

the multitude of Tallies and Bonds; is like to keep Interest-Mony for a long time at a high Rate.

Upon which Accompt, it may be worth the Consideration of such as study the Common Good, whither it may not be adviseable hereafter, when Peace shall have given a better Consistency to Things, to contrive some way of easing the Customs, and to give an Equivalent, by laying Duties that may be Tantalment upon the Commodities, when they come into the Retailers Hands; and so to charge the Consumption, instead of the Importation.

The chief Objection to this, is, That the Duties will not be quite so certain, and more troublesome in the Collection; but those Inconveniencies will be abundantly recompenc'd, by the infinite Ease such a Course of levying, what must be paid, would give to the Trade of *England*.

If we do not fall into some Measures of this kind, we shall never be able to cope with our Rivals in Traffick. The *Dutch*, who by Wisdom, and good Order in their Affairs, are in a way to
over-

overcome the natural Advantages we have over them, in Soil, Product and Situation.

Nor can Trade flourish, till the Gentlemen of the Kingdom, endeavour to make themselves Masters of the general Notions about it; and till they lay it's Concerns warmly to Heart, reflecting how much their Land-Interest depends upon it; which the next Seven Years will more plainly demonstrate, than five times the same number of Years could show before.

If Trade can be eas'd, it will be the better able to bear the remaining Burthen, which our Necessities have plac'd upon it; and it may yield its Proportion of the Sum, that for some time must probably be rais'd out of the Annual Income of this Country; and if Trade prospers, the Product of Land will be the more enabled to pay the rest.

He therefore, who would form a general Scheme, should consider how to make the 3,300,000 *l.* already arising from several Fonds, bear more equally, and in consequence more lightly upon Land and Trade; and in all likelihood

this is to be compass'd by not laying too heavy Excises upon any one Commodity, and by easing the Importation, and rather levying the Duty upon the Consumption.

When the Debts are put into a Method of Payment, and when punctual Payments have lessen'd Interest, Premiums and Discompt, (which of Course they must do) it will be more easy to come at those Supplies, that from Year to Year may be wanting, to support the Government, and defend the Kingdom.

Suppose then, that towards satisfying Deficiencies, Arrears, and this Years Expence; the Publick Necessities should require a Fond to be settled, which may raise Three Millions; 'tis to be apprehended, our present Circumstances consider'd, not above Two Millions can be levied upon the Body of the People, so as to be answer'd within the Year.

So that the Third Million is probably not to be come at, but by some Credit upon the future: And the Two Millions in all likelihood are to be rais'd but these four ways:

1. Either

1. Either by charging One or several Commodities Imported, or of our own Growth, for a term of Time, with such a Duty as may produce the Sum wanted; to which way of raising Money, the People have lately given the Name of remote Fonds.

2. Or by charging several Commodities with such a Duty, as may raise the Sum within the Year.

3. Or by laying the chief Sum upon Land, as formerly by a Monthly Assessment, or by a Four Shilling Aid.

4. Or by a mixt Aid, laying part of the Sum wanted on Land, levying part by a Poll, and the rest by new Impositions upon our Product, and new Duties upon Foreign Materials, either in their Consumption at Home, or at their Importation.

He that would form a Scheme of the Nation's Business, should maturely consider these four Ways and Means of raising Money, in order to see how they may be consistent with our present Circumstances; how far each different Method
may

may affect the Publick, and which Course will least prejudice Land, Trade, and the Manufactures.

With remote Fonds, it will be impossible to avoid exorbitant Premiums; high Interest, and large Discompt of Tallies; which, for these Five Years, have been the Bane of our Affairs, and have plung'd the Publick into most of the present Difficulties: Nor in that Course of supplying the Government, can the Debts be clear'd in any moderate compass of time; which Debts, will be a terrible Weight upon us, in Case we should come to be hereafter engag'd in another long and expensive War.

To charge so many Branches of our Consumption as may raise, within the Year, two Millions, will be impracticable, because those Materials that are most like to yield a good Revenue, have already a Load sufficient upon 'em; nor can Duties of this Nature be put into such Order the first Year, for so great a Sum, as that a Government may depend upon 'em for ready Mony, and Substance; and 'tis an immediate substantial Fond, that in all appearance will be most wanting.

To

To lay what has been hitherto charg'd upon Land, will put the Gentry of *England* in a worse Condition now, than they were during the War; for tho' the principal Burthen has lain all along upon the Landed Men, it was some Relief, that Rents were well paid for most of the time the War lasted; but if there should not be the Call abroad for our Produce, after the Peace, as formerly, 'tis to be fear'd the Tenants will not be so ready with their Payments, as when they had a quicker Market; and if this should happen, Land probably will not be able to bear the Four Shillings Aid, or a high Monthly Assessment.

For these Reasons, to raise what may be wanting by a mix'd Aid, seems most practicable, and to be attended with the fewest ill Consequences.

If at this time two Millions could be rais'd within the Year, without touching upon Land, undoubtedly it were for the Publick Good, to listen to such a Scheme, and give the Landed Men, who are the Strength of *England*, and best Support to the Government, a little Ease: But he who thinks to make such a Proposal, after
he

he has puzzel'd himself, and others, a long while about it, will find he is mistaken.

'Tis true, he who bends his Study to Matters of this Nature, and is desirous to assist with Observations and Hints, for abler Heads and better Understandings to work upon, should so direct his Notions, as that they may tend, at last, not only to the Ease, but Security of the Landed Interest.

Land would be reliev'd in its Taxes to little purpose, if, in their Stead, Revenues should be set up, which, in future Times, may endanger the Liberty of this Country.

He therefore who would form a Scheme for the Good of *England*, should not so much endeavour to avoid Land-Taxes, as thereby to run into Revenues that will require, in their Collection, such a number of Officers, as may master the Landed Man in his own Corporation.

A small number of Hands may collect whatever Duties can be conveniently laid upon our Home-Consumption; but
from

from thence Two Millions cannot be rais'd, all in One Year, without a General Excise; and such a Revenue, in this wide Country, cannot be gather'd, and so ascertain'd, as the Government may depend upon it, for Subsistence, but by a Multitude of Officers, peradventure dangerous to Liberty.

For these Reasons, in the present Juncture, some Aid from Land seems unavoidable. But there will arise a Question, Which is most eligible, under our present Circumstances, a Pound-Rate, or a Monthly Assessment?

A Pound-Rate has the greatest appearance of Equality; but perhaps upon a due Consideration of the Matter, it will be found, that, at this time, it will be less equal upon the whole People, than a Monthly Assessment.

An equal Pound-Rate had been practicable, and would have produc'd a great Sum, in the beginning of the War, when Money was plentiful, and when every County had its due Proportion of it.

But

But is there not Reason to apprehend; That changing the Coin has drawn the Species from the distant Parts of the Kingdom? And does it not seem plain, That the Blood which should circulate in the Veins, is now gather'd all about the Heart? Is it probable that Silver will get down into the North and West, so soon, by a long time, as into the Counties adjacent to *London*?

'Tis evident to any one who understands the Kingdom, That even Thirty Years ago, Money was scarce in the Northern and Western Counties, till long Prosperity, and an immense Trade, had dispers'd it to the remotest Places.

And if it be now drain'd from thence, as there is Ground to think it is, it cannot return thither, but in a Course of Time, by a Vent of their Commodities and Manufactures; which in all likelihood will not proceed fast enough, to put the North and West, forthwith, upon an equal Foot of Taxes, with the rest of *England*, whose quick and near Markets, must supply them immediately from *London* with a greater Plenty of the Species.

So

So that an equal Pound-Rate, which in the beginning of the War, and till the Alteration of the Coin, was adviseable, and would have hinder'd us from running so much in Debt, does for a while seem not so well to consist with the Geometrical Proportion which should be always observ'd in Taxing a Nation: And in these Matters, he who would form a Scheme for the Publick Good, must change his Measures, as Circumstances alter.

l.

The Pound-Rate, 1 Gul. & Mar. at 3 s. per Pound, yielded ———	}	1,566,627
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The 4 s. per Pound, le- vied with the same Care, should have yielded ———	}	2,088,836
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But the next Pound-Rate, which was 4 Gul. & Mar. yielded but ———	}	1,977,713
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Difference ———		<hr style="width: 100%;"/> 111,123
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And it has every Year since gradually decreas'd; and this last Year perhaps as much as ever, tho' Endeavours have been made

made to ascertain its Collection, by stronger Powers than had been granted before; which have only serv'd to show, (what should have been conceal'd) that the Laws may become Impotent.

This Decrease has not proceeded from any Fall in Rents; but, to speak plainly, the Home-Counties have every Year more and more learnt of their Neighbours, to favour themselves in the levying of this Tax.

In the present Scarcity of Money, if any Latitude be left of avoiding Payment, we must expect it will be taken by many People: And as the Case stands, there seems good Reason to believe, That the Men of Figure and Interest. (who alone can bring about an equal Pound-Rate) will be willing, after Nine Years, to give themselves and others a little Ease. And 'tis to be fear'd, the Assessors particularly, will be more influenc'd by the Power of their Landlords, than by any Oath the Parliament can make to bind 'em to their Duty.

So that, whoever duly considers the present Consumption; the Posture of Trade; the Condition of the Manufactures;

tures, and the quantity of Money now probably remaining in every distinct County, (all which he must do who would form a regular Scheme) will be inclin'd to think, That a Monthly Assessment is more practicable for this Year, will produce more in Proportion, and answer with greater Certainty into the Exchequer, than a Pound-Rate.

l. s. d.

The former Monthly Assessment upon all } 137,641-18-2
England, was ——— }

Which produc'd in } 1,651,702-18-6
 the Year ——— }

R

Of

Of this Sum, <i>Lon- don,</i> <i>Mid- dle- sex,</i> and <i>West- min- ster,</i> yield- ed —	} 175,969-12-0	} 1,651,702-18-0	} <i>l. s. d.</i>
Rest of <i>Eng- land</i>	} 1,475,733-06-0		

Whither a Pound Rate, or an Assesment, shall be best lik'd of; perhaps it will be thought convenient to ease Land of half the Burthen it bore during the War.

Half the former Monthly Assesment upon all *England*, will be —

And produce in the Year — — —

But

But *London, Middlesex, and Westminster*, being very much encreas'd in Wealth and Trade, since the Assessment was first Rated, it may be worth considering, whether it would not be reasonable to keep to a Pound-Rate there, tho' it should be thought convenient to proceed by Assessment with the rest of *England*.

If so, half the former Assessment on all <i>England</i> , exclusive of <i>London, Middlesex; and Westminster</i> , would amount to —————	l. s. d. 737,866-13-0
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And two Shillings in the Pound on <i>London, Middlesex, and Westminster</i> , would amount to —————	153,570-00-0
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By which Method of Taxing, an Aid from Land, might produce	891,436-13-0
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Upon the whole Matter, perhaps it will appear to inquisitive and considering Men, That the distant Parts of *England* stand in need, at this time, of being reliev'd by an Assessment, which

is more easy to them than a Pound-Rate ; That those Taxes the Publick Necessities occasion, can be best born by the Home-Counties, who will soonest Taste the Benefits arising from Peace, and the Trade of this great City ; That most of the Silver Species being now center'd in *London*, and hereabouts, it can be no unequal Dealing, to Rate those Parts which are best able to bear it, in a higher Proportion, than other Places.

In the mixt Aids formerly granted to our Princes, there has been most commonly some Charge upon the People by Poll, which generally speaking, is an Unpleasant, and not a Popular way of raising Money : But where a great Sum is wanting, that must otherwise be laid upon Trade, Land, or its Product, a Poll cannot well be thought unreasonable. 'Tis a sort of Tax that falls hardest upon the Farmer, and Inferiour Rank of Men ; but tho' it has been often levy'd during this War, yet considering what a Price our Native Commodities have all along born, and how high Wages have lately been, the Common People have no Reason to complain of Poll-Money.

