |

A.7 Results at the departmental level: cross-sectional regressions (1968-2012)

A.7.1 Without controls

Table 41, Table 42, Table 43, Table 44, and Table 45 present the results of the cross-sectional regressions (simple OLS without controls) of the share of the vote for the left on respectively the share of single households, the MUH and APH indicators for household complexity, the average income per adult and the share of university graduates. Regressions are implemented separately for each election year. Results are presented for the three alternative specifications of the independent variable: 5 quintiles (40 to 60 being the reference category), the rank of each *département*, and the z-score of each *département*. We do not present results for the right as they would simply be the inverse of the left, both categories being by construction equal to 1. Table 46, Table 47, Table 48, Table 49 and Table 50 present results for the extreme-left; Table 51, Table 52, Table 53, Table 54 and Table 55 present results for the centre-left; Table 56, Table 57, Table 58, Table 59 and Table 60 present results for the centre-right; Table 61, Table 62, Table 63, Table 64 and Table 65 present results for the extreme-right.

Table 41: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.5481* (0.3237) | 0.2087 (0.3266) | -0.0204 (0.3214) | 0.3785 (0.3305) | 0.1729 (0.3509) | 0.2054 (0.3291) | 0.5371 (0.3394) | 0.1518 (0.3247) | 0.0988 (0.3261) | -0.0287 (0.3316) | -0.1863 (0.3235) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | 0.4968 (0.3237) | 0.5116 (0.3266) | -0.1428 (0.3214) | 0.2869 (0.3305) | -0.2255 (0.3509) | -0.1679 (0.3291) | 0.2858 (0.3394) | 0.3403 (0.3247) | 0.1667 (0.3261) | 0.0672 (0.3316) | -0.4516 (0.3235) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.5852* (0.3237) | 0.4172 (0.3266) | -0.6580** (0.3214) | -0.1297 (0.3305) | -0.3794 (0.3509) | -0.3491 (0.3291) | 0.6426* (0.3394) | 0.6151* (0.3247) | 0.8133** (0.3261) | 0.3575 (0.3316) | 0.3550 (0.3235) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.9224*** (0.3237) | 0.7132** (0.3266) | -0.1852 (0.3214) | 0.0840 (0.3305) | 0.0092 (0.3509) | 0.0927 (0.3291) | 0.6324* (0.3394) | 0.6527** (0.3247) | 0.6716** (0.3261) | 0.6192* (0.3316) | 0.5771* (0.3235) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | 0.0033 (0.0038) | 0.0033 (0.0038) | -0.0037 (0.0037) | -0.0048 (0.0038) | -0.0023 (0.0040) | -0.0011 (0.0038) | 0.0033 (0.0039) | 0.0059 (0.0038) | 0.0089** (0.0038) | 0.0082** (0.0038) | 0.0116*** (0.0037) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.1436 (0.1048) | 0.0515 (0.1052) | -0.1137 (0.1029) | -0.1647 (0.1038) | -0.1258 (0.1108) | -0.1328 (0.1040) | 0.0031 (0.1092) | 0.0669 (0.1047) | 0.1812* (0.1059) | 0.1794* (0.1053) | 0.2857*** (0.1041) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*.

Table 42: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | -0.2371 (0.3148) | -0.3542 (0.3150) | -0.0490 (0.3088) | -0.0917 (0.3152) | -0.1677 (0.3221) | -0.1205 (0.3035) | 0.3286 (0.3272) | 0.3185 (0.3257) | 0.5391 (0.3316) | 0.2155 (0.3354) | 0.6276* (0.3342) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | -0.2365 (0.3148) | -0.6852** (0.3107) | -0.4380 (0.3046) | -0.3441 (0.3109) | -0.3443 (0.3221) | -0.3696 (0.3035) | 0.2042 (0.3272) | 0.1317 (0.3257) | 0.0326 (0.3316) | -0.2273 (0.3354) | -0.1858 (0.3342) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | 0.2174 (0.3148) | -0.3090 (0.3107) | 0.1365 (0.3046) | 0.2578 (0.3109) | 0.1347 (0.3221) | 0.0331 (0.3035) | 0.6612** (0.3272) | 0.3879 (0.3257) | 0.5005 (0.3316) | 0.1666 (0.3354) | 0.1655 (0.3342) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | 0.7647** (0.3148) | 0.5039 (0.3107) | 0.7854** (0.3046) | 0.8159** (0.3109) | 0.9856*** (0.3221) | 0.8983*** (0.3035) | 1.0389*** (0.3272) | 0.7118** (0.3257) | 0.6570* (0.3316) | 0.3463 (0.3354) | 0.1875 (0.3342) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0139*** (0.0036) | 0.0107*** (0.0037) | 0.0120*** (0.0036) | 0.0129*** (0.0037) | 0.0140*** (0.0038) | 0.0128*** (0.0036) | 0.0095** (0.0038) | 0.0046 (0.0038) | 0.0032 (0.0039) | 0.0032 (0.0039) | -0.0025 (0.0039) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.3763*** (0.0984) | 0.2732*** (0.1025) | 0.3187*** (0.0991) | 0.3582*** (0.0994) | 0.3742*** (0.1046) | 0.3663*** (0.0978) | 0.2096* (0.1070) | 0.0814 (0.1046) | 0.0104 (0.1076) | 0.0207 (0.1069) | -0.1350 (0.1073) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*.

Table 43: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | -0.3233 (0.3281) | -0.2504 (0.3342) | -0.5441* (0.3202) | -0.5760* (0.3224) | -0.0590 (0.3458) | -0.2093 (0.3220) | 0.2782 (0.3435) | 0.4613 (0.3308) | 0.6167* (0.3361) | 0.4130 (0.3372) | 0.3923 (0.3299) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | -0.0639 (0.3281) | -0.2425 (0.3342) | -0.3577 (0.3202) | -0.7508** (0.3224) | 0.3926 (0.3458) | 0.2279 (0.3220) | 0.5753* (0.3435) | 0.3716 (0.3308) | 0.0516 (0.3361) | 0.1541 (0.3372) | 0.3732 (0.3299) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | 0.1268 (0.3281) | -0.0155 (0.3342) | -0.3825 (0.3202) | -0.4218 (0.3224) | 0.2278 (0.3458) | -0.1649 (0.3220) | 0.2812 (0.3435) | 0.3625 (0.3308) | 0.2349 (0.3361) | 0.1100 (0.3372) | -0.2476 (0.3299) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | 0.4350 (0.3281) | 0.0356 (0.3342) | 0.1309 (0.3202) | -0.0820 (0.3224) | 0.6613* (0.3458) | 0.5569* (0.3220) | 0.4098 (0.3435) | 0.1504 (0.3308) | 0.1405 (0.3361) | -0.0796 (0.3372) | -0.3787 (0.3299) |
| Rank (APH) | 0.0087** (0.0037) | 0.0052 (0.0038) | 0.0067* (0.0037) | 0.0074* (0.0037) | 0.0074* (0.0040) | 0.0062 (0.0038) | 0.0000 (0.0040) | -0.0026 (0.0038) | -0.0037 (0.0039) | -0.0062 (0.0038) | -0.0116*** (0.0037) |
| Z-score (APH) | 0.2430** (0.1028) | 0.1431 (0.1043) | 0.2140** (0.1011) | 0.2382** (0.1022) | 0.2712** (0.1080) | 0.2616** (0.1014) | 0.0739 (0.1089) | 0.0109 (0.1049) | -0.0856 (0.1072) | -0.1428 (0.1059) | -0.2540** (0.1050) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*.

Table 44: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | 0.7546** (0.3231) | 0.4337 (0.3329) | 0.3914 (0.3275) | 0.2350 (0.3324) | 0.1881 (0.3467) | 0.2485 (0.3189) | -0.3269 (0.3441) | 0.0341 (0.3192) | 0.2409 (0.3274) | 0.4951 (0.3073) | 0.2552 (0.3311) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.8700*** (0.3231) | 0.2418 (0.3329) | 0.2421 (0.3275) | 0.1282 (0.3324) | 0.0717 (0.3467) | 0.1037 (0.3189) | 0.0617 (0.3441) | -0.2229 (0.3192) | 0.0576 (0.3274) | 0.6759** (0.3073) | 0.0296 (0.3311) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | 0.4762 (0.3231) | 0.3675 (0.3329) | 0.2815 (0.3275) | 0.0628 (0.3324) | -0.2515 (0.3467) | -0.1552 (0.3189) | -0.3973 (0.3441) | -0.1648 (0.3192) | -0.1280 (0.3274) | 0.2435 (0.3073) | -0.2093 (0.3311) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | 0.4647 (0.3231) | 0.1763 (0.3329) | 0.0546 (0.3275) | -0.2211 (0.3324) | -0.5178 (0.3467) | -0.6587** (0.3189) | -0.2126 (0.3441) | -0.8267** (0.3192) | -0.6912** (0.3274) | -0.6130** (0.3073) | -0.6398* (0.3311) |
| Rank (Income) | -0.0049 (0.0038) | -0.0010 (0.0038) | -0.0018 (0.0038) | -0.0040 (0.0038) | -0.0081** (0.0040) | -0.0094** (0.0037) | -0.0016 (0.0040) | -0.0084** (0.0037) | -0.0109*** (0.0037) | -0.0143*** (0.0036) | -0.0108*** (0.0038) |
| Z-score (Income) | -0.0576 (0.1056) | 0.0141 (0.1053) | -0.0296 (0.1035) | -0.0874 (0.1048) | -0.1920* (0.1098) | -0.2541** (0.1016) | -0.0179 (0.1092) | -0.1858* (0.1032) | -0.2579** (0.1042) | -0.3446*** (0.1008) | -0.2510** (0.1051) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*.

Table 45: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.7093** (0.3272) | -0.7928** (0.3185) | -0.6869** (0.3190) | -0.4571 (0.3311) | -0.5066 (0.3473) | -0.2102 (0.3283) | -0.1026 (0.3467) | -0.3567 (0.3306) | -0.4195 (0.3352) | -0.2508 (0.3346) | -0.3537 (0.3411) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | -0.4399 (0.3272) | -0.7504** (0.3185) | -0.0926 (0.3190) | -0.0691 (0.3311) | 0.0456 (0.3473) | 0.1561 (0.3283) | 0.1666 (0.3467) | 0.0789 (0.3306) | 0.2081 (0.3352) | 0.1634 (0.3346) | 0.1774 (0.3411) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | -0.5462* (0.3272) | -0.7299** (0.3185) | -0.3689 (0.3190) | -0.0847 (0.3311) | -0.2560 (0.3473) | -0.1001 (0.3283) | 0.1473 (0.3467) | -0.0418 (0.3306) | -0.0764 (0.3352) | -0.3607 (0.3346) | -0.1585 (0.3411) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | -0.1549 (0.3272) | -0.2070 (0.3185) | 0.0053 (0.3190) | 0.0276 (0.3311) | -0.5418 (0.3473) | -0.4588 (0.3283) | -0.1433 (0.3467) | -0.3023 (0.3306) | -0.3537 (0.3352) | -0.3690 (0.3346) | -0.1061 (0.3411) |
| Rank (Education) | 0.0062 (0.0038) | 0.0079** (0.0037) | 0.0072* (0.0037) | 0.0064* (0.0038) | -0.0014 (0.0040) | -0.0039 (0.0038) | 0.0008 (0.0040) | 0.0004 (0.0038) | -0.0003 (0.0039) | -0.0036 (0.0039) | 0.0015 (0.0039) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.1262 (0.1050) | 0.1555 (0.1041) | 0.1036 (0.1030) | 0.0586 (0.1050) | -0.1047 (0.1111) | -0.1776* (0.1033) | -0.0268 (0.1092) | -0.0243 (0.1049) | -0.0137 (0.1076) | -0.0950 (0.1065) | 0.0530 (0.1081) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*.

Table 46: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.3751 (0.3061) | 0.4316 (0.3105) | -0.0358 (0.3130) | 0.3515 (0.3111) | 0.4622 (0.3241) | 0.4184 (0.3123) | 0.1831 (0.3189) | -0.0829 (0.3170) | -0.2284 (0.3160) | -0.0878 (0.3026) | -0.0296 (0.3180) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | 0.5610* (0.3061) | 0.6493** (0.3105) | -0.1866 (0.3130) | 0.3609 (0.3111) | 0.3696 (0.3241) | 0.3350 (0.3123) | 0.0475 (0.3189) | -0.2566 (0.3170) | -0.1327 (0.3160) | 0.1126 (0.3026) | -0.2570 (0.3180) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.3409 (0.3061) | 0.2358 (0.3105) | -0.5006 (0.3130) | 0.1082 (0.3111) | 0.2939 (0.3241) | 0.3369 (0.3123) | 0.3739 (0.3189) | 0.2531 (0.3170) | 0.0451 (0.3160) | 0.3300 (0.3026) | 0.1500 (0.3180) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | -0.3084 (0.3061) | 0.1402 (0.3105) | 0.0821 (0.3130) | 0.5636* (0.3111) | 0.7884** (0.3241) | 0.6043* (0.3123) | 0.4743 (0.3189) | 0.4200 (0.3170) | 0.2669 (0.3160) | 0.4047 (0.3026) | 0.3827 (0.3180) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | -0.0084** (0.0036) | -0.0051 (0.0036) | -0.0000 (0.0036) | 0.0010 (0.0036) | 0.0033 (0.0038) | 0.0033 (0.0036) | 0.0055 (0.0036) | 0.0074** (0.0036) | 0.0047 (0.0036) | 0.0047 (0.0035) | 0.0068* (0.0036) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | -0.2594*** (0.0974) | -0.1089 (0.0993) | -0.0175 (0.1002) | -0.0076 (0.0995) | -0.0212 (0.1048) | -0.0069 (0.0998) | 0.0460 (0.1014) | 0.0819 (0.1019) | 0.0351 (0.1003) | 0.0599 (0.0965) | 0.1577 (0.1005) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*.

Table 47: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | -0.1827 (0.3102) | -0.0212 (0.3123) | 0.3172 (0.3006) | 0.0126 (0.3129) | -0.3897 (0.3201) | -0.2187 (0.3105) | 0.2002 (0.3182) | 0.3646 (0.3206) | 0.1223 (0.3160) | 0.0668 (0.3059) | 0.3161 (0.3180) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | -0.4567 (0.3102) | -0.6634** (0.3080) | -0.2198 (0.2965) | -0.2643 (0.3086) | -0.5790* (0.3201) | -0.3902 (0.3105) | -0.0107 (0.3182) | 0.1557 (0.3206) | -0.1301 (0.3160) | -0.2956 (0.3059) | -0.2139 (0.3180) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | 0.2697 (0.3102) | 0.0046 (0.3080) | 0.8465*** (0.2965) | 0.4944 (0.3086) | 0.2097 (0.3201) | 0.2556 (0.3105) | 0.5224 (0.3182) | 0.5768* (0.3206) | 0.3615 (0.3160) | -0.1409 (0.3059) | -0.1309 (0.3180) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | -0.4168 (0.3102) | -0.2076 (0.3080) | 0.3886 (0.2965) | 0.2067 (0.3086) | 0.0763 (0.3201) | 0.0122 (0.3105) | 0.1699 (0.3182) | 0.2442 (0.3206) | -0.0265 (0.3160) | -0.2003 (0.3059) | -0.2790 (0.3180) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0021 (0.0037) | 0.0015 (0.0037) | 0.0065* (0.0036) | 0.0053 (0.0036) | 0.0079** (0.0037) | 0.0053 (0.0036) | 0.0030 (0.0037) | -0.0001 (0.0037) | 0.0007 (0.0036) | -0.0018 (0.0035) | -0.0052 (0.0037) |
| Z-score (MUH) | -0.0414 (0.1009) | -0.0451 (0.1004) | 0.1023 (0.1002) | 0.0905 (0.1001) | 0.1786* (0.1031) | 0.1092 (0.0991) | 0.0648 (0.1013) | -0.0078 (0.1023) | 0.0398 (0.1003) | -0.0243 (0.0966) | -0.1408 (0.1008) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*.

Table 48: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | -0.2378 (0.3099) | -0.1405 (0.3066) | -0.0502 (0.3194) | -0.1245 (0.3101) | 0.1926 (0.3243) | 0.2889 (0.3163) | 0.1842 (0.3226) | 0.2015 (0.3235) | 0.0076 (0.3151) | 0.2009 (0.3077) | 0.4471 (0.3181) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | 0.1864 (0.3099) | -0.4611 (0.3066) | -0.0727 (0.3194) | -0.5682* (0.3101) | 0.4897 (0.3243) | 0.0551 (0.3163) | 0.1779 (0.3226) | 0.3068 (0.3235) | -0.2075 (0.3151) | 0.1182 (0.3077) | 0.5349* (0.3181) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | 0.1819 (0.3099) | -0.3078 (0.3066) | -0.0023 (0.3194) | -0.1428 (0.3101) | 0.5289 (0.3243) | 0.2898 (0.3163) | -0.0132 (0.3226) | -0.0663 (0.3235) | -0.4086 (0.3151) | 0.1148 (0.3077) | 0.1087 (0.3181) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | -0.5301* (0.3099) | -0.7825** (0.3066) | -0.2124 (0.3194) | -0.4388 (0.3101) | -0.1034 (0.3243) | 0.0529 (0.3163) | -0.0861 (0.3226) | -0.0271 (0.3235) | 0.0934 (0.3151) | 0.2589 (0.3077) | 0.4279 (0.3181) |
| Rank (APH) | -0.0037 (0.0036) | -0.0051 (0.0036) | -0.0024 (0.0036) | -0.0011 (0.0036) | -0.0019 (0.0038) | -0.0014 (0.0036) | -0.0038 (0.0037) | -0.0046 (0.0037) | -0.0002 (0.0036) | -0.0008 (0.0035) | -0.0029 (0.0037) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.1829* (0.0992) | -0.1943* (0.0979) | -0.0818 (0.0998) | -0.0560 (0.0993) | -0.0240 (0.1048) | -0.0197 (0.0998) | -0.0515 (0.1014) | -0.0582 (0.1021) | 0.0424 (0.1003) | 0.0291 (0.0966) | -0.0115 (0.1018) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*.

Table 49: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | 0.0856 (0.2899) | -0.1124 (0.3042) | -0.2578 (0.3171) | -0.1546 (0.3160) | -0.2923 (0.3320) | -0.2672 (0.3119) | -0.1474 (0.3089) | -0.1232 (0.3238) | 0.2169 (0.3166) | 0.0713 (0.3026) | -0.1628 (0.3228) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.5081* (0.2899) | -0.0003 (0.3042) | 0.0353 (0.3171) | -0.0064 (0.3160) | -0.0887 (0.3320) | -0.3597 (0.3119) | -0.6901** (0.3089) | -0.3976 (0.3238) | 0.0060 (0.3166) | 0.1602 (0.3026) | -0.1622 (0.3228) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | 0.4354 (0.2899) | 0.0607 (0.3042) | -0.1068 (0.3171) | -0.2183 (0.3160) | -0.3560 (0.3320) | -0.5980* (0.3119) | -0.7707** (0.3089) | -0.2161 (0.3238) | -0.0070 (0.3166) | 0.1516 (0.3026) | -0.1254 (0.3228) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | 1.2082*** (0.2899) | 0.7098** (0.3042) | 0.1527 (0.3171) | 0.0900 (0.3160) | -0.2858 (0.3320) | -0.1541 (0.3119) | -0.3350 (0.3089) | -0.3116 (0.3238) | -0.2775 (0.3166) | -0.3516 (0.3026) | -0.4017 (0.3228) |
| Rank (Income) | 0.0116*** (0.0035) | 0.0101*** (0.0035) | 0.0047 (0.0036) | 0.0026 (0.0036) | -0.0003 (0.0038) | 0.0011 (0.0036) | -0.0025 (0.0037) | -0.0009 (0.0037) | -0.0040 (0.0036) | -0.0044 (0.0035) | -0.0026 (0.0037) |
| Z-score (Income) | 0.4067*** (0.0918) | 0.3548*** (0.0930) | 0.1555 (0.0989) | 0.1134 (0.0988) | 0.0006 (0.1048) | 0.0464 (0.0997) | -0.0292 (0.1015) | -0.0067 (0.1023) | -0.0875 (0.1000) | -0.1177 (0.0959) | -0.0660 (0.1016) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*.

Table 50: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.7808** (0.2983) | -0.8915*** (0.2864) | -0.5891* (0.3080) | -0.3306 (0.3099) | -0.0987 (0.3253) | -0.1647 (0.3070) | -0.2225 (0.3193) | -0.4336 (0.3214) | -0.4044 (0.3155) | -0.4156 (0.3040) | -0.7841** (0.3131) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | -0.6069** (0.2983) | -0.6594** (0.2864) | -0.0781 (0.3080) | -0.2469 (0.3099) | 0.5885* (0.3253) | 0.5784* (0.3070) | 0.2884 (0.3193) | 0.0888 (0.3214) | -0.0877 (0.3155) | -0.1130 (0.3040) | -0.1837 (0.3131) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | -0.5802* (0.2983) | -0.8052*** (0.2864) | -0.5485* (0.3080) | -0.4669 (0.3099) | 0.0188 (0.3253) | -0.0496 (0.3070) | 0.0927 (0.3193) | -0.1957 (0.3214) | -0.3189 (0.3155) | -0.1900 (0.3040) | -0.1769 (0.3131) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | 0.1654 (0.2983) | 0.1337 (0.2864) | -0.0168 (0.3080) | 0.1215 (0.3099) | 0.1029 (0.3253) | 0.1875 (0.3070) | -0.1223 (0.3193) | -0.0735 (0.3214) | -0.4427 (0.3155) | -0.4229 (0.3040) | -0.3996 (0.3131) |
| Rank (Education) | 0.0115*** (0.0035) | 0.0100*** (0.0035) | 0.0040 (0.0036) | 0.0048 (0.0036) | -0.0005 (0.0038) | 0.0011 (0.0036) | 0.0006 (0.0037) | 0.0025 (0.0037) | -0.0008 (0.0036) | -0.0000 (0.0035) | 0.0040 (0.0037) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.3433*** (0.0945) | 0.2734*** (0.0959) | 0.0820 (0.0998) | 0.0893 (0.0991) | -0.0639 (0.1046) | 0.0007 (0.0998) | -0.0077 (0.1015) | 0.0473 (0.1022) | -0.0347 (0.1003) | -0.0171 (0.0966) | 0.1022 (0.1013) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*.

Table 51: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.2834 (0.3039) | -0.2583 (0.3440) | 0.0247 (0.3828) | 0.0511 (0.3579) | -0.2781 (0.3783) | -0.1240 (0.3406) | 0.5456 (0.3679) | 0.2569 (0.3435) | 0.2490 (0.3310) | 0.0096 (0.3469) | -0.2021 (0.3212) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | 0.0357 (0.3039) | -0.0935 (0.3440) | 0.0696 (0.3828) | -0.1044 (0.3579) | -0.7228* (0.3783) | -0.4935 (0.3406) | 0.3388 (0.3679) | 0.6399* (0.3435) | 0.2708 (0.3310) | 0.0229 (0.3469) | -0.3974 (0.3212) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.3623 (0.3039) | 0.3116 (0.3440) | -0.2613 (0.3828) | -0.3642 (0.3579) | -0.8500** (0.3783) | -0.7101** (0.3406) | 0.5026 (0.3679) | 0.5087 (0.3435) | 0.9118*** (0.3310) | 0.2537 (0.3469) | 0.3383 (0.3212) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | 1.4174*** (0.3039) | 0.8800** (0.3440) | -0.4347 (0.3828) | -0.7250** (0.3579) | -0.8675** (0.3783) | -0.4210 (0.3406) | 0.3915 (0.3679) | 0.4029 (0.3435) | 0.6172* (0.3310) | 0.5213 (0.3469) | 0.4806 (0.3212) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | 0.0124*** (0.0038) | 0.0117*** (0.0040) | -0.0059 (0.0044) | -0.0090** (0.0041) | -0.0069 (0.0044) | -0.0042 (0.0040) | -0.0009 (0.0042) | 0.0003 (0.0040) | 0.0075* (0.0039) | 0.0073* (0.0039) | 0.0101*** (0.0037) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.4322*** (0.0997) | 0.2207* (0.1131) | -0.1571 (0.1203) | -0.2426** (0.1131) | -0.1494 (0.1227) | -0.1515 (0.1087) | -0.0404 (0.1167) | 0.0062 (0.1098) | 0.1884* (0.1069) | 0.1792 (0.1090) | 0.2539** (0.1027) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*.

Table 52: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | -0.1021 (0.3004) | -0.5010 (0.3247) | -0.5937* (0.3385) | -0.1606 (0.3438) | 0.2042 (0.3609) | 0.0492 (0.3171) | 0.2483 (0.3461) | 0.0524 (0.3409) | 0.5498 (0.3347) | 0.2178 (0.3461) | 0.5728* (0.3291) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | 0.1729 (0.3004) | -0.1472 (0.3203) | -0.3578 (0.3339) | -0.1302 (0.3392) | 0.1727 (0.3609) | -0.0956 (0.3171) | 0.2854 (0.3461) | 0.0172 (0.3409) | 0.1146 (0.3347) | -0.1193 (0.3461) | -0.1094 (0.3291) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | -0.0087 (0.3004) | -0.4677 (0.3203) | -1.1491*** (0.3339) | -0.3518 (0.3392) | -0.0488 (0.3609) | -0.1853 (0.3171) | 0.3836 (0.3461) | -0.0562 (0.3409) | 0.3639 (0.3347) | 0.2627 (0.3461) | 0.2581 (0.3291) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | 1.3363*** (0.3004) | 1.0268*** (0.3203) | 0.6503* (0.3339) | 0.9457*** (0.3392) | 1.2707*** (0.3609) | 1.0548*** (0.3171) | 1.2342*** (0.3461) | 0.6327* (0.3409) | 0.7738** (0.3347) | 0.5007 (0.3461) | 0.3578 (0.3291) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0146*** (0.0037) | 0.0140*** (0.0040) | 0.0090** (0.0044) | 0.0119*** (0.0041) | 0.0104** (0.0044) | 0.0106*** (0.0038) | 0.0098** (0.0041) | 0.0055 (0.0039) | 0.0033 (0.0039) | 0.0046 (0.0040) | -0.0003 (0.0038) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.4938*** (0.0966) | 0.4675*** (0.1057) | 0.3538*** (0.1168) | 0.4157*** (0.1086) | 0.3154*** (0.1193) | 0.3385*** (0.1041) | 0.2193* (0.1146) | 0.1046 (0.1093) | -0.0116 (0.1087) | 0.0360 (0.1105) | -0.0868 (0.1057) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*.

Table 53: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | -0.1505 (0.3115) | -0.1884 (0.3391) | -0.8054** (0.3521) | -0.7001** (0.3424) | -0.2962 (0.3609) | -0.5021 (0.3222) | 0.1959 (0.3647) | 0.3710 (0.3466) | 0.7072** (0.3362) | 0.3815 (0.3475) | 0.2333 (0.3204) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | -0.2634 (0.3115) | 0.2468 (0.3391) | -0.4651 (0.3521) | -0.2970 (0.3424) | -0.0066 (0.3609) | 0.2220 (0.3222) | 0.6021 (0.3647) | 0.1683 (0.3466) | 0.1822 (0.3362) | 0.1212 (0.3475) | 0.1672 (0.3204) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | -0.0296 (0.3115) | 0.3834 (0.3391) | -0.6196* (0.3521) | -0.4345 (0.3424) | -0.2770 (0.3609) | -0.4502 (0.3222) | 0.3915 (0.3647) | 0.4945 (0.3466) | 0.5127 (0.3362) | 0.0716 (0.3475) | -0.3426 (0.3204) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | 1.0534*** (0.3115) | 1.0867*** (0.3391) | 0.5574 (0.3521) | 0.5389 (0.3424) | 1.0252*** (0.3609) | 0.6141* (0.3222) | 0.6355* (0.3647) | 0.2048 (0.3466) | 0.1068 (0.3362) | -0.2194 (0.3475) | -0.6549** (0.3204) |
| Rank (APH) | 0.0141*** (0.0037) | 0.0146*** (0.0039) | 0.0148*** (0.0041) | 0.0130*** (0.0040) | 0.0123*** (0.0043) | 0.0086** (0.0039) | 0.0038 (0.0042) | 0.0011 (0.0040) | -0.0041 (0.0039) | -0.0068* (0.0039) | -0.0120*** (0.0036) |
| Z-score (APH) | 0.4751*** (0.0976) | 0.4704*** (0.1046) | 0.4812*** (0.1107) | 0.4525*** (0.1059) | 0.4000*** (0.1165) | 0.3277*** (0.1044) | 0.1495 (0.1158) | 0.0657 (0.1096) | -0.1238 (0.1080) | -0.1802 (0.1090) | -0.2900*** (0.1017) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*.

Table 54: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | 0.8214*** (0.3067) | 0.7961** (0.3291) | 1.0556*** (0.3599) | 0.5971* (0.3489) | 0.5851 (0.3812) | 0.5296 (0.3208) | -0.2972 (0.3551) | 0.1522 (0.3353) | 0.1497 (0.3351) | 0.5404* (0.3219) | 0.3785 (0.3232) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.5371* (0.3067) | 0.3615 (0.3291) | 0.3373 (0.3599) | 0.2075 (0.3489) | 0.1977 (0.3812) | 0.4391 (0.3208) | 0.7526** (0.3551) | 0.0921 (0.3353) | 0.0629 (0.3351) | 0.7070** (0.3219) | 0.1156 (0.3232) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | 0.1367 (0.3067) | 0.4687 (0.3291) | 0.6318* (0.3599) | 0.4280 (0.3489) | 0.0514 (0.3812) | 0.3413 (0.3208) | 0.2127 (0.3551) | -0.0023 (0.3353) | -0.1436 (0.3351) | 0.2087 (0.3219) | -0.1810 (0.3232) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | -0.6506** (0.3067) | -0.6742** (0.3291) | -0.1586 (0.3599) | -0.4776 (0.3489) | -0.3933 (0.3812) | -0.6460** (0.3208) | 0.0387 (0.3551) | -0.7096** (0.3353) | -0.6335* (0.3351) | -0.5401* (0.3219) | -0.5441* (0.3232) |
| Rank (Income) | -0.0175*** (0.0035) | -0.0148*** (0.0039) | -0.0106** (0.0043) | -0.0101** (0.0041) | -0.0108** (0.0043) | -0.0122*** (0.0038) | 0.0002 (0.0042) | -0.0093** (0.0039) | -0.0102*** (0.0038) | -0.0144*** (0.0037) | -0.0112*** (0.0037) |
| Z-score (Income) | -0.4763*** (0.0975) | -0.4475*** (0.1057) | -0.3002** (0.1174) | -0.3068*** (0.1114) | -0.2648** (0.1206) | -0.3422*** (0.1039) | 0.0042 (0.1168) | -0.2167** (0.1075) | -0.2459** (0.1057) | -0.3428*** (0.1047) | -0.2593** (0.1026) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*.