The

The Subsidies granted last Year were truly a Poll; and the Article which charg'd the Heads was what produc'd the most. An Aid of the same Nature, excluding the Stock on Land and in Trade, and charging Qualities higher, may be brought to produce in a Year ————— 500,000 *l.*

'Tis true, this Tax was Unpopular; but there may be many Arguments urged why, in this Exigency, it should be repeated once more, and rather made use of than any new way.

It was given for 1,500,000 *l.* and has not yielded near that Sum; it was the principal Fond of the Exchequer Bills, which the Publick Faith is engag'd to discharge speedily: There is a kind of Equity they should be made good out of their first Fond. Such a Sum can be no way rais'd so certainly and soon, nor without creating a great Number of Officers; and so much Mony is hardly to be levy'd but by Excises or Duties that must fall directly upon Land and Trade.

l.

If there can be rais'd from }
Land ————— } 890,000

And by such a kind of }
Poll ————— } 500,000

Here will be near half the {
Sum wanting, *viz.* ————— } 1,390,000

Now he that is to form a general Scheme, should consider what Proportion of the remainder may be levied by Excises or Duties upon our Home-Consumption.

He ought to weigh with himself which is best for the Nation, That the Sum propos'd to arise this way, should be levied in one, or more Years.

If it could be rais'd in One Year, the Publick would be sooner out of Debt; but perhaps it does not consist with the carrying on of Trade, and the other Business of the Kingdom, to raise the whole within the Year.

If the present Payments, which are to continue for a long term of Time, can be

be

be put into such an Order, as not to prejudice Trade, Land, and the Manufactures; it will not be difficult to find Fonds for the 3,000,000 *l.* for this Years Supply of the Government, and to satisfy part of the Debt on Account of Deficiencies and Arrears.

'Tis true, the Debt arising from Deficiencies does in a manner intercept any Aids that can be given this Sessions; He therefore, who would form a Scheme, must duly weigh that Article.

The Three Shilling Aid was given for 1,500,000 *l.* but considering the Tax it self has not well answer'd; that it was paid in Mony, by which there will be a Loss; and considering the Interest, we may allow upon that Article of Deficiency of ——— ——— ——— 350,000 *l.*

	l.
Brought over — — — — —	350,000
The several Subsidies and Duties call'd the Capitation, were given likewise for 1,500,000 l. but the Interest on the Exchequer Bills reckon'd, there may be on that Head, another Deficiency of — — — — —	650,000

The Sale of Annuities, another Fond for 280,000 l. has produc'd nothing; and with Interest on that Head, there is another Deficiency of — — — — —	300,000
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And 'tis very well, if, the One Shilling Aid, and the double Tonnage, and the Malt, occasion not another Deficiency of — — — — —	200,000
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Total, 1,500,000

The Exchequer Bills, to the discharge of which the Publick Faith is engag'd, depend upon these Fonds: And the Act provides, *That all Bills which shall or may be issued out, as well for 1,500,000 l. as 1,200,000 l. which shall not be Cancell'd by*
the

the Produce of the said Fonds or Supplies, granted for the Service of the War that Year, by the 25th of March, 1698. shall be satisfy'd, taken and Cancell'd as well by the Arrears of the said Fonds, which shall be then standing out, as by and out of the Money which shall arise by any Aid, which shall be granted in the next Session of Parliament. And the Malt Act provides, That if the Produce of that Duty is so low, as not to yield before the 20th of April, 1698. 800,000 l. the Deficiency shall be made good out of the first Aid to be granted after that Day.

If any considerable part of these Deficiencies are remov'd over to remote Fonds, there is an end of all sort of Credit.

And if what shall be thought necessary for the Government, be supply'd by Fonds of that Nature, the Publick will be eaten out with Usury.

No Man will advise a farther Breach of Credit, and all the Kingdom would be glad to see Interest at a lower Rate, which can never be, while Remote Fonds constrain the Government to borrow.

'Tis

'Tis easy to form a Scheme which may put off the evil Day for a while, by removing the present Burthen, and laying it upon the Years to come; but such Measures can hardly be consistent with the good of *England*.

Many People, in the beginning of this War, did not care to levy Mony by Excises; and yet we are insensibly fall'n into them, having enter'd upon those Measures by degrees; which, if we had gone into early, and all at once, the Peace peradventure had been long ago concluded: We pay now in Excises,

By the Additional 9 Pence for a long term of Time, — — —	<i>l. per Annum.</i>
}	435,950

By the Duty on Salt, a Perpetuity of — — —	}	105,000
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By the Duty on Stamp Paper for near 10 Years,	}	44,800
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Carry over — — —	585,750
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Brought

Brought over, ———— 585,750

By a new Du-
ty on Paper, ———— } 10,000

By a Duty on
Malt for 3 Years, } 600,000

By a Duty on
Leather, ———— } 100,000

By a Duty on
Glas-Ware, &c. } 10,000

Total, 1,305,750 per Annum.

A Yearly Addition of about 700,000 *l.* to this Sum, with what has all along been rais'd from Land, would have supply'd the Years Expence: For in all likelihood, Four Millions answer'd within the Year, would every way have gone as far as Five Millions, granted by Credits upon distant Fonds; since more than a Fifth Part of what has been Yearly given, was consum'd in Discompt, high Interest, and exorbitant Premiums: So that, by raising the Four Millions within the Year, we should have avoided that large Debt, which now presses so hard upon the Nation.

If

If our Affairs had been put into this Order, the Government might be now supported by the ordinary Revenue of the Crown, without any Charge upon Land, or any new Impositions and Duties upon the People: And if this had been done, we should pay at this time to the Publick, but the twentieth part of our Annual Income, as we did before the War.

But as the Case stands, some further Excises seem unavoidable; unless it be judg'd convenient rather to run more and more in Debt, or to lay yet a greater Burthen upon Land and Trade.

And if it should be thought for the Publick Good to go upon Excises, it will not be difficult to find Commodities, which may be the proper Objects of a Revenue, that shall raise what may be wanting.

But he who is to form a Scheme of this kind, should take Care, so to contrive his Proposal, that the Weight of such a Duty may neither lie too hard upon one sort of People, nor press too much upon Land-Interest, or Foreign Traffick.

Not

Not to oppress particular Trades, the Duties should rather lie on Three or Four, than on One or Two Materials.

Not to hurt Land, nor Trade, the Impositions should be divided, and partly laid on the Consumption of our Home, and partly on the Consumption of Commodities that are of Foreign Importation.

Such Duties will affect Land and Trade less, by how much farther they are laid from the first Vender; and by how much nearer they are plac'd to the last Buyer or Consumptioner.

For which Reason, such Materials of our own Growth, as it shall be thought fit to lay a Duty on, should be charg'd, when they are in the last Venders Hands, or when they have had the last Improvement or Manufacture.

In the same manner, Foreign Materials or Manufactures, made from thence, are charg'd with less Prejudice to Trade, in the Hands of the last Improver or Retailer.

For

For in all these Instances, less Stock is requir'd for the Payment of the Duty; towards which, by this way of Charging, more Hands contribute; and the quickness of Returns, in buying, and selling, make it less felt by the whole People: Whereas it is an immediate and dead Weight upon Land and Trade, when the Charge is directly upon the first Vender at Home, or the first Importer from abroad.

'Tis true, this way of Charging renders the Revenue more difficult in the Collection; but he is not fit to go about a Scheme of this Nature, who cannot obviate that Difficulty, and propose Materials, both Domestick and Foreign, where the Duty may be come at easily, and by a small number of Hands, with the Assistance of the present Excise and Custom-house Officers.

One of the Objections against Revenues, laid upon our Home-Consumption, is, The Fraud and Exaction it gives a Rise to, among the Retailers, who, in these Cases, raise the value of their Goods more than the Duty comes to; but this is only in the beginning, when the Revenue

venue is new; for in a small compass of time, all Commodities whatsoever find their just and natural Price, in which they settle at last.

The Writer of these Papers did once think, That the general Fraud of Retailers might be prevented by a Law of Assize, as in *Essay on Ways and Means*, p. 125. but he here retracts that Opinion, being convinc'd, by a farther Insight into these sort of Matters, that Assizes are impracticable, and a Bar to Industry: However with this Distinction, That an Assize, or Limitation of the Price of the Commodity, by the Magistrate, may be for publick Advantage, where the Goodness of the Commodity is in its Nature uniform, so that one cannot improve upon it, or give it a more real Value than another; of which kind are the Bread, and Salt, in common Use. But where the Matter is capable of Melioration by Skill, Art and Care, as Flesh, Drink, and several other Things, there, perhaps, 'tis most for the Publick Good, that the Price should be uncertain and free, as an Encouragement to such, who by Skill and Industry, are desirous to excel others.

The

The Author of that Essay is not ashamed to acknowledg this Error, or any other Mistake he shall be guilty of in these Discourses, since he handles Matters very difficult, and a Subject intirely new, where he can have but little Help from Books.

His principal Aim is to hunt after Truth, and consequently he weds no Opinion, in all these Matters, that he is not willing to change upon better Conviction. To write of the Income and Expence of a whole People, and the Publick Revenues, is travelling in an undiscover'd Country: And if his Draughts and Maps are imperfect at first, he shall mend them upon other Lights, and further Information: And in the meanwhile he hopes these his Endeavours will be taken in good Part; and that his right Intentions to the Publick Service, shall commute for his want of Skill in the Performance.

They who treat of these Affairs, subject themselves to Censure, Answers, and a Paper-War, and must contract many Enemies; but he shall slight all this, if he can give any the least Help or Hint,

Hint, to such as make the Welfare and Prosperity of this Nation their Care and Study, and who are desirous to render the Peace lasting to *England*, and the King's Government easy to him, after all his Toils and Hazards abroad, by placing the Publick Debts in a Course of Payment, and by putting his Revenues in some Order.

And they who are forming a Scheme to this purpose, will perhaps, upon Inquiry, find, (if the Necessities of the State require three Millions to be rais'd) that it may be done by a mix'd Aid, consisting of a Charge upon Land, a Poll, and some new Duties upon our Home-Consumption of Commodities, Foreign and Domestick.

But such as employ their Thoughts upon these Matters, should so contrive their Scheme, if possible, that the Publick may not be consum'd with Interest and Premiums, and that it may fully operate for what it shall be granted.

In this Juncture, nothing can be more advantagious to the Kingdom, than to beat down the Price of Money and lower Interest; for till that can be done Taxes

will be high, and Trade of necessity must languish.

While the State is compell'd to give high Interest, all Contrivances and Laws to lessen it, will, in the Event, be found ineffectual.

But the Price of Money will fall of course, if Affairs can be so order'd, that the Government shall be less constrain'd to borrow for the future.

The Bulk of the Sum wanting, must undoubtedly arise from Land and a Poll. And it will not be difficult to point out some Branches of our Home-Consumption, that may bear such new Duties as to yield about 410,000 *l. per Annum*, and if they are charg'd for two Years, they will produce 820,000 *l.* There is a way likewise of raising 200,000 *l.* within the Year, and not by any Excise.

Nor will it be hard to propose a way of raising a considerable Sum, with laying but a light present Tax upon the Body of the People; and where such as are to lay down this Money, may find their own Accompt by supplying the Government; and who, peradventure, will be
contented

contented with a remote Fond, provided they may have a good Fond settled, for the Payment of their Interest.

As for Example, Suppose some Societies and Bodies of Men, for an Establishment and Priviledges to be granted, should consent to bind themselves to lay down a considerable Sum, by two or four Payments within a Year, and be willing to take a Security for their Mony out of the General Fond settled last Year, for making good Deficiencies, and their Tallies to come after the whole Debt that is already upon that Fond.

Suppose then, that to the several Branches which compose that General Fond, another Branch were added which might produce wherewithal to pay Interest, and that the Sum to be lent were thereunto annex'd.

It has been shown, That the Debt now upon it, even according to the present Produce of the respective Branches, will be clear'd in less than Eight Years. And if those Revenues can be so improv'd as to yield what may be justly expected from the Consumption of the Materials charg'd; such a General Fond

will not only be sufficient to clear the Engagements already upon it, but likewise may be able to pay off this new Sum to be lent, perhaps within the same term of Time.

And for a good Establishment and Priviledges to be granted, 'tis probable that there are Societies of Men, who, to give a greater Certainty to their Affairs, and to make them more consistant, would be willing to supply the Government with a considerable Loan, and to stay for their Principal the whole Eight Years; if, in the mean while, they are allow'd a moderate Interest for their Mony.

Suppose then they should be thus join'd to the General Fond, their Principal to come after the whole present Debt, a Duty of 4 Pence *per* Bushel on Salt would produce 36000 *l. per Annum*; which will be a Fond to pay their Interest, at 6 *l. per Cent.*

As to the Debt by Arrears, at the winding up of our Bottom, after this long War, it has been here stated at 1,700,000 *l.* and there is Reason to fear it exceeds that Sum; but be it more or less, 'tis to be doubted part of it cannot be

be well postpon'd, and of necessity must break into the 3,000,000 *l.* which per-adventure will be this Year wanting; and for such the Wisdom of the State will make Provision.

But it may be worth the Consideration of such as would form a Scheme of this Nation's Business, Whither it might not be adviseable to annex to the General Fond, establish'd last Year for making good former Deficiencies, such Debts as will admit of a Delay, but which in Justice ought to have some Security.

And this General Fond, with the Addition of some new Branch, by the First of *August*, 1706. would probably clear Principal and Interest of our whole Debts of this kind; especially considering that Peace, and a better Conduct in the Revenues, without doubt will Improve every particular Branch.

'Tis true, at first Sight, Tallies coming after so large a Debt, may seem very remote; but when Peace shall have given a Consistency to Things, and a fresh Reputation to the Exchequer, Securities upon the Publick, to which there is a reasonable Interest annex'd, will not in

all likelihood be less esteem'd for the distance of the Fond, especially if the Fond is substantial, as this must be; and such a One, as from it, the Principal, in a limited time, may be expected.

And these Tallies would yet have a greater Value, if one thing could be brought about; their Fonds are to continue still Nine Years, which is a term of Time liable to many Changes and Accidents: Upon which Accompt, this general Fond would be much more esteem'd, if a Law could be obtain'd, to make any voluntary Misapplication of this, or any other Parliament Security more Criminal than it is at present; and if it were render'd Capital, it would peradventure better consist with the King's Profit, and with the Liberties of *England*.

	l	
If there can be rais'd from		
Land, —————	}	890,000
By a Poll, —————		500,000
And from a Duty not con-	}	200,000
sisting in Excises, —————		
And by Excises in Two	}	820,000
Years, —————		
By Loans on remote Fonds,	}	600,000
from several Societies, for		
Establishments and Privi-	}	
leges to be granted, —————		
		—————

There will be rais'd for
 Deficiencies, Arrears, and the
 Years Expence, ————— } 3,010,000

According to		l.
such a Scheme,	}	
there would not		
be rais'd upon the	}	2,000,000
People within the		
Year, above—————		
There is already	}	3,300,000
paid —————		
		—————

So that we
 should not exceed } 5,300,000 An. Pay.

Or not quite the
 Eighth Penny out } 44,000,000 An. Inc.
 of —————

For which Reason, it is perhaps better, rather to lay some Excises for Two Years, than so many as will raise the same Sum in One Year; it being peradventure not consistant with the good of Trade, and the other Business of the Nation, that our Payments should exceed the Eighth Penny of our Annual Income.

And upon the same Accompt, it may perhaps be adviseable, to make some Agreement with particular Societies, because a considerable Sum may be thereby rais'd, without charging the Body of the People with a new Imposition; nor will it be hard to find out such Materials to charge, as that the Duties may be collected by about Forty Officers.

If the Aid from Land be by a Monthly Assessment, it will produce with certainty whatever 'tis given for. A Poll, something in the Nature of what was levy'd last Year, will answer Quarterly. The 200,000 *l.* here mention'd, will likewise arise Quarterly. The Six Hundred Thousand Pound Loans to be made upon Consideration, will be as good as ready Mony. And the new Duties arising in Two Years, Tallies struck upon them, will
serve

serve to many Uses, as well as Money it self. So that if Three Millions could be levy'd this way, the Government would be out of the Hands of the Money'd Men and Usurers, which would prove very beneficial to the Kingdom; for if the Publick is not compell'd to borrow, the Price of Money must fall of Course; and till Interest is some way or other lower'd, Trade can never Flourish.

And here, perhaps, it may not be unreasonable to take notice, That it would be for the general Good of Trade, if the Bank of *England* were restrain'd by Law, from allowing Interest for running Cash: For the Ease of having from thence Three or Four *per Cent*, without Trouble or Hazard, must be a continual Bar to Industry, and has lately occasion'd such a Stagnation of the Species in their Hands, as by no manner of Means can be adviseable to suffer.

And now, in a few Words, to recapitulate our whole Matter, we have endeavour'd to show, That the Publick of this Country may sooner emerge out of its Difficulties, than either *France* or *Holland*.

That

That according to the Produce of the Revenues in 1695. the Debts may be paid off in about Eight Years; that they may be clear'd sooner, if the respective Branches are improv'd to the utmost Advantage; and that, the Nation which can first be disengag'd, will soonest tast the Benefits of Trade and Peace.

As to the Observations that relate to the raising this Years Supply, peradventure they may serve as little Hints and Helps, to those who are forming a good and regular Scheme of the Nation's Business.

The Writer of these Papers has met with extream Difficulty and Opposition, in procuring the sight of the Accompts relating to the Revenue, which perhaps is not a fair way of proceeding, with one, who endeavours and bends his whole Study to do the Publick Service. The Books of the Principal Offices have been in a manner shut up against any Inquiry he desir'd to make; and this has render'd his Work more imperfect, than peradventure it would have otherwise been: However, he hopes not to have committed any material Error, in stating the Annual Produce of the chief Duties.

This

This Discourse was written in *October* last, at which time, it was impossible to guess what the new Impositions on *Glass-Ware, Earthen-Ware, Tobacco-Pipes, Paper, Parchment, and Vellum,* might yield; but since the first Sheets of this Tract were Printed off, he has procur'd the following Accompt.

	l.	s.	d.
Glass-Duty, from the 29th <i>September</i> , 1695. to the 17th <i>August</i> , 1697.	}	24953	0--7½.

Pipes, and Earthen- Ware, from the 17th of <i>May</i> , 1696. to the 17th <i>August</i> , 1697. ———	}	20389	8--19
--	---	-------	-------

Paper, Parchment, and Vellum, from the 1st <i>May</i> , to the 15th <i>Novem-</i> <i>ber</i> , 1697. ——— ———	}	9114	2--6¼.
---	---	------	--------

And if the Acts of Parliament, which grant these Duties, were revis'd, and inforc'd with some new Clauses for the better ascertaining their Collection, they might be brought to yield *per Annum*, about

=====	—	55,000 l.
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We

	<i>l.</i>
We have computed the	}
Deficiencies at _____	1,500,000
And the Arrears at _____	1,700,000
	<hr style="width: 100%;"/>
In all	3,200,000

It was not pretended to be exact in this last Calculation ; but it was necessary to lay down some Ground, upon which we might fix our Reasonings, and draw those Conclusions we were to make from thence. However, in the Article of Deficiencies, we are come very near the Truth ; which is a great Confirmation of the Rules and Art the Writer goes by, and a Proof that his Computations are not made at Random. He might indeed be guided by Political Arithmetick, to guess what the Deficiencies might amount to ; but the Art of Reasoning upon Things by Figures, could not let him into the Knowledge of that Debt, which arises from Arrears to the Fleet and Army : And he is now inform'd they are as follows.

The

l. s. d.

The Deficiencies
are computed at — } 1,493,000 00 0

The Arrears to
the Land-Forces,
Guards and Garri-
fons, — — } 2,028,818 04 9 $\frac{1}{2}$.

The Arrear of the
Extraordinary Charg
of the War — } 428,055 10 0

The Arrears to
the *Irish* Forces — } 99,951 18 4

The Arrears to
the Office of Ordi-
nance (over & above
178104 *l.* 14 *s.* 10 $\frac{1}{4}$ *d.*
which they have in
deficient Tallies) — } 26,052 11 5 $\frac{1}{4}$.

The Arrears to the
Navy (over and a-
bove One Million
which the Treasurer
has in his Hands of
deficient Tallies) — } —————

Deficiencies and Ar-
rears together — } 5,598,401 04 7 $\frac{1}{4}$.

This

This is a very large new Debt ; but perhaps when it comes to be examin'd, it will appear, That part of the Arrears arise from the fore-mention'd, or from some of the present Deficiencies. But we must here again repeat; That if the several Branches which compose the Publick Revenue, had been managed and improv'd to the best Advantage, a great Share of this Incumbrance had been avoided.

When a State is in Disorder, and plung'd in Debts and Difficulties, it is a Duty incumbent upon all Men, at such a time, not to entertain Dispair, but rather, in that Juncture, to embrace the Government more warmly than before, as the *Romans* did after their Defeat at *Cannæ* : And when the Common Wealth is afflicted, every one ought to lend a helping Hand towards mending and restoring her Condition, and to imploy all the Faculties of his Body and Mind in her Service.

War does of necessity introduce Corruption of Manners, and loose Administration ; both which are attended with private Poverty, and publick Want.

When

When a few Years have, in a great degree, wasted what had been gathering by the Care and Wisdom of many Ages; when the Publick Revenues are ill conducted, and reduced to little; when a Country has lost some of its richest Trafficks, and is in danger to lose the rest; when the Wants of a State cannot be supply'd by a willing People; when those who are trusted, know not what to ask, where every Thing is granted; nor what to do, when every Thing is left to their Discretion; when most Councils have unsuccessful Events, and Affairs in general proceed amiss; to occasion all this there must be some latent Disease, or Ulcer in the Body-Politick, which is not to be thoroughly cured by applying Remedies to the sick Part, but by mending the whole Mass of Blood that is corrupted.

•

The Publick can never have a firm Existence, unless all the different Ranks of Men co-operate to its Preservation, not faintly, but with the utmost Spirit and Vigour.

For, if among those in high Stations, there is not an Affection which warmly
em-

embraces the Honour and Interest of the Common-wealth; and if the same Genius does not universally possess the Inferior Order of People, such supine Negligence and giddy Administration will creep into the State, as must be attended at last with certain Ruin.

If it be the Interest of a great many to promote Disorder, the Affairs of a Country will proceed amiss, notwithstanding all the Endeavours of a wise and virtuous Prince, and a good Senate: Therefore to mend Things rightly, the whole People must be mended.

To bring this about, in all likelihood, the best Ways are by Precepts and Examples to inspire, as many as possible with a true Zeal and Affection to their Native Country; To cultivate in the Minds of the Common People, a due Reverence to Religion; To advance Morality among the better sort; To give all Men in general an honest Interest; and, to make Virtue and Merit the only Road to Greatness and Preferment.

It may perhaps be beneficial and safe in a Tyranny, to let all Things loose, and deprave the Manners of the People; for
the

the Light is thereby extinguish'd, that would otherwise be troublesome and too discerning; but 'tis not so with Lawful Governments, where the Prince and People compose one Body; since if the Inferior Members are there infected, the Disease will produce such unwholsome Fumes and Vapours, as may reach and hurt the Head at last.

After a Country has been long afflicted with Calamities, occasion'd by Foreign or Civil Wars, the Minds of the People will take different Turns; sometimes to great Piety, and, at other Seasons, to the height of Vice: The *Romans*, after the *Gauls* had Sack'd and Burnt *Rome*, were presently kindled with new Devotion, they reviv'd their ancient Justice and Discipline, they restor'd those Old and almost obsolete Laws, that were the chief Strength of their Constitution, and they reassum'd their former Virtue. But after the Civil Wars, in the Times of *Galba*, *Otho*, and *Vitellius*, they were not at all better'd by their Miseries (which is the worst Symptom of a deprav'd People) and rather plung'd deeper into Wickedness. For when *Vespasian's* Party seiz'd the City, there were in some Streets Rapine and Murders, and in
T
others

others Feasting and Prostitution; so that one and the same Town gave the View of a raging War and a riotous Peace.