Table 55: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.0711 (0.3461) | -0.0065 (0.3636) | -0.1650 (0.3852) | -0.2041 (0.3577) | -0.5867 (0.3838) | -0.1046 (0.3405) | 0.0777 (0.3727) | -0.0358 (0.3481) | -0.2450 (0.3419) | -0.0878 (0.3474) | -0.0198 (0.3362) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | 0.0787 (0.3461) | -0.2499 (0.3636) | -0.0244 (0.3852) | 0.2678 (0.3577) | -0.5941 (0.3838) | -0.3231 (0.3405) | -0.0555 (0.3727) | 0.0143 (0.3481) | 0.2920 (0.3419) | 0.2452 (0.3474) | 0.2983 (0.3362) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | -0.0758 (0.3461) | -0.0266 (0.3636) | 0.2875 (0.3852) | 0.5772 (0.3577) | -0.3731 (0.3838) | -0.0751 (0.3405) | 0.1085 (0.3727) | 0.1268 (0.3481) | 0.1003 (0.3419) | -0.3260 (0.3474) | -0.0961 (0.3362) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | -0.3518 (0.3461) | -0.4857 (0.3636) | 0.0358 (0.3852) | -0.1417 (0.3577) | -0.8602** (0.3838) | -0.7090** (0.3405) | -0.0742 (0.3727) | -0.2960 (0.3481) | -0.1465 (0.3419) | -0.2216 (0.3474) | 0.0762 (0.3362) |
| Rank (Education) | -0.0041 (0.0039) | -0.0014 (0.0042) | 0.0052 (0.0044) | 0.0026 (0.0042) | -0.0014 (0.0045) | -0.0056 (0.0039) | 0.0005 (0.0042) | -0.0017 (0.0040) | 0.0002 (0.0039) | -0.0042 (0.0040) | -0.0003 (0.0038) |
| Z-score (Education) | -0.1920* (0.1075) | -0.1288 (0.1147) | 0.0361 (0.1214) | -0.0450 (0.1158) | -0.0727 (0.1235) | -0.2113* (0.1076) | -0.0286 (0.1168) | -0.0718 (0.1096) | 0.0047 (0.1087) | -0.1020 (0.1100) | 0.0107 (0.1061) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*.

Table 56: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012))

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | -0.5503* (0.3235) | -0.2184 (0.3257) | 0.0337 (0.3231) | -0.3890 (0.3308) | -0.1547 (0.3428) | -0.3595 (0.3329) | -0.7776** (0.3440) | -0.3832 (0.3386) | -0.2002 (0.3456) | -0.0477 (0.3281) | 0.0937 (0.3370) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | -0.4996 (0.3235) | -0.5265 (0.3257) | 0.1420 (0.3231) | -0.2872 (0.3308) | 0.0894 (0.3428) | -0.0813 (0.3329) | -0.2862 (0.3440) | -0.3699 (0.3386) | 0.0140 (0.3456) | -0.0999 (0.3281) | 0.2829 (0.3370) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | -0.5805* (0.3235) | -0.4075 (0.3257) | 0.6330* (0.3231) | 0.1214 (0.3308) | 0.3729 (0.3428) | 0.2263 (0.3329) | -0.5661 (0.3440) | -0.3015 (0.3386) | -0.2719 (0.3456) | -0.2898 (0.3281) | -0.1789 (0.3370) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | -0.9179*** (0.3235) | -0.7563** (0.3257) | 0.1680 (0.3231) | -0.0895 (0.3308) | 0.0461 (0.3428) | -0.1950 (0.3329) | -0.4285 (0.3440) | -0.2315 (0.3386) | -0.1249 (0.3456) | -0.5084 (0.3281) | -0.1965 (0.3370) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | -0.0032 (0.0038) | -0.0035 (0.0038) | 0.0031 (0.0038) | 0.0049 (0.0038) | 0.0031 (0.0039) | 0.0025 (0.0038) | 0.0016 (0.0040) | 0.0021 (0.0039) | 0.0007 (0.0039) | -0.0056 (0.0037) | -0.0047 (0.0039) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | -0.1417 (0.1047) | -0.0683 (0.1051) | 0.0816 (0.1035) | 0.1550 (0.1040) | 0.0850 (0.1083) | 0.1344 (0.1052) | 0.0836 (0.1107) | 0.1223 (0.1061) | 0.0566 (0.1086) | -0.1105 (0.1038) | -0.0851 (0.1067) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*.

Table 57: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012))

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | 0.2426 (0.3146) | 0.3258 (0.3170) | 0.0139 (0.3126) | 0.0823 (0.3165) | 0.1655 (0.3332) | 0.1809 (0.3232) | -0.2996 (0.3454) | -0.2633 (0.3355) | -0.4813 (0.3178) | -0.1752 (0.3259) | -0.5115 (0.3284) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | 0.2449 (0.3146) | 0.6485** (0.3127) | 0.4372 (0.3083) | 0.3253 (0.3122) | 0.3252 (0.3332) | 0.3775 (0.3232) | -0.2006 (0.3454) | -0.1532 (0.3355) | -0.1089 (0.3178) | 0.2254 (0.3259) | 0.0688 (0.3284) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | -0.2208 (0.3146) | 0.3038 (0.3127) | -0.1117 (0.3083) | -0.2686 (0.3122) | -0.1200 (0.3332) | -0.0683 (0.3232) | -0.7241** (0.3454) | -0.5798* (0.3355) | -0.9917*** (0.3178) | -0.2700 (0.3259) | -0.5271 (0.3284) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | -0.7551** (0.3146) | -0.5024 (0.3127) | -0.7325** (0.3083) | -0.8086** (0.3122) | -0.5450 (0.3332) | -0.5484* (0.3232) | -0.4673 (0.3454) | -0.3646 (0.3355) | -1.0004*** (0.3178) | -0.4075 (0.3259) | -0.6100* (0.3284) |
| Rank (MUH) | -0.0139*** (0.0036) | -0.0101*** (0.0038) | -0.0110*** (0.0037) | -0.0127*** (0.0037) | -0.0082** (0.0038) | -0.0095** (0.0037) | -0.0044 (0.0040) | -0.0030 (0.0039) | -0.0097** (0.0038) | -0.0050 (0.0038) | -0.0050 (0.0038) |
| Z-score (MUH) | -0.3742*** (0.0983) | -0.2483** (0.1032) | -0.2809*** (0.1005) | -0.3475*** (0.0999) | -0.2036* (0.1066) | -0.2696*** (0.1024) | -0.0989 (0.1105) | -0.0862 (0.1065) | -0.1929* (0.1069) | -0.0746 (0.1042) | -0.0914 (0.1066) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*.

Table 58: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | 0.3217 (0.3280) | 0.2206 (0.3345) | 0.5083 (0.3227) | 0.5811* (0.3226) | 0.0583 (0.3466) | 0.1902 (0.3341) | -0.1137 (0.3525) | -0.1894 (0.3389) | -0.3052 (0.3438) | -0.3463 (0.3315) | -0.4285 (0.3382) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | 0.0709 (0.3280) | 0.2643 (0.3345) | 0.3280 (0.3227) | 0.7658** (0.3226) | -0.1101 (0.3466) | -0.0085 (0.3341) | -0.2029 (0.3525) | -0.2504 (0.3389) | -0.0027 (0.3438) | -0.0863 (0.3315) | -0.0943 (0.3382) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | -0.1323 (0.3280) | 0.0056 (0.3345) | 0.3804 (0.3227) | 0.4421 (0.3226) | -0.1513 (0.3466) | 0.2903 (0.3341) | 0.1561 (0.3525) | -0.3047 (0.3389) | -0.2755 (0.3438) | -0.1331 (0.3315) | -0.1572 (0.3382) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | -0.4263 (0.3280) | -0.0114 (0.3345) | -0.0988 (0.3227) | 0.1038 (0.3226) | -0.0144 (0.3466) | -0.2207 (0.3341) | 0.0407 (0.3525) | 0.0246 (0.3389) | -0.3539 (0.3438) | -0.0306 (0.3315) | -0.0018 (0.3382) |
| Rank (APH) | -0.0086** (0.0037) | -0.0048 (0.0038) | -0.0059 (0.0037) | -0.0072* (0.0037) | -0.0016 (0.0039) | -0.0027 (0.0038) | 0.0032 (0.0040) | 0.0021 (0.0039) | -0.0017 (0.0039) | 0.0040 (0.0038) | 0.0050 (0.0038) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.2403** (0.1027) | -0.1226 (0.1046) | -0.1818* (0.1021) | -0.2298** (0.1025) | -0.0699 (0.1085) | -0.1415 (0.1051) | 0.0225 (0.1110) | -0.0325 (0.1068) | -0.0705 (0.1085) | 0.0815 (0.1041) | 0.0897 (0.1066) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*.

Table 59: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | -0.7497** (0.3229) | -0.4486 (0.3330) | -0.3472 (0.3294) | -0.2239 (0.3332) | 0.1007 (0.3470) | 0.0572 (0.3383) | 0.0225 (0.3520) | 0.3152 (0.3371) | -0.0249 (0.3415) | -0.3824 (0.3019) | -0.1288 (0.3246) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | -0.8724*** (0.3229) | -0.2326 (0.3330) | -0.2448 (0.3294) | -0.1103 (0.3332) | 0.0260 (0.3470) | 0.1211 (0.3383) | 0.2932 (0.3520) | 0.2187 (0.3371) | -0.1626 (0.3415) | -0.6315** (0.3019) | 0.0883 (0.3246) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | -0.4816 (0.3229) | -0.3820 (0.3330) | -0.2660 (0.3294) | -0.0675 (0.3332) | -0.0368 (0.3470) | 0.0192 (0.3383) | 0.1170 (0.3520) | -0.1714 (0.3371) | -0.0657 (0.3415) | -0.1642 (0.3019) | 0.3331 (0.3246) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | -0.4695 (0.3229) | -0.2407 (0.3330) | -0.1129 (0.3294) | 0.2072 (0.3332) | -0.0773 (0.3470) | 0.2062 (0.3383) | -0.1168 (0.3520) | 0.0832 (0.3371) | 0.4049 (0.3415) | 0.6370** (0.3019) | 0.7928** (0.3246) |
| Rank (Income) | 0.0048 (0.0038) | 0.0003 (0.0038) | 0.0009 (0.0038) | 0.0036 (0.0038) | -0.0030 (0.0039) | -0.0004 (0.0038) | -0.0023 (0.0040) | -0.0045 (0.0038) | 0.0053 (0.0039) | 0.0133*** (0.0035) | 0.0106*** (0.0037) |
| Z-score (Income) | 0.0555 (0.1056) | -0.0434 (0.1053) | -0.0062 (0.1038) | 0.0752 (0.1050) | -0.0742 (0.1084) | 0.0255 (0.1061) | -0.0996 (0.1105) | -0.0299 (0.1068) | 0.2044* (0.1066) | 0.3446*** (0.0982) | 0.3433*** (0.1009) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*.

Table 60: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | 0.7079** (0.3267) | 0.7867** (0.3174) | 0.6396** (0.3192) | 0.4620 (0.3311) | 0.6259* (0.3346) | 0.3262 (0.3317) | 0.2012 (0.3483) | 0.3592 (0.3362) | 0.3456 (0.3384) | 0.1661 (0.3263) | 0.5960* (0.3326) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | 0.4441 (0.3267) | 0.7649** (0.3174) | 0.0531 (0.3192) | 0.0728 (0.3311) | 0.0222 (0.3346) | -0.2386 (0.3317) | -0.0890 (0.3483) | 0.0719 (0.3362) | -0.2820 (0.3384) | -0.2308 (0.3263) | 0.0183 (0.3326) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | 0.5485* (0.3267) | 0.7185** (0.3174) | 0.3272 (0.3192) | 0.0714 (0.3311) | -0.1304 (0.3346) | -0.2575 (0.3317) | -0.3212 (0.3483) | -0.1744 (0.3362) | -0.0033 (0.3384) | 0.2480 (0.3263) | 0.1933 (0.3326) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | 0.1440 (0.3267) | 0.1433 (0.3174) | -0.1226 (0.3192) | -0.0518 (0.3311) | -0.1327 (0.3346) | -0.1323 (0.3317) | -0.3462 (0.3483) | -0.1015 (0.3362) | 0.3440 (0.3384) | 0.3909 (0.3263) | 0.4842 (0.3326) |
| Rank (Education) | -0.0063* (0.0038) | -0.0087** (0.0037) | -0.0080** (0.0037) | -0.0069* (0.0038) | -0.0088** (0.0038) | -0.0049 (0.0038) | -0.0082** (0.0039) | -0.0058 (0.0038) | 0.0012 (0.0039) | 0.0046 (0.0038) | 0.0001 (0.0039) |
| Z-score (Education) | -0.1295 (0.1049) | -0.1921* (0.1035) | -0.1423 (0.1028) | -0.0751 (0.1050) | -0.1311 (0.1078) | -0.0170 (0.1061) | -0.1336 (0.1101) | -0.0538 (0.1067) | 0.0864 (0.1083) | 0.1341 (0.1035) | 0.0744 (0.1068) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*.

Table 61: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.1719 (0.3065) | 0.1469 (0.2729) | -0.1228 (0.3298) | 0.2251 (0.3058) | -0.0156 (0.3054) | 0.2585 (0.2948) | 0.4449 (0.3232) | 0.2754 (0.3215) | 0.1256 (0.3110) | 0.3048 (0.3170) | 0.1519 (0.2923) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | 0.1893 (0.3065) | 0.2546 (0.2729) | 0.0119 (0.3298) | 0.0276 (0.3058) | 0.1817 (0.3054) | 0.4093 (0.2948) | 0.0402 (0.3232) | 0.0406 (0.3215) | -0.2429 (0.3110) | 0.1156 (0.3170) | 0.2950 (0.2923) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | -0.1150 (0.3065) | -0.0541 (0.2729) | 0.2508 (0.3298) | 0.1442 (0.3058) | -0.0139 (0.3054) | 0.1971 (0.2948) | -0.0287 (0.3232) | -0.3596 (0.3215) | -0.7452** (0.3110) | -0.3331 (0.3170) | -0.2889 (0.2923) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | -0.0575 (0.3065) | 0.6224** (0.2729) | 0.1649 (0.3298) | 0.1087 (0.3058) | -0.0788 (0.3054) | 0.1707 (0.2948) | -0.2263 (0.3232) | -0.4859 (0.3215) | -0.7442** (0.3110) | -0.5521* (0.3170) | -0.5937** (0.2923) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | -0.0038 (0.0035) | 0.0031 (0.0032) | 0.0049 (0.0037) | -0.0006 (0.0035) | -0.0013 (0.0035) | -0.0023 (0.0034) | -0.0070* (0.0037) | -0.0093** (0.0037) | -0.0129*** (0.0035) | -0.0120*** (0.0036) | -0.0109*** (0.0033) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | -0.0582 (0.0965) | 0.2091** (0.0863) | 0.3009*** (0.0993) | 0.1673* (0.0944) | 0.0509 (0.0958) | -0.0050 (0.0932) | -0.1332 (0.1027) | -0.2220** (0.1021) | -0.3175*** (0.0991) | -0.3039*** (0.0994) | -0.3099*** (0.0918) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*.

Table 62: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | -0.2655 (0.3012) | 0.2887 (0.2853) | 0.3267 (0.3247) | 0.1671 (0.3089) | -0.0070 (0.2972) | -0.1019 (0.2885) | 0.0009 (0.3133) | -0.0599 (0.3276) | -0.1047 (0.3221) | -0.1989 (0.3273) | -0.2545 (0.2959) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | -0.3917 (0.3012) | 0.3389 (0.2814) | 0.0197 (0.3203) | 0.3237 (0.3047) | 0.0064 (0.2972) | -0.0193 (0.2885) | 0.0227 (0.3133) | 0.0275 (0.3276) | 0.0968 (0.3221) | 0.0506 (0.3273) | 0.1838 (0.2959) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | 0.1725 (0.3012) | 0.0177 (0.2814) | -0.2337 (0.3203) | 0.2210 (0.3047) | -0.0129 (0.2972) | 0.0588 (0.2885) | 0.1886 (0.3133) | 0.2327 (0.3276) | 0.6070* (0.3221) | 0.3734 (0.3273) | 0.4483 (0.2959) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | -0.2939 (0.3012) | 0.0560 (0.2814) | -0.5125 (0.3203) | -0.0724 (0.3047) | -0.5728* (0.2972) | -0.5632* (0.2885) | -0.7363** (0.3133) | -0.3977 (0.3276) | 0.4072 (0.3221) | 0.1738 (0.3273) | 0.5245* (0.2959) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0015 (0.0035) | -0.0055* (0.0032) | -0.0097** (0.0037) | -0.0037 (0.0035) | -0.0074** (0.0034) | -0.0053 (0.0033) | -0.0065* (0.0037) | -0.0018 (0.0038) | 0.0081** (0.0037) | 0.0063* (0.0037) | 0.0104*** (0.0034) |
| Z-score (MUH) | -0.0384 (0.0966) | -0.2575*** (0.0856) | -0.3598*** (0.0979) | -0.1718* (0.0953) | -0.2223** (0.0931) | -0.1535* (0.0919) | -0.1414 (0.1026) | 0.0070 (0.1046) | 0.2354** (0.1016) | 0.2071** (0.1020) | 0.3195*** (0.0914) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*.

Table 63: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | 0.0200 (0.3011) | 0.3201 (0.2732) | 0.3473 (0.3237) | -0.1400 (0.3021) | -0.0027 (0.2854) | 0.0280 (0.2892) | -0.2148 (0.3206) | -0.3131 (0.3326) | -0.4371 (0.3252) | -0.3397 (0.3196) | -0.0162 (0.2837) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | -0.3043 (0.3011) | -0.2981 (0.2732) | 0.2856 (0.3237) | -0.3385 (0.3021) | -0.3818 (0.2854) | -0.3591 (0.2892) | -0.4938 (0.3206) | -0.1369 (0.3326) | -0.0661 (0.3252) | -0.2949 (0.3196) | -0.4270 (0.2837) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | 0.2467 (0.3011) | 0.1160 (0.2732) | 0.0302 (0.3237) | -0.4109 (0.3021) | -0.0960 (0.2854) | -0.2102 (0.2892) | -0.6345* (0.3206) | -0.0621 (0.3326) | 0.0394 (0.3252) | 0.0693 (0.3196) | 0.5721** (0.2837) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | -0.3043 (0.3011) | -0.2848 (0.2732) | -0.3011 (0.3237) | -0.4128 (0.3021) | -0.8888*** (0.2854) | -0.5464* (0.2892) | -0.6371** (0.3206) | -0.2039 (0.3326) | 0.2681 (0.3252) | 0.4470 (0.3196) | 0.5614* (0.2837) |
| Rank (APH) | -0.0013 (0.0035) | -0.0042 (0.0032) | -0.0079** (0.0037) | -0.0035 (0.0035) | -0.0079** (0.0034) | -0.0057* (0.0033) | -0.0049 (0.0037) | 0.0005 (0.0038) | 0.0071* (0.0037) | 0.0095** (0.0037) | 0.0105*** (0.0034) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.0800 (0.0963) | -0.2254** (0.0858) | -0.3042*** (0.0992) | -0.1382 (0.0949) | -0.2726*** (0.0917) | -0.1942** (0.0910) | -0.1383 (0.1026) | 0.0256 (0.1046) | 0.2065** (0.1022) | 0.2671*** (0.1005) | 0.2571*** (0.0935) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*.

Table 64: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | -0.0977 (0.3047) | 0.2435 (0.2655) | -0.4215 (0.3159) | -0.1884 (0.2996) | -0.4034 (0.2712) | -0.5013* (0.2590) | 0.4236 (0.3059) | -0.4113 (0.3023) | -0.2926 (0.3243) | -0.5355 (0.3256) | -0.2075 (0.3101) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.2260 (0.3047) | -0.0749 (0.2655) | 0.0182 (0.3159) | -0.3242 (0.2996) | -0.1359 (0.2712) | -0.3701 (0.2590) | -0.5381* (0.3059) | 0.0013 (0.3023) | 0.1325 (0.3243) | -0.3025 (0.3256) | -0.1597 (0.3101) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | 0.2939 (0.3047) | 0.2291 (0.2655) | -0.1519 (0.3159) | 0.0918 (0.2996) | 0.3988 (0.2712) | 0.2222 (0.2590) | 0.3766 (0.3059) | 0.3937 (0.3023) | 0.2576 (0.3243) | -0.3573 (0.3256) | -0.1287 (0.3101) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | 0.2689 (0.3047) | 0.7982*** (0.2655) | 0.5393* (0.3159) | 0.2406 (0.2996) | 0.8232*** (0.2712) | 0.7370*** (0.2590) | 0.4778 (0.3059) | 0.8632*** (0.3023) | 0.4087 (0.3243) | 0.0225 (0.3256) | -0.0971 (0.3101) |
| Rank (Income) | 0.0042 (0.0035) | 0.0082*** (0.0031) | 0.0087** (0.0037) | 0.0065* (0.0034) | 0.0154*** (0.0031) | 0.0161*** (0.0029) | 0.0058 (0.0037) | 0.0150*** (0.0035) | 0.0078** (0.0037) | 0.0065* (0.0037) | 0.0020 (0.0035) |
| Z-score (Income) | 0.0766 (0.0964) | 0.3528*** (0.0811) | 0.3323*** (0.0982) | 0.2203** (0.0932) | 0.3707*** (0.0879) | 0.3738*** (0.0848) | 0.1786* (0.1020) | 0.2513** (0.1014) | 0.0835 (0.1041) | 0.0658 (0.1040) | -0.0805 (0.0969) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*.

Table 65: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.0423 (0.2989) | -0.0451 (0.2606) | 0.4580 (0.3115) | -0.1266 (0.2983) | -0.2023 (0.2706) | -0.1954 (0.2627) | -0.1660 (0.3126) | -0.0088 (0.3259) | 0.1189 (0.3336) | 0.3795 (0.3262) | -0.2609 (0.3052) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | -0.2405 (0.2989) | -0.2851 (0.2606) | 0.3690 (0.3115) | -0.0746 (0.2983) | -0.0946 (0.2706) | 0.1391 (0.2627) | -0.0963 (0.3126) | -0.1765 (0.3259) | 0.0839 (0.3336) | 0.2332 (0.3262) | -0.2859 (0.3052) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | -0.1767 (0.2989) | 0.0287 (0.2606) | 0.3972 (0.3115) | 0.2420 (0.2983) | 0.5394** (0.2706) | 0.5896** (0.2627) | 0.2882 (0.3126) | 0.2543 (0.3259) | 0.1073 (0.3336) | 0.5100 (0.3262) | -0.0199 (0.3052) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | 0.4367 (0.2989) | 0.7333*** (0.2606) | 1.0874*** (0.3115) | 0.4533 (0.2983) | 0.9357*** (0.2706) | 0.9698*** (0.2627) | 0.7341** (0.3126) | 0.4712 (0.3259) | 0.0324 (0.3336) | -0.0155 (0.3262) | -0.4795 (0.3052) |
| Rank (Education) | 0.0061* (0.0035) | 0.0109*** (0.0030) | 0.0075** (0.0037) | 0.0088** (0.0034) | 0.0146*** (0.0031) | 0.0144*** (0.0030) | 0.0116*** (0.0036) | 0.0063* (0.0037) | -0.0012 (0.0038) | -0.0032 (0.0038) | -0.0023 (0.0035) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.1583* (0.0953) | 0.4616*** (0.0750) | 0.3553*** (0.0973) | 0.3136*** (0.0903) | 0.3324*** (0.0895) | 0.3187*** (0.0872) | 0.2433** (0.1005) | 0.0917 (0.1042) | -0.0932 (0.1040) | -0.1353 (0.1033) | -0.1760* (0.0955) |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*.

A.7.2 With control variables

This subsection presents regression results with control variables. Table 66, Table 67, Table 68, Table 69 and Table 70 present the results of the cross-sectional regressions (simple OLS with controls) of the share of the vote for the left on respectively the share of single households, the MUH and APH indicators for household complexity, the average income per adult and the share of university graduates. Regressions are implemented separately for each election year. Results are presented for the three alternative specifications of the independent variable: 5 quintiles (40 to 60 being the reference category), the rank of each *département*, and the z-score of each *département*. We use the following controls: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of single individuals.

Table 71, Table 72, Table 73, Table 74 and Table 75 present results for the extreme-left. Table 76, Table 77, Table 78, Table 79 and Table 80 present results for the centre-left. Table 81, Table 82, Table 83, Table 84 and Table 85 present results for the centre-right. Table 86, Table 87, Table 88, Table 89 and Table 90 present results for the extreme-right.