Wise Lawgivers, and Directors of a People, may make advantage of a favourable Crisis. As for Example, when a long War is at an end, they may take that time to reform the Vices of the Age; for at such a Season, when Poverty is grown upon 'em, Men will probably be more willing to listen after Virtue, and those Methods by which their Condition is to be restor'd.

Nothing prevails more with the Multitude, nor operates better towards their Amendment, than the Example of the great Ones: If such are seen to content themselves with moderate Power, Wealth and Honours, it teaches those below 'em to be temperate in their Desires: By which means, Faction may be quite rooted out, which in most Soils is but a Weed that grows from the Disappointment of ambitious Hopes; and where Faction can be destroy'd, Government is render'd much more easy to the Rulers, and without doubt less expensive; for when that reigns, Men expect to be
be

be highly courted, and largely paid for looking after their own Safety.

Dishonesty has nothing in it so very Charming, but that Mankind might be perswaded to lay it quite aside, (at least in Relation to the Publick) if they could do their Business in the World with other Aids, and by any other Way. For why, in the late Reigns, did so many Protestants help on the Designs of Popery? Because it was the only means of obtaining Greatness and Preferment. Why, in former Times, were we betray'd by some Persons? Because the Court had made selling the People's Rights, a gainful Traffick. But if Men could have mounted up to Wealth and Honours by any other Steps; If those, who were then at the Helm, had employ'd and rewarded such as they had seen Zealous for the Religion of their Country, jealous of its Liberties, and careful of its Safety; if general Integrity had been taken notice of, and call'd into the Offices of the State; by degrees the Age would have mended of it self: Vice and Folly must have withdrawn and been out of Countenance, and Virtue and good Sense might perhaps at last have gotten the upper Hand.

T 2

Any

Any Body of Men that have but one way to Honours and Advancement, will take that Course, tho' it be never so much out of the Road of Honesty: And if there is but one Place where Offices and Dignities grow, and are gather'd, thither Men will get, whatever it shall cost them.

Any Faculty of the Mind, whither for Use or for Pleasure, which is in great Vogue and Estimation, will be cultivated and improv'd; and Men will bend their whole Study to excel in what they see most pleasing or most advantagious.

'Tis the same Thing with Vice and Virtue, either of 'em thrive as they are encourag'd or discountenanc'd. Bar but the Gate to Vice, and Men will desire to enter and advance themselves in the World by Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Integrity, Zeal for the Publick, Magnanimity, and true Wisdom.

But if another Mark be set up, and all their Aims directed thither, they will endeavour to rise and prosper as others have done, by Fraud, servile Compliance, Treachery, Artifice, Bribery, Tricks,
and

and corrupted Eloquence ; and when a Common-wealth is thus abandon'd, even some of those in good Esteem are contented to come in and take their Share of the Plunder.

In a free Country, 'tis the Concern and Interest of Princes, That Virtue should be restor'd to her just Value and rightful Dominion, and that Vice should for ever be depos'd, and especially banish'd from the Place in which are bred up their Men of Action and Council.

When Men quit the Paths of Virtue, which lead to true Wisdom, they are presently bewilder'd in Errors: And till they get again into the right Road, and observe her Dictates and Directions, nothing is to be expected but Misery and Confusion. When Men leave Honesty, Wisdom forsakes them, and mixes no longer in their Councils: And the general Immoralities of a People, embolden weak and ill Persons to thrust themselves into the Administration of Business, who, void of all Skill and Art, cast the Common-wealth upon Rocks, where she is like to split and perish: And in such a Country, unless there be an universal Tendency in the Whole, to be guided by
the

the Principles of former Honour, its Affairs must impair daily, till, at last, in the Course of a few Years, it shall be quite lost and utterly extinguish'd.

In a free Country, if a few of the most Conspicuous Persons in it do but agree, to lay to Heart the Honour and Safety of the Publick; they will go very far towards it's Preservation, or at least keep off the Evil Day for a while. For when Fortune had undertaken to destroy the Common-Wealth of *Rome*, the single Virtue of *Cato* held her long in Play, and gave her a great deal of Opposition: Much more than in a Nation, were many yet remain untainted, may those good Patriots, if they will exert themselves, preserve its Constitution against the Attempts of designing Men; who are very far from having the Wealth of *Crassus*, the Fame of *Pompey*, or *Cæsar's* Conduct; and who indeed resemble the Subverters of the *Roman* Liberty, in nothing but the Luxury and Rage of *Clodius*.

When Things go amiss in a State, Men are apt to blame the Ministers; tho' such Errors (the Corruption of the People consider'd) perhaps were not to be avoided. For

For a Country may have been so de-
prav'd in a long Proceſs of Time, that
its Affairs cannot ſuddenly be capable of
a good and ſound Adminiſtration.

But if any Corruptions are crept into
the ſubordinate parts of this Govern-
ment, they will be undoubtedly cor-
rected in Times of Peace and Quiet.
Eſpecially, ſince ſuch as love their Coun-
try, and would prevent it's Ruin, will
be aſſiſted in their Endeavours, by a
Prince dispos'd by Intereſt and Inclina-
tion, to promote it's Welfare. The King's
Virtues will reform the Age; and his
Wiſdom, at the Head of the Legiſlative
Authority, can put the Affairs of this
Nation upon ſuch a Foot, as may ex-
tricate the Publick out of all its Debts
and Engagements.

And ſo far as to the Publick Revenues:
In the Second Part, the Writer of theſe
Papers will offer ſomething concerning
the Trade of *England*.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page	line	read
93	2	unknowing
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Jacobi Rohaulti Physica. Latine redidit,
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 vit. *S. Clark.* A. B. C. G: C. C. Acce-
 sit Index rerum & Phænomenorum
 Præcipuorum. Cum Figuris. 8vo.
 Printed for *J. Knapton.*

A
DISCOURSE
UPON
IMPROVING
THE
REVENUE
OF THE
STATE
OF
ATHENS.

Written Originally in *Greek* by *Xenophon*.
And made *English* from the Original, with
some Historical Notes: By *W. M. Esq;*

LONDON,

Printed for *J. Knapton*, at the *Crown* in
St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1697.

TO THE
AUTHOR
OF THE
ESSAY
UPON
Ways and Means.

S I R,

AT length the WAR, which has been carry'd on for so many Years, with such Expence of Blood, and Treasure to the Nation, is at an End; and

A a 2

we

we have the fairest Prospect imaginable of a lasting P E A C E, and a happy Settlement under the Government of a Prince, who after He has employ'd His Arms abroad with so much Succes for the Defence of our Liberties ; will, we hope, turn all His Councils to the finishing so Glorious a Design, and be as Renown'd to future Ages, for the Peaceful Arts of Government, as for His Military Virtues : As His Courage has made us Safe, so His Wisdom, undoubtedly, will make us Rich and Happy, by the improvement of our Navigation, and the increase of our Trade : For 'tis to Trade we owe the Rise and Progress of the *English* Greatness, that has enabled us to support so tedious a War against the most formidable Power which has been known in Europe for these many Ages, and that alone can enable us to discharge the vast Debts we have

CON-

contracted by the W A R. Trade being of such mighty Consequence to the Interest of the Nation, will, we hope, meet with due Encouragement and Protection from our Laws, and will be settled under the ablest Management, and the wisest Regulation. These Branches of our Commerce which have been impair'd or lost by the Piratick W A R, and the fatal Interruption of our Navigation, may be retriev'd by the P E A C E, and other Trades, and particularly that with *France*, which the Negligence, or the mistaken Counsells of the last Reigns had settled upon a Foot so destructive to our Interest, may be establish'd to our Advantage in a new Treaty of Commerce. The great Trade to the *East-Indies* with some few Regulations, might be establish'd upon a Bottom more consistent with the Manufactures of *England*; but in all Appearance, this is not to be

compass'd, unless some publick spirited Man with a Masterly Genius be plac'd at the Head of our Affairs in *India*; and though we who are his Friends, are loath to loose him, 'twere to be wish'd, for the Good of the Kingdom, that the Gentleman whom common Fame, and the Voice of the World, have pointed out as the ablest Man for such a Station, would employ his excellent Judgment and Talents that way, in the Execution of so usefull a Design.

The general Interest of a Nation, ought to be the Care of particular Men, the main bent of their Studies, and the chief Pursuit of their Inquiries: Every Man ought to set his helping Hand to such a Work: And your own generous Labours upon this Subject, have set an excellent Pattern to the rest of the World. To this End I present

sent you with a Translation of this Discourse of *Xenophon* upon the Subject of *Revenue and Trade*, and I fancy it will be no unwelcome Entertainment to you, to find your own admirable Observations upon these Matters, confirm'd by the Authority of one of the greatest Men that ever Antiquity produc'd, and the only ancient Author upon this Subject, which is now extant. You will admire the Force and Solidity of his Observations, the Exactness of his Calculations, the justness, and freedom of his Thoughts, not confin'd to the narrow Notions of Parties and Factions, and the vigour of his Judgment and Eloquence at so great an Age. The general Rules for the Increase of Riches and Trade, are either directly advanc'd, or may be very naturally deduc'd from this Discourse. That admirable Maxim *That the true Wealth and Greatness of a*

Nation, consists in Numbers of People, well employ'd, is every where inculcated throughout the whole Course of the Treatise. And I believe Xenophon was the first Author that ever argu'd by Political Arithmetick, or the Art of Reasoning upon things by Figures, which has been improv'd by some able Heads of our own Nation, and carry'd to the highest Perfection by your own successful Inquiries.

As for what relates to my Translation, I have rather chosen to render the Sense and Meaning of the Author, than his Words, or his Manner: The Purity, Politeness, and the unaffected Simplicity of his Stile, are Graces not to be copy'd by the Barrenness and Barbarity of our Modern Languages.

I hope the Translation is faithful, and exact; if there are any Mistakes,
I de-

I desire the candid Reader to forgive them : I have added some Historical Notes at the End, to explain some Difficulties relating to the Law and Customs of the *Grecian* People. I am,

S I R,

Your very Affectionate Friend,

W. M.

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A
DISCOURSE
UPON
Improving the Revenue
OF THE
STATE
OF
ATHENS.

I Always held it for a certain Maxim, that Governments resembled their Governors, and that the Prosperity, or Declension, the Vigor or Decay of all States, was deriv'd from the Virtues and Vices, the Abilities or Weakness
of

of their Rulers: But since 'tis generally alleadg'd in vindication of the *Athenian* Ministry, that they understand the common Principles of Justice as well as the rest of Mankind; but that they are compell'd by the (1.) Necessities of the common People to oppress their (2.) Confederate Cities with unreasonable Tributes, and Taxes: I have attempted to examin whither this Apology is well grounded, and whither they are not capable by the Native Riches, and Revenue of the State of *Athens*, to maintain the whole Body of our People, which is the justest, and most honourable Provision can be thought of: For I imagine if such a Design could be compass'd, that the Wants of the People would be more effectually reliev'd, and the Jealousies, and Suspensions of our Neighbours would be quieted.

Upon a general view of the whole Matter, it appear'd to me that the *Athenian* Territory is capable of affording a mighty Income, and Revenue, the truth of which Assertion may be easily evinc'd by a brief Survey of the State, and Nature of the Country.

The Fruits of the Earth, and Native Products of our Soil, are a Proof of the temperature of our Climate; and the mildness

mildness of our Seasons ; for we have Plants which bear in great abundance in our Country, which will never grow in others ; and our Sea, as well as Land, abounds in all Things necessary for Life, or Luxury : Add to this, that all the Blessings which the Gods have made peculiar to the different Seasons of the Year, begin earlier, and end later with us, than in any Part of the World.