Table 66: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | -0.1076 (0.4762) | 0.2214 (0.4807) | 0.0446 (0.5998) | 0.6905 (0.5743) | 0.2139 (0.6285) | 0.3074 (0.5380) | 0.2211 (0.5299) | 0.4342 (0.5009) | -0.1087 (0.5137) | 0.5290 (0.5130) | 0.7544 (0.6047) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | -0.3421 (0.4015) | 0.2261 (0.4476) | 0.3297 (0.4430) | 0.8803* (0.4594) | 0.2782 (0.5466) | -0.0894 (0.4835) | 0.0813 (0.5786) | 0.2639 (0.3904) | 0.0009 (0.3879) | 0.7075 (0.4337) | 0.1978 (0.5117) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.7078 (0.4499) | 0.4492 (0.3876) | -0.6446 (0.5555) | 0.8308 (0.5253) | -0.5702 (0.6058) | -0.6652 (0.5491) | 0.4802 (0.5329) | -0.0787 (0.5225) | 0.2760 (0.5230) | -0.1037 (0.4310) | -0.2403 (0.4268) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.7690 (0.5229) | 0.6084 (0.4545) | -0.3464 (0.5018) | 0.2732 (0.4972) | -0.3038 (0.6818) | 0.0288 (0.6202) | 1.1726* (0.6251) | 0.5530 (0.5571) | 0.6946 (0.6534) | 0.5284 (0.5705) | -0.5685 (0.5459) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | 0.0060 (0.0047) | 0.0082* (0.0047) | -0.0070 (0.0042) | -0.0090** (0.0044) | -0.0091 (0.0058) | -0.0090 (0.0060) | -0.0082 (0.0064) | -0.0030 (0.0067) | -0.0065 (0.0069) | -0.0073 (0.0064) | -0.0087 (0.0069) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.0933 (0.1035) | 0.2264 (0.1592) | -0.3742* (0.1883) | -0.5748*** (0.1979) | -1.0053*** (0.2629) | -1.0490*** (0.2609) | -1.0689*** (0.2848) | -0.8379*** (0.2733) | -0.8469*** (0.2638) | -0.7636*** (0.2500) | -0.5844** (0.2476) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 67: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | -0.0795 (0.4753) | -0.9658*** (0.3454) | -0.9205* (0.4588) | -0.6244 (0.3718) | 0.0254 (0.7280) | -0.4978 (0.6374) | 0.9952 (0.7391) | 0.4582 (0.5208) | 0.4693 (0.6766) | -0.2162 (0.6089) | 1.4358* (0.7634) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | 0.2036 (0.3895) | -0.6662** (0.2781) | -0.3910 (0.4508) | -0.5816* (0.3009) | 0.0252 (0.6709) | -0.1103 (0.5544) | 1.0572** (0.4911) | 0.7923 (0.5038) | 0.6228 (0.5157) | 0.0375 (0.4561) | 1.1378 (0.7202) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | 0.4716 (0.4560) | -0.9448*** (0.3154) | -0.1349 (0.4323) | -0.2102 (0.3754) | -0.3571 (0.5853) | -0.2881 (0.5169) | 0.9035 (0.5593) | 0.6612 (0.4356) | 0.8134 (0.5016) | -0.1136 (0.4163) | 0.2411 (0.4267) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | 1.4110** (0.6629) | 0.5930 (0.3944) | 0.9820* (0.5702) | 0.3988 (0.4803) | 0.2080 (0.7284) | 0.3702 (0.7032) | 1.2903* (0.6402) | 0.9165* (0.5091) | 0.2188 (0.4359) | -0.1219 (0.4530) | 0.0914 (0.4226) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0067 (0.0042) | 0.0065 (0.0043) | 0.0143*** (0.0043) | 0.0132*** (0.0048) | 0.0135** (0.0067) | 0.0152** (0.0068) | 0.0215*** (0.0075) | 0.0082 (0.0078) | 0.0045 (0.0081) | -0.0031 (0.0070) | -0.0091 (0.0068) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.3300*** (0.1184) | 0.3096** (0.1409) | 0.6519*** (0.1658) | 0.7646*** (0.1752) | 1.0502*** (0.2505) | 1.0396*** (0.2561) | 1.1513*** (0.3294) | 0.4687 (0.3049) | 0.2147 (0.3142) | -0.0461 (0.3147) | -0.3362 (0.2974) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 68: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | -0.4169 (0.4957) | -0.3901 (0.3363) | -0.8109* (0.4366) | -0.2820 (0.4662) | 0.9839 (0.5994) | -0.2732 (0.5218) | 0.0561 (0.6778) | 0.3651 (0.5023) | -0.1643 (0.5345) | -0.4033 (0.4029) | -0.3530 (0.4312) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | -0.1284 (0.5044) | 0.1858 (0.4172) | -0.2508 (0.4568) | -0.7647* (0.3746) | 1.5303** (0.6385) | 0.8679** (0.3939) | 0.1601 (0.5905) | 0.7758** (0.3649) | -0.1915 (0.5317) | -0.5464 (0.4222) | -0.5415 (0.4720) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | -0.4068 (0.5312) | -0.0922 (0.3834) | 0.3152 (0.5275) | -0.0564 (0.4558) | 0.8067 (0.6081) | 0.3815 (0.4986) | -0.4788 (0.4881) | 0.0893 (0.3951) | -0.3732 (0.4292) | -0.0794 (0.3993) | 0.0231 (0.4381) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | -0.0422 (0.6622) | 0.6421 (0.5528) | 0.6221 (0.6846) | 0.2567 (0.5638) | 1.0575 (0.9203) | 0.4920 (0.5532) | 0.2393 (0.4384) | -0.2582 (0.4513) | -0.5400 (0.4851) | -0.6155 (0.4920) | -0.2850 (0.5625) |
| Rank (APH) | 0.0031 (0.0045) | 0.0031 (0.0043) | 0.0096** (0.0042) | 0.0084* (0.0043) | 0.0065 (0.0051) | 0.0068 (0.0051) | 0.0064 (0.0046) | 0.0003 (0.0051) | 0.0071 (0.0052) | 0.0050 (0.0051) | 0.0016 (0.0058) |
| Z-score (APH) | 0.2089* (0.1218) | 0.1649 (0.1245) | 0.3728** (0.1416) | 0.4443*** (0.1496) | 0.6057*** (0.1821) | 0.5687*** (0.1772) | 0.4542** (0.1740) | 0.3127* (0.1686) | 0.3958** (0.1655) | 0.3029* (0.1716) | 0.1057 (0.1909) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 69: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | 1.2148* (0.6579) | 0.5536 (0.7258) | 0.6811 (0.7615) | -0.0925 (0.5794) | -0.4121 (0.8479) | -0.5410 (0.7334) | -0.6573 (0.5148) | -0.6962 (0.5929) | 0.7071 (0.6761) | 1.4288** (0.6630) | 0.9483* (0.5347) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.5884 (0.4178) | -0.0130 (0.4803) | -0.2057 (0.5478) | -0.0892 (0.3861) | 0.5187 (0.5314) | 0.2134 (0.5503) | -0.1549 (0.3809) | 0.0423 (0.4378) | 0.2880 (0.4064) | 0.7749* (0.3874) | 0.2674 (0.4195) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | 0.6722 (0.5137) | -0.0145 (0.4813) | -0.3258 (0.6171) | -0.5474 (0.3507) | -0.0080 (0.6148) | -0.0281 (0.5062) | -0.3986 (0.4542) | -0.6630 (0.4814) | -0.1737 (0.4733) | -0.1297 (0.4812) | 0.0576 (0.4936) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | -0.0848 (0.6074) | -0.8808 (0.5805) | 0.2579 (0.9107) | -2.4333*** (0.7196) | -1.0009 (0.9266) | -1.6009* (0.8721) | -0.2694 (0.4968) | -1.4921** (0.6745) | -0.9832 (0.8777) | -0.6030 (0.6777) | -1.0456 (0.7709) |
| Rank (Income) | -0.0106 (0.0076) | -0.0102 (0.0081) | -0.0148* (0.0083) | -0.0239*** (0.0086) | -0.0170* (0.0098) | -0.0102 (0.0089) | 0.0003 (0.0050) | -0.0215*** (0.0074) | -0.0279*** (0.0094) | -0.0329*** (0.0077) | -0.0220*** (0.0072) |
| Z-score (Income) | -0.3951 (0.2559) | -0.9143*** (0.3042) | -1.1408*** (0.3543) | -1.0581*** (0.3736) | -0.3219 (0.4065) | -0.1479 (0.3767) | 0.0931 (0.1484) | -1.1244*** (0.4100) | -1.7219*** (0.4572) | -1.7561*** (0.3973) | -1.1931*** (0.2827) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Control variables: share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 70: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.7657 (0.6811) | 1.0507** (0.4858) | 1.0108 (0.6683) | 0.8319* (0.4862) | 1.9677* (1.1555) | 0.7362 (1.0083) | -0.0116 (0.8738) | 0.6686 (0.7889) | 0.8588 (0.8695) | 0.5061 (0.7990) | 0.1228 (0.5553) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | -0.4358 (0.4980) | 0.0566 (0.4068) | 0.1787 (0.4367) | 0.8922** (0.3987) | 0.7546 (0.6012) | 0.2438 (0.5526) | 0.0261 (0.5553) | 0.5178 (0.5360) | 0.2453 (0.5648) | -0.1329 (0.5873) | 0.4897 (0.4640) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | -0.5965 (0.4495) | -0.9611** (0.4418) | -0.2710 (0.5317) | 0.0073 (0.4048) | -0.5377 (0.6668) | -0.7076 (0.6574) | 0.8848 (0.5578) | -0.5618 (0.5037) | -0.2199 (0.5295) | -0.6719 (0.5368) | 0.0726 (0.4796) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | -0.5899 (1.3274) | 0.3301 (0.7389) | -0.7874 (0.7651) | -0.5553 (0.5385) | -1.3789 (1.0167) | -0.6919 (0.9194) | 1.0828 (0.8621) | -0.7295 (0.7384) | -1.2566* (0.7037) | -0.5085 (0.7224) | 0.6061 (0.7961) |
| Rank (Education) | -0.0007 (0.0104) | -0.0042 (0.0103) | -0.0005 (0.0103) | -0.0059 (0.0106) | -0.0260* (0.0155) | -0.0145 (0.0149) | -0.0191 (0.0155) | -0.0196 (0.0150) | -0.0351** (0.0138) | -0.0324*** (0.0116) | -0.0248** (0.0113) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.5723 (0.4091) | 0.2867 (0.5451) | -0.2518 (0.5500) | -0.4347 (0.4691) | -0.9964 (0.6375) | -0.8618 (0.6264) | -1.0971 (0.6645) | -1.8138* (0.7198) | -2.7142*** (0.7098) | -1.7680** (0.6397) | -1.4827* (0.6159) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 71: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | -0.4212 (0.4459) | -0.3472 (0.4784) | -0.5012 (0.6596) | 0.2844 (0.6423) | 0.3040 (0.5350) | -0.3263 (0.4808) | 0.0092 (0.4752) | 0.1460 (0.4710) | 0.0032 (0.6176) | 0.2242 (0.4887) | 0.2366 (0.6050) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | -0.2700 (0.3760) | -0.1778 (0.4454) | 0.0825 (0.4871) | 0.5154 (0.5138) | 0.6317 (0.4653) | 0.1900 (0.4321) | 0.5144 (0.5189) | 0.0605 (0.3671) | -0.1623 (0.4663) | -0.0653 (0.4132) | 0.5074 (0.5120) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.8676** (0.4213) | 0.1930 (0.3856) | -0.4425 (0.6109) | 1.0206* (0.5875) | 0.7341 (0.5157) | 0.7424 (0.4907) | 0.9758* (0.4779) | 0.7736 (0.4914) | 0.7988 (0.6288) | -0.0667 (0.4107) | 0.0711 (0.4270) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.1981 (0.4897) | -0.2193 (0.4523) | 0.1605 (0.5519) | 0.8682 (0.5561) | 1.5854** (0.5804) | 1.3762** (0.5543) | 0.8238 (0.5606) | 1.2738** (0.7855) | 0.4922 (0.7855) | -0.2831 (0.5435) | -0.2526 (0.5462) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.1444 (0.5916) | 0.6189 (0.4783) | 0.5842 (0.5594) | -0.0929 (0.7213) | -0.6944 (0.4460) | -0.9641*** (0.3330) | 0.0419 (0.3672) | -0.2324 (0.4238) | -0.9898* (0.5680) | -0.3548 (0.4520) | 0.2685 (0.3331) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | -0.0045 (0.0047) | -0.0012 (0.0047) | 0.0031 (0.0042) | 0.0051 (0.0044) | 0.0103* (0.0053) | 0.0092* (0.0055) | 0.0064 (0.0058) | 0.0142** (0.0065) | 0.0081 (0.0072) | 0.0062 (0.0066) | -0.0064 (0.0075) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | -0.2098** (0.1017) | -0.1699 (0.1598) | -0.0695 (0.1803) | -0.0458 (0.1892) | -0.1433 (0.2454) | -0.2196 (0.2470) | -0.2631 (0.2723) | -0.2014 (0.2771) | -0.4186 (0.2849) | -0.1934 (0.2560) | -0.2905 (0.2590) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 72: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | 0.0918 (0.4871) | -0.3246 (0.4398) | 0.0895 (0.5290) | 0.1209 (0.4311) | 0.8354 (0.6757) | 0.5308 (0.6088) | 0.2630 (0.7119) | 0.8695 (0.5157) | -0.3748 (0.8261) | 0.0350 (0.5264) | 0.9582 (0.7327) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | -0.0151 (0.3992) | -0.7012* (0.3541) | 0.2783 (0.5198) | -0.5553 (0.3489) | 0.0574 (0.6226) | -0.0992 (0.5295) | 0.4083 (0.4731) | 1.0492** (0.4989) | 0.5093 (0.6297) | -0.2555 (0.3943) | 0.7770 (0.6912) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | 0.2649 (0.4673) | -0.5335 (0.4016) | 0.9668* (0.4984) | -0.0920 (0.4352) | -0.1847 (0.5432) | -0.3184 (0.4937) | -0.5712 (0.5387) | 0.4959 (0.4313) | 0.2466 (0.6124) | -0.2825 (0.3599) | -0.0814 (0.4095) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | 0.6309 (0.6794) | -0.5717 (0.5022) | 0.7041 (0.6575) | -0.5949 (0.5569) | -0.5708 (0.6760) | -0.8185 (0.6716) | -0.1152 (0.6166) | 0.1113 (0.5041) | -0.4647 (0.5322) | -0.2052 (0.3916) | -0.6254 (0.4056) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0008 (0.0042) | 0.0001 (0.0042) | 0.0083* (0.0045) | 0.0030 (0.0049) | 0.0016 (0.0063) | 0.0033 (0.0064) | 0.0046 (0.0072) | -0.0020 (0.0078) | -0.0113 (0.0083) | -0.0129* (0.0070) | -0.0134* (0.0073) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.0001 (0.1247) | 0.0440 (0.1449) | 0.2803* (0.1668) | 0.2091 (0.1761) | 0.3227 (0.2352) | 0.3944 (0.2399) | 0.3717 (0.3107) | 0.2373 (0.2963) | 0.3000 (0.3224) | 0.1139 (0.3054) | 0.0110 (0.3055) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 73: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | -0.3765 (0.4765) | -0.6130* (0.3266) | -0.7638 (0.4602) | 0.1727 (0.5072) | 0.8095 (0.5013) | 0.9749* (0.5068) | -0.0540 (0.6264) | 0.8311 (0.5095) | -0.8541 (0.6452) | -0.4577 (0.3305) | -0.2208 (0.4187) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | -0.1134 (0.4849) | -0.0226 (0.4051) | 0.2211 (0.4815) | -0.7311* (0.4076) | 1.0779* (0.5340) | 0.6098 (0.3826) | -0.0563 (0.5457) | 0.3241 (0.3701) | -0.5874 (0.6419) | -0.2607 (0.3464) | 0.3152 (0.4582) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | -0.4468 (0.5106) | -0.7104* (0.3723) | 0.6927 (0.5561) | 0.2851 (0.4959) | 0.8021 (0.5085) | 0.4100 (0.4844) | -0.4712 (0.4510) | -0.1515 (0.4008) | -0.7193 (0.5181) | 0.5471 (0.3276) | 0.3189 (0.4254) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | -0.3318 (0.6366) | -0.3756 (0.5367) | 0.7294 (0.7217) | -0.0067 (0.6134) | -0.9570 (0.7696) | -0.3546 (0.5374) | -0.3138 (0.4051) | -0.3300 (0.4578) | -0.2632 (0.5856) | 0.3016 (0.4036) | 0.0879 (0.5461) |
| Rank (APH) | -0.0001 (0.0045) | -0.0004 (0.0042) | 0.0047 (0.0042) | 0.0006 (0.0043) | -0.0032 (0.0048) | -0.0012 (0.0047) | -0.0009 (0.0042) | -0.0047 (0.0050) | 0.0009 (0.0055) | 0.0009 (0.0052) | 0.0072 (0.0062) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.0963 (0.1241) | -0.0526 (0.1255) | 0.1050 (0.1376) | 0.0471 (0.1433) | 0.0585 (0.1669) | 0.0997 (0.1629) | 0.1051 (0.1601) | 0.1098 (0.1651) | 0.2963* (0.1732) | 0.1613 (0.1689) | 0.1637 (0.1940) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 74: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | -0.1013 (0.6340) | -0.2029 (0.7222) | -0.7198 (0.8101) | 0.4463 (0.6460) | -0.1537 (0.8047) | -0.0506 (0.7075) | -0.4820 (0.4725) | -1.2628** (0.5896) | 0.3183 (0.8279) | -0.3512 (0.5835) | -0.5466 (0.5223) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.1495 (0.4027) | -0.0765 (0.4780) | -0.4938 (0.5828) | 0.3224 (0.4305) | 0.0777 (0.5043) | 0.0746 (0.5308) | -0.9218** (0.3496) | -0.6995 (0.4354) | 0.2781 (0.4977) | 0.4825 (0.3409) | -0.1007 (0.4097) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | 0.5401 (0.4950) | 0.1426 (0.4790) | -0.5879 (0.6565) | -0.8109** (0.3910) | -0.5474 (0.5835) | -0.6864 (0.4883) | -0.5862 (0.4169) | -1.4753*** (0.4786) | -0.5333 (0.5797) | 0.1489 (0.4234) | 0.1241 (0.4821) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | 0.5400 (0.5854) | -0.5402 (0.5776) | -0.1606 (0.9689) | -1.0630 (0.8024) | -0.7261 (0.8794) | -1.5457* (0.8412) | -0.7886* (0.4560) | -2.4015*** (0.6707) | -1.0903 (1.0748) | -1.0713* (0.5964) | -0.8887 (0.7531) |
| Rank (Income) | 0.0117 (0.0076) | 0.0033 (0.0079) | -0.0025 (0.0081) | -0.0137 (0.0085) | -0.0091 (0.0090) | -0.0010 (0.0081) | -0.0017 (0.0045) | -0.0123* (0.0073) | -0.0199** (0.0098) | -0.0182** (0.0079) | -0.0106 (0.0078) |
| Z-score (Income) | 0.6175** (0.2570) | -0.1537 (0.3037) | -0.5868* (0.3311) | -0.6529* (0.3392) | 0.1503 (0.3489) | 0.1412 (0.3261) | 0.0147 (0.1314) | -0.3290 (0.3940) | -0.2405 (0.4703) | -0.6496* (0.3858) | -0.6030** (0.2880) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Control variables: share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 75: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extremeleft on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.1738 (0.6563) | -0.0716 (0.4834) | 0.4109 (0.7110) | 1.2165** (0.5421) | 2.3167** (1.0966) | 2.1772** (0.9726) | -0.1104 (0.8020) | 1.2774 (0.7844) | 0.1024 (1.0648) | 0.1268 (0.7031) | -0.7394 (0.5424) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | -0.6771 (0.4799) | 0.0064 (0.4048) | 0.0545 (0.4646) | 0.9385** (0.4446) | 1.0488* (0.5706) | 1.2813** (0.5331) | 0.5471 (0.5097) | 0.5840 (0.5330) | 0.3430 (0.6917) | 0.4456 (0.5168) | 0.0131 (0.4533) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | -0.8740* (0.4332) | -0.6033 (0.4396) | -0.5603 (0.5657) | -0.1992 (0.4513) | -0.6897 (0.6329) | -1.2948** (0.6341) | 0.4813 (0.5119) | -1.4139*** (0.5009) | -0.7694 (0.6484) | -0.2119 (0.4724) | -0.4819 (0.4685) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | -0.6665 (1.2792) | 0.7287 (0.7353) | -0.3534 (0.8140) | 0.3106 (0.6004) | -0.6216 (0.9650) | -1.6000* (0.8869) | -0.4174 (0.7913) | -0.9812 (0.7343) | -0.4640 (0.8617) | -0.2823 (0.6357) | 0.2156 (0.7777) |
| Rank (Education) | 0.0052 (0.0103) | -0.0022 (0.0100) | -0.0054 (0.0102) | -0.0067 (0.0104) | -0.0222 (0.0144) | -0.0129 (0.0136) | -0.0112 (0.0141) | -0.0189 (0.0149) | -0.0219 (0.0145) | -0.0030 (0.0119) | -0.0011 (0.0122) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.3626 (0.4108) | -0.0529 (0.5443) | -0.7830 (0.5141) | -0.6787 (0.4259) | -1.0051 (0.5472) | -0.9339 (0.5424) | -1.2795* (0.5881) | -1.5315* (0.6919) | -1.3940 (0.7301) | -0.6635 (0.6212) | -0.0736 (0.6275) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 76: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.2923 (0.4280) | 0.7893 (0.7075) | 0.8846 (0.9311) | 0.6343 (0.7708) | -0.0451 (0.7999) | 0.6513 (0.5516) | 0.2889 (0.6586) | 0.3887 (0.6211) | -0.1273 (0.4958) | 0.5049 (0.5518) | 0.7601 (0.5818) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | -0.1410 (0.3609) | 0.5725 (0.6587) | 0.4036 (0.6877) | 0.5770 (0.6166) | -0.3224 (0.6957) | -0.2730 (0.4957) | -0.3896 (0.7191) | 0.2618 (0.4840) | 0.0970 (0.3744) | 0.8542* (0.4665) | -0.0233 (0.4923) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | -0.0176 (0.4044) | 0.4159 (0.5704) | -0.3337 (0.8624) | -0.2654 (0.7050) | -1.6039** (0.7711) | -1.4414** (0.5630) | -0.3000 (0.6624) | -0.7935 (0.6479) | -0.1538 (0.5048) | -0.0878 (0.4636) | -0.3153 (0.4106) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.7261 (0.4700) | 1.1982* (0.6689) | -0.8245 (0.7790) | -0.8950 (0.6674) | -2.1878** (0.8677) | -1.1751* (0.6359) | 0.7798 (0.7769) | -0.4883 (0.6907) | 0.5106 (0.6306) | 0.7528 (0.6137) | -0.5357 (0.5253) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | 0.0117** (0.0051) | 0.0138** (0.0063) | -0.0164*** (0.0059) | -0.0217*** (0.0059) | -0.0240*** (0.0069) | -0.0187*** (0.0064) | -0.0173** (0.0072) | -0.0164** (0.0068) | -0.0123* (0.0072) | -0.0115 (0.0069) | -0.0069 (0.0067) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.3221*** (0.1143) | 0.5625*** (0.2118) | -0.4973* (0.2530) | -0.8177*** (0.2547) | -1.2230*** (0.3058) | -1.0513*** (0.2794) | -1.1842*** (0.3206) | -0.8226*** (0.2830) | -0.7299** (0.2791) | -0.7927*** (0.2760) | -0.5352** (0.2530) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 77: Regression of the share of vote for the centre-left on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | -0.1874 (0.4319) | -1.0137* (0.5654) | -1.6450** (0.6633) | -1.1471** (0.4677) | -0.8977 (0.9870) | -1.0569 (0.6775) | 1.0849 (0.9040) | -0.2365 (0.6761) | 0.7631 (0.6594) | -0.2685 (0.6650) | 1.1928 (0.7435) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | 0.2599 (0.3539) | -0.0688 (0.4552) | -1.0881 (0.6516) | -0.0556 (0.3785) | -0.0294 (0.9095) | -0.0437 (0.5893) | 1.0276* (0.6007) | 0.0017 (0.6541) | 0.4176 (0.5026) | 0.1689 (0.4981) | 0.9364 (0.7014) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | 0.3018 (0.4143) | -0.7064 (0.5163) | -1.7863*** (0.6249) | -0.1850 (0.4721) | -0.2852 (0.7935) | -0.0620 (0.5494) | 1.7709** (0.6841) | 0.3446 (0.5655) | 0.7928 (0.4888) | 0.0065 (0.4546) | 0.3214 (0.4155) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | 1.0646* (0.6024) | 1.6407** (0.6456) | 0.4596 (0.8243) | 1.5176** (0.6041) | 0.9234 (0.9875) | 1.1583 (0.7474) | 1.8494** (0.7831) | 0.9982 (0.6610) | 0.5273 (0.4248) | -0.0411 (0.4947) | 0.4191 (0.4116) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0072 (0.0046) | 0.0095 (0.0057) | 0.0098 (0.0066) | 0.0159** (0.0069) | 0.0168* (0.0084) | 0.0151** (0.0076) | 0.0245*** (0.0086) | 0.0116 (0.0082) | 0.0119 (0.0084) | 0.0028 (0.0077) | -0.0039 (0.0067) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.3965*** (0.1359) | 0.4042** (0.1938) | 0.6082** (0.2340) | 0.8630*** (0.2348) | 1.0845*** (0.3009) | 0.8866*** (0.2812) | 1.1897*** (0.3744) | 0.3475 (0.3164) | 0.0704 (0.3267) | -0.1094 (0.3451) | -0.3969 (0.3011) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 78: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | -0.1243 (0.4524) | 0.2270 (0.5086) | -0.0841 (0.7183) | -0.6971 (0.6832) | 0.4499 (0.8510) | -1.1807** (0.5588) | 0.1280 (0.8536) | -0.3134 (0.6483) | 0.3153 (0.5211) | -0.2444 (0.4431) | -0.3006 (0.4084) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | -0.0409 (0.4603) | 0.3073 (0.6309) | -0.7669 (0.7515) | -0.0715 (0.5490) | 0.9019 (0.9066) | 0.4937 (0.4219) | 0.2702 (0.7437) | 0.6372 (0.4710) | 0.1263 (0.5184) | -0.5072 (0.4644) | -0.7882* (0.4470) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | -0.0418 (0.4848) | 0.8005 (0.5798) | -0.6087 (0.8678) | -0.5194 (0.6680) | 0.2143 (0.8634) | 0.0924 (0.5340) | -0.1876 (0.6147) | 0.2439 (0.5100) | -0.0054 (0.4184) | -0.3605 (0.4392) | -0.1325 (0.4149) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | 0.2813 (0.6044) | 1.4550* (0.8359) | -0.1680 (1.1264) | 0.4063 (0.8262) | 2.5232* (1.3066) | 0.8952 (0.5925) | 0.6268 (0.5521) | -0.0113 (0.5826) | -0.4675 (0.4729) | -0.8632 (0.5411) | -0.3758 (0.5327) |
| Rank (APH) | 0.0038 (0.0050) | 0.0051 (0.0058) | 0.0080 (0.0062) | 0.0121* (0.0061) | 0.0124* (0.0064) | 0.0091 (0.0056) | 0.0095* (0.0053) | 0.0047 (0.0053) | 0.0077 (0.0055) | 0.0054 (0.0056) | -0.0018 (0.0056) |
| Z-score (APH) | 0.3474** (0.1376) | 0.3158* (0.1689) | 0.4374** (0.1921) | 0.6143*** (0.1932) | 0.7679*** (0.2108) | 0.5870*** (0.1884) | 0.5096** (0.1954) | 0.2757 (0.1747) | 0.2816 (0.1749) | 0.2730 (0.1894) | 0.0412 (0.1942) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 79: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | 1.5615** (0.5923) | 1.0947 (1.0998) | 2.2762* (1.1722) | -0.8195 (0.7944) | -0.3954 (1.1802) | -0.5972 (0.8394) | -0.4176 (0.6474) | 0.3066 (0.7410) | 0.6278 (0.6617) | 1.8327** (0.7281) | 1.3775** (0.5184) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.5577 (0.3762) | 0.0816 (0.7279) | 0.4649 (0.8433) | -0.6265 (0.5294) | 0.6269 (0.7397) | 0.1875 (0.6298) | 0.6857 (0.4790) | 0.6829 (0.5472) | 0.1679 (0.3978) | 0.6641 (0.4254) | 0.3617 (0.4066) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | 0.2674 (0.4625) | -0.2099 (0.7294) | 0.4216 (0.9499) | 0.3848 (0.4808) | 0.6002 (0.8558) | 0.5698 (0.5794) | 0.0319 (0.5711) | 0.5385 (0.6016) | 0.1148 (0.4633) | -0.2237 (0.5284) | 0.0050 (0.4785) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | -0.6424 (0.5469) | -0.6020 (0.8796) | 0.6804 (1.4019) | -2.1434** (0.9867) | -0.5663 (1.2897) | -0.5409 (0.9982) | 0.4023 (0.6247) | 0.3815 (0.8430) | -0.4900 (0.8591) | -0.1756 (0.7442) | -0.7733 (0.7474) |
| Rank (Income) | -0.0245*** (0.0085) | -0.0196* (0.0109) | -0.0201* (0.0120) | -0.0162 (0.0122) | -0.0131 (0.0123) | -0.0112 (0.0098) | 0.0020 (0.0057) | -0.0146* (0.0077) | -0.0204** (0.0099) | -0.0294*** (0.0084) | -0.0203*** (0.0070) |
| Z-score (Income) | -1.0929*** (0.2951) | -1.1624*** (0.4173) | -0.9084* (0.4757) | -0.6428 (0.4861) | -0.6106 (0.4764) | -0.2995 (0.3990) | 0.1111 (0.1667) | -1.0508** (0.4222) | -1.8448*** (0.4741) | -1.7225*** (0.4358) | -1.0877*** (0.2871) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Control variables: share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 80: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.7464 (0.6132) | 1.6636** (0.7361) | 0.9814 (1.0288) | -0.5608 (0.6667) | 0.1208 (1.6083) | -1.0397 (1.1541) | 0.0915 (1.0987) | -0.3529 (0.9860) | 0.9305 (0.8511) | 0.5260 (0.8774) | 0.5126 (0.5383) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | 0.1539 (0.4484) | 0.0761 (0.6164) | 0.2029 (0.6722) | -0.0463 (0.5467) | -0.1326 (0.8368) | -0.8366 (0.6325) | -0.4956 (0.6982) | 0.0930 (0.6699) | 0.0802 (0.5528) | -0.3729 (0.6450) | 0.5637 (0.4498) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | 0.1578 (0.4047) | -0.6385 (0.6695) | 0.4662 (0.8185) | 0.3133 (0.5550) | 0.0302 (0.9282) | 0.2983 (0.7524) | 0.7247 (0.7014) | 0.6043 (0.6296) | 0.2012 (0.5182) | -0.6771 (0.5895) | 0.3254 (0.4649) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | -0.0420 (1.1952) | -0.4695 (1.1197) | -0.7106 (1.1778) | -1.3279* (0.7383) | -1.2031 (1.4152) | 0.5851 (1.0524) | 1.8632* (1.0841) | 0.0122 (0.9229) | -1.1758* (0.6887) | -0.4526 (0.7933) | 0.5979 (0.7718) |
| Rank (Education) | -0.0061 (0.0115) | -0.0034 (0.0138) | 0.0080 (0.0150) | 0.0010 (0.0150) | -0.0110 (0.0196) | -0.0059 (0.0164) | -0.0148 (0.0178) | -0.0064 (0.0158) | -0.0276* (0.0146) | -0.0362*** (0.0127) | -0.0284** (0.0109) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.3250 (0.4718) | 0.4980 (0.7479) | 0.8582 (0.7385) | 0.3583 (0.6104) | -0.2488 (0.7470) | -0.2017 (0.6636) | -0.2361 (0.7462) | -0.7906 (0.7414) | -2.3079** (0.7360) | -1.7294* (0.7017) | -1.6896** (0.6254) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 81: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.1088 (0.4779) | -0.2584 (0.4755) | -0.1153 (0.5921) | -0.6928 (0.5691) | -0.2240 (0.4567) | -0.2096 (0.5056) | 0.0849 (0.4821) | -0.8976* (0.4894) | -0.2541 (0.5026) | -0.4968 (0.5000) | -0.7809 (0.6372) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | 0.3420 (0.4030) | -0.2846 (0.4428) | -0.3466 (0.4373) | -0.8366* (0.4552) | -0.1528 (0.3972) | 0.0087 (0.4544) | 0.1512 (0.5264) | -0.4175 (0.3814) | 0.0269 (0.3795) | -0.5884 (0.4227) | -0.2083 (0.5393) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | -0.6991 (0.4516) | -0.4562 (0.3834) | 0.5715 (0.5484) | -0.7929 (0.5205) | 0.6635 (0.4403) | 0.7885 (0.5160) | -0.4534 (0.4849) | -0.0232 (0.5105) | 0.1117 (0.5117) | 0.1280 (0.4201) | 0.4246 (0.4498) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | -0.7698 (0.5248) | -0.6525 (0.4496) | 0.2844 (0.4954) | -0.2671 (0.4927) | 0.7743 (0.4955) | 0.5545 (0.5828) | -1.0942* (0.5687) | -0.3481 (0.5443) | 0.0411 (0.6392) | -0.4635 (0.5560) | 0.4344 (0.5753) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | -0.0059 (0.0047) | -0.0081* (0.0047) | 0.0064 (0.0041) | 0.0091** (0.0044) | 0.0072 (0.0048) | 0.0084 (0.0056) | 0.0041 (0.0057) | 0.0016 (0.0060) | 0.0131* (0.0066) | 0.0081 (0.0061) | 0.0095 (0.0066) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | -0.0932 (0.1039) | -0.2191 (0.1567) | 0.3286* (0.1868) | 0.5751*** (0.1971) | 0.8055*** (0.2103) | 0.9677*** (0.2399) | 0.6969*** (0.2580) | 0.6580*** (0.2385) | 0.8567*** (0.2396) | 0.7630*** (0.2329) | 0.4528* (0.2314) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 82: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | 0.0822 (0.4761) | 0.9384** (0.3443) | 0.8848* (0.4554) | 0.5909 (0.3682) | 0.2761 (0.5406) | 0.7576 (0.5882) | -0.9144 (0.6760) | 0.2454 (0.5136) | -0.2641 (0.5531) | 0.2104 (0.5873) | -1.2334 (0.8176) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | -0.1935 (0.3902) | 0.5842** (0.2772) | 0.3555 (0.4474) | 0.5633* (0.2980) | 0.2266 (0.4982) | 0.2237 (0.5116) | -1.0824** (0.4492) | -0.3025 (0.4968) | -0.8662** (0.4216) | -0.0167 (0.4399) | -1.1204 (0.7714) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | -0.4708 (0.4567) | 0.9420*** (0.3144) | 0.0844 (0.4290) | 0.2088 (0.3717) | 0.4529 (0.4346) | 0.2591 (0.4769) | -0.3921 (0.5116) | -0.7081 (0.4295) | -1.2371*** (0.4100) | 0.0955 (0.4015) | -0.4367 (0.4570) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | -1.4221** (0.6640) | -0.6563 (0.3931) | -0.9350 (0.5660) | -0.3823 (0.4756) | -0.2111 (0.5409) | -0.5485 (0.6489) | -0.7650 (0.5856) | -1.1141** (0.5020) | -1.1514*** (0.3564) | 0.1587 (0.4369) | -0.3551 (0.4527) |
| Rank (MUH) | -0.0068 (0.0042) | -0.0058 (0.0043) | -0.0132*** (0.0043) | -0.0131*** (0.0048) | -0.0122** (0.0055) | -0.0167*** (0.0063) | -0.0155** (0.0067) | -0.0089 (0.0070) | -0.0192** (0.0076) | -0.0001 (0.0067) | -0.0039 (0.0066) |
| Z-score (MUH) | -0.3325*** (0.1188) | -0.2795** (0.1393) | -0.6130*** (0.1651) | -0.7644*** (0.1744) | -0.9417*** (0.1946) | -1.0780*** (0.2287) | -0.9794*** (0.2883) | -0.5219** (0.2608) | -0.5774** (0.2828) | -0.1049 (0.2953) | -0.1094 (0.2771) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 83: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | 0.4050 (0.4979) | 0.3741 (0.3377) | 0.8698* (0.4269) | 0.3154 (0.4574) | -0.4848 (0.4558) | 0.6176 (0.4928) | 0.0037 (0.6102) | -0.1319 (0.5388) | 0.1686 (0.5203) | 0.3562 (0.3946) | 0.1412 (0.4446) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | 0.1405 (0.5066) | -0.1378 (0.4189) | 0.2387 (0.4467) | 0.7915** (0.3675) | -1.0948** (0.4855) | -0.6150 (0.3720) | -0.2394 (0.5316) | -0.2919 (0.3914) | 0.0251 (0.5176) | 0.4728 (0.4136) | 0.8236 (0.4866) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | 0.3833 (0.5335) | 0.1086 (0.3850) | -0.2450 (0.5158) | 0.1132 (0.4472) | -0.4558 (0.4624) | -0.2452 (0.4710) | 0.5787 (0.4394) | -0.1665 (0.4239) | -0.2276 (0.4178) | 0.0942 (0.3911) | 0.0285 (0.4517) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | 0.0247 (0.6652) | -0.5840 (0.5550) | -0.5347 (0.6695) | -0.2330 (0.5531) | -1.1029 (0.6998) | -0.4799 (0.5225) | 0.1550 (0.3947) | 0.2427 (0.4842) | 0.0507 (0.4722) | 0.4570 (0.4819) | 0.2556 (0.5799) |
| Rank (APH) | -0.0031 (0.0045) | -0.0028 (0.0043) | -0.0087** (0.0041) | -0.0084* (0.0043) | -0.0056 (0.0043) | -0.0076 (0.0047) | -0.0012 (0.0041) | 0.0031 (0.0045) | -0.0073 (0.0051) | -0.0054 (0.0048) | -0.0003 (0.0056) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.2070* (0.1224) | -0.1404 (0.1228) | -0.3487** (0.1403) | -0.4493*** (0.1488) | -0.4773*** (0.1460) | -0.5395*** (0.1623) | -0.2182 (0.1562) | -0.1682 (0.1476) | -0.2927* (0.1544) | -0.2959* (0.1608) | 0.0459 (0.1769) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 84: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | -1.2254* (0.6595) | -0.6135 (0.7221) | -0.6205 (0.7478) | 0.1511 (0.5706) | 0.3452 (0.6407) | 0.6270 (0.6955) | 0.2723 (0.4695) | 0.6823 (0.5910) | -0.6435 (0.6504) | -1.2036* (0.6394) | -0.7920 (0.5668) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | -0.6004 (0.4189) | -0.0009 (0.4779) | 0.2441 (0.5380) | 0.1129 (0.3803) | -0.5152 (0.4015) | -0.3089 (0.5218) | 0.0610 (0.3474) | -0.0306 (0.4365) | -0.5381 (0.3910) | -0.7944** (0.3736) | -0.4045 (0.4446) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | -0.6685 (0.5150) | -0.0235 (0.4789) | 0.3501 (0.6060) | 0.5446 (0.3454) | -0.0063 (0.4646) | -0.0378 (0.4800) | 0.1928 (0.4142) | 0.4254 (0.4798) | -0.2642 (0.4554) | 0.2115 (0.4640) | -0.0255 (0.5232) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | 0.0793 (0.6090) | 0.8754 (0.5775) | -0.2694 (0.8944) | 2.4753*** (0.7088) | 0.6937 (0.7002) | 1.8350** (0.8270) | 0.1038 (0.4530) | 0.8293 (0.6724) | -0.1273 (0.8444) | 0.7199 (0.6536) | 1.0640 (0.8171) |
| Rank (Income) | 0.0107 (0.0077) | 0.0104 (0.0081) | 0.0161** (0.0081) | 0.0235*** (0.0086) | 0.0086 (0.0081) | 0.0037 (0.0082) | -0.0002 (0.0044) | 0.0078 (0.0066) | 0.0173* (0.0091) | 0.0318*** (0.0073) | 0.0224*** (0.0069) |
| Z-score (Income) | 0.3924 (0.2570) | 0.9149*** (0.2992) | 1.1852*** (0.3495) | 1.0470*** (0.3723) | -0.1812 (0.3252) | -0.2728 (0.3465) | -0.0811 (0.1294) | 0.0838 (0.3541) | 1.2485*** (0.4210) | 1.6929*** (0.3730) | 1.0188*** (0.2615) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Control variables: share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 85: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | 0.7809 (0.6828) | -1.1113** (0.4833) | -1.0997 (0.6563) | -0.8219* (0.4789) | -1.9766** (0.8731) | -1.1330 (0.9561) | -0.4214 (0.7968) | -0.3669 (0.7864) | -0.0428 (0.8365) | -0.4218 (0.7705) | -0.2816 (0.5885) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | 0.4625 (0.4992) | -0.0727 (0.4047) | -0.2475 (0.4288) | -0.9189** (0.3927) | -0.6267 (0.4543) | -0.4667 (0.5240) | -0.3821 (0.5064) | -0.2742 (0.5343) | 0.0026 (0.5434) | 0.1742 (0.5664) | -0.5165 (0.4918) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | 0.5972 (0.4506) | 1.0164** (0.4396) | 0.2216 (0.5222) | -0.0384 (0.3987) | 0.4538 (0.5039) | 0.8967 (0.6234) | -0.8613* (0.5086) | 0.5058 (0.5021) | 0.0358 (0.5094) | 0.6148 (0.5177) | -0.4558 (0.5083) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | 0.5496 (1.3308) | -0.3185 (0.7352) | 0.6727 (0.7514) | 0.5855 (0.5304) | 0.9931 (0.7683) | 0.7526 (0.8719) | -1.0947 (0.7862) | 0.6802 (0.7361) | 0.8888 (0.6769) | 0.5226 (0.6967) | -0.6678 (0.8438) |
| Rank (Education) | 0.0005 (0.0104) | 0.0050 (0.0103) | 0.0036 (0.0101) | 0.0053 (0.0106) | 0.0096 (0.0129) | 0.0053 (0.0139) | 0.0126 (0.0137) | 0.0040 (0.0134) | 0.0176 (0.0135) | 0.0272** (0.0110) | 0.0107 (0.0108) |
| Z-score (Education) | -0.5891 (0.4108) | -0.2754 (0.5363) | 0.3051 (0.5427) | 0.4321 (0.4675) | 0.4357 (0.5100) | 0.5380 (0.5762) | 0.9435 (0.5793) | 0.5826 (0.6219) | 1.8542** (0.6536) | 1.5248* (0.6006) | 0.8077 (0.5698) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 86: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (SingleHH) | -0.0675 (0.5387) | 0.4767 (0.5059) | 0.6547 (0.6686) | 0.0972 (0.8331) | 0.0276 (0.4112) | -0.1565 (0.2889) | -0.4406 (0.3113) | 0.5536 (0.3811) | 0.4750 (0.4466) | -0.2265 (0.4065) | -0.0877 (0.3689) |
| 20 to 40 (SingleHH) | -0.0464 (0.4543) | 0.7344 (0.4711) | 0.1480 (0.4938) | -0.7462 (0.6664) | -0.1632 (0.3576) | 0.1319 (0.2596) | -0.3469 (0.3399) | 0.1854 (0.2970) | -0.0361 (0.3372) | -0.6010* (0.3437) | -0.0184 (0.3122) |
| 60 to 80 (SingleHH) | -0.2666 (0.5090) | 0.1510 (0.4079) | 0.6967 (0.6192) | -0.6421 (0.7619) | -0.1689 (0.3963) | -0.2153 (0.2948) | 0.0253 (0.3131) | 0.1188 (0.3975) | -0.5165 (0.4546) | -0.0753 (0.3415) | -0.2032 (0.2604) |
| 80 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.1444 (0.5916) | 0.6189 (0.4783) | 0.5842 (0.5594) | -0.0929 (0.7213) | -0.6944 (0.4460) | -0.9641*** (0.3330) | 0.0419 (0.3672) | -0.2324 (0.4238) | -0.9898* (0.5680) | -0.3548 (0.4520) | 0.2685 (0.3331) |
| Rank (SingleHH) | -0.0039 (0.0055) | -0.0010 (0.0043) | 0.0054 (0.0054) | -0.0019 (0.0051) | 0.0023 (0.0033) | 0.0008 (0.0035) | 0.0053 (0.0040) | 0.0016 (0.0046) | -0.0083 (0.0059) | -0.0019 (0.0052) | 0.0002 (0.0058) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.0101 (0.1332) | -0.0543 (0.1571) | 0.4330* (0.2272) | -0.0493 (0.2096) | 0.2256 (0.1531) | 0.1165 (0.1621) | 0.4248** (0.1920) | 0.1983 (0.1921) | 0.0347 (0.2456) | 0.1479 (0.2114) | 0.2678 (0.2062) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 87: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (MUH) | -0.1235 (0.5249) | 0.1859 (0.4459) | 0.3572 (0.5530) | 0.5766 (0.5764) | -0.4315 (0.4881) | -0.4381 (0.3808) | 0.0136 (0.4145) | -0.8221** (0.3959) | -0.2914 (0.5523) | 0.0638 (0.4662) | -0.4992 (0.4727) |
| 20 to 40 (MUH) | -0.3981 (0.4302) | 0.8844** (0.3590) | 0.3402 (0.5433) | 0.2954 (0.4665) | -0.3602 (0.4498) | -0.1893 (0.3313) | 0.1854 (0.2754) | -0.5645 (0.3830) | 0.2799 (0.4210) | -0.0888 (0.3492) | -0.2078 (0.4459) |
| 60 to 80 (MUH) | 0.0327 (0.5036) | -0.1064 (0.4072) | 0.4727 (0.5209) | 0.0096 (0.5819) | -0.1593 (0.3924) | 0.0430 (0.3088) | -0.6623** (0.3136) | 0.0663 (0.3311) | 0.5024 (0.4094) | 0.0925 (0.3187) | 0.2178 (0.2642) |
| 80 to 100 (MUH) | 0.6701 (0.7321) | 0.8474 (0.5092) | -0.4642 (0.6872) | -0.2764 (0.7445) | 0.0171 (0.4884) | 0.3013 (0.4201) | -0.6301* (0.3590) | 0.2482 (0.3870) | 1.1933*** (0.3558) | -0.1209 (0.3468) | 0.3316 (0.2617) |
| Rank (MUH) | 0.0048 (0.0049) | -0.0070* (0.0038) | -0.0106* (0.0057) | -0.0010 (0.0057) | -0.0010 (0.0039) | 0.0027 (0.0040) | -0.0062 (0.0049) | 0.0010 (0.0054) | 0.0187*** (0.0066) | 0.0129** (0.0055) | 0.0186*** (0.0054) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.1528 (0.1580) | -0.3154** (0.1369) | -0.3787* (0.2145) | 0.0556 (0.1968) | -0.0918 (0.1498) | 0.0813 (0.1596) | -0.1050 (0.2263) | 0.0704 (0.2068) | 0.4569* (0.2709) | 0.6002** (0.2430) | 0.6400*** (0.2328) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 88: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (APH) | 0.4415 (0.4709) | 0.1345 (0.3737) | -0.5226 (0.4874) | -0.6454 (0.7090) | -0.6569 (0.4096) | -0.5742* (0.3273) | -0.0844 (0.3477) | -0.2689 (0.3889) | 0.0037 (0.4524) | 0.2614 (0.2952) | 0.3356 (0.2460) |
| 20 to 40 (APH) | -0.5257 (0.4792) | -0.5473 (0.4636) | 0.1192 (0.5100) | -0.5590 (0.5697) | -0.5321 (0.4363) | -0.4034 (0.2471) | 0.1445 (0.3029) | -0.5578* (0.2825) | 0.2257 (0.4501) | 0.3921 (0.3093) | -0.2827 (0.2692) |
| 60 to 80 (APH) | 0.9324* (0.5046) | -0.2103 (0.4261) | -0.6601 (0.5889) | -1.0635 (0.6932) | -0.4548 (0.4155) | -0.2188 (0.3128) | -0.2204 (0.2503) | 0.0925 (0.3059) | 0.7975** (0.3633) | -0.0429 (0.2925) | -0.0715 (0.2499) |
| 80 to 100 (APH) | 0.7314 (0.6291) | -0.6021 (0.6142) | -0.8279 (0.7644) | -0.4219 (0.8574) | 0.1297 (0.6288) | -0.0117 (0.3471) | -0.5742** (0.2249) | 0.0141 (0.3495) | 0.6626 (0.4106) | 0.7381** (0.3605) | 0.0849 (0.3209) |
| Rank (APH) | -0.0002 (0.0052) | -0.0031 (0.0039) | -0.0083 (0.0054) | 0.0005 (0.0050) | -0.0009 (0.0029) | 0.0015 (0.0029) | -0.0071** (0.0028) | -0.0040 (0.0034) | -0.0002 (0.0045) | 0.0006 (0.0041) | -0.0019 (0.0048) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.0483 (0.1588) | -0.2686** (0.1188) | -0.2341 (0.1760) | 0.1266 (0.1583) | -0.1473 (0.1041) | -0.0386 (0.1069) | -0.3005*** (0.1110) | -0.1652 (0.1137) | -0.1555 (0.1490) | -0.0849 (0.1399) | -0.2163 (0.1536) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 89: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Income) | 0.6221 (0.7004) | 0.8010 (0.7905) | -0.5813 (0.8244) | -1.0998 (0.8268) | 0.0709 (0.5684) | -0.1515 (0.4365) | 0.5018 (0.2969) | 0.0048 (0.4489) | -0.1217 (0.6204) | -1.1542** (0.5097) | -0.3594 (0.3280) |
| 20 to 40 (Income) | 0.5888 (0.4449) | 0.1653 (0.5232) | -0.3505 (0.5931) | -0.4483 (0.5511) | 0.0266 (0.3562) | 0.1616 (0.3275) | 0.1231 (0.2197) | -0.0130 (0.3315) | 0.3072 (0.3729) | -0.0712 (0.2978) | 0.1368 (0.2573) |
| 60 to 80 (Income) | -0.0591 (0.5469) | 0.4534 (0.5243) | -0.2163 (0.6681) | 0.0097 (0.5005) | 0.0200 (0.4121) | 0.1086 (0.3013) | 0.2617 (0.2619) | 0.2692 (0.3645) | 0.5758 (0.4344) | -0.2959 (0.3699) | -0.0515 (0.3027) |
| 80 to 100 (Income) | 0.2170 (0.6468) | -0.0660 (0.6322) | 0.0995 (0.9859) | -0.9723 (1.0270) | 0.3801 (0.6211) | -0.4145 (0.5190) | 0.2177 (0.2865) | 0.7570 (0.5107) | 1.4905* (0.8054) | -0.3435 (0.5210) | 0.1458 (0.4728) |
| Rank (Income) | -0.0035 (0.0088) | -0.0042 (0.0073) | -0.0114 (0.0105) | 0.0060 (0.0097) | 0.0109* (0.0055) | 0.0105** (0.0050) | -0.0001 (0.0031) | 0.0158*** (0.0050) | 0.0152* (0.0080) | 0.0109* (0.0062) | 0.0031 (0.0060) |
| Z-score (Income) | 0.0568 (0.3276) | -0.1426 (0.2965) | -0.3795 (0.4266) | 0.1238 (0.3759) | 0.7031*** (0.2202) | 0.6932*** (0.2136) | -0.0055 (0.0950) | 1.2085*** (0.2741) | 0.7080* (0.4001) | 0.5815* (0.3185) | 0.4227* (0.2299) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Control variables: share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 90: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012)