Besides the vast plenty we enjoy of perishable Goods, our Soil affords us some staple and permanent Commodities, such as our noble Quarries of Marble, out of which are drawn the best Materials for the Building, and Ornament of Temples, and for the Altars and Statues of the Gods, and which both the *Greeks*, and barbarous Nations set a high Value upon.

And where the Soil is too barren to receive the common Improvements of Husbandry, it contains hidden Treasures, which will feed a much greater Number of Mouths, than any arable Lands can doe : For the Divine Bounty has bestow'd upon us inexhaustible Mines of Silver, an Advantage which we enjoy above all our Neighbouring Cities by Sea, and Land, who never yet could disco-

discover one Vein of Silver Oar in all their Dominions.

We have Reason likewise to believe that *Athens* is seated in the Center of *Greece*, and the habitable World; for all Nations are incommoded with more intense Degrees of Heat or Cold in proportion to their * distance from us; and that we lie in the Heart of *Greece* is evident, for all Travellers, that pass by Sea or Land, from one Extremity of *Greece* to the other, must take *Athens* in their Way.

*He means
North or
South.

And tho' *Attica* is no Island, yet we have the same Benefit of Trading with all Winds, for we are bounded on two Sides by the Sea, and by being join'd to the Continent we have the Convenience of driving on an Inland Traffick.

Other Cities lie expos'd to the Fury of barbarous Nations, but we are so far from having so ill a Neighbourhood, that the States that border immediately upon us, lie at a remote distance from them.

To all those Advantages which conspire to the Felicity, and greatness of our State, and which we owe to the happy Situation, and the native Wealth of our Country, a mighty Improvement might
be

be made by the Institution of publick Laws, in favour of Strangers that establish themselves among us; for besides the general Benefits deriv'd to all Cities from Numbers of People, our Strangers would be so far from living on the Publick, and receiving Pensions from the State as our own Citizens do, that they would maintain themselves, and be the Foundation of the Noblest Branch of our Revenue by the Payment of the (3.) Aliens Duties.

An effectual Inducement to the Settlement of Foreigners among us might be establish'd, by taking off all those publick Marks of Dishonour from them which are of no Service, nor Advantage to the State, and by excusing them from serving among our heavy arm'd Troops; for an Exemption from the Dangers of War, and from the necessity of being absent from their Families, and (4.) Trades, would be a very powerful Encouragement.

'Tis likewise the Interest of the Common-Wealth, rather to fight our Battles with our own Troops, than to keep up in our Armies, a mixture of *Lydians*, *Phrygians* and *Syrians*, and all kinds of barbarous Nations, out of whom the greatest Number of our Aliens are compos'd.

Besides

Besides the Advantage of avoiding the Confusion such a Mixture of Troops produces, 'twould be more for our Reputation Abroad, to trust the Fortune of our State to the Courage, and Valour of our own Citizens, than in the Hands of Foreigners,

Besides all other proper encouragement to Strangers, the Priviledge of being (5.) inroll'd among our Horse, would more warmly unite them in our Interests, and prove a solid Foundation of Strength, and greatness to the State.

'Twould be likewise a strong Inducement to greater Numbers of considerable Strangers to plant among us, if we gave the (6.) wast Ground within our Walls to be built on by such of them as deserv'd, and desir'd it of the Publick.

The Institution of a new (7.) Magistracy, like the (8.) publick Guardians of our Orphans, for the protection, and Security of Strangers, with Rewards of Honours, and Dignities to those, who by their Care, and Industry, procur'd the most numerous Settlements of Foreigners among us, would gain the Affections of our Aliens, and would have a very happy Effect, in drawing a vast

con-

concourse of * Exiles, and Strangers to live under the Protection of our Government, and augment our publick Revenue.

* Exiles.
Απόλιδες.
Men
whose Ci-
ties have
been de-
stroy'd.

That of all Cities, *Athens* lies the fairest for inviting an extended Commerce, is evident from the convenience of our Stations, and Harbours, where Ships can ride secure in all Weather. And whereas in other trading Cities, Merchants are fore'd to barter one Commodity for another, in regard their Coin is not current abroad, we abound not only in Manufactures, and Products of our own Growth, sufficient to answer the Demands of all Foreign Traders, but in case they refused to export our Goods, in return for their own, they may trade with us to Advantage, by receiving Silver in exchange for them, (9.) which transported to any other Market, would pass for more than they took it for at *Athens*.

'Twould be a great Encouragement to Commerce, if Prizes, and Rewards were allotted to such (10.) Judges of the Court-Merchant, as made the quickest, and justest Determination of all Causes relating to Trade, that the Merchant might not loose the Benefit of his Market by an attendance upon the Courts of Justice.

B b

'Twould

'Twould be likewise for the Honour and Advantage of the Publick, to give the first Rank (11.) and Precedence in all publick Places to Foreign Sea-men, and Merchants, and to invite to the publick Feasts of the City, such of them as by their Ships, or Commodities do service to the State; for this Distinction of Honour as well as the Consideration of their own Profit, would invite them to make quick Returns from their Voyages to so friendly a Government.

And 'tis manifest beyond all Contradiction, that our Trade and Commerce would be extended, our Exportations, and Importations increas'd, and the standing Income, and Revenue of the State improv'd, in proportion to the Number of Foreign Sea-men, and Merchants of all kinds that establish themselves among us.

To the Improvement of these Articles of our Revenue, nothing more is requir'd than a generous Lenity, and Indulgence in our publick Laws, and an universal Encouragement, and Protection to Strangers. But the Improvements that may be added by other Methods to advance our standing Income, will of Necessity require a Settlement of some Publick (12.) Fond.

And

And I have good Grounds to believe that the People will make large Contributions in favour of such a publick Undertaking, when I consider what Sums they advanc'd when we sent Succours to the *Arcadians* under the Command of *Lyfistratus*, and likewise of (13.) *Hegelilaus*.

How often we have set out Squadrons of Gallies by extraordinary Subsidies, without any certain Prospect of Advantage to the State, but this we were all sure of, that no particular Contributor would ever be repaid the whole, or any part of his Money.

But in the present Case no Man can possess a more Honourable, or Advantageous Revenue, than what he will receive in Recompence for his Contribution to this publick Fond: For a Contributor of Ten *Minæ*, will receive a (14.) *Triobolon* a Day from the State, which in a Year's time, amounts to near 20 *per Cent.* which is a running Income as high as the Produce of (15.) *Nautick* Interest: And a Contributor of five *Minæ*, will at the Year's End receive more than a (16.) third Part of the Capital Summ he advanc'd: As for the Body of the People, if they pay in one *Minæ* a Piece, they will in a Year's

B b 2

time

time very near (17.) double their Principal Money, and be paid in the City, without any hazzard, or Contingency, upon the Security of the publick Faith, which is the most certain, and most lasting Profit.

I am of Opinion likewise, that private Strangers, and (18.) foreign Cities, Kings, and Governours, if they had the Honour of being register'd to Posterity in our publick Monuments, and Records, as Benefactors to the State, would mutually vie in emulation who should contribute most largely to the carrying on so generous a Design.

The necessary Fonds being advanc'd, 'twould be for the Honour and Interest of the State, to build a greater Number of publick Inns, and Houses of Entertainment in our Ports, for the use of Sea-men, in the trading Parts of the City for Merchants, and in general for the Reception of all Strangers whatsoever.

And if we build Shops, Ware-houses, and Exchanges for common Retailers, the Rents of the Houses would be a great Addition to our publick Revenues, and the magnificence of the Buildings would be an Ornament to the City.

As the Publick builds Gallies for War, so it might likewise be for the Advantage of the State to make a new Experiment, and build Merchant-Ships for Trade, which might be farm'd out, like the other Branches of our Revenue, upon good Security ; for if this Design was found practicable, it would prove a considerable Article in the Increase of our publick Income.

Our Silver Mines alone, if rightly manag'd, besides all the other Branches of our Revenue, would be an inestimable Treasure to the Publick. But for the Benefit of those who are unskill'd in Inquiries of this Nature, I design to premise some general Considerations upon the true State, and Value of our Silver-Mines, that the Publick, upon a right Information, may proceed to the taking such Measures, and Councils, as may improve them to the best Advantage.

No one ever pretended from Tradition, or the earliest Accounts of Time, to determine when these Mines first began to be wrought, which is a Proof of their Antiquity, and yet as ancient as they are, the Heaps of Rubbish which have been dug out of them, and lie above Ground, bear no Proportion

with the vast Quantities which still remain below, nor does there appear any sensible Decay, or Diminution in our Mines, but as we dig on, we still discover fresh Veins of Silver-Oar in all Parts, and when we had most Labourers at work in the Mines, we found that we had still Business for more Hands than were employ'd.

Nor do I find that the Adventurers in the Mines retrench the Number of their Workmen, but purchase as many new Slaves as they can get; for their Gains are greater, or less, in Proportion to the Number of Hands they employ. And this is the only Profession I know of where the Undertakers are never envy'd be their Stock or Profits never so extraordinary, because their Gains never interfere with those of their Fellow Traders.

Every Husbandman knows how many Yoak of Oxen and Servants are necessary to cultivate his Farm, and if he employs more than he has occasion for, reckons himself so much a Looser; but no Dealer in the Silver Mines ever thought he had Hands enow to set to work.

For there is the Difference between this, and all other Professions, that whereas in other Callings, for Instance, Bra- ziers and Black-Smiths, when their Trades are over-stock'd, are undone, because the Price of their Commodities is lower'd of course, by the multitude of Sellers; and likewise a good Year of Corn, and a plentiful Vintage, for the same Reason does hurt to the Farmers, and forces them to quit their Employments, and set up publick Houses, or turn Mer- chants and Bankers.

But here the Case is quite otherwise, for the more Oar is found, and the more Silver is wrought, and made, the more Adventurers come in, and the more Hands are employ'd in our Mines.

A Master of a Family indeed when he is well provided with Furniture, and Household-Goods, buys no more, but no Man was ever so overstock'd with Silver, as not to desire a further Increase: if there are any who have more than their Occasions require, they hoard up the rest with as much Pleasure as if they actually made use of it.

And when a Nation is in a flourishing Condition, no One is at a loss how to employ his Money: The Men lay it out

in fine Armour, in Houses, and in magnificent Houses and Buildings; Women lay it out in great Equipage, costly Habits, and rich Cloaths.

And in Accidents of War when our Lands lie fallow, and uncultivated, or in a publick Dearth, and Scarcity, what Reserve have we left to apply to but Silver, to purchase Necessaries for our Subsistence, or hire Auxiliaries for our Defence?

If 'tis objected that Gold is as useful as Silver, I will not dispute it, but this I am sure of, that plenty of Gold always lower'd its Value, and advanc'd the Price of Silver.

I have insisted the longer upon these general Reflections to encourage Adventurers of all kinds, to employ as many Hands as possible in so advantageous a Trade, from these plain Considerations, that the Mines can never be (19.) exhausted, nor can Silver ever lose its Value.

That the Publick has known this long before, is evident from our Laws, which allow Foreigners to work our Mines upon the (20.) same Terms and Conditions our own Citizens enjoy.

But to draw this Discourse more immediately to the subject of my present Consideration, which is the Maintenance
of

of our Citizens, I will begin to propose those Ways, and Means, by which the Silver-Mines may be improv'd to the highest Benefit, and Advantage to the Publick. Nor do I set up for the Vanity of being admir'd for an Author of new Discoveries : For that Part of my following Discourse which relates to the Examples of the present Age, lies obvious to all the World ; as for what is past 'tis Matter of Fact, and every Man might inform himself that would be at the Pains of inquiring.

'Tis very strange, that after so many Precedents of private Citizens of *Athens*, who have made their Fortunes by the Mines, the Publick should never think of following their Example : For we who have made Inquiry into this Matter have heard, that *Nicias*, the Son of *Niceratus*, had a thousand Slaves employ'd in the Mines, whom he let out to *Sofias* the *Thracian*, upon Condition to receive an *Obolus* a Day, clear of all Charges, for every Head, and that the same Complement of Workmen should be always kept on Foot.