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1981 | 1986 | 1988 | 1993 | 1997 | 2002 | 2007 | 2012 |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 0 to 20 (Education) | -0.7514 (0.7252) | 0.8829 (0.5291) | 0.7963 (0.7235) | -0.1213 (0.6939) | 0.1329 (0.7745) | 0.6688 (0.6001) | 0.6653 (0.5038) | -0.3447 (0.5973) | -1.1028 (0.7980) | -0.4265 (0.6142) | 0.1887 (0.3406) |
| 20 to 40 (Education) | -1.1882** (0.5302) | 0.2014 (0.4430) | 0.6334 (0.4727) | 0.5670 (0.5691) | -0.1377 (0.4030) | 0.3728 (0.3289) | 0.5519* (0.3202) | -0.2787 (0.4059) | -0.3341 (0.5183) | -0.1364 (0.4515) | -0.0444 (0.2846) |
| 60 to 80 (Education) | -0.1170 (0.4786) | -0.8065 (0.4812) | 0.4655 (0.5756) | 0.5800 (0.5777) | 0.0877 (0.4470) | -0.3248 (0.3913) | 0.0865 (0.3216) | 0.0567 (0.3814) | 0.2502 (0.4859) | 0.3518 (0.4126) | 0.4918 (0.2941) |
| 80 to 100 (Education) | 1.6152 (1.4134) | -0.0900 (0.8048) | 1.0864 (0.8283) | -0.6062 (0.7685) | 0.4700 (0.6816) | -0.1122 (0.5472) | 0.1684 (0.4971) | 0.0460 (0.5591) | 0.5456 (0.6457) | 0.0416 (0.5553) | -0.0173 (0.4883) |
| Rank (Education) | 0.0082 (0.0120) | -0.0109 (0.0093) | -0.0291** (0.0131) | 0.0113 (0.0120) | 0.0220** (0.0088) | 0.0150* (0.0084) | 0.0074 (0.0097) | 0.0181* (0.0102) | 0.0246** (0.0118) | 0.0267*** (0.0093) | 0.0225** (0.0094) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.7866 (0.5238) | -0.0920 (0.5314) | -0.4865 (0.6624) | 0.0158 (0.4720) | 0.7446* (0.3453) | 0.5208 (0.3553) | 0.0844 (0.4251) | 1.4220** (0.4814) | 1.2631* (0.6211) | 1.2890* (0.5128) | 1.1276* (0.5009) |
| Observations | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Education is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16 in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

A.8 Results at the departmental level: panel regressions (1968-2012)

This section presents the results of the panel regression of the share of the vote on the share of single households, the MUH and APH indicators for household complexity, on average income per adult and on the share of university graduates in the *département*. Results are presented for the three alternative specifications of the independent variable: 5 quintiles (40 to 60 being the reference category), the rank of each *département*, and the *z*-score of each *département*. We do not present results for the right as they would simply be the inverse of the left, both categories being by construction equal to 1. Table 91 and Table 92 present results for the left; Table 93 and Table 94 present results for the extreme-left; Table 95 and Table 96 present results for the centre-left; Table 97 and Table 98 present results for the centre-right; Table 99 and Table 100 present results for the extreme-right.

Table 91: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012)

| | SingleHH | SingleHH | SingleHH | MUH | MUH | MUH | APH | APH | APH |
|-----------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | No control | Control married | All controls | No control | Control married | All controls | No control | Control married | All controls |
| 0 to 20 | 0.1021 (0.1165) | 0.0101 (0.1253) | 0.0643 (0.1002) | 0.2117* (0.1283) | 0.4258*** (0.1055) | 0.2384** (0.1086) | 0.1561 (0.0977) | 0.1660* (0.0911) | 0.0873 (0.0736) |
| 20 to 40 | 0.1152 (0.0776) | 0.0500 (0.0769) | 0.0034 (0.0730) | 0.0604 (0.1017) | 0.1671** (0.0824) | 0.0766 (0.0805) | 0.1225 (0.0755) | 0.1274* (0.0668) | 0.0523 (0.0532) |
| 60 to 80 | 0.0028 (0.0738) | 0.0516 (0.0723) | -0.0081 (0.0592) | -0.0843 (0.0688) | -0.0868 (0.0658) | -0.1233* (0.0679) | -0.0931 (0.0786) | -0.1149 (0.0738) | -0.0784 (0.0599) |
| 80 to 100 | 0.0104 (0.0976) | 0.1071 (0.0953) | -0.0177 (0.0800) | -0.3573*** (0.1242) | -0.3915*** (0.1138) | -0.2337** (0.1019) | -0.3215*** (0.0810) | -0.2644*** (0.0832) | -0.1613* (0.0868) |
| Rank | -0.0020 (0.0022) | 0.0020 (0.0023) | -0.0010 (0.0018) | -0.0085*** (0.0024) | -0.0139*** (0.0022) | -0.0066*** (0.0024) | -0.0068*** (0.0018) | -0.0066*** (0.0017) | -0.0043** (0.0017) |
| Z-score | -0.0612 (0.0624) | 0.0116 (0.0632) | -0.1078* (0.0557) | -0.3300*** (0.0842) | -0.5113*** (0.0858) | -0.2882*** (0.0819) | -0.1984*** (0.0452) | -0.1741*** (0.0457) | -0.1003 (0.0701) |
| Obs. | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 92: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on income and education, panel (1968-2012)

| | Income No control | Income Control education | Income All controls | Education No control | Education Control income | Education All controls |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 20 | -0.1229 (0.1167) | -0.1127 (0.1162) | 0.0233 (0.0898) | -0.1453 (0.1436) | -0.1188 (0.1332) | 0.1550 (0.1013) |
| 20 to 40 | 0.0468 (0.0722) | 0.0520 (0.0741) | 0.1285** (0.0634) | -0.1286 (0.1125) | -0.1228 (0.1081) | 0.0687 (0.0864) |
| 60 to 80 | 0.1743* (0.1008) | 0.1475 (0.0902) | 0.0546 (0.0650) | 0.0523 (0.1296) | 0.0565 (0.1324) | -0.0381 (0.1124) |
| 80 to 100 | 0.1383 (0.1006) | 0.1117 (0.0953) | 0.0224 (0.0806) | 0.3832 (0.2411) | 0.3582 (0.2315) | 0.0525 (0.1689) |
| Rank | 0.0038** (0.0017) | 0.0029* (0.0017) | 0.0002 (0.0014) | 0.0130** (0.0050) | 0.0123** (0.0049) | -0.0041 (0.0038) |
| Z-score | 0.0677** (0.0334) | 0.0531 (0.0330) | 0.0086 (0.0266) | 0.5850*** (0.1954) | 0.5760*** (0.1941) | -0.2172 (0.1983) |
| Obs. | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Education is the share of university graduates in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 93: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012)

| | SingleHH No control | SingleHH Control married | SingleHH All controls | MUH No control | MUH Control married | MUH All controls | APH No control | APH Control singles | APH All controls |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 | 0.0805 (0.0902) | 0.0020 (0.0812) | 0.0256 (0.0850) | 0.0082 (0.1622) | 0.0896 (0.1567) | 0.1381 (0.1654) | 0.0324 (0.1304) | 0.0325 (0.1303) | -0.0091 (0.1308) |
| 20 to 40 | 0.1025** (0.0519) | 0.0623 (0.0490) | 0.0759 (0.0582) | -0.1144 (0.0748) | -0.0774 (0.0673) | -0.0549 (0.0759) | 0.0555 (0.0649) | 0.0504 (0.0647) | 0.0584 (0.0694) |
| 60 to 80 | -0.1050* (0.0575) | -0.0810 (0.0534) | -0.1362** (0.0573) | 0.0640 (0.0671) | 0.0322 (0.0624) | -0.0080 (0.0555) | 0.0390 (0.0819) | 0.0077 (0.0772) | 0.0148 (0.0823) |
| 80 to 100 | -0.1493* (0.0794) | -0.0981 (0.0760) | -0.0879 (0.0825) | -0.2571** (0.1007) | -0.2994*** (0.0832) | -0.3692*** (0.0865) | -0.1777 (0.1103) | -0.1574 (0.1002) | -0.1397 (0.1094) |
| Rank | -0.0037** (0.0015) | -0.0014 (0.0016) | -0.0014 (0.0016) | -0.0004 (0.0025) | -0.0037 (0.0023) | -0.0031 (0.0025) | -0.0031 (0.0021) | -0.0029 (0.0020) | -0.0022 (0.0023) |
| Z-score | -0.1367*** (0.0487) | -0.0905* (0.0490) | -0.0841 (0.0520) | -0.0886 (0.0824) | -0.2176*** (0.0727) | -0.1811* (0.0930) | -0.1207* (0.0624) | -0.1041* (0.0577) | -0.1560** (0.0672) |
| Obs. | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 94: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on income and education, panel (1968-2012)

| | Income No control | Income Control education | Income All controls | Education No control | Education Control income | Education All controls |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 20 | -0.0019 (0.0921) | -0.0035 (0.0908) | 0.0674 (0.0933) | 0.0823 (0.1728) | 0.0717 (0.1731) | 0.1601 (0.1380) |
| 20 to 40 | -0.1033* (0.0584) | -0.1006* (0.0579) | -0.0468 (0.0572) | 0.1006 (0.1525) | 0.0910 (0.1517) | 0.1644 (0.1240) |
| 60 to 80 | 0.0893 (0.0723) | 0.0825 (0.0716) | 0.0567 (0.0599) | -0.0876 (0.0979) | -0.0841 (0.0983) | -0.0909 (0.0964) |
| 80 to 100 | 0.1245 (0.0894) | 0.1142 (0.0900) | 0.0488 (0.0907) | -0.0150 (0.1387) | -0.0400 (0.1378) | -0.0030 (0.1540) |
| Rank | 0.0031** (0.0013) | 0.0031** (0.0013) | 0.0008 (0.0013) | 0.0007 (0.0042) | 0.0001 (0.0042) | -0.0055 (0.0048) |
| Z-score | 0.0689** (0.0300) | 0.0624** (0.0281) | -0.0019 (0.0248) | 0.2685 (0.1652) | 0.2579 (0.1638) | 0.0323 (0.1859) |
| Obs. | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Education is the share of university graduates in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 95: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012)

| | SingleHH No control | SingleHH Control married | SingleHH All controls | MUH No control | MUH Control married | MUH All controls | APH No control | APH Control singles | APH All controls |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 | 0.0342 (0.2152) | 0.0764 (0.1966) | 0.1567 (0.1644) | 0.0089 (0.1608) | 0.2499 (0.1569) | 0.3088** (0.1677) | 0.1419 (0.1271) | 0.1538 (0.1243) | 0.0827 (0.1035) |
| 20 to 40 | 0.0135 (0.1145) | 0.0214 (0.1161) | -0.0200 (0.1171) | -0.1165 (0.1217) | 0.1917 (0.1191) | 0.2246* (0.1242) | 0.1051 (0.0970) | 0.1112 (0.1002) | -0.0013 (0.0797) |
| 60 to 80 | 0.1256 (0.0966) | 0.1302 (0.0948) | 0.1232 (0.0893) | -0.2949*** (0.0929) | -0.2858*** (0.0946) | -0.1809** (0.0874) | -0.1364 (0.1162) | -0.1199 (0.1124) | -0.0761 (0.0998) |
| 80 to 100 | 0.1308 (0.1208) | 0.1288 (0.1228) | -0.0093 (0.1244) | -0.2852** (0.1378) | -0.2629* (0.1403) | -0.0033 (0.1207) | -0.0815 (0.1351) | -0.0799 (0.1407) | 0.0419 (0.1433) |
| Rank | 0.0008 (0.0030) | 0.0004 (0.0032) | -0.0037 (0.0027) | -0.0125*** (0.0032) | -0.0131*** (0.0033) | -0.0057* (0.0033) | -0.0036 (0.0026) | -0.0036 (0.0026) | -0.0005 (0.0031) |
| Z-score | 0.0381 (0.0791) | 0.0293 (0.0820) | -0.1108 (0.0783) | -0.3268*** (0.1131) | -0.3279*** (0.1208) | -0.0398 (0.1240) | -0.0331 (0.0703) | -0.0351 (0.0692) | 0.1250 (0.1062) |
| Obs. | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 96: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on income and education, panel (1968-2012)

| | Income No control | Income Control education | Income All controls | Education No control | Education Control income | Education All controls |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 20 | -0.1292 (0.1581) | -0.1287 (0.1547) | -0.0836 (0.1265) | -0.0931 (0.2203) | -0.0453 (0.2050) | 0.0633 (0.1791) |
| 20 to 40 | 0.1804** (0.0912) | 0.1820* (0.0949) | 0.2132** (0.0958) | -0.1583 (0.1687) | -0.1353 (0.1617) | -0.0888 (0.1443) |
| 60 to 80 | 0.0888 (0.1099) | 0.0779 (0.1050) | 0.0260 (0.1033) | 0.1493 (0.1724) | 0.1492 (0.1760) | 0.0500 (0.1348) |
| 80 to 100 | -0.1226 (0.1195) | -0.1323 (0.1190) | -0.0967 (0.1123) | 0.3094 (0.2484) | 0.3182 (0.2413) | -0.0633 (0.1949) |
| Rank | -0.0008 (0.0021) | -0.0014 (0.0020) | -0.0012 (0.0017) | 0.0088 (0.0061) | 0.0091 (0.0060) | -0.0027 (0.0063) |
| Z-score | -0.0494 (0.0371) | -0.0576 (0.0378) | -0.0176 (0.0313) | 0.3129 (0.2238) | 0.3226 (0.2213) | -0.3830 (0.2459) |
| Obs. | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Education is the share of university graduates in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 97: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012)

| | SingleHH No control | SingleHH Control married | SingleHH All controls | MUH No control | MUH Control married | MUH All controls | APH No control | APH Control singles | APH All controls |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| 0 to 20 | -0.1049 (0.1362) | -0.0901 (0.1307) | -0.1319 (0.1301) | -0.1730* (0.0973) | -0.2198** (0.0940) | -0.1634* (0.0983) | -0.0237 (0.0705) | -0.0377 (0.0706) | 0.0166 (0.0722) |
| 20 to 40 | -0.0272 (0.0754) | -0.0157 (0.0770) | -0.0412 (0.0762) | -0.0880 (0.0878) | -0.1120 (0.0860) | -0.0529 (0.0836) | 0.0325 (0.0563) | 0.0332 (0.0567) | 0.0575 (0.0585) |
| 60 to 80 | 0.0297 (0.0646) | 0.0152 (0.0697) | 0.0891 (0.0654) | -0.0476 (0.0735) | -0.0437 (0.0748) | -0.0462 (0.0815) | 0.0890 (0.0731) | 0.0992 (0.0716) | 0.0801 (0.0698) |
| 80 to 100 | 0.0402 (0.0739) | 0.0251 (0.0784) | 0.1673** (0.0789) | -0.0073 (0.1087) | -0.0061 (0.1104) | -0.0809 (0.1219) | 0.1304 (0.0946) | 0.1342 (0.0958) | 0.1062 (0.1025) |
| Rank | 0.0017 (0.0016) | 0.0009 (0.0018) | 0.0033* (0.0019) | 0.0026 (0.0019) | 0.0038* (0.0020) | 0.0000 (0.0024) | 0.0024* (0.0014) | 0.0023* (0.0013) | 0.0017 (0.0018) |
| Z-score | 0.0463 (0.0461) | 0.0284 (0.0493) | 0.1195** (0.0530) | 0.0536 (0.0641) | 0.0913 (0.0694) | 0.0120 (0.0810) | 0.0714* (0.0423) | 0.0651 (0.0414) | 0.0916 (0.0772) |
| Obs. | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 98: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on income and education, panel (1968-2012)

| | Income No control | Income Control education | Income All controls | Education No control | Education Control income | Education All controls |
|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 20 | -0.1642* (0.0959) | -0.1613* (0.0952) | -0.2296*** (0.0854) | -0.1016 (0.1243) | -0.0965 (0.1244) | -0.1553 (0.1129) |
| 20 to 40 | -0.1220** (0.0563) | -0.1271** (0.0583) | -0.1660*** (0.0625) | -0.0768 (0.1076) | -0.0788 (0.1074) | -0.1329 (0.0815) |
| 60 to 80 | -0.0510 (0.0791) | -0.0337 (0.0711) | 0.0006 (0.0667) | 0.0096 (0.0901) | 0.0128 (0.0922) | 0.1012 (0.0880) |
| 80 to 100 | 0.0326 (0.0893) | 0.0550 (0.0839) | 0.0642 (0.0834) | -0.1423 (0.1598) | -0.1550 (0.1544) | 0.0287 (0.1445) |
| Rank | 0.0031** (0.0014) | 0.0033** (0.0013) | 0.0048*** (0.0012) | -0.0020 (0.0035) | -0.0027 (0.0034) | 0.0040 (0.0040) |
| Z-score | 0.0838*** (0.0281) | 0.0878*** (0.0297) | 0.1029*** (0.0300) | -0.1396 (0.1498) | -0.1544 (0.1512) | 0.0300 (0.1643) |
| Obs. | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Education is the share of university graduates in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 99: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012)

| | SingleHH No control | SingleHH Control married | SingleHH All controls | MUH No control | MUH Control married | MUH All controls | APH No control | APH Control singles | APH All controls |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 20 | 0.1229 (0.2118) | 0.2393 (0.1999) | 0.2296 (0.1749) | -0.1592 (0.1376) | -0.3885*** (0.1391) | -0.0508 (0.1524) | -0.2553** (0.1222) | -0.2618** (0.1214) | -0.1607 (0.1098) |
| 20 to 40 | -0.0836 (0.1223) | -0.0059 (0.1207) | 0.1522 (0.1140) | 0.0583 (0.1339) | -0.0551 (0.1378) | 0.0780 (0.1377) | -0.2890*** (0.0826) | -0.2949*** (0.0772) | -0.2156** (0.0856) |
| 60 to 80 | -0.0775 (0.0896) | -0.1328 (0.0876) | -0.1117 (0.0869) | 0.3078*** (0.1169) | 0.3488*** (0.1067) | 0.2573** (0.1192) | 0.0357 (0.1147) | 0.0551 (0.1098) | 0.0290 (0.0896) |
| 80 to 100 | -0.1206 (0.1201) | -0.2342** (0.1139) | -0.1862* (0.1027) | 0.7386*** (0.1335) | 0.7775*** (0.1292) | 0.5998*** (0.1348) | 0.2821** (0.1358) | 0.2167 (0.1365) | 0.1042 (0.1052) |
| Rank | -0.0019 (0.0027) | -0.0063** (0.0029) | -0.0055* (0.0028) | 0.0129*** (0.0030) | 0.0187*** (0.0031) | 0.0116*** (0.0035) | 0.0081*** (0.0024) | 0.0079*** (0.0024) | 0.0051** (0.0023) |
| Z-score | -0.0084 (0.0753) | -0.0760 (0.0768) | -0.0095 (0.0792) | 0.5747*** (0.1089) | 0.7690*** (0.1207) | 0.5183*** (0.1322) | 0.2357*** (0.0711) | 0.2149*** (0.0754) | 0.0697 (0.0913) |
| Obs. | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. SingleHH is the share of single households in each *département*. MUH is the average number of marital units per household in each *département*. APH is the average number of adults per household (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is aged over 20) in each *département*. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

Table 100: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on income and education, panel (1968-2012)

| | Income No control | Income Control education | Income All controls | Education No control | Education Control income | Education All controls |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 20 | 0.4166*** (0.1162) | 0.3784*** (0.1173) | 0.3029*** (0.0958) | 0.5992*** (0.2117) | 0.5582*** (0.2062) | 0.2776 (0.1812) |
| 20 to 40 | 0.1517 (0.0951) | 0.1517 (0.0956) | 0.0608 (0.0798) | 0.3910*** (0.1317) | 0.3859*** (0.1306) | 0.2619** (0.1053) |
| 60 to 80 | -0.2022 (0.1311) | -0.1789 (0.1334) | -0.0186 (0.1191) | -0.0743 (0.1314) | -0.0849 (0.1334) | -0.0841 (0.1084) |
| 80 to 100 | -0.1708 (0.1286) | -0.1594 (0.1363) | 0.0039 (0.1199) | -0.4083** (0.1879) | -0.3549* (0.1838) | -0.1179 (0.1596) |
| Rank | -0.0093*** (0.0022) | -0.0082*** (0.0022) | -0.0056*** (0.0018) | -0.0175*** (0.0052) | -0.0157*** (0.0052) | 0.0004 (0.0065) |
| Z-score | -0.1757*** (0.0547) | -0.1588*** (0.0510) | -0.1104** (0.0495) | -0.6938*** (0.1840) | -0.6670*** (0.1837) | 0.3512 (0.2897) |
| Obs. | 1042 | 1042 | 1042 | 1045 | 1045 | 1045 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Income is the average income per adult in each *département*. Education is the share of university graduates in each *département*. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of university graduates, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals.