In like manner *Hipponicus* had 600 Slaves let out at the same Rate, which yielded him a Revenue of a *Mina* a Day, and *Philemonides* 300, which brought

brought him in half a *Mina* a Day, and many others made the same Advantage, in proportion to the Number of Slaves they possess'd. But what need we to appeal to Precedents of an elder Date, when at this Day we have so many Instances of the same Nature before our Eyes ?

In the Proposals which I offer, there is only One thing new, namely, That as private Men have a constant Revenue coming in from the Slaves whom they let out to work in the Mines, so the Publick in imitation of their Example, should purchase as many Slaves to be employ'd in the same manner, as will treble the Number of their own Citizens.

Let any reasonable Man take this whole Proposal to pieces, and examin every distinct Head apart, and then judge whether the Design is feasible or not. 'Tis plain the State can bear the Charge of the Price of the Slaves better than private Men. And nothing can be easier than for the Senate to make Proclamation for all that have Slaves to sell, to bring them in, and then buy them up for the publick Use.

And

And when they are bought, what should hinder any one from hiring them of the State upon the same Terms they hire them from private Men? For we see that our Revenues are farm'd by particular Men, and the repair, and the building of our publick Structures and Temples (21.) are let out to private Undertakers.

And that the Publick may be no loser by the Desertion of Slaves, or other Accidents, the Adventurers in the Mines like the Farmers of our Revenue, should be oblig'd to give good Security to save the State harmless: Though at the same time the Common-Wealth may be much more easily cheated by the Farmers of their Revenue, than by the Hirers of their Slaves.

For how is it possible to discover the Frauds that are committed in the Management of the Publick Money? there being no visible Distinction between publick and private Money; the same Materials, and Stamp being common to both. But when our Slaves are burnt with the publick Mark of the State, with severe Penalties to be inflicted upon all that buy, or sell them; what Danger is there of their being stole? Thus
much

much of my Proposal as relates to the buying and preserving our Slaves, appears practicable beyond all Contradiction.

If any one questions whether after we have purchas'd a great Number of Workmen, there will be Adventurers enow to hire them of the Publick, let him consider, that the Undertakers who have a good Stock of Slaves will hire more of the State; for the Mines are so great, that they will require a vast Number of Hands to work them; and many of the Workmen that are grown old, and unserviceable, and many others, *Athenians*, and Strangers whose Bodies are not vigorous enough for Labour, yet would be willing to get their Living by easier Callings, would turn Adventurers in the Mines, and hire our Slaves; so that there is little danger of wanting Employment for our Workmen.

Twelve hundred Slaves, when bought, will probably in five or six Year's time, produce a Revenue sufficient to purchase as many more as will make the Number 6000. This Number at the rate of an *Obolus* a Day a Head, clear of all Charges, will afford a Yearly Revenue of (22) sixty Talents.

And

And if but twenty of these Talents are laid out in the Purchase of more Slaves, the City may employ the overplus as they think convenient; and when the Number of Slaves is increas'd to 10000. it will produce a standing Revenue to the Publick, of a hundred Talents a Year.

To demonstrate that the Mines would take up a greater Proportion of Slaves to work 'em, I appeal to the Authority of all these living Witnesses who remember, what Numbers of Workmen were employ'd in them before the taking of (23) *Decelea* by the *Lacedemonians*. And our Silver Mines that have been wrought for so many Ages, with such Numbers of Hands, and continue still so far from being drein'd, or exhausted, that we can discover no visible difference in their present State from the Accounts our Ancestors have deliver'd down to us, are undeniable Proofs of my Assertion.

And their present Condition is a good Argument that there never can be more Hands at work in the Mines than there is Employment for: For we dig on still without finding any Bottom or End of our Mines, or decay of the Silver-Oar.

And

And at this Day we may open new Mines as well as in former Ages, and no one can determin whether the new Mines may not prove more Rich than the old Ones.

If any one demands why our Miners are not so forward in pursuit of new Discoveries, as formerly, I answer, 'tis not long since that the Mines have begun to be wrought afresh, and the present Adventurers are not rich enough to run the Risque of such an Undertaking.

For if they discover a rich Mine their Fortunes are made, but if they fail, they lose all the Charges they have been at; and this Consideration chiefly has discourag'd the Adventurers from trying so dangerous an Experiment.

But in Order to remedy this Difficulty, I have some (24) Proposals to offer to the Publick. There are Ten Tribes at *Athens*, and to each of these I would have the Government assign an equal Proportion of their publick Slaves, to be employ'd in search of new Mines, and the gains to be equally divided in common among all the Sharers in the Ten Tribes: For if the Mines were once settled upon this Establishment, and the whole Undertaking carry'd on by a National

tional Stock, the Adventurers would run little Hazard; and if but one of the Ten Tribes succeeded in the Attempt, the whole Community would be Gainers; and if two, three, four, or half the Tribes had the same good Fortune, the Profits would be proportionably greater; for 'tis a wild Supposition, and against the Experience of all Ages, to imagin that not One in Ten should succeed in such an Undertaking.

Companies of private Adventurers may carry on the same Trade in a Joint-Stock, nor is there any danger that they and the National Company will interfere one with another, but as Confederates are strengthen'd by their mutual Assistance to each other, so the more Adventurers of all kinds are imploy'd in the Mines, so much larger will the Gains, and Advantages be to all.

Thus have I briefly propos'd some Considerations to the Publick, for establishing the Management of the National Revenue upon such an Institution as shall make effectual Provision for the whole Body of our People.

Nor let any Man be discourag'd from the Considerations of the vast Expence, which will be necessary for the perfecting so great a Work: For there is no Necessity

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sity that either the whole Design must be finish'd at once, or the Publick will receive no Advantage from it; Quite contrary, every Step we advance in our Way, the State will gain Ground; and by the gradual Progress we make in our publick Buildings in the rigging out our Trading-Vessels, or in the Purchase of our Slaves, the Common-Wealth will be an immediate Gainer.

And 'tis certainly more for the Advantage of the Publick to parcel out the Design, and finish it by degrees: For when many Houses are building at once, they cost more, and are worse built: In like manner, if we purchase our Complement of Slaves all at once, we must pay more for them, and buy worse into the Bargain.

But if we proceed gradually according to to our Abilities, we shall still have the same Advantage of continuing any right Methods we pitch'd upon in the Beginning, and shall be at liberty to correct the Oversights, and Mistakes we made at our first setting out. And if we perfect some Parts of our Undertaking, and delay the Execution of the rest, the Revenue arising from part of our Design, which is finish'd, will be sufficient to answer the whole Expence of
the

the Remainder. But if we resolve to execute the whole Project at once, the whole Charge of the Enterprize must be rais'd at once likewise.

And then the great Difficulty which will be objected to this whole Scheme is, that in case the Publick purchase so great a Number of Slaves, the Mines may happen to be overstock'd; but there can be no Grounds for such an Apprehension, if we take care every Year to imploy no more than there is actually Occasion for.

Thus I think the easiest Methods of finishing this Design are the best, and most effectual. It may be objected that the immense Charges of this War have exhausted our Treasure in such a manner, that 'twill be impossible for the Publick to raise any new Subsidies, much less to advance the Necessary Fonds for such an Undertaking. But this Difficulty may be easily remov'd, for let the State employ no more Money in the Administration of the Government the next Year after we have a Peace, than the annual Income of the Publick produc'd during the War, and whatever additional Improvements of our Revenue are made by the Peace, from the Incouragement of Strangers, and Merchants, from

the Increase of our Exportations, and Importations, occasion'd by the resort of more People, and from a greater Vent of Commodities in our Ports and Markets, let all that be appropriated to this particular Service, in order to advance the National Revenue.

If any One imagins that a War will ruine our Works, let him but consider that the Execution of this Design, will enable us to meet a Foreign Invasion, with so many Advantages on our side, that a War in such a Juncture will be less formidable to us, than to our Enemies themselves.

For what Advantage can better enable us to carry on a vigorous and successful War, than Numbers of Men? and by such an Addition to the Stock of our People, as might be made by due care and encouragement; what Levies might be rais'd, what mighty Fleets and Armies set out to disappoint all the Designs of our Enemies?

And I have Reason to believe that 'tis possible to work our Mines in the conjuncture of a foreign War, for they are cover'd on the South-Sea, by a strong Citadel in *Anaphlystus*, and on the North-Sea, by another in *Thoricus*, and these

two Fortresses lie at a distance of but 60 Furlongs from one another.

And if a third Fort was built upon the top of a high Mountain, in the middle of the two former, the three Works would meet together, and our Silver Mines would be inclosed in a Circle, and guarded on all sides, and the Workmen at the first Notice of an Invasion might retire to a Place of Security.

But if we are invaded with more Numerous Armies, our Enemies may make themselves Masters of our Corn, Wine, and Cattle that lie without the Works; but if they possess themselves of our Silver Mines, what can they find to carry off more than a heap of Stones and Rubbish.

But how is it possible for our Enemies to make an Inroad upon our Mines? For the City *Megara*, which lies nearest, is above 500 Furlongs from them; and *Thebes*, which is nearer than any but *Megara*, is more than 600 Furlongs distant from them.

If they advance to our Mines in a small Body from this side, they must leave *Athens* behind them, and run the hazard of being cut off by our Horse, and flying Parties; for 'tis a wild Noti-

on to imagine that they will invade us with their whole Force, and unguard their own Country, and leave it expos'd to our Inroads; for in such a Case, *Athens* would be nearer to their Cities than their own Army.

But suppose they march'd up to our Mines with a Numerous Army, how could they Subsist for want of Provisions? If they forrag'd in small Parties, they would be in danger of having their Conveys intercepted; if they forrag'd with their whole Armies, they must act upon the defensive, and we should be the Aggressors.

The Revenue arising from our Slaves would not only make a considerable Article in the Charge of maintaining our Citizens, but by the vast Concourse of People from all Parts, the Customs of the Fairs, and Markets at the Mines, and the Rent of our Publick Buildings, and Melting-houses, and many other Heads would produce a mighty Income to the State.

The State upon such an Establishment would be peopled with a prodigious Number of Inhabitants, and the value of Lands at the Mines would be as high as those that lie near *Athens*.

A pursuit of such Measures and Councils would not only enrich the City, but introduce a habit of Obedience in the People; reform their Discipline, and revive the Courage of the Nation.

For if upon this Improvement of our Revenue, a larger Allowance was establish'd for the maintenance of our Youth, they would be train'd up to the Art of War in our (25.) Publick Academies with more exactness, and performe their Military Exercises with a more regular Discipline, than the Racers in the (26) Torch-Course are taught to observe. And our Troops in Garrison, and the standing Guards of our Coasts, would do their Duty in their several Posts, with more cheerfulness, if any effectual Provision was settled for their subsistence.

If it be made appear that the Revenue of *Athens* can never be improv'd, or advanc'd to the full height without a Peace, it may deserve the publick Inquiry, whether the Establishment of a (27) Council of Peace would not be for the Benefit and Advantage of the State.

For the Institution of such a Magistracy, would invite more numerous Settlements of Foreigners to make *Athens* the Place of their Abode.

For 'tis an absur'd Supposition to imagin, that Peace will weaken our Strength, and ruine our Authority, and Reputation abroad; for of all Governments, those are happiest who have continued longest without War, and of all Common-Wealths, *Athens* lies fairest for flourishing, and increasing by the Arts of Peace.

For *Athens* in time of Peace, is the great Theatre to which all Mankind have Occasion to resort: To begin with Merchants and Commanders of Ships, Where can the Traders in Wine, Oyl, Corn, or Cattle have a quicker Vent, or a better Market for their Commodities than at *Athens*? Where can Mony'd Men make a better Improvement of their Wealth; and, where is there greater Encouragement for those who live by Arts of Invention and Ingenuity?