A.9 Data at the municipal level (2002 and 2012)

Electoral results

Table 101 and Table 102 present descriptive statistics for the results of the first round of the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections at the municipal level, weighting with the number of votes cast in each municipality. Figure 124 and Figure 125 are maps presenting results for the left vs. right at the municipal level for respectively 2002 and 2012. Figure 126 and Figure 127 present results for the extreme-left; Figure 128 and Figure 129 present results for the centre-left; Figure 130 and Figure 131 present results for the centre-right; Figure 132 and Figure 133 present results for the extreme-right.

Table 101: Results of the first round of the 2002 French legislative elections, at the municipal level

| | N | Total votes | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|---------------|-------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Left | 35718 | 25.25e+06 | 0.4237 | 0.1151 | 0.0000 | 0.3457 | 0.4224 | 0.5033 | 1.0000 |
| Right | 35718 | 25.25e+06 | 0.5763 | 0.1151 | 0.0000 | 0.4967 | 0.5776 | 0.6543 | 1.0000 |
| Extreme-left | 35718 | 25.25e+06 | 0.0782 | 0.0808 | 0.0000 | 0.0375 | 0.0547 | 0.0825 | 0.8049 |
| Centre-left | 35718 | 25.25e+06 | 0.3455 | 0.1104 | 0.0000 | 0.2751 | 0.3456 | 0.4208 | 1.0000 |
| Centre-right | 35718 | 25.25e+06 | 0.4340 | 0.1190 | 0.0000 | 0.3599 | 0.4292 | 0.5076 | 1.0000 |
| Extreme-right | 35718 | 25.25e+06 | 0.1423 | 0.0715 | 0.0000 | 0.0920 | 0.1288 | 0.1798 | 0.9333 |

Source: CDSP

Note: We computed voting shares excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Table 102: Results of the first round of the 2012 French legislative elections, at the municipal level

| | N | Total votes | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|---------------|-------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Left | 35758 | 25.05e+06 | 0.4911 | 0.1248 | 0.0000 | 0.4032 | 0.4914 | 0.5821 | 1.0000 |
| Right | 35758 | 25.05e+06 | 0.5089 | 0.1248 | 0.0000 | 0.4179 | 0.5086 | 0.5968 | 1.0000 |
| Extreme-left | 35758 | 25.05e+06 | 0.0817 | 0.0696 | 0.0000 | 0.0447 | 0.0646 | 0.0919 | 0.9184 |
| Centre-left | 35758 | 25.05e+06 | 0.4094 | 0.1094 | 0.0000 | 0.3339 | 0.4109 | 0.4900 | 1.0000 |
| Centre-right | 35758 | 25.05e+06 | 0.3661 | 0.1224 | 0.0000 | 0.2798 | 0.3561 | 0.4432 | 1.0000 |
| Extreme-right | 35758 | 25.05e+06 | 0.1428 | 0.0672 | 0.0000 | 0.0922 | 0.1324 | 0.1838 | 0.6667 |

Source: Ministry of Interior

Note: We computed voting shares excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 124: Map of the vote for the left in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties. Vote for the right is the difference between 100 and vote for the left. As a result, p0-p10 of the vote for the left corresponds to p90-p100 of the vote for the right, p10-p20 of the vote for the left corresponds to p80-p90 of the vote for the right, and so on.


Figure 125: Map of the vote for the left in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties. Vote for the right is the difference between 100 and vote for the left. As a result, p0-p10 of the vote for the left corresponds to p90-p100 of the vote for the right, p10-p20 of the vote for the left corresponds to p80-p90 of the vote for the right, and so on.


Figure 126: Map of the vote for the extreme-left in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 127: Map of the vote for the extreme-left in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 128: Map of the vote for the centre-left in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 129: Map of the vote for the centre-left in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 130: Map of the vote for the centre-right in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.


Figure 131: Map of the vote for the centre-right in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.

Figure 132: Map of the vote for the extreme-right in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality



Source: CDSP

Note: Voting shares are computed excluding votes cast for parties with unclear positioning on the right-left political axis, such as regionalists or hunters federations. See Figure 40 for the classification of political parties.

Household structures

Table 103 and Table 104 present respectively for 1999 and 2009 some descriptive statistics for three indicators of household structures at the municipal level (average number of marital units per household, average number of adults per household, share of single households), weighting with the number of registered voters in each municipality in the first round of respectively the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections. Figure 134 and Figure 135 are maps presenting the share of single households at the municipal level for respectively 1999 and 2009. Figure 136 and Figure 137 are maps presenting the average number of marital units per household at the municipal level for respectively 1999 and 2009. Figure 138 and Figure 139 are maps presenting the average number of adults per household at the municipal level for respectively 1999 and 2009.

Table 103: Indicators for household structures in 1999, at the municipal level

| | N | Total registered | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-----------|-------|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| MUH | 35718 | 39.59e+06 | 0.8253 | 0.1143 | 0.2276 | 0.7685 | 0.8496 | 0.9028 | 3.9167 |
| APH | 35718 | 39.59e+06 | 1.8198 | 0.1701 | 1.0000 | 1.6980 | 1.8343 | 1.9414 | 6.0000 |
| Single HH | 35718 | 39.59e+06 | 0.2881 | 0.1042 | 0.0000 | 0.2097 | 0.2759 | 0.3589 | 1.0000 |

Source: Census results, 1999, CDSP for the number of voters used as weights, 2002.

Note: MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household; APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 per household (with the assumption of 75% of the population counted separately aged more than 20); Single HH is the average share of households made up of one person. Figures are weighted by the number of registered voters in the municipality in 2002.


Table 104: Indicators for household structures in 2009, at the municipal level

| | N | Total registered | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|-----------|-------|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| MUH | 35758 | 43.29e+06 | 0.7631 | 0.1127 | 0.0000 | 0.7114 | 0.7870 | 0.8372 | 2.9737 |
| APH | 35758 | 43.29e+06 | 1.7404 | 0.1562 | 1.0000 | 1.6302 | 1.7597 | 1.8523 | 7.0000 |
| Single HH | 35758 | 43.29e+06 | 0.3175 | 0.1036 | 0.0000 | 0.2367 | 0.3029 | 0.3911 | 1.0000 |

Source: Census results, 2009, and Ministry of Interior for the number of voters used as weights, 2012.

Note: MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household; APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 per household (with the assumption of 75% of the population counted separately aged more than 20); Single HH is the average share of households made up of one person. Figures are weighted by the number of registered voters in the municipality in 2012.


Figure 134: Map of the share of single households in 1999 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: The share of single households is the share of households composed of one individual.


Figure 135: Map of the share of single households in 2009 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: The share of single households is the share of households composed of one individual.


Figure 136: Map of the average number of marital units per household (MUH) in 1999 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household.


Figure 137: Map of the average number of marital units per household (MUH) in 2009 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household.


Figure 138: Map of the average number of adults per household (APH) in 1999 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 per household (with the assumption of 75% of the population counted separately aged more than 20).

Figure 139: Map of the average number of adults per household (APH) in 2009 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 per household (with the assumption of 75% of the population counted separately aged more than 20).

Marriage, education and income

Table 105 and Table 106 present respectively for 1999/2002 and 2009/2012 some descriptive statistics for marriage and education (1999 and 2009), as well as income (2002 and 2012), weighting with the number of registered voters in each municipality in the first round of respectively the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections. Figure 140 and Figure 141 are maps presenting the share of married individuals at the municipal level for respectively 1999 and 2009. Figure 142 and Figure 143 are maps presenting the share of university graduates (diploma higher than Bac.+2) at the municipal level for respectively 1999 and 2009. Figure 144 and Figure 145 are maps presenting the average income per adult at the municipal level for respectively 2002 and 2012.

Table 105: Marriage, education and income in 1999/2002, at the municipal level

| | N | Total registered | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|--------------|-------|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| Married | 35718 | 39.59e+06 | 0.5202 | 0.0751 | 0.0000 | 0.4709 | 0.5279 | 0.5764 | 0.9310 |
| University | 35664 | 39.59e+06 | 0.2348 | 0.1182 | 0.0000 | 0.1529 | 0.2131 | 0.2885 | 1.0000 |
| University + | 35718 | 39.59e+06 | 0.0859 | 0.0720 | 0.0000 | 0.0401 | 0.0633 | 0.1036 | 0.55566 |
| Income | 35591 | 39.58e+06 | 14073 | 3593 | 1002 | 11899 | 13362 | 15637 | 35787 |

Source: Census results, 1999, Ministry of Finance, 2002, and CDSF for the number of voters used as weights, 2002.

Note: Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. Income is the average annual income per adult in euros, using total income reported to the fiscal authorities. University is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 15. University+ is the share of university graduates with a diploma higher than Bac+2 in the not-in-school population aged more than 15. Figures are weighted by the number of registered voters in the municipality in 2002.


Table 106: Marriage, education and income in 2009/2012, at the municipal level

| | N | Total registered | mean | sd | min | p25 | p50 | p75 | max |
|--------------|-------|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Married | 35758 | 43.29e+06 | 0.4884 | 0.0813 | 0.0000 | 0.4332 | 0.4944 | 0.5493 | 0.8571 |
| University | 35690 | 43.29e+06 | 0.3375 | 0.1349 | 0.0000 | 0.2436 | 0.3150 | 0.4057 | 1.0000 |
| University + | 35758 | 43.29e+06 | 0.1241 | 0.0913 | 0.0000 | 0.0643 | 0.0972 | 0.1497 | 0.5737 |
| Income | 35664 | 43.29e+06 | 18641 | 4558 | 1993 | 15697 | 17764 | 20515 | 50703 |

Source: Census results, 2009, Ministry of Finance, 2012, and Ministry of Interior for the number of voters used as weights, 2012.

Note: Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15. University is the share of university graduates in the not-in-school population aged more than 16. University+ is the share of university graduates with a diploma higher than Bac+2 in the not-in-school population aged more than 15. Income is the average annual income per adult in euros, using total income reported to the fiscal authorities. Figures are weighted by the number of registered voters in the municipality in 2012.


Figure 140: Map of the share of married individuals in 1999 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: The share of married individuals is defined for the population aged more than 15.


Figure 141: Map of the share of married individuals in 2009 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: The share of married individuals is defined for the population aged more than 15.


Figure 142: Map of the share of university graduates in 1999 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: The share of university graduates is the share of individuals with a diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the population not currently in school aged more than 15.


Figure 143: Map of the share of university graduates in 2009 by municipality



Source: Census results

Note: The share of university graduates is the share of individuals with a diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the population not currently in school aged more than 15.


Figure 144: Map of the average income per adult by municipality in 2002



Source: Census results

Note: The average income per adult is the total income reported to the fiscal authorities by fiscal households of the municipality divided by the number of adults aged more than 20 in the municipality.

Figure 145: Map of the average income per adult by municipality in 2012



Source: Census results

Note: The average income per adult is the total income reported to the fiscal authorities by fiscal households of the municipality divided by the number of adults aged more than 20 in the municipality.

A.10 Results at the municipal level: cross-sectional regressions (2002 and 2012)

This section presents the results of the regressions at the municipal level implemented for the first round of the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections. section A.10.1. presents results for household structures and section A.10.2. presents results for income and education. For each variable of interest and political affiliation, three specifications are presented (see Section 3.3.2 for details).

A.10.1 Household structures

Table 107, Table 108 and Table 109 present results for the regression of the share of vote for the **left** on the share of single households, on the average number of marital units per household and on the average number of adults per household for the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections. Figure 146, Figure 147, Figure 148, Figure 149, Figure 150 and Figure 151 are the corresponding graphs.

Table 110, Table 111, Table 112, Figure 152, Figure 153, Figure 154, Figure 155, Figure 156 and Figure 157 present results for the **extreme-left**.

Table 113, Table 114, Table 115, Figure 158, Figure 159, Figure 160, Figure 161, Figure 162 and Figure 163 present results for the **centre-left**.

Table 116, Table 117, Table 118, Figure 164, Figure 165, Figure 166, Figure 167, Figure 168 and Figure 169 present results for the **centre-right**.

Table 119, Table 120, Table 121, Figure 170, Figure 171, Figure 172, Figure 173, Figure 174 and Figure 175 present results for the **extreme-right**.

Table 107: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of single households (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (SingleHH) | -0.0919* (0.0520) | 0.3661*** (0.0472) | 0.1091** (0.0456) | -0.3562*** (0.0503) | 0.0984** (0.0492) | 0.0741 (0.0462) |
| 10 to 20 (SingleHH) | -0.0491 (0.0534) | 0.3186*** (0.0478) | 0.1083** (0.0438) | -0.2893*** (0.0528) | 0.0817 (0.0497) | 0.0332 (0.0429) |
| 20 to 30 (SingleHH) | -0.0193 (0.0575) | 0.2454*** (0.0516) | 0.1026** (0.0438) | -0.1942*** (0.0549) | 0.1178** (0.0517) | 0.0532 (0.0438) |
| 30 to 40 (SingleHH) | 0.0250 (0.0577) | 0.2241*** (0.0514) | 0.0839** (0.0423) | -0.1308** (0.0569) | 0.0878* (0.0525) | 0.0868** (0.0412) |
| 40 to 50 (SingleHH) | 0.1349** (0.0642) | 0.2156*** (0.0562) | 0.1243*** (0.0435) | -0.0349 (0.0596) | 0.1013* (0.0539) | 0.0601 (0.0417) |
| 60 to 70 (SingleHH) | 0.0787 (0.0753) | -0.0570 (0.0687) | -0.0447 (0.0515) | -0.0549 (0.0831) | -0.1686** (0.0718) | -0.0829* (0.0488) |
| 70 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.0258 (0.0832) | -0.2727*** (0.0792) | -0.1320** (0.0551) | -0.0259 (0.0831) | -0.3994*** (0.0936) | -0.2234*** (0.0562) |
| 80 to 90 (SingleHH) | -0.0839 (0.0877) | -0.6962*** (0.1104) | -0.3751*** (0.0701) | -0.0172 (0.1109) | -0.6774*** (0.1308) | -0.3554*** (0.0708) |
| 90 to 95 (SingleHH) | 0.2468 (0.1660) | -0.7993*** (0.2323) | -0.5935*** (0.1040) | 0.4649** (0.1861) | -0.6757*** (0.2446) | -0.6495*** (0.1032) |
| 95 to 99 (SingleHH) | 0.5220*** (0.1951) | -0.6442** (0.2966) | -0.4296*** (0.1406) | 0.5157*** (0.1755) | -0.7763*** (0.2528) | -0.6894*** (0.1310) |
| 99 to 100 (SingleHH) | -0.1038 (0.1623) | -1.3179*** (0.2661) | -0.5446* (0.3053) | 0.6312*** (0.2273) | -0.7058** (0.3021) | -0.4788*** (0.1637) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (SingleHH) | 0.0061*** (0.0021) | -0.0217*** (0.0021) | -0.0023 (0.0022) | 0.0168*** (0.0021) | -0.0100*** (0.0022) | 0.0049* (0.0029) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.0733*** (0.0276) | -0.3608*** (0.0373) | -0.2323*** (0.0257) | 0.1976*** (0.0266) | -0.2894*** (0.0423) | -0.1758*** (0.0340) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residences.

Table 108: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (MUH) | 0.4413*** (0.1065) | -0.4016** (0.1940) | -0.2369* (0.1315) | 0.7978*** (0.1085) | 0.1601 (0.2225) | 0.2689* (0.1454) |
| 10 to 20 (MUH) | 0.2163** (0.0956) | -0.2710** (0.1309) | -0.1797** (0.0698) | 0.3789*** (0.0995) | -0.0511 (0.1456) | -0.0037 (0.0677) |
| 20 to 30 (MUH) | 0.0217 (0.0873) | -0.3363*** (0.0890) | -0.1232** (0.0596) | 0.1193 (0.0981) | -0.1524 (0.1097) | -0.0175 (0.0513) |
| 30 to 40(MUH) | 0.0495 (0.0719) | -0.1745** (0.0708) | -0.1102** (0.0451) | 0.0065 (0.0735) | -0.1298* (0.0741) | -0.0883* (0.0458) |
| 40 to 50 (MUH) | -0.0462 (0.0599) | -0.1525*** (0.0576) | -0.0716* (0.0396) | 0.0839 (0.0564) | 0.0423 (0.0575) | 0.0396 (0.0392) |
| 60 to 70 (MUH) | 0.0105 (0.0517) | 0.0445 (0.0501) | 0.0295 (0.0363) | -0.0128 (0.0516) | 0.0402 (0.0518) | 0.0465 (0.0351) |
| 70 to 80 (MUH) | 0.0955** (0.0470) | 0.1885*** (0.0448) | 0.0815** (0.0332) | 0.0137 (0.0493) | 0.0983** (0.0486) | 0.0731** (0.0320) |
| 80 to 90 (MUH) | 0.0947** (0.0457) | 0.2250*** (0.0439) | 0.0856** (0.0334) | -0.1755*** (0.0504) | -0.0434 (0.0503) | -0.0021 (0.0333) |
| 90 to 95 (MUH) | 0.0646 (0.0539) | 0.2441*** (0.0530) | 0.0765* (0.0415) | -0.2187*** (0.0517) | -0.0617 (0.0510) | -0.0202 (0.0368) |
| 95 to 99 (MUH) | -0.1104** (0.0504) | 0.0275 (0.0489) | 0.0013 (0.0398) | -0.3323*** (0.0530) | -0.1735*** (0.0533) | -0.0576 (0.0385) |
| 99 to 100 (MUH) | 0.0018 (0.0628) | -0.0762 (0.0655) | 0.0860 (0.0541) | -0.2021** (0.0826) | -0.1796** (0.0811) | -0.0034 (0.0648) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (MUH) | -0.0055*** (0.0019) | 0.0121*** (0.0017) | 0.0096*** (0.0014) | -0.0207*** (0.0020) | -0.0066*** (0.0019) | -0.0083*** (0.0017) |
| Z-score (MUH) | -0.1130*** (0.0265) | 0.1484*** (0.0327) | 0.1302*** (0.0218) | -0.2726*** (0.0247) | -0.0508 (0.0346) | -0.1272*** (0.0216) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 109: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (APH) | 0.3214*** (0.1178) | -0.7230*** (0.2354) | -0.4414*** (0.0942) | 0.5359*** (0.1005) | -0.6787*** (0.1652) | -0.4164*** (0.0901) |
| 10 to 20 (APH) | -0.1526* (0.0878) | -0.7457*** (0.1104) | -0.4164*** (0.0683) | -0.0144 (0.1275) | -0.7278*** (0.1349) | -0.3513*** (0.0653) |
| 20 to 30 (APH) | -0.1071 (0.0751) | -0.4724*** (0.0829) | -0.1755*** (0.0563) | -0.0440 (0.0839) | -0.4780*** (0.0905) | -0.2009*** (0.0502) |
| 30 to 40 (APH) | -0.0544 (0.0727) | -0.2346*** (0.0659) | -0.1109** (0.0469) | -0.0735 (0.0811) | -0.2368*** (0.0689) | -0.0530 (0.0432) |
| 40 to 50 (APH) | 0.0387 (0.0604) | -0.0440 (0.0533) | -0.0004 (0.0425) | -0.0936 (0.0639) | -0.1429*** (0.0542) | -0.0411 (0.0382) |
| 60 to 70 (APH) | 0.0429 (0.0501) | 0.1191*** (0.0462) | 0.0042 (0.0378) | -0.0915 (0.0583) | -0.0089 (0.0472) | -0.0157 (0.0340) |
| 70 to 80 (APH) | -0.0041 (0.0482) | 0.1320*** (0.0445) | -0.0038 (0.0360) | -0.1143** (0.0580) | 0.0240 (0.0484) | -0.0152 (0.0361) |
| 80 to 90 (APH) | -0.0664 (0.0460) | 0.1310*** (0.0433) | -0.0526 (0.0370) | -0.1946*** (0.0541) | 0.0070 (0.0443) | -0.0411 (0.0328) |
| 90 to 95 (APH) | -0.1868*** (0.0482) | 0.0334 (0.0454) | -0.1684*** (0.0407) | -0.3386*** (0.0618) | -0.1135** (0.0520) | -0.0904** (0.0402) |
| 95 to 99 (APH) | -0.2150*** (0.0504) | -0.0006 (0.0477) | -0.2156*** (0.0411) | -0.3860*** (0.0715) | -0.1699*** (0.0598) | -0.1925*** (0.0411) |
| 99 to 100 (APH) | -0.3608*** (0.0523) | -0.2552*** (0.0501) | -0.2940*** (0.0457) | -0.4107*** (0.1073) | -0.2722*** (0.0984) | -0.2813*** (0.0565) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (APH) | -0.0060*** (0.0021) | 0.0138*** (0.0019) | -0.0024 (0.0019) | -0.0153*** (0.0022) | 0.0049** (0.0021) | -0.0065*** (0.0022) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.0754*** (0.0250) | 0.2147*** (0.0257) | 0.0632*** (0.0178) | -0.1873*** (0.0241) | 0.1494*** (0.0284) | 0.0080 (0.0199) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 146: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 147.

Figure 147: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Single households is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence

Figure 148: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 149.

Figure 149: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the municipal unemployment rate. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 150: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 151.

Figure 151: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 110: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of single households (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (SingleHH) | -0.3330*** (0.0836) | 0.0335 (0.0746) | 0.0726 (0.0721) | -0.4700*** (0.0675) | 0.0639 (0.0662) | 0.0718 (0.0728) |
| 10 to 20 (SingleHH) | -0.1805** (0.0870) | 0.1343* (0.0785) | 0.0996 (0.0750) | -0.3792*** (0.0700) | 0.0681 (0.0687) | 0.0150 (0.0744) |
| 20 to 30 (SingleHH) | -0.0926 (0.0917) | 0.1402* (0.0848) | 0.0928 (0.0758) | -0.1810** (0.0839) | 0.1932** (0.0858) | 0.1337* (0.0799) |
| 30 to 40(SingleHH) | -0.0187 (0.0949) | 0.1530* (0.0880) | 0.0399 (0.0734) | -0.1569** (0.0779) | 0.1020 (0.0756) | 0.0730 (0.0669) |
| 40 to 50 (SingleHH) | 0.0170 (0.1013) | 0.0859 (0.0977) | 0.0417 (0.0744) | -0.0521 (0.0881) | 0.1006 (0.0857) | 0.0652 (0.0713) |
| 60 to 70 (SingleHH) | -0.0397 (0.1074) | -0.1471 (0.1070) | -0.1025 (0.0867) | -0.0471 (0.1110) | -0.1735* (0.1009) | -0.0809 (0.0850) |
| 70 to 80 (SingleHH) | -0.0796 (0.1190) | -0.2990** (0.1194) | -0.0940 (0.0881) | -0.0951 (0.1052) | -0.4668*** (0.1050) | -0.2491*** (0.0875) |
| 80 to 90 (SingleHH) | -0.1507 (0.1153) | -0.5394*** (0.1314) | -0.1955* (0.1056) | -0.2161** (0.0927) | -0.7940*** (0.1170) | -0.4827*** (0.1072) |
| 90 to 95 (SingleHH) | -0.3990*** (0.0936) | -0.8413*** (0.1465) | -0.3491** (0.1362) | -0.1619 (0.1196) | -0.9203*** (0.1494) | -0.5397*** (0.1297) |
| 95 to 99 (SingleHH) | -0.3371*** (0.1114) | -0.7919*** (0.1726) | -0.7388*** (0.2115) | -0.1238 (0.1199) | -0.9324*** (0.1770) | -0.5382*** (0.1451) |
| 99 to 100 (SingleHH) | -0.5971*** (0.1257) | -1.0561*** (0.1845) | -0.3983* (0.2183) | -0.0899 (0.1546) | -0.9042*** (0.2014) | -0.5258*** (0.1753) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (SingleHH) | 0.0018 (0.0016) | -0.0179*** (0.0022) | -0.0023 (0.0029) | 0.0102*** (0.0015) | -0.0174*** (0.0022) | -0.0037 (0.0032) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | -0.0257 (0.0168) | -0.2695*** (0.0308) | -0.1565*** (0.0350) | 0.0704*** (0.0165) | -0.3705*** (0.0359) | -0.3717*** (0.0393) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 111: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 | 2002 | 2002 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control married | All controls | No control | Control married | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (MUH) | -0.2268*** (0.0698) | -0.5123*** (0.1474) | 0.1522 (0.1755) | 0.1220 (0.0903) | -0.2042 (0.1983) | 0.1040 (0.2076) |
| 10 to 20 (MUH) | 0.0822 (0.1105) | -0.2636** (0.1213) | 0.0224 (0.0989) | 0.2036* (0.1158) | -0.2281* (0.1201) | -0.0350 (0.0928) |
| 20 to 30 (MUH) | 0.0956 (0.1051) | -0.2226** (0.1057) | -0.0675 (0.0853) | 0.0471 (0.0885) | -0.2921*** (0.0982) | -0.0973 (0.0823) |
| 30 to 40 (MUH) | -0.0232 (0.0821) | -0.2366*** (0.0787) | -0.1438** (0.0638) | -0.0795 (0.0654) | -0.2754*** (0.0694) | -0.1636*** (0.0629) |
| 40 to 50 (MUH) | -0.0892 (0.0726) | -0.1981*** (0.0711) | -0.1169* (0.0628) | -0.0133 (0.0783) | -0.0717 (0.0765) | 0.0129 (0.0678) |
| 60 to 70 (MUH) | 0.0135 (0.0625) | 0.0485 (0.0604) | 0.0267 (0.0524) | -0.0399 (0.0688) | 0.0510 (0.0672) | 0.0749 (0.0601) |
| 70 to 80 (MUH) | 0.0150 (0.0606) | 0.1138* (0.0585) | 0.0759 (0.0477) | -0.0129 (0.0597) | 0.1355** (0.0586) | 0.1091** (0.0550) |
| 80 to 90 (MUH) | 0.0229 (0.0557) | 0.1590*** (0.0529) | 0.0694 (0.0445) | -0.1979*** (0.0530) | 0.0335 (0.0511) | 0.0426 (0.0471) |
| 90 to 95 (MUH) | 0.0603 (0.0650) | 0.2431*** (0.0638) | 0.1610*** (0.0538) | -0.1460** (0.0579) | 0.1240** (0.0563) | 0.0894* (0.0539) |
| 95 to 99 (MUH) | -0.1439*** (0.0552) | -0.0010 (0.0530) | 0.0496 (0.0482) | -0.2885*** (0.0522) | -0.0121 (0.0503) | 0.0446 (0.0513) |
| 99 to 100 (MUH) | -0.1279* (0.0687) | -0.1729** (0.0682) | 0.0846 (0.0634) | -0.1455 (0.0890) | -0.0678 (0.0867) | 0.1155 (0.0858) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (MUH) | 0.0009 (0.0017) | 0.0154*** (0.0017) | 0.0063*** (0.0017) | -0.0095*** (0.0017) | 0.0096*** (0.0018) | 0.0057*** (0.0018) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.0372** (0.0174) | 0.2448*** (0.0226) | 0.1205*** (0.0271) | -0.0961*** (0.0207) | 0.1832*** (0.0288) | 0.1477*** (0.0298) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 112: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (APH) | -0.4434*** (0.0904) | -0.9705*** (0.1750) | -0.4724*** (0.1627) | -0.1698* (0.0999) | -1.1401*** (0.1707) | -0.6645*** (0.1242) |
| 10 to 20 (APH) | -0.3162*** (0.1086) | -0.8005*** (0.1276) | -0.3948*** (0.1036) | -0.1980* (0.1098) | -0.9141*** (0.1422) | -0.5338*** (0.1078) |
| 20 to 30 (APH) | -0.2509** (0.1013) | -0.5982*** (0.1132) | -0.3703*** (0.0893) | -0.1493 (0.1091) | -0.6516*** (0.1254) | -0.3959*** (0.0952) |
| 30 to 40 (APH) | -0.1243 (0.1076) | -0.3037*** (0.1039) | -0.1692** (0.0786) | -0.2020* (0.1082) | -0.4135*** (0.1007) | -0.1964** (0.0777) |
| 40 to 50 (APH) | -0.1552 (0.1012) | -0.2399** (0.0977) | -0.1728** (0.0755) | -0.1524 (0.1032) | -0.2216** (0.0941) | -0.0872 (0.0719) |
| 60 to 70 (APH) | -0.1056 (0.0924) | -0.0282 (0.0863) | -0.0799 (0.0664) | -0.1312 (0.0982) | -0.0188 (0.0846) | -0.0076 (0.0657) |
| 70 to 80 (APH) | -0.1030 (0.0918) | 0.0402 (0.0854) | -0.0215 (0.0672) | -0.1913** (0.0946) | -0.0028 (0.0798) | -0.0260 (0.0644) |
| 80 to 90 (APH) | -0.2243*** (0.0840) | -0.0179 (0.0769) | -0.0576 (0.0673) | -0.2342** (0.0934) | 0.0480 (0.0798) | -0.0009 (0.0661) |
| 90 to 95 (APH) | -0.3316*** (0.0850) | -0.1041 (0.0771) | -0.1379** (0.0683) | -0.2989** (0.1187) | 0.0168 (0.1108) | -0.0230 (0.0940) |
| 95 to 99 (APH) | -0.4056*** (0.0796) | -0.1822** (0.0711) | -0.1946*** (0.0634) | -0.3399*** (0.0939) | -0.0422 (0.0799) | -0.1497* (0.0847) |
| 99 to 100 (APH) | -0.4612*** (0.0806) | -0.3339*** (0.0730) | -0.2455*** (0.0632) | -0.2686 (0.1830) | -0.0523 (0.1623) | -0.1420 (0.1333) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (APH) | 0.0013 (0.0017) | 0.0179*** (0.0022) | 0.0022 (0.0025) | -0.0029* (0.0016) | 0.0221*** (0.0026) | 0.0096*** (0.0026) |
| Z-score (APH) | 0.0392** (0.0163) | 0.2167*** (0.0264) | 0.0910*** (0.0262) | -0.0203 (0.0162) | 0.3327*** (0.0336) | 0.2457*** (0.0299) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals

Figure 152: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 153

Figure 153: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 50 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 154: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 155.

Figure 155: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the municipal unemployment rate. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 156: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



See Figure 155.

Figure 157: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share without diploma is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 16 with no diploma or a diploma of lower secondary education in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 113: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of single households (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (SingleHH) | 0.1479** (0.0624) | 0.3570*** (0.0585) | 0.0606 (0.0568) | -0.1074** (0.0511) | 0.0717 (0.0533) | 0.0389 (0.0561) |
| 10 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.0809 (0.0645) | 0.2338*** (0.0603) | 0.0400 (0.0584) | -0.0888 (0.0541) | 0.0499 (0.0549) | 0.0283 (0.0543) |
| 20 to 30 (SingleHH) | 0.0477 (0.0669) | 0.1532** (0.0624) | 0.0391 (0.0583) | -0.1063* (0.0560) | 0.0115 (0.0559) | -0.0244 (0.0539) |
| 30 to 40(SingleHH) | 0.0397 (0.0677) | 0.1216* (0.0632) | 0.0583 (0.0556) | -0.0494 (0.0593) | 0.0353 (0.0589) | 0.0527 (0.0511) |
| 40 to 50 (SingleHH) | 0.1281* (0.0741) | 0.1619** (0.0714) | 0.0990* (0.0559) | -0.0067 (0.0597) | 0.0516 (0.0578) | 0.0271 (0.0485) |
| 60 to 70 (SingleHH) | 0.1111 (0.0819) | 0.0482 (0.0827) | 0.0284 (0.0665) | -0.0326 (0.0755) | -0.0820 (0.0726) | -0.0431 (0.0555) |
| 70 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.0851 (0.0912) | -0.0654 (0.0916) | -0.0688 (0.0697) | 0.0310 (0.0780) | -0.1587* (0.0901) | -0.0964 (0.0639) |
| 80 to 90 (SingleHH) | 0.0228 (0.1019) | -0.3309*** (0.1217) | -0.2479*** (0.0856) | 0.1179 (0.1063) | -0.2677** (0.1294) | -0.0984 (0.0803) |
| 90 to 95 (SingleHH) | 0.5492*** (0.1646) | -0.2174 (0.2216) | -0.3630*** (0.1272) | 0.6335*** (0.1733) | -0.1855 (0.2378) | -0.3978*** (0.1173) |
| 95 to 99 (SingleHH) | 0.7907*** (0.1825) | -0.0919 (0.2708) | 0.0929 (0.1771) | 0.6672*** (0.1532) | -0.2925 (0.2258) | -0.4442*** (0.1466) |
| 99 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.3287** (0.1294) | -0.6006** (0.2362) | -0.2761 (0.3330) | 0.7774*** (0.1809) | -0.2301 (0.2598) | -0.2117 (0.1834) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (SingleHH) | 0.0051** (0.0022) | -0.0095*** (0.0022) | -0.0007 (0.0029) | 0.1807*** (0.0255) | -0.0944** (0.0423) | 0.0359 (0.0385) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.0952*** (0.0285) | -0.1788*** (0.0359) | -0.1276*** (0.0347) | 0.1816*** (0.0256) | -0.0953** (0.0421) | -0.0054 (0.0344) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 114: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (MUH) | 0.6258*** (0.1043) | -0.0437 (0.1679) | -0.3583** (0.1679) | 0.8326*** (0.0949) | 0.3126* (0.1841) | 0.2406 (0.1787) |
| 10 to 20 (MUH) | 0.1652* (0.0981) | -0.0895 (0.1191) | -0.2037** (0.0937) | 0.3028*** (0.0897) | 0.0868 (0.1306) | 0.0180 (0.0763) |
| 20 to 30 (MUH) | -0.0473 (0.0873) | -0.1876** (0.0908) | -0.0790 (0.0775) | 0.1062 (0.0925) | 0.0120 (0.1020) | 0.0419 (0.0603) |
| 30 to 40 (MUH) | 0.0686 (0.0701) | -0.0088 (0.0694) | -0.0096 (0.0554) | 0.0580 (0.0727) | 0.0271 (0.0735) | 0.0034 (0.0545) |
| 40 to 50 (MUH) | 0.0171 (0.0625) | -0.0140 (0.0604) | 0.0109 (0.0495) | 0.1042* (0.0563) | 0.0939* (0.0568) | 0.0370 (0.0440) |
| 60 to 70 (MUH) | 0.0010 (0.0537) | 0.0109 (0.0533) | 0.0112 (0.0447) | 0.0107 (0.0540) | 0.0135 (0.0546) | 0.0054 (0.0426) |
| 70 to 80 (MUH) | 0.0885* (0.0476) | 0.1132** (0.0468) | 0.0294 (0.0400) | 0.0238 (0.0501) | 0.0259 (0.0501) | 0.0139 (0.0402) |
| 80 to 90 (MUH) | 0.0819* (0.0465) | 0.1182*** (0.0457) | 0.0384 (0.0404) | -0.0743 (0.0489) | -0.0708 (0.0486) | -0.0295 (0.0376) |
| 90 to 95 (MUH) | 0.0232 (0.0536) | 0.0765 (0.0532) | -0.0381 (0.0472) | -0.1567*** (0.0527) | -0.1493*** (0.0522) | -0.0799* (0.0426) |
| 95 to 99 (MUH) | -0.0097 (0.0515) | 0.0294 (0.0505) | -0.0349 (0.0452) | -0.1956*** (0.0530) | -0.1903*** (0.0537) | -0.0941** (0.0431) |
| 99 to 100 (MUH) | 0.0955 (0.0636) | 0.0471 (0.0655) | 0.0278 (0.0588) | -0.1380 (0.0863) | -0.1618* (0.0860) | -0.0774 (0.0741) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (MUH) | -0.0064*** (0.0021) | 0.0013 (0.0017) | 0.0055*** (0.0016) | -0.0175*** (0.0020) | -0.0136*** (0.0019) | -0.0131*** (0.0018) |
| Z-score (MUH) | -0.1450*** (0.0272) | -0.0245 (0.0314) | 0.0476* (0.0271) | -0.2499*** (0.0222) | -0.1746*** (0.0313) | -0.2391*** (0.0250) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 115: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (APH) | 0.6594*** (0.1152) | -0.0433 (0.2222) | -0.1143 (0.1198) | 0.7194*** (0.0925) | -0.0490 (0.1518) | -0.0524 (0.1027) |
| 10 to 20 (APH) | 0.0724 (0.0997) | -0.1915 (0.1184) | -0.1451* (0.0869) | 0.1095 (0.1168) | -0.2488* (0.1355) | -0.0613 (0.0806) |
| 20 to 30 (APH) | 0.0720 (0.0883) | -0.0545 (0.0944) | 0.0881 (0.0742) | 0.0447 (0.0782) | -0.1308 (0.0914) | 0.0227 (0.0647) |
| 30 to 40 (APH) | 0.0343 (0.0754) | -0.0223 (0.0769) | 0.0082 (0.0611) | 0.0447 (0.0710) | -0.0071 (0.0711) | 0.0645 (0.0549) |
| 40 to 50 (APH) | 0.1539** (0.0721) | 0.1297* (0.0706) | 0.1260** (0.0558) | -0.0098 (0.0584) | -0.0220 (0.0576) | 0.0086 (0.0463) |
| 60 to 70 (APH) | 0.1220** (0.0606) | 0.1448** (0.0599) | 0.0628 (0.0511) | -0.0208 (0.0553) | 0.0018 (0.0551) | -0.0131 (0.0451) |
| 70 to 80 (APH) | 0.0710 (0.0589) | 0.1082* (0.0575) | 0.0118 (0.0496) | -0.0087 (0.0548) | 0.0292 (0.0547) | -0.0008 (0.0447) |
| 80 to 90 (APH) | 0.0949* (0.0575) | 0.1496*** (0.0560) | -0.0127 (0.0524) | -0.0730 (0.0508) | -0.0225 (0.0509) | -0.0463 (0.0440) |
| 90 to 95 (APH) | 0.0479 (0.0588) | 0.1110* (0.0573) | -0.0746 (0.0526) | -0.1962*** (0.0593) | -0.1402** (0.0616) | -0.0885 (0.0557) |
| 95 to 99 (APH) | 0.0727 (0.0616) | 0.1327** (0.0590) | -0.0823 (0.0529) | -0.2242*** (0.0667) | -0.1670** (0.0685) | -0.1243** (0.0554) |
| 99 to 100 (APH) | -0.0386 (0.0595) | -0.0217 (0.0583) | -0.1267** (0.0543) | -0.2977*** (0.1123) | -0.2773** (0.1129) | -0.2306** (0.1008) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (APH) | -0.0072*** (0.0023) | 0.0013 (0.0020) | -0.0041* (0.0024) | -0.0156*** (0.0021) | -0.0084*** (0.0022) | -0.0135*** (0.0022) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.1072*** (0.0263) | 0.0653*** (0.0250) | -0.0007 (0.0237) | -0.2008*** (0.0235) | -0.0412 (0.0295) | -0.1471*** (0.0246) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 158: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 159.

Figure 159: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share without diploma is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 16 with no diploma or a diploma of lower secondary education in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 160: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 161.

Figure 161: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Aged 35 to 50 is the share of residents aged 35 to 50. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 162: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 163.

Figure 163: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 116: Regression of the share of vote for the centre-right on the share of single households (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (SingleHH) | 0.0671 (0.0548) | -0.5202*** (0.0486) | -0.1439*** (0.0445) | 0.2286*** (0.0536) | -0.4470*** (0.0504) | -0.2225*** (0.0490) |
| 10 to 20 (SingleHH) | -0.0442 (0.0575) | -0.5116*** (0.0514) | -0.1584*** (0.0433) | 0.1518*** (0.0555) | -0.3751*** (0.0507) | -0.1411*** (0.0472) |
| 20 to 30 (SingleHH) | -0.0674 (0.0621) | -0.4005*** (0.0550) | -0.1298*** (0.0433) | 0.0349 (0.0588) | -0.3797*** (0.0543) | -0.1553*** (0.0480) |
| 30 to 40(SingleHH) | -0.1714*** (0.0638) | -0.4204*** (0.0566) | -0.1642*** (0.0420) | 0.0021 (0.0636) | -0.2748*** (0.0591) | -0.1624*** (0.0440) |
| 40 to 50 (SingleHH) | -0.1744*** (0.0672) | -0.2750*** (0.0585) | -0.1534*** (0.0414) | -0.0375 (0.0648) | -0.1996*** (0.0591) | -0.0875** (0.0445) |
| 60 to 70 (SingleHH) | -0.0496 (0.0775) | 0.1142* (0.0686) | 0.0322 (0.0512) | 0.0910 (0.0861) | 0.2262*** (0.0758) | 0.0920* (0.0521) |
| 70 to 80 (SingleHH) | 0.0905 (0.0844) | 0.4406*** (0.0763) | 0.1617*** (0.0534) | 0.0973 (0.1005) | 0.5164*** (0.0839) | 0.3419*** (0.0577) |
| 80 to 90 (SingleHH) | 0.0788 (0.0844) | 0.7520*** (0.0965) | 0.3914*** (0.0672) | 0.1786* (0.1013) | 0.9001*** (0.1246) | 0.4804*** (0.0732) |
| 90 to 95 (SingleHH) | 0.1816 (0.1363) | 1.2099*** (0.2138) | 0.6157*** (0.1057) | -0.0152 (0.1922) | 1.2142*** (0.2656) | 0.7457*** (0.1036) |
| 95 to 99 (SingleHH) | -0.1323 (0.2027) | 0.9945*** (0.3058) | 0.3711*** (0.1339) | 0.0326 (0.1963) | 1.4191*** (0.2781) | 0.8276*** (0.1340) |
| 99 to 100 (SingleHH) | 0.6526*** (0.1841) | 1.8172*** (0.2744) | 0.4644* (0.2629) | -0.0135 (0.2224) | 1.4197*** (0.3084) | 0.6192*** (0.1627) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (SingleHH) | 0.0033* (0.0018) | 0.0370*** (0.0020) | 0.0106*** (0.0022) | -0.0031 (0.0019) | 0.0318*** (0.0022) | 0.0215*** (0.0025) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | 0.0505** (0.0250) | 0.5373*** (0.0361) | 0.2481*** (0.0242) | -0.0193 (0.0262) | 0.5694*** (0.0461) | 0.4108*** (0.0305) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 117: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (MUH) | 0.0032 (0.1047) | 1.0367*** (0.1802) | 0.3492*** (0.1251) | -0.1849* (0.1116) | 0.6835*** (0.2415) | -0.1278 (0.1402) |
| 10 to 20 (MUH) | -0.0142 (0.0970) | 0.6704*** (0.1236) | 0.2400*** (0.0682) | 0.0320 (0.1100) | 0.6643*** (0.1614) | 0.1752** (0.0690) |
| 20 to 30 (MUH) | -0.0335 (0.0826) | 0.4708*** (0.0822) | 0.1973*** (0.0591) | 0.0813 (0.1073) | 0.4899*** (0.1055) | 0.1726*** (0.0535) |
| 30 to 40 (MUH) | -0.0189 (0.0664) | 0.2751*** (0.0652) | 0.1290*** (0.0452) | 0.1922*** (0.0728) | 0.3984*** (0.0735) | 0.2028*** (0.0497) |
| 40 to 50 (MUH) | 0.0463 (0.0632) | 0.1822*** (0.0568) | 0.0822** (0.0385) | 0.0437 (0.0573) | 0.1068* (0.0555) | 0.0248 (0.0408) |
| 60 to 70 (MUH) | -0.0981* (0.0551) | -0.1431*** (0.0511) | -0.0678** (0.0343) | -0.0090 (0.0550) | -0.0939* (0.0533) | -0.0936*** (0.0358) |
| 70 to 80 (MUH) | -0.1204** (0.0493) | -0.2422*** (0.0457) | -0.1056*** (0.0313) | -0.0502 (0.0497) | -0.1917*** (0.0480) | -0.1445*** (0.0335) |
| 80 to 90 (MUH) | -0.1801*** (0.0481) | -0.3507*** (0.0452) | -0.1255*** (0.0324) | 0.1373*** (0.0485) | -0.0905* (0.0479) | -0.0895*** (0.0336) |
| 90 to 95 (MUH) | -0.1164** (0.0551) | -0.3538*** (0.0529) | -0.1172*** (0.0391) | 0.1626*** (0.0526) | -0.1160** (0.0517) | -0.0823** (0.0413) |
| 95 to 99 (MUH) | 0.0319 (0.0523) | -0.1496*** (0.0502) | -0.0696* (0.0390) | 0.3265*** (0.0514) | 0.0380 (0.0507) | -0.0682* (0.0392) |
| 99 to 100 (MUH) | 0.0487 (0.0648) | 0.1550** (0.0662) | -0.1866*** (0.0544) | 0.3283*** (0.0892) | 0.2675*** (0.0856) | -0.1152* (0.0679) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (MUH) | -0.0038** (0.0017) | -0.0242*** (0.0017) | -0.0140*** (0.0013) | 0.0050** (0.0020) | -0.0155*** (0.0020) | -0.0134*** (0.0016) |
| Z-score (MUH) | -0.0266 (0.0261) | -0.3481*** (0.0341) | -0.1941*** (0.0213) | 0.0741*** (0.0266) | -0.2470*** (0.0380) | -0.1566*** (0.0206) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 118: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (APH) | 0.1699 (0.1140) | 1.2467*** (0.2105) | 0.5090*** (0.0907) | 0.0001 (0.1049) | 1.1519*** (0.1620) | 0.6524*** (0.0885) |
| 10 to 20 (APH) | 0.3181*** (0.0745) | 0.9942*** (0.0896) | 0.4872*** (0.0638) | 0.2452** (0.1207) | 0.9594*** (0.1399) | 0.5405*** (0.0668) |
| 20 to 30 (APH) | 0.1424* (0.0824) | 0.5701*** (0.0687) | 0.2467*** (0.0549) | 0.1845* (0.0988) | 0.6405*** (0.0772) | 0.3799*** (0.0513) |
| 30 to 40 (APH) | 0.1397* (0.0772) | 0.3507*** (0.0673) | 0.1036** (0.0466) | 0.1822** (0.0841) | 0.3645*** (0.0735) | 0.1025** (0.0442) |
| 40 to 50 (APH) | 0.0410 (0.0614) | 0.1393*** (0.0528) | 0.0441 (0.0403) | 0.1653** (0.0673) | 0.2242*** (0.0592) | 0.0993** (0.0392) |
| 60 to 70 (APH) | -0.0368 (0.0552) | -0.1287*** (0.0495) | -0.0027 (0.0379) | 0.0519 (0.0613) | -0.0512 (0.0533) | 0.0159 (0.0361) |
| 70 to 80 (APH) | -0.0006 (0.0542) | -0.1682*** (0.0482) | -0.0021 (0.0361) | 0.0611 (0.0596) | -0.1182** (0.0522) | -0.0185 (0.0385) |
| 80 to 90 (APH) | 0.0462 (0.0506) | -0.1994*** (0.0463) | 0.0267 (0.0374) | 0.1108** (0.0544) | -0.1650*** (0.0464) | -0.0046 (0.0347) |
| 90 to 95 (APH) | 0.1350** (0.0542) | -0.1439*** (0.0499) | 0.1019** (0.0444) | 0.2429*** (0.0630) | -0.0691 (0.0542) | 0.0467 (0.0429) |
| 95 to 99 (APH) | 0.2282*** (0.0510) | -0.0452 (0.0464) | 0.1901*** (0.0416) | 0.2586*** (0.0640) | -0.0471 (0.0526) | 0.1303*** (0.0440) |
| 99 to 100 (APH) | 0.4205*** (0.0558) | 0.2770*** (0.0511) | 0.2840*** (0.0472) | 0.3425*** (0.0969) | 0.1306 (0.0844) | 0.2358*** (0.0589) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (APH) | -0.0036** (0.0018) | -0.0258*** (0.0018) | -0.0043** (0.0018) | 0.0005 (0.0020) | -0.0232*** (0.0020) | -0.0076*** (0.0018) |
| Z-score (APH) | -0.0393* (0.0219) | -0.3316*** (0.0251) | -0.0892*** (0.0176) | 0.0152 (0.0231) | -0.3418*** (0.0293) | -0.1503*** (0.0182) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 164: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 165.

Figure 165: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 166: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 167.

Figure 167: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of *cadres* is the share of the labour force classified as *cadres* in the PCS occupational classification. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 168: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 169.

Figure 169: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 119: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of single households (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (SingleHH) | 0.0364 (0.0462) | 0.2763*** (0.0481) | 0.0637 (0.0393) | 0.2452*** (0.0496) | 0.6311*** (0.0528) | 0.2676*** (0.0420) |
| 10 to 20 (SingleHH) | 0.1527*** (0.0499) | 0.3384*** (0.0502) | 0.0893** (0.0394) | 0.2609*** (0.0545) | 0.5313*** (0.0575) | 0.1954*** (0.0414) |
| 20 to 30 (SingleHH) | 0.1432*** (0.0550) | 0.2713*** (0.0557) | 0.0508 (0.0394) | 0.2971*** (0.0583) | 0.4726*** (0.0596) | 0.1840*** (0.0397) |
| 30 to 40(SingleHH) | 0.2450*** (0.0599) | 0.3387*** (0.0586) | 0.1381*** (0.0389) | 0.2391*** (0.0621) | 0.3373*** (0.0625) | 0.1345*** (0.0373) |
| 40 to 50 (SingleHH) | 0.0731 (0.0558) | 0.1105** (0.0563) | 0.0552 (0.0366) | 0.1332** (0.0617) | 0.1754*** (0.0613) | 0.0478 (0.0349) |
| 60 to 70 (SingleHH) | -0.0442 (0.0708) | -0.0982 (0.0703) | 0.0185 (0.0432) | -0.0637 (0.0787) | -0.0987 (0.0792) | -0.0136 (0.0388) |
| 70 to 80 (SingleHH) | -0.1922*** (0.0680) | -0.2942*** (0.0704) | -0.0565 (0.0455) | -0.1292 (0.1451) | -0.1986* (0.1144) | -0.2076*** (0.0447) |
| 80 to 90 (SingleHH) | 0.0040 (0.1649) | -0.1305 (0.1414) | -0.0474 (0.0509) | -0.2933*** (0.1073) | -0.3808*** (0.1360) | -0.2146*** (0.0495) |
| 90 to 95 (SingleHH) | -0.6997*** (0.0908) | -0.7266*** (0.1246) | -0.0690 (0.0698) | -0.8357*** (0.0891) | -0.9559*** (0.1383) | -0.1515** (0.0658) |
| 95 to 99 (SingleHH) | -0.6204*** (0.0849) | -0.6177*** (0.1260) | 0.0742 (0.0943) | -1.0171*** (0.0862) | -1.1424*** (0.1484) | -0.2265*** (0.0868) |
| 99 to 100 (SingleHH) | -0.9189*** (0.1098) | -0.9022*** (0.1476) | 0.1041 (0.1210) | -1.1475*** (0.1394) | -1.2742*** (0.1866) | -0.2384** (0.1120) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (SingleHH) | -0.0154*** (0.0025) | -0.0267*** (0.0023) | -0.0139*** (0.0017) | -0.0256*** (0.0022) | -0.0394*** (0.0020) | -0.0484*** (0.0026) |
| Z-score (SingleHH) | -0.2021*** (0.0253) | -0.3132*** (0.0348) | -0.0388* (0.0225) | -0.3318*** (0.0210) | -0.4994*** (0.0293) | -0.4215*** (0.0331) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 120: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control married | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control married | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (MUH) | -0.7159*** (0.0663) | -1.0787*** (0.1469) | -0.1997* (0.1042) | -1.1450*** (0.0801) | -1.5419*** (0.1541) | -0.2665*** (0.1020) |
| 10 to 20 (MUH) | -0.3246*** (0.0729) | -0.6794*** (0.1192) | -0.1100* (0.0653) | -0.7620*** (0.0812) | -1.1146*** (0.1223) | -0.3120*** (0.0598) |
| 20 to 30 (MUH) | 0.0208 (0.1525) | -0.2419** (0.1008) | -0.1299** (0.0546) | -0.3696** (0.1546) | -0.6090*** (0.1084) | -0.2818*** (0.0502) |
| 30 to 40 (MUH) | -0.0483 (0.0730) | -0.1768** (0.0692) | -0.0373 (0.0483) | -0.3620*** (0.0759) | -0.4845*** (0.0741) | -0.2053*** (0.0451) |
| 40 to 50 (MUH) | -0.0025 (0.0613) | -0.0577 (0.0567) | -0.0215 (0.0352) | -0.2355*** (0.0637) | -0.2730*** (0.0624) | -0.1187*** (0.0390) |
| 60 to 70 (MUH) | 0.1465** (0.0580) | 0.1665*** (0.0570) | 0.0654* (0.0378) | 0.0402 (0.0683) | 0.0963 (0.0647) | 0.0841** (0.0395) |
| 70 to 80 (MUH) | 0.0466 (0.0434) | 0.0996** (0.0423) | 0.0445 (0.0280) | 0.0660 (0.0622) | 0.1666*** (0.0589) | 0.1275*** (0.0376) |
| 80 to 90 (MUH) | 0.1473*** (0.0439) | 0.2213*** (0.0431) | 0.0710** (0.0307) | 0.0759 (0.0601) | 0.2453*** (0.0551) | 0.1667*** (0.0349) |
| 90 to 95 (MUH) | 0.0897* (0.0497) | 0.1958*** (0.0493) | 0.0719** (0.0350) | 0.1101 (0.0677) | 0.3258*** (0.0637) | 0.1873*** (0.0432) |
| 95 to 99 (MUH) | 0.1247** (0.0494) | 0.2047*** (0.0487) | 0.1137*** (0.0364) | 0.0226 (0.0632) | 0.2530*** (0.0596) | 0.2312*** (0.0405) |
| 99 to 100 (MUH) | -0.0839 (0.0581) | -0.1353** (0.0601) | 0.1720*** (0.0462) | -0.2224*** (0.0801) | -0.1536* (0.0791) | 0.2161*** (0.0495) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (MUH) | 0.0152*** (0.0022) | 0.0208*** (0.0018) | 0.0078*** (0.0014) | 0.0294*** (0.0022) | 0.0405*** (0.0019) | 0.0398*** (0.0019) |
| Z-score (MUH) | 0.2262*** (0.0179) | 0.3404*** (0.0218) | 0.1133*** (0.0181) | 0.3713*** (0.0178) | 0.5443*** (0.0240) | 0.5214*** (0.0232) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 121: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 | | | 2012 | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control married | All controls | No control | Control married | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (APH) | -0.8003*** (0.0666) | -0.9107*** (0.1345) | -0.1363* (0.0746) | -0.9953*** (0.0734) | -0.8369*** (0.1528) | -0.4146*** (0.0653) |
| 10 to 20 (APH) | -0.2837** (0.1247) | -0.4537*** (0.1385) | -0.1403** (0.0562) | -0.4197*** (0.1119) | -0.3952*** (0.1381) | -0.3316*** (0.0526) |
| 20 to 30 (APH) | -0.0645 (0.1340) | -0.1881* (0.1057) | -0.1281*** (0.0492) | -0.2542* (0.1487) | -0.2785** (0.1234) | -0.3187*** (0.0455) |
| 30 to 40 (APH) | -0.1450** (0.0694) | -0.2059*** (0.0695) | 0.0063 (0.0433) | -0.1953** (0.0787) | -0.2240*** (0.0788) | -0.0882** (0.0395) |
| 40 to 50 (APH) | -0.1306** (0.0530) | -0.1609*** (0.0535) | -0.0728** (0.0346) | -0.1271** (0.0646) | -0.1428** (0.0644) | -0.1045*** (0.0307) |
| 60 to 70 (APH) | -0.0078 (0.0581) | 0.0223 (0.0569) | -0.0023 (0.0388) | 0.0753 (0.0653) | 0.1098* (0.0648) | 0.0003 (0.0347) |
| 70 to 80 (APH) | 0.0077 (0.0540) | 0.0674 (0.0530) | 0.0096 (0.0379) | 0.1010 (0.0623) | 0.1706*** (0.0616) | 0.0619* (0.0344) |
| 80 to 90 (APH) | 0.0301 (0.0489) | 0.1208** (0.0476) | 0.0403 (0.0370) | 0.1596*** (0.0563) | 0.2874*** (0.0550) | 0.0846*** (0.0322) |
| 90 to 95 (APH) | 0.0761 (0.0603) | 0.1857*** (0.0594) | 0.1016** (0.0501) | 0.1866*** (0.0629) | 0.3366*** (0.0633) | 0.0829** (0.0378) |
| 95 to 99 (APH) | -0.0335 (0.0511) | 0.0762 (0.0498) | 0.0308 (0.0407) | 0.2462*** (0.0674) | 0.4014*** (0.0727) | 0.1201*** (0.0444) |
| 99 to 100 (APH) | -0.1188** (0.0527) | -0.0501 (0.0525) | 0.0007 (0.0476) | 0.1392* (0.0777) | 0.2677*** (0.0847) | 0.0929 (0.0611) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (APH) | 0.0156*** (0.0025) | 0.0208*** (0.0020) | 0.0110*** (0.0014) | 0.0275*** (0.0022) | 0.0330*** (0.0021) | 0.0259*** (0.0025) |
| Z-score (APH) | 0.1868*** (0.0242) | 0.2060*** (0.0249) | 0.0466*** (0.0157) | 0.3201*** (0.0199) | 0.3448*** (0.0239) | 0.2587*** (0.0238) |
| N | 35718 | 35718 | 35559 | 35758 | 35758 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 170: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 171.

Figure 171: Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. SingleHH is the share of households made up of one person in the total number of households of the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals

Figure 172: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 173.

Figure 173: Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. MUH is the average number of marital units (married women, divorced men and women, widowed men and women) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals

Figure 174: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 175.

Figure 175: Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. APH is the average number of adults aged more than 20 (using the assumption that 75% of the population counted separately is older than 20) per household in the municipality. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. The share without diploma is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 16 with no diploma or a diploma of lower secondary education in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged more than 65, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals

A.10.2 Marriage, income and education

Table 122, Table 123, Table 124 present results for the regression of the share of vote for the **left** on the share of married individuals, the average income per adult and on the share of university graduates for the 2002 and 2012 legislative elections. Figure 176, Figure 177, Figure 178, Figure 179, Figure 180 and Figure 181 are the corresponding graphs.

Table 125, Table 126, Table 127, Figure 182, Figure 183, Figure 184, Figure 185, Figure 186 and Figure 187 present results for the **extreme-left**.

Table 128, Table 129, Table 130, Figure 188, Figure 189, Figure 190, Figure 191, Figure 192 and Figure 193 present results for the **centre-left**.

Table 131, Table 132, Table 133, Figure 194, Figure 195, Figure 196, Figure 197, Figure 198 and Figure 199 present results for the **centre-right**.

Table 135, Table 136, Figure 202, Figure 203, Figure 204 and Figure 205 present results for the **extreme-right**.