Where is there better Employment for Artificers, and Mechanick Trades? where can the Sophists, Philosophers, Poets, and the Lovers of the Liberal Arts, resort to a more renown'd School of Learning, and Humanity? where is there a nobler Scene to gratifie the Curiosity of all Strangers that are delighted with Divine Rights, and Institutions,
and

and the celebrations of Religious Games, and Festivals ? And where can Merchants of all kinds whatsoever, find a better Market to make quick Returns of their Money, than *Athens*.

If my Opposers acknowledge all this to be true, but still imagine that we can never recover the Dominion of *Greece* but by a War, I desire them to look back to the *Persian* Invasion, and examine, whether it was by Force of Arms, or our good Offices to the *Greeks*, that we were plac'd at the Head of the (28.) Naval Confederacy, and the Common Treasury of *Greece*.

And when by a Tyrannical Exercise of our Power we lost our Jurisdiction, by an Alteration of our Measures, and a milder Administration, (29.) we were restor'd to our ancient Authority by the joint Consent of all the Islands.

Did not the *Thebans* in Acknowledgement of our generous Assistance to their State, place us at the Head of the Common (30.) Alliance ? and our Rivals, the *Lacedemonians*, for the same Consideration, quitted their old Pretensions, and suffer'd us to give Laws to the (31.) last Treaty, and dispose of the Supream Command of *Greece* at our own Discretion.

And at this Juncture in the general Confusion of *Greece*, we have the most favourable Opportunity of recovering our ancient Dominion without Difficulty, Hazard, or Expence, that ever any Nation had: For if we set up to be the Common Mediators of *Greece*, and interpos'd our Authority to unite all the divided Interests abroad, and reconcile all the Factions at home; and if by solemn Embassies to all the Neighbouring States, we declar'd for the Liberty of (32.) *Delphi*, all *Greece* would support us at the Head of so Glorious a Cause, and unite in a general Confederacy against the common Enemies (33.) who endeavour'd to make themselves Masters of *Delphi*, when the *Phocians* were reduc'd to Extremity.

And if we afterwards warmly interested our selves to establish a general Peace by Sea, and Land; all *Greece*, next to the Security of their own Governments, would desire the Preservation of *Athens*.

If any Man can have so wild a Notion, as to imagine, that War will contribute more to the Increase of the Riches of the State than Peace, I know no better way to decide the Controversie, than by appealing to the Experience of former
Ages,

Ages; and producing Precedents to the contrary out of our own Story.

For upon inquiry he may find that the vast Treasure we had amass'd in Peace, was all consum'd in our former Wars; and to quote Instances of a fresher Date, in the present War all the Branches of our Income have been deficient, and what Money came in upon the Publick Fonds, has been all apply'd to the pressing Occasions of the State; but since the Seas have been open, and our Trade free, every Article of our Income is advanc'd, and the Government is at liberty to employ it as they think convenient.

Not that I would advise the Commonwealth to sit down tamely by their Injuries in case of a Foreign Invasion; but this I am sure of, that we should be better inabled to revenge the Affront, if we are not the Aggressors, for our Enemies will never be able to form a Confederacy to support them in an unjust War.

Upon the whole Matter, if nothing in this Proposal appears impossible, or difficult, and if a pursuit of these Councils, and Resolutions, will gain the Affections of *Greece*, and establish our Security at Home, and increase our Reputation

putation abroad: if the common People will abound in all things necessary for Life, and the Rich be eas'd of their Taxes to the Wars: If in this Universal Plenty our Temples will be rebuilt, and our Religious Festivals, and Solemnities celebrated with more Magnificence: If our Walls, Docks, and Arsenals will be repair'd, and our Priests, Senate, Magistrates, and Cavalry, restor'd to their ancient Rights and Priviledges, is it not fit that all Engins should be set at work to promote so glorious an Undertaking, that in our Days we may see our Country establish'd upon a solid Foundation of Security and Happiness?

And if the Publick, upon due consideration, thinks fit to execute these Orders and Institutions, I would advise them to send Embassadors to *Delphi*, and *Dodona* to consult the Gods, whether such a Reformation of our Government would not turn to the Advantage of the present Age, and the Benefit of all Posterity.

And if these Resolutions are ratify'd by the Divine Approbation, to consult the Oracle once more, to the protection of what Gods we should recommend the Success of this Enterprize, and then to propitiate those Gods we are directed

rected to apply to, in order to engage their Assistance. And after this solemn Invocation to enter boldly upon the Execution of this Design: For 'tis but reason that all Undertakings should be attended with more favourable Success, that are begun, and carry'd on, under the immediate Care and Protection of the Divine Providence.

The End.

NOTES

UPON THE

TRANSLATION.

A Table of the Attick Coins reduc'd to the Value of English Money.

THE *Obolus* was equal to 1 d. 1 q.
 The *Triobolus* was three *Oboli*,
 and made 3 d. 3 q.

The *Drachma* was six *Oboli*, and made
 7 d. 2 q.

The *Mina* was an hundred *Drachma's*,
 and made 3 l. 2 s. 6 d.

The common *Attick Talent* consisted
 of sixty *Minæ*, which amounts in our
 Money to 187 l. 10 s.

These are the common *Attick Coins*,
 which are most frequently mention'd by
 their Writers, and which I have reduc'd
 to our *English Money*, to make way for
 the easier understanding of this Discourse.

Note

Note (1.)

Διὰ τὴν τῆς πλῆθους πενίαν. The State of *Athens* was at a great Charge in maintaining the Common People. They were allow'd three *Oboli* a Man for every Cause they judg'd; and this Pension was call'd the *Τρωβόλον δικαστικόν*. *Lucian. in bis accusato.* And some days many Thousands receiv'd this Pension.

The *Θεώριον* was an Allowance of two *Oboli* a-piece, to pay for the Sight of publick Shows. *Liba. in argu. Olyn. primæ.*

The *Ἐκκλησιαστικόν* was an *Obolus* a-piece, paid them every time they assembl'd. *Juli. Poll. l. 6. c. 9.* And this Pension was afterwards increas'd to three *Oboli*. Besides, all maim'd and disabl'd Citizens had a Pension of two *Oboli* a day. *Harpocra. in verbo ἀδύνατοι.*

Note (2.)

Xenophon says only *ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι*, but the Word *συμμαχίας* is plainly understood, as appears from the Sequel of this Discourse, and *Xenophon's* Treatise of *the Government of Athens*. This Tax upon the Confederates was at first but 400 Talents, but it was afterwards advanc'd to 1300. *Plutar. in Vitâ Aristidis.* This Tribute was so burdensome, that it provok'd the Confederates to frequent Revolts.

Note

Note (3.)

Μετοίκιον, *Aliens Duties*. This was an annual Tribute paid by the Aliens, of twelve *Drachma's* for every Man, and six for every Woman. *Harpocra. in verbo μετοίκιον*. The number of the Aliens amounted generally to 10000. Originally at *Athens* there was no distinction between Strangers and Natives; for all Foreigners were naturaliz'd promiscuously. *Thucyd. l. 1. c. 2*. Thus all the *Platæans* were naturaliz'd at once. *Thucyd. l. 3. c. 55*. And this Custom was the Foundation of their future Greatness. But as the City grew more populous, they grew more sparing of this Favour. *Scholi. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 2*. and this Privilege was given to such only as had deserv'd it by some extraordinary Service to the State. *Demost. Oratio contra Neæram*.

Note (4.)

Trades. Τέχνων not τέχνων. The *Basil* Edition reads it right; for most part of the Mechanick and Handicraft Trades were carry'd on by the Aliens at *Athens*. *Xenoph. de polit. Athen.*

Note (5.)

Τῶ ἰππικῷ. *Xenophon* explains this Passage in his *Hipparchicus*, where he advises the State to inroll Aliens among their

A Discourse upon improving

their Horse. Besides the Dignity of the Horse-Service, there was a considerable Pay in Peace and War allow'd them. *Ulpianus in Timocrateam. Xenoph. in Hippar.*

Note (6.)

Waste Ground. Vide Thucyd. l. 2. c. 17.

Note (7.)

Μετοικοφύλακες. Every Alien by the Laws of *Athens*, was oblig'd to choose a private Patron among the Citizens. *Harpocratio in verbo προσάτης*, but here *Xenophon* proposes publick Patrons for the whole Body of the Aliens.

Note (8.)

Ὀρφανοφύλακες. Vide Demosthen. contra Macartatum.

Note (9.)

Γανταχῶ πλείον τῷ ἄρχαίῳ Λαμβάνουσιν. The meaning of *Xenophon* is that the *Athenian* Money was more valuable abroad than the Coin of any other Nation, because it was finer, and consequently was worth more than its own weight of any other Silver that had more Alloy in it. For 'tis impossible that an Ounce of *Athenian* Silver should be worth more in Specie than an Ounce of other Silver of the same fineness. *Sensus moresque repugnant, atque ipsa utilitas.*

- Note

Note (10.)

Τὸ ἐμπορεῖς δῶρον. This Court of Judicature was probably the same with the ναυτοδίκαι, mention'd by *Suidas* and *Hesychius*, in verbo ναυτοδίκαι.

Note (11.)

Προεδείαις τιμᾶσιν. This was a right of Precedence in the Theatres, Senate, Assemblies of the People, and in all publick places whatsoever. *Schol. Aristoph. in Equ.* This Custom was practis'd by the *Spartans*, who gave this Privilege to the *Deceleans*. *Herodotus lib. 9. c. 72.*

Note (12.)

Ἄφορμῆ, a Fond. *Harpoc. Hesychius*, in verbo ἄφορμῆ.

Note (13.)

Hegesilaus commanded the *Athenian* Troops sent to the Assistance of the *Mantineans* at the Battle of *Mantineæ*; which is a Proof that this Discourse was writ after that Battle. *Diog. Laer. in Xenoph. Diodorus Siculus* by Mistake calls him *Hegelochus*.

Note (14.)

Τελώβολον. *Salmasius de modo usurarum* thinks that this was the τελώβολον δικαστηριον which the People receiv'd for judging Causes. But *Xenophon's* Com-

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putation

putation plainly confutes this Opinion: He says that a Contributor of 10 *Minæ*, or 1000 *Drachmæ's*, at the rate of a *Triobolus* or half a *Drachma* a Day, will in a Years' time receive almost the fifth part of the principal Money he advanced. Which is very true, for reckoning (as *Xenophon* always does in this Discourse) 360 Days to the Year, the Payment of a *Triobolus* a Day will amount to 180 *Drachmæ*, which is near the fifth part of 1000 *Drachmæ*. But the payment of the *τριώβολον δικάσιον* cou'd never amount to this Summ, because the Holydays, by the Confession of *Salmasius*, took up two Months in the Year, and on these Days the People never heard Causes, so that 30 *Drachmæ's* must be deducted from 180, which reduces the Summ to 150, which is little more than the seventh part of 1000. So that *Salmasius* is mistaken, or *Xenophon* was a very loose Calculator. The true meaning of the Passage I take to be this: *Xenophon* in the following part of this Discourse, in order to make Provision for the Citizens, makes a Proposal to the State, to buy as many Slaves as wou'd treble the Number of their own Citizens, which

Slaves

Slaves were to be let out at the rate of an *Obolus* a Day to the Adventurers in the Mines, which brought in a Revenue of three *Oboli* a Day to every Citizen, because the Slaves were thrice as many as the Citizens among whom this Revenue was to be divided. And this I take to be the *Triobulus* mentioned by *Xenophon*, which every Citizen was to receive in recompence for his Contribution.

Note (15.)

Nautick-Interest was the highest Interest, and is here oppos'd to Land-Interest, which was considerably less. For in the former the Creditor run a greater Hazard; for if the Merchant who borrow'd the Money, and imploy'd it in Trade, lost his Ship, the Creditor lost his Money, and had no right to demand it of the Merchant; a Trade somewhat like our *Bottumry*. This Interest generally amounted to 20 *per Cent.* or the fifth part of the Principal *per annum*. 'Tis true, it often vary'd, and was higher or lower according to the Plenty and Scarcity of Money, or the Danger and Distance of the Voyage. But the general *Medium* may be safely establish'd at 20 *per Cent.* There are several Contracts of Money lent upon

Nautick-Interest, extant in the Orations of *Demosth. contra Lacrit. pro Phormi. contra Pant. contra Phormi.*

Note (16.)