Table 122: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control unempl. | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control unempl. | 2012 All controls |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (Married) | 0.5126*** (0.0980) | 0.3136*** (0.1004) | 0.2101* (0.1073) | 0.7634*** (0.0941) | 0.5968*** (0.0929) | 0.3102*** (0.1078) |
| 10 to 20 (Married) | 0.1488 (0.1048) | -0.0346 (0.1030) | 0.0426 (0.0644) | 0.4372*** (0.0952) | 0.2673*** (0.0931) | 0.2403*** (0.0643) |
| 20 to 30 (Married) | 0.2003** (0.0926) | 0.0397 (0.0913) | 0.0207 (0.0573) | 0.1457 (0.0994) | 0.0407 (0.0971) | 0.0673 (0.0565) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | 0.1705** (0.0691) | 0.0659 (0.0668) | 0.0625 (0.0461) | 0.1658* (0.0860) | 0.0955 (0.0794) | 0.1256*** (0.0474) |
| 40 to 50 (Married) | 0.0840 (0.0675) | 0.0374 (0.0643) | 0.0634 (0.0427) | -0.0023 (0.0681) | -0.0425 (0.0666) | 0.0240 (0.0424) |
| 60 to 70 (Married) | -0.0132 (0.0471) | 0.0301 (0.0475) | -0.0274 (0.0340) | -0.1398*** (0.0452) | -0.1159** (0.0456) | -0.1056*** (0.0328) |
| 70 to 80 (Married) | -0.0926** (0.0455) | 0.0050 (0.0447) | -0.1035*** (0.0323) | -0.2014*** (0.0405) | -0.1548*** (0.0406) | -0.1626*** (0.0321) |
| 80 to 90 (Married) | -0.0959** (0.0427) | 0.0592 (0.0427) | -0.0929*** (0.0319) | -0.2033*** (0.0403) | -0.1377*** (0.0402) | -0.1693*** (0.0318) |
| 90 to 95 (Married) | -0.2045*** (0.0456) | 0.0103 (0.0453) | -0.1853*** (0.0353) | -0.2994*** (0.0429) | -0.2196*** (0.0430) | -0.2363*** (0.0343) |
| 95 to 99 (Married) | -0.2858*** (0.0441) | -0.0312 (0.0441) | -0.2199*** (0.0370) | -0.3321*** (0.0453) | -0.2417*** (0.0450) | -0.2120*** (0.0363) |
| 99 to 100 (Married) | -0.3707*** (0.0575) | -0.0763 (0.0577) | -0.2492*** (0.0465) | -0.4832*** (0.0536) | -0.3948*** (0.0541) | -0.2884*** (0.0448) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Married) | -0.0171*** (0.0018) | -0.0031* (0.0019) | -0.0111*** (0.0013) | -0.0254*** (0.0019) | -0.0162*** (0.0019) | -0.0212*** (0.0017) |
| Z-score (Married) | -0.1993*** (0.0211) | -0.0954*** (0.0254) | -0.0501** (0.0171) | -0.3105*** (0.0211) | -0.2394*** (0.0254) | -0.2073*** (0.0220) |
| N | 35718 | 35664 | 35559 | 35758 | 35691 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unempl. is the unemployment rate in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 123: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on average income per adult (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 | | | 2012 | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control education | All controls | No control | Control education | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Income) | 0.0157 (0.0824) | 0.1267 (0.0881) | 0.5351*** (0.0594) | 0.2226*** (0.0822) | 0.4801*** (0.0695) | 0.7019*** (0.0550) |
| 10 to 20 (Income) | 0.0635 (0.0869) | 0.1523* (0.0921) | 0.3500*** (0.0573) | 0.1102 (0.0837) | 0.2698*** (0.0668) | 0.4143*** (0.0521) |
| 20 to 30 (Income) | 0.1213 (0.0895) | 0.1664* (0.0955) | 0.2352*** (0.0584) | 0.0999 (0.0873) | 0.1604** (0.0689) | 0.3016*** (0.0530) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | 0.0180 (0.1001) | 0.0243 (0.1104) | 0.1406** (0.0556) | 0.0865 (0.0996) | 0.1121 (0.0939) | 0.2520*** (0.0494) |
| 40 to 50 (Income) | 0.1386 (0.0991) | 0.1290 (0.1017) | 0.1307** (0.0542) | 0.0209 (0.1047) | 0.0396 (0.0747) | 0.0956** (0.0467) |
| 60 to 70 (Income) | -0.0235 (0.1012) | -0.0141 (0.1065) | -0.0771 (0.0528) | -0.2085** (0.1006) | -0.2243** (0.0933) | -0.1218*** (0.0447) |
| 70 to 80 (Income) | -0.1586* (0.0876) | -0.1860* (0.1005) | -0.2824*** (0.0504) | -0.1158 (0.1090) | -0.2792*** (0.0812) | -0.3530*** (0.0461) |
| 80 to 90 (Income) | -0.2121** (0.0856) | -0.2948*** (0.1067) | -0.5195*** (0.0554) | -0.2504*** (0.0885) | -0.4824*** (0.0734) | -0.5123*** (0.0467) |
| 90 to 95 (Income) | -0.1704 (0.1777) | -0.5231*** (0.1333) | -0.8252*** (0.0783) | -0.3354*** (0.1261) | -0.8947*** (0.0962) | -0.8772*** (0.0696) |
| 95 to 99 (Income) | -0.7619*** (0.1073) | -1.2991*** (0.1588) | -1.3272*** (0.0986) | -0.8298*** (0.1024) | -1.7076*** (0.1269) | -1.4529*** (0.0866) |
| 99 to 100 (Income) | -1.5016*** (0.3303) | -2.2763*** (0.3401) | -2.0767*** (0.1811) | -1.9200*** (0.1990) | -2.9032*** (0.2074) | -2.3319*** (0.1672) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Income) | -0.0153*** (0.0022) | -0.0217*** (0.0023) | -0.0377*** (0.0026) | -0.0235*** (0.0021) | -0.0400*** (0.0023) | -0.0477*** (0.0032) |
| Z-score (Income) | -0.2053*** (0.0233) | -0.3260*** (0.0268) | -0.5542*** (0.0297) | -0.2787*** (0.0205) | -0.5265*** (0.0244) | -0.6164*** (0.0283) |
| N | 35591 | 35569 | 35559 | 35664 | 35619 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2) in the municipality. All control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 124: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 | 2002 | 2002 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | No control | Control income | All controls | No control | Control income | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Education) | 0.0482 (0.0521) | -0.1008* (0.0550) | 0.1838*** (0.0476) | -0.0813 (0.0516) | -0.4525*** (0.0556) | -0.0384 (0.0434) |
| 10 to 20 (Education) | 0.1044* (0.0571) | -0.0237 (0.0585) | 0.1663*** (0.0488) | -0.0741 (0.0533) | -0.3433*** (0.0533) | -0.0790* (0.0422) |
| 20 to 30 (Education) | 0.1127** (0.0528) | 0.0063 (0.0535) | 0.1432*** (0.0464) | 0.0074 (0.0548) | -0.1973*** (0.0531) | -0.0461 (0.0432) |
| 30 to 40 (Education) | 0.0755 (0.0554) | 0.0047 (0.0550) | 0.0741 (0.0462) | -0.0101 (0.0561) | -0.1348*** (0.0520) | -0.0787** (0.0393) |
| 40 to 50 (Education) | 0.1421** (0.0587) | 0.0911 (0.0584) | 0.0873* (0.0453) | 0.0483 (0.0645) | -0.0378 (0.0607) | -0.0055 (0.0448) |
| 60 to 70 (Education) | 0.0057 (0.0726) | 0.0470 (0.0757) | 0.0226 (0.0492) | -0.0573 (0.0782) | 0.0164 (0.0777) | 0.0017 (0.0454) |
| 70 to 80 (Education) | 0.1019 (0.0857) | 0.1689* (0.0922) | 0.1165** (0.0560) | 0.0975 (0.0951) | 0.1871* (0.1043) | 0.0684 (0.0522) |
| 80 to 90 (Education) | 0.1174 (0.0963) | 0.3246*** (0.1107) | 0.1899*** (0.0694) | 0.2505*** (0.0928) | 0.4958*** (0.0828) | 0.0994 (0.0624) |
| 90 to 95 (Education) | 0.0405 (0.1420) | 0.3089*** (0.1110) | 0.1007 (0.1187) | 0.2980* (0.1578) | 0.7120*** (0.1234) | 0.1081 (0.1047) |
| 95 to 99 (Education) | -0.1037 (0.2467) | 0.8581*** (0.1833) | 0.2685 (0.2006) | -0.1345 (0.2227) | 1.1203*** (0.1613) | 0.2041 (0.1435) |
| 99 to 100 (Education) | -0.9095** (0.3844) | 0.8885*** (0.3011) | 0.3724 (0.2794) | -1.0494*** (0.3583) | 1.0523*** (0.2013) | -0.2205 (0.2424) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Education) | -0.0022 (0.0021) | 0.0099*** (0.0025) | -0.0053** (0.0021) | 0.0057** (0.0022) | 0.0268*** (0.0025) | 0.0094*** (0.0025) |
| Z-score (Education) | -0.0789** (0.0379) | 0.1560*** (0.0395) | 0.0510 (0.0407) | -0.0061 (0.0409) | 0.3713*** (0.0337) | 0.0418 (0.0381) |
| N | 35718 | 35591 | 35559 | 35758 | 35664 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2) in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 176: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 177.

Figure 177: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the municipality. Aged 65 to 80 is the share of residents aged 65 to 80 years old. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 178: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 179.

Figure 179: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Employed in agriculture is the share of the labour force aged 25 to 54 employed in the agricultural sector. All control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 180: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 181.

Figure 181: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the left is 42.37% in 2002 and 49.11% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the left across municipalities is 11.51% in 2002 and 12.48% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Population density is the ratio of the total number of municipal residents over the municipal surface area. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 125: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control unempl. | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control unempl. | 2012 All controls |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (Married) | -0.2393*** (0.0681) | -0.4554*** (0.0732) | -0.1975 (0.1233) | 0.1025 (0.0754) | -0.1696** (0.0785) | 0.0708 (0.1344) |
| 10 to 20 (Married) | 0.0908 (0.1117) | -0.1826 (0.1135) | -0.1271 (0.0988) | 0.3451*** (0.1196) | 0.0353 (0.1214) | 0.1516 (0.1051) |
| 20 to 30 (Married) | 0.1085 (0.1006) | -0.1057 (0.0908) | -0.2083** (0.0820) | 0.1629* (0.0908) | -0.0331 (0.0893) | -0.0027 (0.0865) |
| 30 to 40 (Married) | 0.1470 (0.0947) | 0.0135 (0.0887) | -0.0821 (0.0718) | 0.2122** (0.0907) | 0.0744 (0.0831) | 0.0564 (0.0777) |
| 40 to 50 (Married) | 0.0994 (0.0820) | 0.0303 (0.0764) | -0.0268 (0.0696) | 0.1614** (0.0818) | 0.0939 (0.0770) | 0.0758 (0.0678) |
| 60 to 70 (Married) | -0.0548 (0.0560) | -0.0009 (0.0544) | -0.0002 (0.0477) | -0.1296** (0.0512) | -0.0894* (0.0492) | -0.0873** (0.0415) |
| 70 to 80 (Married) | -0.1613*** (0.0515) | -0.0539 (0.0490) | -0.0344 (0.0425) | -0.2243*** (0.0490) | -0.1368*** (0.0457) | -0.1124*** (0.0368) |
| 80 to 90 (Married) | -0.2079*** (0.0509) | -0.0509 (0.0483) | -0.0328 (0.0432) | -0.2659*** (0.0478) | -0.1474*** (0.0436) | -0.1395*** (0.0355) |
| 90 to 95 (Married) | -0.2640*** (0.0522) | -0.0691 (0.0492) | -0.0518 (0.0451) | -0.3310*** (0.0490) | -0.1976*** (0.0447) | -0.1850*** (0.0368) |
| 95 to 99 (Married) | -0.3108*** (0.0509) | -0.0906* (0.0470) | -0.0193 (0.0467) | -0.3920*** (0.0476) | -0.2411*** (0.0427) | -0.1996*** (0.0375) |
| 99 to 100 (Married) | -0.3443*** (0.0569) | -0.1143** (0.0538) | -0.0230 (0.0540) | -0.4488*** (0.0535) | -0.3084*** (0.0494) | -0.2336*** (0.0453) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Married) | -0.0101*** (0.0017) | 0.0051*** (0.0014) | 0.0018 (0.0014) | -0.0204*** (0.0017) | -0.0072*** (0.0014) | -0.0137*** (0.0014) |
| Z-score (Married) | -0.0547*** (0.0193) | 0.1075*** (0.0170) | 0.1582*** (0.0259) | -0.1870*** (0.0188) | -0.0453** (0.0189) | -0.0678** (0.0286) |
| N | 35718 | 35664 | 35559 | 35758 | 35691 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unempl. is the unemployment rate in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 126: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on average income per adult (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 | | | 2012 | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control education | All controls | No control | Control education | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Income) | 0.2092*** (0.0680) | 0.1176* (0.0652) | 0.2814*** (0.0717) | 0.3175*** (0.1028) | 0.3925*** (0.1034) | 0.3935*** (0.0780) |
| 10 to 20 (Income) | 0.2995*** (0.0827) | 0.2289*** (0.0844) | 0.2571*** (0.0755) | 0.1309 (0.0991) | 0.1761* (0.0971) | 0.1939** (0.0764) |
| 20 to 30 (Income) | 0.3566*** (0.1108) | 0.3128*** (0.1115) | 0.2516*** (0.0800) | 0.0755 (0.0989) | 0.0911 (0.1000) | 0.1431* (0.0747) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | 0.0871 (0.0769) | 0.0655 (0.0715) | 0.0319 (0.0646) | 0.0028 (0.0919) | 0.0129 (0.0951) | 0.0397 (0.0723) |
| 40 to 50 (Income) | 0.0156 (0.0718) | 0.0189 (0.0686) | 0.0349 (0.0645) | -0.0562 (0.0963) | -0.0548 (0.0932) | -0.0015 (0.0658) |
| 60 to 70 (Income) | 0.1496 (0.1045) | 0.1441 (0.0997) | 0.0970 (0.0795) | -0.1489 (0.1068) | -0.1493 (0.1078) | -0.1075 (0.0746) |
| 70 to 80 (Income) | -0.0851 (0.0774) | -0.0692 (0.0718) | -0.1140* (0.0627) | -0.1789* (0.0941) | -0.2295** (0.0940) | -0.2956*** (0.0691) |
| 80 to 90 (Income) | -0.1486** (0.0712) | -0.1103 (0.0679) | -0.2489*** (0.0702) | -0.3109*** (0.0870) | -0.3863*** (0.0981) | -0.4302*** (0.0699) |
| 90 to 95 (Income) | -0.2674*** (0.0646) | -0.1787*** (0.0660) | -0.5028*** (0.0839) | -0.4102*** (0.0916) | -0.6167*** (0.1077) | -0.6609*** (0.0811) |
| 95 to 99 (Income) | -0.4688*** (0.0667) | -0.3427*** (0.0761) | -0.6119*** (0.1013) | -0.6314*** (0.0860) | -0.9759*** (0.1147) | -0.9584*** (0.0893) |
| 99 to 100 (Income) | -0.7365*** (0.0752) | -0.5548*** (0.0850) | -0.9614*** (0.1863) | -0.9912*** (0.0834) | -1.3438*** (0.1201) | -1.1287*** (0.1305) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Income) | -0.0200*** (0.0017) | -0.0131*** (0.0022) | -0.0286*** (0.0033) | -0.0235*** (0.0018) | -0.0258*** (0.0019) | -0.0245*** (0.0027) |
| Z-score (Income) | -0.1938*** (0.0109) | -0.1242*** (0.0180) | -0.2676*** (0.0304) | -0.2318*** (0.0124) | -0.2840*** (0.0157) | -0.2613*** (0.0230) |
| N | 35591 | 35569 | 35559 | 35664 | 35619 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2). Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 127: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control income | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control income | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (Education) | 0.3089*** (0.0774) | 0.2090*** (0.0766) | 0.4390*** (0.0703) | 0.1707** (0.0763) | -0.1121 (0.0845) | 0.2020*** (0.0658) |
| 10 to 20 (Education) | 0.2064*** (0.0755) | 0.1151 (0.0747) | 0.2896*** (0.0643) | 0.1039 (0.0802) | -0.0902 (0.0812) | 0.1343** (0.0634) |
| 20 to 30 (Education) | 0.1964** (0.0836) | 0.1201 (0.0821) | 0.2379*** (0.0692) | 0.1757** (0.0826) | 0.0328 (0.0829) | 0.1288** (0.0640) |
| 30 to 40 (Education) | 0.1155 (0.0873) | 0.0685 (0.0845) | 0.1139* (0.0676) | 0.0735 (0.0839) | -0.0149 (0.0836) | 0.0425 (0.0639) |
| 40 to 50 (Education) | 0.1787* (0.0976) | 0.1411 (0.0948) | 0.1010 (0.0764) | 0.0248 (0.0778) | -0.0295 (0.0763) | -0.0371 (0.0654) |
| 60 to 70 (Education) | -0.0033 (0.1020) | 0.0287 (0.1004) | 0.0178 (0.0818) | -0.0285 (0.0827) | 0.0312 (0.0804) | -0.0317 (0.0531) |
| 70 to 80 (Education) | 0.0243 (0.0998) | 0.0632 (0.0975) | 0.1179 (0.0892) | -0.0068 (0.0808) | 0.0618 (0.0758) | -0.0906 (0.0609) |
| 80 to 90 (Education) | -0.1703** (0.0813) | -0.0691 (0.0809) | 0.0812 (0.0956) | 0.0397 (0.1099) | 0.2045* (0.1189) | 0.0683 (0.0928) |
| 90 to 95 (Education) | -0.2489*** (0.0908) | -0.1187 (0.0898) | 0.0600 (0.1285) | 0.0021 (0.1151) | 0.2579** (0.1078) | -0.0304 (0.1051) |
| 95 to 99 (Education) | -0.3780*** (0.0869) | -0.0497 (0.0820) | -0.1021 (0.1810) | -0.1892 (0.1280) | 0.5147*** (0.1100) | -0.0091 (0.1295) |
| 99 to 100 (Education) | -0.6871*** (0.0861) | -0.1780* (0.0960) | -0.1397 (0.2664) | -0.6646*** (0.1060) | 0.3643*** (0.1080) | -0.3364 (0.2195) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Education) | -0.0166*** (0.0016) | -0.0094*** (0.0022) | -0.0138*** (0.0032) | -0.0078*** (0.0019) | 0.0068*** (0.0021) | -0.0069** (0.0028) |
| Z-score (Education) | -0.1830*** (0.0129) | -0.0883*** (0.0200) | -0.0764** (0.0388) | -0.0960*** (0.0202) | 0.1302*** (0.0237) | -0.1042*** (0.0329) |
| N | 35718 | 35591 | 35559 | 35758 | 35664 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2) in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 182: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 183.

Figure 183: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the municipality. The share without diploma is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 16 with no diploma or a diploma of lower secondary education in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 184: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 185.

Figure 185: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Aged more than 80 is the share of residents aged more than 80 years old. Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 186: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 193.

Figure 187: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-left is 7.82% in 2002 and 8.17% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 8.08% in 2002 and 6.96% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Aged 35 to 50 is the share of residents aged 35 to 50 years old. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 128: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control unempl. | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control unempl. | 2012 All controls |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (Married) | 0.7094*** (0.0973) | 0.6601*** (0.1041) | 0.3635*** (0.1323) | 0.8058*** (0.0859) | 0.7889*** (0.0889) | 0.3090** (0.1207) |
| 10 to 20 (Married) | 0.0887 (0.1055) | 0.0976 (0.0916) | 0.1374 (0.0868) | 0.2793*** (0.0862) | 0.2825*** (0.0822) | 0.1777** (0.0774) |
| 20 to 30 (Married) | 0.1293 (0.0850) | 0.1187 (0.0825) | 0.1740** (0.0693) | 0.0626 (0.0919) | 0.0675 (0.0917) | 0.0785 (0.0664) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | 0.0702 (0.0772) | 0.0589 (0.0754) | 0.1252** (0.0604) | 0.0542 (0.0809) | 0.0616 (0.0783) | 0.1074** (0.0531) |
| 40 to 50 (Married) | 0.0148 (0.0639) | 0.0168 (0.0632) | 0.0857* (0.0514) | -0.1053 (0.0674) | -0.1082 (0.0673) | -0.0209 (0.0490) |
| 60 to 70 (Married) | 0.0263 (0.0463) | 0.0320 (0.0460) | -0.0285 (0.0395) | -0.0771* (0.0462) | -0.0754 (0.0461) | -0.0649* (0.0350) |
| 70 to 80 (Married) | 0.0216 (0.0459) | 0.0446 (0.0452) | -0.0826** (0.0385) | -0.0871** (0.0425) | -0.0896** (0.0424) | -0.1141*** (0.0347) |
| 80 to 90 (Married) | 0.0522 (0.0441) | 0.0990** (0.0439) | -0.0728* (0.0387) | -0.0628 (0.0424) | -0.0634 (0.0421) | -0.1044*** (0.0341) |
| 90 to 95 (Married) | -0.0200 (0.0452) | 0.0613 (0.0449) | -0.1552*** (0.0411) | -0.1311*** (0.0453) | -0.1248*** (0.0452) | -0.1519*** (0.0372) |
| 95 to 99 (Married) | -0.0705 (0.0444) | 0.0337 (0.0441) | -0.2151*** (0.0436) | -0.1295*** (0.0485) | -0.1224** (0.0478) | -0.1149*** (0.0389) |
| 99 to 100 (Married) | -0.1344** (0.0560) | 0.0041 (0.0561) | -0.2429*** (0.0506) | -0.2658*** (0.0579) | -0.2542*** (0.0580) | -0.1805*** (0.0492) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Married) | -0.0104*** (0.0020) | -0.0070*** (0.0019) | -0.0130*** (0.0014) | -0.0160*** (0.0019) | -0.0138*** (0.0018) | -0.0154*** (0.0017) |
| Z-score (Married) | -0.1676*** (0.0246) | -0.1780*** (0.0267) | -0.1680*** (0.0260) | -0.2353*** (0.0211) | -0.2443*** (0.0237) | -0.1934*** (0.0265) |
| N | 35718 | 35664 | 35559 | 35758 | 35691 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unempl. is the unemployment rate in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80 share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 129: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on average income per adult (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 | | | 2012 | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control education | All controls | No control | Control education | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Income) | -0.1368* (0.0781) | 0.0460 (0.0862) | 0.3518*** (0.0693) | 0.0520 (0.0860) | 0.2981*** (0.0707) | 0.5505*** (0.0613) |
| 10 to 20 (Income) | -0.1530* (0.0878) | -0.0088 (0.0971) | 0.1766*** (0.0680) | 0.0424 (0.0902) | 0.1958*** (0.0699) | 0.3494*** (0.0590) |
| 20 to 30 (Income) | -0.1345 (0.1021) | -0.0554 (0.1086) | 0.0610 (0.0747) | 0.0659 (0.0948) | 0.1251* (0.0757) | 0.2531*** (0.0597) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | -0.0449 (0.1065) | -0.0225 (0.1138) | 0.1232* (0.0699) | 0.0970 (0.1090) | 0.1197 (0.1019) | 0.2623*** (0.0551) |
| 40 to 50 (Income) | 0.1330 (0.0960) | 0.1207 (0.0964) | 0.1107* (0.0645) | 0.0596 (0.1058) | 0.0800 (0.0784) | 0.1101** (0.0481) |
| 60 to 70 (Income) | -0.1340 (0.1116) | -0.1202 (0.1117) | -0.1513** (0.0695) | -0.1432 (0.1019) | -0.1610* (0.0937) | -0.0707 (0.0530) |
| 70 to 80 (Income) | -0.1030 (0.0820) | -0.1432 (0.0946) | -0.2109*** (0.0578) | -0.0183 (0.1041) | -0.1726** (0.0793) | -0.2148*** (0.0513) |
| 80 to 90 (Income) | -0.1123 (0.0815) | -0.2266** (0.1017) | -0.3593*** (0.0643) | -0.0879 (0.0876) | -0.3047*** (0.0766) | -0.3109*** (0.0500) |
| 90 to 95 (Income) | 0.0181 (0.1693) | -0.4145*** (0.1267) | -0.4921*** (0.0877) | -0.1217 (0.1198) | -0.6285*** (0.0968) | -0.5804*** (0.0705) |
| 95 to 99 (Income) | -0.4510*** (0.1056) | -1.1032*** (0.1497) | -0.9354*** (0.1119) | -0.5451*** (0.1057) | -1.3275*** (0.1182) | -1.0480*** (0.0882) |
| 99 to 100 (Income) | -1.0260*** (0.3097) | -1.9664*** (0.3241) | -1.4609*** (0.1910) | -1.5601*** (0.2087) | -2.4575*** (0.2085) | -1.9426*** (0.1710) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Income) | -0.0013 (0.0022) | -0.0130*** (0.0027) | -0.0184*** (0.0029) | -0.0118*** (0.0020) | -0.0292*** (0.0024) | -0.0388*** (0.0030) |
| Z-score (Income) | -0.0721*** (0.0242) | -0.2488*** (0.0301) | -0.3818*** (0.0345) | -0.1705*** (0.0222) | -0.4201*** (0.0265) | -0.5371*** (0.0285) |
| N | 35591 | 35569 | 35559 | 35664 | 35619 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2). Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 130: Regression of the share of vote for the centre-left on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control income | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control income | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (Education) | -0.1758*** (0.0629) | -0.2580*** (0.0677) | -0.1297** (0.0601) | -0.2013*** (0.0519) | -0.4450*** (0.0547) | -0.1723*** (0.0487) |
| 10 to 20 (Education) | -0.0422 (0.0674) | -0.1089 (0.0699) | -0.0386 (0.0623) | -0.1506*** (0.0488) | -0.3344*** (0.0514) | -0.1756*** (0.0445) |
| 20 to 30 (Education) | -0.0262 (0.0672) | -0.0814 (0.0689) | -0.0249 (0.0600) | -0.1033* (0.0542) | -0.2459*** (0.0549) | -0.1346*** (0.0460) |
| 30 to 40 (Education) | -0.0059 (0.0669) | -0.0452 (0.0671) | -0.0061 (0.0594) | -0.0583 (0.0539) | -0.1443*** (0.0526) | -0.1169*** (0.0415) |
| 40 to 50 (Education) | 0.0173 (0.0782) | -0.0083 (0.0774) | 0.0170 (0.0618) | 0.0393 (0.0656) | -0.0244 (0.0647) | 0.0174 (0.0497) |
| 60 to 70 (Education) | 0.0083 (0.0823) | 0.0280 (0.0842) | 0.0105 (0.0658) | -0.0472 (0.0745) | -0.0012 (0.0755) | 0.0221 (0.0479) |
| 70 to 80 (Education) | 0.0884 (0.1070) | 0.1298 (0.1121) | 0.0351 (0.0832) | 0.1156 (0.0987) | 0.1742 (0.1100) | 0.1356** (0.0573) |
| 80 to 90 (Education) | 0.2470** (0.1064) | 0.3889*** (0.1201) | 0.1384 (0.0974) | 0.2606*** (0.0937) | 0.4356*** (0.0888) | 0.0699 (0.0744) |
| 90 to 95 (Education) | 0.2243* (0.1361) | 0.4088*** (0.1205) | 0.0611 (0.1442) | 0.3387*** (0.1238) | 0.6483*** (0.0919) | 0.1428 (0.1203) |
| 95 to 99 (Education) | 0.1685 (0.2213) | 0.9307*** (0.1726) | 0.3546* (0.2033) | -0.0331 (0.1880) | 0.9508*** (0.1382) | 0.2387 (0.1500) |
| 99 to 100 (Education) | -0.4451 (0.3636) | 1.0563*** (0.2866) | 0.4903 (0.3312) | -0.7746** (0.3576) | 0.9689*** (0.1946) | -0.0376 (0.2419) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Education) | 0.0098*** (0.0022) | 0.0172*** (0.0029) | 0.0045* (0.0026) | 0.0115*** (0.0021) | 0.0263*** (0.0025) | 0.0151*** (0.0025) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.0517 (0.0358) | 0.2272*** (0.0401) | 0.1091** (0.0427) | 0.0542 (0.0372) | 0.3408*** (0.0307) | 0.1140*** (0.0402) |
| N | 35718 | 35591 | 35559 | 35758 | 35664 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2) in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 188: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 189.

Figure 189: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the municipality. Aged 65 to 80 is the share of residents aged 65 to 80 years old. The share without diploma is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 16 with no diploma or a diploma of lower secondary education in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 190: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 191.

Figure 191: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Aged 20 to 35 is the share of residents aged 20 to 35. Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 192: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 193.

Figure 193: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-left in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-left is 34.55% in 2002 and 40.94% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-left across municipalities is 11.04% in 2002 and 10.94% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Aged 20 to 35 is the share of residents aged 20 to 35. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 131: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 | 2002 | 2002 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | No control | Control unempl. | All controls | No control | Control unempl. | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Married) | -0.0625 (0.0947) | 0.2682*** (0.0873) | -0.0921 (0.1004) | -0.2072** (0.0957) | 0.1669* (0.0862) | -0.0820 (0.1107) |
| 10 to 20 (Married) | -0.0789 (0.0853) | 0.2913*** (0.0776) | 0.0802 (0.0645) | -0.1995** (0.0858) | 0.2045** (0.0808) | 0.0133 (0.0687) |
| 20 to 30 (Married) | -0.1271 (0.0926) | 0.1650* (0.0871) | -0.0053 (0.0568) | 0.0418 (0.0939) | 0.3020*** (0.0864) | 0.1094* (0.0603) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | -0.1561** (0.0712) | 0.0273 (0.0631) | -0.0444 (0.0460) | -0.0763 (0.1004) | 0.0992 (0.0869) | -0.0223 (0.0500) |
| 40 to 50 (Married) | -0.0506 (0.0756) | 0.0392 (0.0647) | -0.0319 (0.0416) | 0.0496 (0.0845) | 0.1428* (0.0767) | 0.0170 (0.0451) |
| 60 to 70 (Married) | 0.0379 (0.0497) | -0.0392 (0.0456) | 0.0190 (0.0321) | 0.1126** (0.0503) | 0.0596 (0.0486) | 0.0800** (0.0338) |
| 70 to 80 (Married) | 0.1056** (0.0506) | -0.0540 (0.0456) | 0.0741** (0.0332) | 0.2276*** (0.0478) | 0.1121** (0.0453) | 0.1539*** (0.0335) |
| 80 to 90 (Married) | 0.1089** (0.0457) | -0.1348*** (0.0419) | 0.0760** (0.0316) | 0.2956*** (0.0463) | 0.1328*** (0.0437) | 0.2089*** (0.0331) |
| 90 to 95 (Married) | 0.2479*** (0.0479) | -0.0695 (0.0444) | 0.2111*** (0.0351) | 0.3733*** (0.0487) | 0.1849*** (0.0466) | 0.2694*** (0.0355) |
| 95 to 99 (Married) | 0.3972*** (0.0466) | 0.0307 (0.0433) | 0.2931*** (0.0364) | 0.4472*** (0.0488) | 0.2313*** (0.0464) | 0.2761*** (0.0378) |
| 99 to 100 (Married) | 0.4559*** (0.0583) | 0.0548 (0.0550) | 0.3323*** (0.0440) | 0.6319*** (0.0600) | 0.4260*** (0.0585) | 0.3861*** (0.0465) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Married) | 0.0124*** (0.0016) | -0.0101*** (0.0017) | 0.0080*** (0.0013) | 0.0179*** (0.0017) | -0.0001 (0.0020) | 0.0127*** (0.0015) |
| Z-score (Married) | 0.1100*** (0.0197) | -0.0898*** (0.0230) | 0.0538*** (0.0200) | 0.1850*** (0.0194) | 0.0154 (0.0227) | 0.1088*** (0.0224) |
| N | 35718 | 35664 | 35559 | 35758 | 35691 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unempl. is the unemployment rate in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 132: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on average income per adult (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 | | | 2012 | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control education | All controls | No control | Control education | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Income) | 0.1093* (0.0613) | 0.1218** (0.0615) | -0.2903*** (0.0565) | -0.1821*** (0.0634) | -0.3116*** (0.0627) | -0.5781*** (0.0555) |
| 10 to 20 (Income) | -0.0880 (0.0625) | -0.0692 (0.0621) | -0.1823*** (0.0541) | -0.1310** (0.0641) | -0.2073*** (0.0604) | -0.3495*** (0.0532) |
| 20 to 30 (Income) | -0.1098 (0.0682) | -0.0951 (0.0696) | -0.0865 (0.0563) | -0.0795 (0.0683) | -0.1069 (0.0660) | -0.2591*** (0.0554) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | -0.1067 (0.0649) | -0.0910 (0.0639) | -0.0983* (0.0522) | -0.0925 (0.0702) | -0.1009 (0.0638) | -0.2198*** (0.0514) |
| 40 to 50 (Income) | -0.0882 (0.0572) | -0.0948* (0.0567) | -0.0928* (0.0496) | 0.0035 (0.0705) | -0.0150 (0.0641) | -0.0764 (0.0479) |
| 60 to 70 (Income) | 0.0096 (0.0662) | 0.0146 (0.0649) | 0.0859* (0.0496) | 0.1486** (0.0708) | 0.1612** (0.0727) | 0.0780* (0.0450) |
| 70 to 80 (Income) | 0.1598** (0.0662) | 0.1521** (0.0606) | 0.2219*** (0.0468) | 0.1609** (0.0739) | 0.2203*** (0.0693) | 0.2853*** (0.0477) |
| 80 to 90 (Income) | 0.2844*** (0.0588) | 0.2821*** (0.0579) | 0.4287*** (0.0544) | 0.3353*** (0.0620) | 0.4310*** (0.0627) | 0.4425*** (0.0479) |
| 90 to 95 (Income) | 0.3998*** (0.1348) | 0.4527*** (0.0885) | 0.6987*** (0.0825) | 0.6390*** (0.0910) | 0.8298*** (0.0873) | 0.8192*** (0.0740) |
| 95 to 99 (Income) | 1.1312*** (0.0918) | 1.2120*** (0.1414) | 1.1706*** (0.1369) | 1.4002*** (0.0897) | 1.6663*** (0.1190) | 1.4340*** (0.0921) |
| 99 to 100 (Income) | 2.0401*** (0.2855) | 2.1597*** (0.2977) | 1.9425*** (0.2025) | 2.6260*** (0.2186) | 2.8583*** (0.2023) | 2.3374*** (0.1697) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Income) | 0.0186*** (0.0022) | 0.0145*** (0.0021) | 0.0240*** (0.0024) | 0.0308*** (0.0021) | 0.0351*** (0.0020) | 0.0451*** (0.0028) |
| Z-score (Income) | 0.2742*** (0.0227) | 0.2550*** (0.0246) | 0.3882*** (0.0304) | 0.3946*** (0.0221) | 0.4826*** (0.0242) | 0.5512*** (0.0240) |
| N | 35591 | 35569 | 35559 | 35664 | 35619 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2). Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 133: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control income | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control income | 2012 All controls |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (Education) | -0.1135** (0.0574) | -0.0835 (0.0586) | -0.3559*** (0.0485) | -0.0296 (0.0557) | 0.2489*** (0.0571) | -0.2064*** (0.0458) |
| 10 to 20 (Education) | -0.1398** (0.0601) | -0.0871 (0.0599) | -0.2915*** (0.0490) | -0.0065 (0.0549) | 0.2024*** (0.0545) | -0.1054** (0.0439) |
| 20 to 30 (Education) | -0.1884*** (0.0552) | -0.1301** (0.0548) | -0.2612*** (0.0474) | -0.1063* (0.0561) | 0.0578 (0.0546) | -0.1148** (0.0450) |
| 30 to 40 (Education) | -0.1796*** (0.0584) | -0.1355** (0.0569) | -0.1990*** (0.0471) | -0.0383 (0.0549) | 0.0629 (0.0521) | -0.0151 (0.0409) |
| 40 to 50 (Education) | -0.1897*** (0.0590) | -0.1553*** (0.0579) | -0.1457*** (0.0462) | -0.0677 (0.0597) | 0.0079 (0.0566) | -0.0366 (0.0465) |
| 60 to 70 (Education) | -0.0129 (0.0634) | -0.0492 (0.0630) | 0.0521 (0.0472) | 0.0900 (0.0676) | 0.0265 (0.0650) | 0.0586 (0.0481) |
| 70 to 80 (Education) | -0.0603 (0.0722) | -0.1074* (0.0645) | 0.0241 (0.0520) | -0.0550 (0.0836) | -0.1350* (0.0698) | 0.0501 (0.0492) |
| 80 to 90 (Education) | 0.0717 (0.0696) | -0.1048 (0.0660) | 0.0170 (0.0669) | 0.0751 (0.0809) | -0.1535** (0.0727) | 0.1027 (0.0631) |
| 90 to 95 (Education) | 0.2992** (0.1281) | 0.0558 (0.1014) | 0.2469** (0.1193) | 0.1977 (0.1545) | -0.1934* (0.1131) | 0.2555** (0.1047) |
| 95 to 99 (Education) | 0.5848** (0.2481) | -0.2914 (0.1882) | 0.1299 (0.1895) | 0.8481*** (0.2213) | -0.3637** (0.1541) | 0.2231 (0.1479) |
| 99 to 100 (Education) | 1.5191*** (0.3422) | -0.1688 (0.2674) | 0.0414 (0.2430) | 1.8975*** (0.3582) | -0.1663 (0.1965) | 0.5796** (0.2516) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Education) | 0.0123*** (0.0019) | 0.0036* (0.0019) | 0.0138*** (0.0020) | 0.0098*** (0.0022) | -0.0096*** (0.0018) | -0.0013 (0.0023) |
| Z-score (Education) | 0.2307*** (0.0340) | 0.0636* (0.0362) | 0.1652*** (0.0406) | 0.2271*** (0.0388) | -0.0968*** (0.0308) | 0.1063*** (0.0342) |
| N | 35718 | 35591 | 35559 | 35758 | 35664 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2) in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 194: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 195.

Figure 195: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 196: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




See Figure 197.

Figure 197: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Employed in agriculture is the share of the labour force aged 25 to 54 employed in the agricultural sector. Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 198: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 199.

Figure 199: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the centre-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the centre-right is 43.40% in 2002 and 36.61% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the centre-right across municipalities is 11.90% in 2002 and 12.24% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Population density is the ratio of the total number of municipal residents over the municipal surface area. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 134: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 No control | 2002 Control unempl. | 2002 All controls | 2012 No control | 2012 Control unempl. | 2012 All controls |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 0 to 10 (Married) | -0.7214*** (0.0710) | -0.9512*** (0.0727) | -0.1850** (0.0807) | -1.0405*** (0.0750) | -1.4124*** (0.0706) | -0.4268*** (0.0788) |
| 10 to 20 (Married) | -0.1084 (0.1648) | -0.4291*** (0.0980) | -0.2021*** (0.0600) | -0.4487*** (0.1650) | -0.8688*** (0.1047) | -0.4705*** (0.0554) |
| 20 to 30 (Married) | -0.1110 (0.0882) | -0.3385*** (0.0717) | -0.0245 (0.0570) | -0.3468*** (0.0900) | -0.6255*** (0.0820) | -0.3241*** (0.0464) |
| 30 to 40 (Married) | -0.0148 (0.0676) | -0.1516** (0.0614) | -0.0267 (0.0419) | -0.1690** (0.0820) | -0.3579*** (0.0750) | -0.1927*** (0.0443) |
| 40 to 50 (Married) | -0.0510 (0.0628) | -0.1254** (0.0513) | -0.0490 (0.0368) | -0.0861 (0.0728) | -0.1811*** (0.0644) | -0.0754** (0.0371) |
| 60 to 70 (Married) | -0.0418 (0.0505) | 0.0168 (0.0418) | 0.0125 (0.0300) | 0.0547 (0.0557) | 0.1069** (0.0503) | 0.0504 (0.0311) |
| 70 to 80 (Married) | -0.0266 (0.0549) | 0.0818* (0.0476) | 0.0433 (0.0347) | -0.0404 (0.0559) | 0.0834 (0.0515) | 0.0218 (0.0303) |
| 80 to 90 (Married) | -0.0268 (0.0510) | 0.1291*** (0.0439) | 0.0231 (0.0337) | -0.1607*** (0.0504) | 0.0139 (0.0453) | -0.0660** (0.0277) |
| 90 to 95 (Married) | -0.0833* (0.0496) | 0.0992** (0.0430) | -0.0529 (0.0348) | -0.1237** (0.0509) | 0.0711 (0.0459) | -0.0517* (0.0301) |
| 95 to 99 (Married) | -0.2008*** (0.0485) | -0.0009 (0.0420) | -0.1336*** (0.0356) | -0.1975*** (0.0523) | 0.0277 (0.0472) | -0.1090*** (0.0324) |
| 99 to 100 (Married) | -0.1618*** (0.0567) | 0.0317 (0.0512) | -0.1518*** (0.0435) | -0.2532*** (0.0618) | -0.0425 (0.0566) | -0.1673*** (0.0404) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Married) | 0.0070*** (0.0022) | 0.0217*** (0.0018) | 0.0046*** (0.0012) | 0.0146*** (0.0022) | 0.0303*** (0.0018) | 0.0163*** (0.0016) |
| Z-score (Married) | 0.1378*** (0.0239) | 0.3030*** (0.0181) | -0.0089 (0.0189) | 0.2399*** (0.0238) | 0.4167*** (0.0183) | 0.1868*** (0.0253) |
| N | 35718 | 35664 | 35559 | 35758 | 35691 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unempl. is the unemployment rate in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 135: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on average income per adult (2002 and 2012)

| | 2002 | | | 2012 | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control education | All controls | No control | Control education | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Income) | -0.2070* (0.1058) | -0.4067*** (0.1097) | -0.3785*** (0.0465) | -0.0819 (0.0928) | -0.3243*** (0.0709) | -0.2509*** (0.0469) |
| 10 to 20 (Income) | 0.0442 (0.1121) | -0.1301 (0.1185) | -0.2601*** (0.0487) | 0.0339 (0.0964) | -0.1235* (0.0749) | -0.1331*** (0.0460) |
| 20 to 30 (Income) | -0.0126 (0.1130) | -0.1097 (0.1206) | -0.2347*** (0.0484) | -0.0407 (0.1052) | -0.1032 (0.0784) | -0.0884** (0.0388) |
| 30 to 40 (Income) | 0.1486 (0.1524) | 0.1123 (0.1648) | -0.0628 (0.0493) | 0.0077 (0.1504) | -0.0245 (0.1350) | -0.0678* (0.0401) |
| 40 to 50 (Income) | -0.0765 (0.1323) | -0.0501 (0.1320) | -0.0561 (0.0488) | -0.0452 (0.1116) | -0.0462 (0.0746) | -0.0384 (0.0347) |
| 60 to 70 (Income) | 0.0219 (0.1192) | -0.0016 (0.1254) | -0.0189 (0.0435) | 0.1166 (0.0974) | 0.1232* (0.0738) | 0.0842*** (0.0299) |
| 70 to 80 (Income) | -0.0107 (0.1096) | 0.0463 (0.1214) | 0.0854** (0.0421) | -0.0779 (0.1143) | 0.1174* (0.0659) | 0.1362*** (0.0319) |
| 80 to 90 (Income) | -0.1318 (0.1058) | 0.0052 (0.1387) | 0.1230** (0.0505) | -0.1454 (0.0941) | 0.1111 (0.0704) | 0.1457*** (0.0335) |
| 90 to 95 (Income) | -0.3911*** (0.1312) | 0.0889 (0.1642) | 0.1659** (0.0755) | -0.5406*** (0.1122) | 0.1508** (0.0766) | 0.1375*** (0.0451) |
| 95 to 99 (Income) | -0.6558*** (0.1350) | 0.0747 (0.1898) | 0.1888 (0.1811) | -1.0084*** (0.1015) | 0.1374* (0.0757) | 0.0873 (0.0557) |
| 99 to 100 (Income) | -0.9774*** (0.1259) | 0.0710 (0.1853) | 0.1111 (0.1992) | -1.2158*** (0.1086) | 0.1872** (0.0774) | 0.0747 (0.0763) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Income) | -0.0064*** (0.0020) | 0.0107*** (0.0032) | 0.0208*** (0.0020) | -0.0125*** (0.0021) | 0.0104*** (0.0034) | 0.0065* (0.0034) |
| Z-score (Income) | -0.1259*** (0.0173) | 0.1006*** (0.0306) | 0.2463*** (0.0241) | -0.2009*** (0.0175) | 0.0991*** (0.0278) | 0.1412*** (0.0235) |
| N | 35591 | 35569 | 35559 | 35664 | 35619 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2). Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Table 136: Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012)


| | 2002 | 2002 | 2002 | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | No control | Control income | All controls | No control | Control income | All controls |
| 0 to 10 (Education) | 0.1114* (0.0583) | 0.3012*** (0.0664) | 0.2964*** (0.0456) | 0.2049*** (0.0505) | 0.3872*** (0.0574) | 0.4471*** (0.0359) |
| 10 to 20 (Education) | 0.0646 (0.0562) | 0.1831*** (0.0636) | 0.2173*** (0.0439) | 0.1493*** (0.0532) | 0.2691*** (0.0573) | 0.3387*** (0.0358) |
| 20 to 30 (Education) | 0.1321** (0.0585) | 0.2065*** (0.0636) | 0.2041*** (0.0415) | 0.1797*** (0.0598) | 0.2611*** (0.0614) | 0.2947*** (0.0368) |
| 30 to 40 (Education) | 0.1775*** (0.0654) | 0.2179*** (0.0681) | 0.2119*** (0.0425) | 0.0885 (0.0552) | 0.1358** (0.0557) | 0.1736*** (0.0324) |
| 40 to 50 (Education) | 0.0870 (0.0683) | 0.1118 (0.0696) | 0.1019** (0.0443) | 0.0335 (0.0688) | 0.0559 (0.0691) | 0.0767** (0.0361) |
| 60 to 70 (Education) | 0.0124 (0.0799) | 0.0062 (0.0820) | -0.1231*** (0.0416) | -0.0575 (0.0729) | -0.0787 (0.0756) | -0.1099*** (0.0400) |
| 70 to 80 (Education) | -0.0638 (0.1470) | -0.0933 (0.1353) | -0.2276*** (0.0472) | -0.0809 (0.1374) | -0.1016 (0.1406) | -0.2181*** (0.0437) |
| 80 to 90 (Education) | -0.3083** (0.1237) | -0.3482** (0.1401) | -0.3340*** (0.0610) | -0.6021*** (0.0682) | -0.6414*** (0.0715) | -0.3717*** (0.0497) |
| 90 to 95 (Education) | -0.5630*** (0.0894) | -0.5902*** (0.0957) | -0.5730*** (0.0935) | -0.9135*** (0.0692) | -0.9702*** (0.0813) | -0.6661*** (0.0746) |
| 95 to 99 (Education) | -0.8062*** (0.0728) | -0.8968*** (0.1177) | -0.6486*** (0.1237) | -1.2944*** (0.0524) | -1.4184*** (0.0668) | -0.7854*** (0.0801) |
| 99 to 100 (Education) | -1.0637*** (0.0859) | -1.1497*** (0.1416) | -0.6686*** (0.1711) | -1.5060*** (0.0521) | -1.6516*** (0.0700) | -0.6459*** (0.1135) |
| <i>Rank</i> ₁₀₀₀ (Education) | -0.0169*** (0.0023) | -0.0219*** (0.0038) | -0.0144*** (0.0016) | -0.0284*** (0.0022) | -0.0323*** (0.0036) | -0.0152*** (0.0027) |
| Z-score (Education) | -0.2568*** (0.0140) | -0.3571*** (0.0302) | -0.3572*** (0.0370) | -0.4022*** (0.0119) | -0.5134*** (0.0267) | -0.2713*** (0.0318) |
| N | 35718 | 35591 | 35559 | 35758 | 35664 | 35606 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. Coefficients are expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Education is the share of university graduates (higher than Bac.+2) in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 200: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 201.

Figure 201: Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-right across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Married is the share of married individuals in the population aged more than 15 years old. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. All control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 202: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)




Note: See Figure 203

Figure 203: Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)




Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. The share of foreigners is the share of residents of foreign nationality in the municipality. Control variables: share without diploma, share with a university diploma (higher than Bac.+2), share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

Figure 204: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002)



Note: See Figure 205

Figure 205: Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012)



Note: Standardised share of vote for the extreme-right in the first round of French legislative elections. Mean vote for the extreme-right is 14.23% in 2002 and 14.28% in 2012. Standard-deviation of the vote for the extreme-left across municipalities is 7.15% in 2002 and 6.72% in 2012. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of not-in-school individuals aged more than 15 with a university diploma higher than Bac.+2 in the municipality. Income is the average income per adult in the municipality. Aged 20 to 35 is the share of residents aged 20 to 35 years old. The share of *cadres* is the share of the labour force classified as *cadres* in the PCS occupational classification. Control variables: average income per adult, share without diploma, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 35 to 50, share of the population aged 50 to 65, share of the population aged 65 to 80, share of the population aged more than 80, share of *cadres*, share of *ouvriers*, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density, share of foreign individuals, share of married individuals, share of owned main places of residence.

List of Figures

| | | |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Marital status of the women aged more than 15 in France (1856-2009) | 18 |
| 2 | Marital status of men aged more than 15 in France (1856-2009) | 18 |
| 3 | Married women as a share of the female population aged more than 15, by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 19 |
| 4 | Married men as a share of the male population aged more than 15, by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 19 |
| 5 | Mean household size in France (1856-1946) | 21 |
| 6 | Mean household size in France (1954-2014) | 21 |
| 7 | Average number of adults per household in France (1856-1946) | 23 |
| 8 | Average number of adults per household in France (1954-2014) | 23 |
| 9 | Average number of adults per household by <i>départements</i> (1856-1946) | 24 |
| 10 | Average number of adults per household by <i>départements</i> (1954-2014) | 24 |
| 11 | Average number of marital units per household in France (1856-1954) | 26 |
| 12 | Average number of marital units per household in France (1954-2009) | 26 |
| 13 | Average number of marital units per household by <i>départements</i> (1856-1946) | 27 |
| 14 | Average number of marital units per household by <i>départements</i> (1954-2009) | 27 |
| 15 | Marginal effect of complex household structures (MUH) on the vote for the left, by quintiles of <i>département</i> (1968-2012) | 43 |
| 16 | Marginal effect of complex household structures (MUH) on the vote for the extreme-right, by quintiles of <i>département</i> (1968-2012) | 43 |
| 17 | Marginal effect of income on the vote for the centre-right, by quintiles of <i>département</i> (1968-2012) | 44 |
| 18 | Marginal effect of income on the vote for the extreme-right, by quintiles of <i>département</i> (1968-2012) | 44 |
| 19 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 49 |
| 20 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 49 |
| 21 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 50 |
| 22 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 50 |
| 23 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 51 |
| 24 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 51 |
| 25 | Marginal effect of the average number of adults per household on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 53 |
| 26 | Marginal effect of the average number of adults per household on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 53 |
| 27 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 55 |
| 28 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 55 |
| 29 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 58 |
| 30 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 58 |
| 31 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 59 |
| 32 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 59 |
| 33 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 60 |
| 34 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 60 |

| | | |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 35 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 61 |
| 36 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 61 |
| 37 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 62 |
| 38 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 62 |
| 39 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 64 |
| 40 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 64 |
| 41 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 65 |
| 42 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 65 |
| 43 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 66 |
| 44 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 66 |
| 45 | Number of households in France (1856-1946) | 78 |
| 46 | Number of households in France (1954-2014) | 78 |
| 47 | Total population in France (1856-2014) | 79 |
| 48 | Legal vs. present population in France (1881-1946) | 80 |
| 49 | Share of the population counted separately in France (1856-2014) | 82 |
| 50 | Population counted separately in France (1856-2014) | 83 |
| 51 | Number of school boarders in the population counted separately in France (1856-1954) | 84 |
| 52 | Share of school boarders in the population counted separately in France (1856-1954) | 85 |
| 53 | Share of total population aged more than 20 in France (1856-2014) | 87 |
| 54 | Share of total population aged more than 60 in France (1856-2014) | 87 |
| 55 | Servants as a share of total population in France (1861-1982) | 93 |
| 56 | Age distribution of servants in France in 1891 | 94 |
| 57 | Number of women aged more than 15 by marital status in France (1856-2009) . . . | 96 |
| 58 | Number of men aged more than 15 by marital status in France (1856-2009) | 96 |
| 59 | Share of married the female population aged more than 15, by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 97 |
| 60 | Share of married in the male population aged more than 15, by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 97 |
| 61 | Share of singles in the female population aged more than 15, by <i>département</i> (1856-2009) | 99 |
| 62 | Share of singles in the male population aged more than 15, by <i>département</i> (1856-2009) | 99 |
| 63 | Mean household size by <i>département</i> (1856-1946) | 102 |
| 64 | Mean household size by <i>département</i> (1954-2014) | 102 |
| 65 | Mean household size by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 103 |
| 66 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 1856 | 103 |
| 67 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 1881 | 104 |
| 68 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 1911 | 104 |
| 69 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 1936 | 105 |
| 70 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 1962 | 105 |
| 71 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 1982 | 106 |
| 72 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 1999 | 106 |
| 73 | Map of the mean household size by <i>département</i> in 2014 | 107 |
| 74 | Share of single households by <i>département</i> (1968-2014) | 108 |
| 75 | Map of the share of single households by <i>département</i> in 1968 | 109 |
| 76 | Map of the share of single households by <i>département</i> in 1982 | 109 |
| 77 | Map of the share of single households by <i>département</i> in 1999 | 110 |
| 78 | Map of the share of single households by <i>département</i> in 2014 | 110 |

| | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 79 | Cohabiting secondary families, adult descendants, ascendants and other kin per 100 ordinary households in France (1962-1990) | 111 |
| 80 | Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> (1962-1990) | 113 |
| 81 | Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1962 | 113 |
| 82 | Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1975 | 114 |
| 83 | Cohabiting adult descendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1990 | 114 |
| 84 | Number of cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> (1962-1990) | 115 |
| 85 | Cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1962 | 115 |
| 86 | Cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1975 | 116 |
| 87 | Cohabiting ascendants per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1990 | 116 |
| 88 | Number of cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> (1962-1990) | 117 |
| 89 | Cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1962 | 117 |
| 90 | Cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1975 | 118 |
| 91 | Cohabiting other kin per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1990 | 118 |
| 92 | Number of cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> (1962-1990) | 119 |
| 93 | Cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1962 | 119 |
| 94 | Cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1975 | 120 |
| 95 | Cohabiting secondary families per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> in 1990 | 120 |
| 96 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 1856 | 122 |
| 97 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 1881 | 123 |
| 98 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 1911 | 123 |
| 99 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 1936 | 124 |
| 100 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 1962 | 124 |
| 101 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 1982 | 125 |
| 102 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 1999 | 125 |
| 103 | Map of the average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> in 2014 | 126 |
| 104 | Crude average number of adults per household, excluding servants (1856-1946) . . | 127 |
| 105 | Crude average number of adults per household, excluding servants (1954-2014) . . | 127 |
| 106 | Average number of adults per household excluding servants (1856-1946) | 128 |
| 107 | Average number of adults per household excluding servants (1954-2014) | 128 |
| 108 | Average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> (1856-2009) | 129 |
| 109 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 1856 | 130 |
| 110 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 1881 | 130 |
| 111 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 1911 | 131 |
| 112 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 1936 | 131 |
| 113 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 1962 | 132 |
| 114 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 1982 | 132 |
| 115 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 1999 | 133 |
| 116 | Map of the average number of marital units per household by <i>département</i> in 2009 | 133 |
| 117 | National share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, left vs. right (1968-2012) | 138 |
| 118 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, left (1968-2012) . . . | 139 |
| 119 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, right (1968-2012) . . | 139 |
| 120 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-left (1968-2012) | 140 |
| 121 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-left (1968-2012) | 140 |
| 122 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-right (1968-2012) | 141 |
| 123 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-right (1968-2012) | 141 |
| 124 | Map of the vote for the left in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality | 183 |
| 125 | Map of the vote for the left in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality | 184 |
| 126 | Map of the vote for the extreme-left in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality | 185 |

| | | |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 127 | Map of the vote for the extreme-left in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality | 186 |
| 128 | Map of the vote for the centre-left in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality | 187 |
| 129 | Map of the vote for the centre-left in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality | 188 |
| 130 | Map of the vote for the centre-right in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality | 189 |
| 131 | Map of the vote for the centre-right in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality | 190 |
| 132 | Map of the vote for the extreme-right in the first round of the 2002 legislative elections by municipality | 191 |
| 133 | Map of the vote for the extreme-right in the first round of the 2012 legislative elections by municipality | 192 |
| 134 | Map of the share of single households in 1999 by municipality | 194 |
| 135 | Map of the share of single households in 2009 by municipality | 195 |
| 136 | Map of the average number of marital units per household (MUH) in 1999 by municipality | 196 |
| 137 | Map of the average number of marital units per household (MUH) in 2009 by municipality | 197 |
| 138 | Map of the average number of adults per household (APH) in 1999 by municipality | 198 |
| 139 | Map of the average number of adults per household (APH) in 2009 by municipality | 199 |
| 140 | Map of the share of married individuals in 1999 by municipality | 201 |
| 141 | Map of the share of married individuals in 2009 by municipality | 202 |
| 142 | Map of the share of university graduates in 1999 by municipality | 203 |
| 143 | Map of the share of university graduates in 2009 by municipality | 204 |
| 144 | Map of the average income per adult by municipality in 2002 | 205 |
| 145 | Map of the average income per adult by municipality in 2012 | 206 |
| 146 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 211 |
| 147 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 211 |
| 148 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 212 |
| 149 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 212 |
| 150 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 213 |
| 151 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 213 |
| 152 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 217 |
| 153 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 217 |
| 154 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 218 |
| 155 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 218 |
| 156 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 219 |
| 157 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 219 |
| 158 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 223 |
| 159 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 223 |
| 160 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 224 |

| | | |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 161 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 224 |
| 162 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 225 |
| 163 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 225 |
| 164 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 229 |
| 165 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 229 |
| 166 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 230 |
| 167 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 230 |
| 168 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 231 |
| 169 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 231 |
| 170 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 235 |
| 171 | Marginal effect of the share of single households on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 235 |
| 172 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 236 |
| 173 | Marginal effect of MUH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 236 |
| 174 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 237 |
| 175 | Marginal effect of APH on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 237 |
| 176 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 242 |
| 177 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 242 |
| 178 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 243 |
| 179 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 243 |
| 180 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 244 |
| 181 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 244 |
| 182 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 248 |
| 183 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 248 |
| 184 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 249 |
| 185 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 249 |
| 186 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the vote for the extreme-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 250 |
| 187 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 250 |
| 188 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 254 |
| 189 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 254 |

| | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 190 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 255 |
| 191 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 255 |
| 192 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 256 |
| 193 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the vote for the centre-left, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 256 |
| 194 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 260 |
| 195 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 260 |
| 196 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 261 |
| 197 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 261 |
| 198 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 262 |
| 199 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the centre-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 262 |
| 200 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 266 |
| 201 | Marginal effect of the share of married individuals on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 266 |
| 202 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 267 |
| 203 | Marginal effect of the average income per adult on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 267 |
| 204 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2002) | 268 |
| 205 | Marginal effect of the share of university graduates on the standardised vote for the extreme-right, by deciles of municipalities (2012) | 268 |

List of Tables

| | | |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1 | Structure of households, classificatory table by Laslett (1972) | 8 |
| 2 | Household definitions, 1856 to 2014 censuses | 13 |
| 3 | Population counted separately, definitions, 1856 to 2014 censuses | 14 |
| 4 | Present and legal population in the historical censuses (1881-1946) | 72 |
| 5 | Absolute number of households, summary statistics (1856-2014) | 77 |
| 6 | Total population, summary statistics (1856-2014) | 80 |
| 7 | Share of the population counted separately by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 82 |
| 8 | Population counted separately by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 83 |
| 9 | Number of school boarders in the population counted separately by <i>département</i> (1856-1954) | 84 |
| 10 | Share of school boarders in the population counted separately by <i>département</i> (1856-1954) | 85 |
| 11 | Share of total population aged more than 20 by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 88 |
| 12 | Share of total population aged more than 60 by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 88 |
| 13 | Domestic servants and housed employees, definitions, 1856 to 2014 censuses | 91 |
| 14 | Raw number of servants by <i>département</i> , as presented in the historical census results (1861-1982) | 91 |
| 15 | Share of servants in agriculture by <i>département</i> (1861-1891) | 92 |
| 16 | Share of servants in industry by <i>département</i> (1861-1891) | 92 |
| 17 | Share of servants in commerce and transport by <i>département</i> (1861-1891) | 92 |
| 18 | Servants as a share of total population by <i>département</i> (1861-1982) | 93 |
| 19 | Age distribution of servants by <i>département</i> in 1891 | 94 |
| 20 | Share of married women by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 98 |
| 21 | Share of married men by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 98 |
| 22 | Share of single women by <i>département</i> (1856-2009) | 100 |
| 23 | Share of single men by <i>département</i> (1856-2009) | 100 |
| 24 | Share of single households by <i>département</i> (1968-2014) | 108 |
| 25 | Cohabiting secondary families, adult descendants, ascendants and other kin per 100 ordinary households by <i>département</i> (1962-1990) | 112 |
| 26 | Crude average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 121 |
| 27 | Average number of adults per household by <i>département</i> (1856-2014) | 122 |
| 28 | Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1962 | 135 |
| 29 | Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1975 | 135 |
| 30 | Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1982 | 136 |
| 31 | Correlations between variables of household complexity in 1990 | 136 |
| 32 | Census results used for the analysis of legislative electoral results at the departmental level (1968-2012) | 137 |
| 33 | National share of vote of the different political affiliations in the first round of French legislative elections (1968-2012) | 138 |
| 34 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, left (1968-2012) | 142 |
| 35 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, right (1968-2012) | 142 |
| 36 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-left (1968-2012) | 143 |
| 37 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-left (1968-2012) | 143 |
| 38 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, centre-right (1968-2012) | 144 |
| 39 | Share of vote in the first round of French legislative elections, extreme-right (1968-2012) | 144 |
| 40 | Classification of the political parties by affiliation (1968-2012) | 145 |
| 41 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 146 |
| 42 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 147 |
| 43 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 147 |
| 44 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 148 |

| | | |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 45 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 148 |
| 46 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 149 |
| 47 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 149 |
| 48 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 150 |
| 49 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 150 |
| 50 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 151 |
| 51 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 151 |
| 52 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 152 |
| 53 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 152 |
| 54 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 153 |
| 55 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 153 |
| 56 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 154 |
| 57 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 154 |
| 58 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 155 |
| 59 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 155 |
| 60 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 156 |
| 61 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of single households, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 156 |
| 62 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on MUH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 157 |
| 63 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on APH, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 157 |
| 64 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on average income per adult, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 158 |
| 65 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, without controls (1968-2012) | 158 |
| 66 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 159 |
| 67 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 160 |
| 68 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 160 |
| 69 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 161 |
| 70 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 161 |
| 71 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 162 |
| 72 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 162 |
| 73 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 163 |

| | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 74 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 163 |
| 75 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extremeleft on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 164 |
| 76 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 164 |
| 77 | Regression of the share of vote for the centre-left on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 165 |
| 78 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 165 |
| 79 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 166 |
| 80 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 166 |
| 81 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 167 |
| 82 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 167 |
| 83 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 168 |
| 84 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 168 |
| 85 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 169 |
| 86 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of single households, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 169 |
| 87 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on MUH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 170 |
| 88 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on APH, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 170 |
| 89 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the average income per adult, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 171 |
| 90 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of university graduates, cross-section, with controls (1968-2012) | 171 |
| 91 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012) | 172 |
| 92 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on income and education, panel (1968-2012) | 173 |
| 93 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012) | 174 |
| 94 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on income and education, panel (1968-2012) | 175 |
| 95 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012) | 176 |
| 96 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on income and education, panel (1968-2012) | 177 |
| 97 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012) | 178 |
| 98 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on income and education, panel (1968-2012) | 179 |
| 99 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on indicators for household structures, panel (1968-2012) | 180 |
| 100 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on income and education, panel (1968-2012) | 181 |
| 101 | Results of the first round of the 2002 French legislative elections, at the municipal level | 182 |
| 102 | Results of the first round of the 2012 French legislative elections, at the municipal level | 182 |

| | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 103 | Indicators for household structures in 1999, at the municipal level | 193 |
| 104 | Indicators for household structures in 2009, at the municipal level | 193 |
| 105 | Marriage, education and income in 1999/2002, at the municipal level | 200 |
| 106 | Marriage, education and income in 2009/2012, at the municipal level | 200 |
| 107 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of single households (2002 and 2012) | 208 |
| 108 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012) | 209 |
| 109 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012) | 210 |
| 110 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of single households (2002 and 2012) | 214 |
| 111 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012) | 215 |
| 112 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012) | 216 |
| 113 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of single households (2002 and 2012) | 220 |
| 114 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012) | 221 |
| 115 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012) | 222 |
| 116 | Regression of the share of vote for the centre-right on the share of single households (2002 and 2012) | 226 |
| 117 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012) | 227 |
| 118 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012) | 228 |
| 119 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of single households (2002 and 2012) | 232 |
| 120 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the average number of marital units per household (2002 and 2012) | 233 |
| 121 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the average number of adults per household (2002 and 2012) | 234 |
| 122 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012) | 239 |
| 123 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on average income per adult (2002 and 2012) | 240 |
| 124 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the left on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012) | 241 |
| 125 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012) | 245 |
| 126 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on average income per adult (2002 and 2012) | 246 |
| 127 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-left on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012) | 247 |
| 128 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012) | 251 |
| 129 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-left on average income per adult (2002 and 2012) | 252 |
| 130 | Regression of the share of vote for the centre-left on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012) | 253 |
| 131 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012) | 257 |
| 132 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on average income per adult (2002 and 2012) | 258 |
| 133 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the centre-right on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012) | 259 |

| | | |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 134 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of married individuals (2002 and 2012) | 263 |
| 135 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on average income per adult (2002 and 2012) | 264 |
| 136 | Regression of the standardised share of vote for the extreme-right on the share of university graduates (2002 and 2012) | 265 |