Ἡλθειον ἢ ἑπιτεριον. More than a third part of the principal Money: For a *Triobolus* a Day in a Year makes 180 *Drachmæ*, which is above the third part of five *Minæ* or 500 *Drachmæ*. The τοκοῦ ἑπιτεριου was the highest *Nautick-Interest*, and came to above 33 *per Cent*. There is an Instance which comes very near this Computation, in the Oration of *Demosthenes contra Phormi.*

Note (17.)

Almost double their Principal. For 180 *Drachmæ* is almost double one *Mina*, or 100 *Drachmæ*.

Note (18.)

Foreign Cities, &c. Foreign States often contributed to the Publick Buildings of the *Greeks*. The *Rhodians* when their *Colossus* was overturn'd by an Earthquake, receiv'd Contributions from all the neighbouring States in order to restore it, *Polybius, lib. 5.* And there are many Inscriptions of such publick Benefactors extant in *Gruterus*, and elsewhere.

Note

Note (19.)

That the Mines can never be exhausted. 'Tis plain from *Pausanias* that these Mines were not work'd in his Time. *Paus. Attic.* But this does not destroy the Assertion of *Xenophon*, for the plundering the Temple of *Delphi* brought out two Millions of our Money, which lay dead before; and the Conquest of *Persia* by the *Macedonians* brought such a vast quantity of Silver into *Greece*, and consequently made Labour so dear, that the Silver found in the Mines would in all probability scarce counter-vail the expences of the working them. Or it might proceed from the Subjection of *Athens* to a Foreign Power, or from other Accidents, and not from any decay of the Mines.

Note (20.)

Ἐπὶ ἰσοτιμείᾳ. Upon the same Terms, &c. The State was the Proprietor of the Silver-Mines, and Strangers or *Athenians* that work'd in them, were oblig'd to pay the same Tribute of the 24th Part of the Silver found, to the Publick. *Suidas* in ἀγογὰς μεταλλῶν διαγ.

Note (21.)

The repair of our Temple, &c. Μισθῶνται ἱερά. 'Twas the Custom of the *Greeks* to let out the building and repair of

their Temples to private Undertakers. *Athenæus* l. 6. *Herod.* l. 5. c. 62. where he makes use of the same Word, *ἰνδὲ Μισθῆται*; That is, *They hir'd the building of the Temple upon such Terms.* And the *Latines* us'd the Word *conducunt* in the same Sense. *Conducunt foricas*, i. e. *Repurgandas.* *Juvenal.* Sat. 3.

Note (22.)

Revenue of 60 Talents. This Computation proves that *Xenophon* reckon'd but 360 Days to the Year: For 6000 *Oboli*, multiply'd by 360, make 2160'000 *Oboli*; which Sum. divided by 600 (for 600 *Oboli* make a *Mina*) makes 3'600 *Minae*, which divided by 60 (for 60 *Minae* make a *Talent*) reduces the whole Sum to 60 *Talents*. And the following Computation of 100 *Talents* a Year, produc'd by 10000 *Oboli* a Day, answers exactly to the former.

Note (23.)

The taking of Decelea, &c. *Decelea* was taken and fortify'd by the *Lacedæmonians* in the 19th Year of the *Peloponnesian* War, and lying in the Heart of *Attica*, it gave opportunity to 20000 *Athenian* Slaves to desert to the Enemy. *Thucyd.* l. 7. c. 27.

Note

Note (24.)

Xenophon in his former Proposal would have 10000 Slaves let out at a certain Rate to the Adventurers' in the Mines, but in this second Proposal he advises the State it self to adventure in search of Discoveries of new Mines, which Work was to be carry'd on by another set of Slaves, and not by the former 10000.

Note (25.)

There were at *Athens*, and in other Parts of *Greece*, Military Academies or *Gymnasia*, where the young Men exercis'd. *Theophrastus de Blanditiâ Aristoph. & Schol. in Equil. Xenoph. in 1, 2, 3, & 6th lib. de rebus Græc.*

Note (26.)

Ἐν τῷ λαμπάσει. Torch-course. There was a Festival at *Athens*, on which a certain Number of Men ran with lighted Torches in their Hands. *Paus. Attic.* To this Ceremony *Lucretius* makes that fine Allusion in his 2d. Book,

Et quasi Cursores vitæ lampada tradunt.

Note (27.)

Ἐιρηνοβούλας. Council of Peace. This new Magistracy which *Xenophon* proposes to be instituted for the Preservation

of the Publick Peace, was to be, in all probability, like the εἰρηνοδίται or *Fœciales* of the Romans, who were instituted by *Numa* for the same considerations. *Dion. Halicarn.* lib. 2.

Note (28.)

Ἑλληνοταρμίας. After the *Persian* Invasion, the *Athenians* had the command of the Confederate Fleet, and were made Treasurers of the Money contributed by the *Greeks* to the carrying on the War against *Persia*. *Thucydides*, lib. 1.

Note (29.)

The *Athenians* recover'd the Command of the *Greek* Islands, (which they lost in the *Peloponnesian* War,) in the 4th Year of the 100th Olymp. *Diod. Sicul.* lib. 15.

Note (30.)

This Alliance between the *Thebans* and *Athenians*, was made in the second Year of the 96th Olympiad. *Diod. Siculus*. lib. 1.4. *Xenophon* lib. 3. *de rebus Græc.*

Note (31.)

This League between the *Spartans* and *Athenians*, was made in the 4th Year of the 102d Olympiad, not long after the Battle of *Leuctra*. *Diod. Sic.* l. 15. *Xenop.* l. 7. *de rebus Græc.*

Note

Note (32.)

For the Liberty of Delphi. The Greeks made it a part of their Religion, to preserve the Liberty of *Delphi*. Thus the *Lacedæmonians* enter'd into a War to restore the Oracle to the *Delphians*. *Thucyd.* lib. 1. c. 112. And the first Article of their Leagues, often began with a mutual Engagement on both Parts, to protect the Liberty of *Delphi*. *Thucyd.* l. 4. c. 118. l. 5. c. 18. Besides their Religion, they had Reasons of State for this proceeding: For if *Delphi* were subject to a foreign Power, the Priestess might be forc'd to utter whatever Oracles the Conqueror pleas'd to impose: Nor could the Resolutions and Sentences of the *Amphictyons*, who often sat at *Delphi*, be free and unbiass'd as long as *Delphi* was under a Foreign Dominion.

Note (33.)

If we knew who these Enemies were that design'd to seize upon *Delphi*, it would be no difficult Matter to determine exactly the Time when this Discourse was written. *Jason*, the Tyrant of *Thessaly*, had form'd a Design upon *Delphi*, but his Death prevented the execution of it. *Diod. Sic. Xenop. Hist. Græc. Ælian. Frag.* But this Passage cannot

not be understood to mean this attempt, for *Fason* was assassinated in the third Year of the 102 *Olymp.* Some Years before the Battle of *Mantinæa*, and this Discourse, as I have prov'd in a former Note, was written after that Battle. I think that this Passage (taking the Word *ἐκλειπόντων* in a neutral Sense as I have rendred it, and for which there are a thousand Authorities) ought to be understood of a Design the *Thebans* had form'd upon *Delphi*. The Story in short is this: The *Thebans* being engag'd in a War with the *Phocians*, upon some Dispute about a Frontier, form'd a Design upon the Temple of *Delphi*. *Demost. de Falsâ Legatione, Ulpianus.* And the *Phocians* at the same time being condemn'd by the *Amphietyons* to pay a great Fine for plowing up some Consecrated Land, the *Greeks* prepar'd to execute the Sentence by force of Arms. The *Phocians* being unable to resist such an approaching Storm, were reduc'd to great Extremities, and compell'd for their own Preservation, to seize upon the Treasures of *Delphi*: This gave beginning to the Holy War, and all *Greece* engag'd in the Quarrel. The *Athenians* assisted the *Phocians*, but *Xenophon* advises them to break off that Alliance, and declare for the Liberty

berthy of *Delphi*, and under that Plausible Pretence, to unite all *Greece*, against the *Thebans* who were equally Criminal with the *Phocians*, (as *Demosthenes* observes) for having form'd the first Design upon the Temple. This Counsel he recommends to the *Athenians* as the best Method to recover the Dominion of *Greece*. I know it will be objected that *Laertius* places the Death of *Xenophon* in the first Year of the 105th Olympiad, and the *Phocian* War breaking out some Years after, it will be impossible to explain this Passage in my Sence. To this I answer that this Account of *Laertius* is certainly false : For *Xenophon*, in his *Greek History*, mentions the Death of *Alexander* the Tyrant of *Pheræ*, which happen'd, as *Diodorus* observes, in the 4th Year of the 105th Olymp. so that *Xenophon* must be a Prophet, or be alive at that time, three Years after his suppos'd Death. *Xenophon* likewise in the conclusion of his *Greek History* affirms, that after the Battle of *Mantinæa*, *Greece* was in a greater Disorder and Confusion than ever. But we read of no considerable Commotion in *Greece* till the breaking out of the Holy War, in the 1st Year of the 106th Olymp. which engag'd all *Greece* in an intestine Division.

To

To confirm this Account of *Laertius*, it may be urg'd, that *Xenophon* living 90 Years, according to *Lucian* in *Macrob.* and being present at the Battle of *Delium*, which was fought in the first Year of the 89th *Olympiad*, about 67 Years before the *Holy War*, it is highly improbable that he was living at the time of the *Holy War*. 'Tis true, *Laertius* says that *Socrates* fav'd *Xenophon's* Life at that Battle: But *Athenæus* l. 5. says that *Socrates* was not at the Battle; and 'tis probable that the other part of the Story of *Xenophon's* being there, may be equally fabulous, especially if what *Athenæus* (according to *Casaubon's* Correction) says be true, that *Xenophon* was but a Boy at the Banquet of *Callias*, which was three Years afterwards. Besides he is call'd a *Young Man* in his Expedition into *Asia*; but at this rate he must have been 50 Years old at that time, an Age at which a Man cannot properly be call'd young.

But granting that he was present at the Battle of *Delium*, if we allow him to be 18 Years old, the Age, if I mistake not, that the *Athenians* usually made their first Campaigne, he would be but 81 Years old on the first Year of the 105th *Olympiad*, and consequently

might

might write of the *Holy War*, which broke out four Years afterwards. Nor does *Lucian* precisely limit his Age to 90 Years only, but says he lived above 90 Years.

Xenophon in this Discourse says, that the *Athenians* had been engag'd in a War by Sea and Land; that the War by Sea was at an end, but the War by Land still continu'd. This exactly agrees with the *Bellum Sociale*, or the War of the *Athenians* against their revolted Islands, which was carryed on by Sea, and begun in the third Year of the 105th *Olympiad*, and ended in the second Year of the 106th *Olympiad*, two Years after the breaking out of the *Holy War*, which the *Athenians* were then engaged in.

By this Account *Xenophon* writ this Discourse about the third Year of the 106th *Olympiad*, a Year after the Conclusion of the Peace with the Islands.

If the Account of *Xenophon's* Death in *Laertius* be true, I cannot believe this Work to be genuine; for I believe it almost impossible to explain this Passage in any other sense. But the Authority of all the Writers who ascribe this Discourse to *Xenophon*, and the Conformity of the Style with the rest of his Works,

Works, and that Character of Piety which runs thro' the whole Piece, which is so peculiar to the Works of *Xenophon*, and that particular Maxime at the Conclusion of this Treatise, of *undertaking every thing under the Favour and Protection of the Gods*, which he inculcates in all his Works, and particularly at the end of his *ἐπιπράξεις*, are undeniable Proofs that this Discourse is Genuine.

The End of the Notes.



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