

# The compensation of slave owners after the abolition of slavery in the French and British colonies: a comparative and quantitative perspective

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## Abstract

This paper aims at filling a current gap in the literature regarding the history of slave holders compensation after the abolition of slavery during the 19th century. It is the first attempt to draw some comparative statistics between the French and British compensations at the individual level. I use simultaneously 30,999 French compensations from the REPAIRS database and 46,287 British claims from the Legacy of British Slavery (LBS) database. In particular, I show that compensations received by French and British claimants were highly concentrated in the hands of the richest 10% and 1%, in a consistent manner with slave ownership distribution. Both in the French and the British cases, I find the top 10% slave owners owned about 60-80% of slaves (and received around 60-80% of total compensation), and that the top 1% slave owners owned about 20-30% of slaves (and received 20-30% of compensation). The concentration appears to be somewhat larger in the British case, though the ranking is reverse when the analysis is conducted at the level of the family rather than the individual. Overall the levels of concentration appear to be relatively similar, in spite of the many differences in social and institutional context between the two cases (in particular the much larger role of absentee owners in the British case). I also review the historiographic literature and confirm that small slave holders were the most indebted, at least in the French colonies, and that a significant share of compensation securities were handed over from indebted owners to their creditors. Finally, I draw some network analysis in order to bring a modest insight of the credit relationships structure in the French and British Empire.

**JEL Classification** - N30, N20

**Keywords** - Compensation, Slavery, Colonies, French Empire, British Empire, Credit, Network analysis

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*"S'il fallait analyser rigoureusement l'origine de toutes les propriétés, quelle est celle qui serait à l'abri du raisonnement ? Ce qui est principe pour les uns ne l'est pas pour les autres. Le mode de transmission des biens, leur inégalité, ne sont-ils pas sans cesse attaqués par des doctrines dangereuses et novatrices ? Qu'on ne cherche donc pas à soulever le voile qui couvre l'origine des propriétés. Si l'une de ces propriétés ne convient plus à notre état de civilisation, si l'on veut la modifier, qu'on le fasse, mais avec les garanties communes à toutes les propriétés. Pour moi, lorsqu'il s'agit de régler les effets de la propriété, je n'en connais qu'une espèce : c'est celle que l'usage et la loi ont consacrée, et, sous ce rapport, la propriété des colons doit être placée sur la même ligne que les autres."*

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Minutes of the session of July 10, 1839 in the Chamber of Deputies - Statement by Mr. Vidal de Lingendes, delegate of French Guiana, about the proposal of Mr. de Tracy concerning the abolition of slavery.

## 1 Introduction

On 22 May 2020 in Martinique, some activists destroyed the statues of the abolitionist Victor Schoelcher in Fort-de-France and Schoelcher, a town that have his name.<sup>1</sup> According to them, the figure of Victor Schoelcher would supplant that of the revolting slaves in the abolition memory. They also criticized him for supporting compensation to slave owners after the abolition in 1848. Despite the long period that has passed since then, it seems that the question of slavery and the unequal compensation that occurred in France and in the United-Kingdom remains a hot topic nowadays. In 2018, the British HM Treasury sparked a controversy by twitting<sup>2</sup>:

*"Here's today's surprising #FridayFact. Millions of you have helped end the slave trade through your taxes. Did you know? In 1833, Britain used £20 million, 40% of its national budget, to buy freedom for all slaves in the Empire. The amount of money borrowed for the Slavery Abolition Act was so large that it wasn't paid off until 2015. Which means that living British citizens helped pay to end the slave trade."*

showing that the absence of any payment to slaves and their descendants still raises debates, and that a consensual historical memory regarding slavery still needs to be built.

Some countries and firms already started to compensate the descendants of the formerly enslaved. On 6 May 2021 a bill to create a commission to evaluate the terms of a future compensation for descendants of slaves was passed by the U.S. Congress.<sup>3</sup> In the United-Kingdom, the pub chain and brewer Greene King and the insurance market Lloyd's of London offered reparations for their historical involvement in the slave trade and for the compensations their founders received after the abolition.<sup>4</sup> The Caribbean and African states also asked for reparations to the old European slave states, and the terms and conditions of potential interstate payments are still an ongoing research field (Craemer [2018]). In this context, the current study proposes to bring a modest contribution to the comprehension of the slave owners compensation.

So far, very few studies have addressed this topics in a quantitative perspective. Regarding the British compensation,

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<sup>1</sup>Lorriaux, A. (2020, June 2). Pourquoi des militants ont-ils détruit des statues de Victor Schœlcher (et est-ce justifié) ? [Press release]. <https://www.20minutes.fr/arts-stars/culture/2788147-20200529-pourquoi-militants-detruit-statues-victor-schlcher-justifie>

<sup>2</sup>Manjapra, K. (2021b, November 10). When will Britain face up to its crimes against humanity? [Press release]. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/29/slavery-abolition-compensation-when-will-britain-face-up-to-its-crimes-against-humanity>

<sup>3</sup>Forson, V. (2021, May 10). Esclavage : la question des réparations toujours d'actualité [Press release]. [https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/esclavage-la-question-des-reparations-toujours-d-actualite-10-05-2021-2425700\\_3826.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/esclavage-la-question-des-reparations-toujours-d-actualite-10-05-2021-2425700_3826.php)

<sup>4</sup>Rawlinson, K. (2020, June 18). Lloyd's of London and Greene King to make slave trade reparations [Press release]. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/18/lloyds-of-london-and-greene-king-to-make-slave-trade-reparations>



Ekama et al. [2021] have recently studied the compensation distribution in the Cape colony. Their research displays a high discrepancy in the appraised value of slaves across Cape districts and sometimes important gaps between the appraised value and the compensations received due to the computation method used at the time. This could have results in bankrupts for many slave owners and thus potential economic losses that remains poorly studied. Draper [2007] drew also a broad snapshot of British compensation and in particular shows that a significant part of slave ownership in the British Empire was held in Britain by rentiers rather than in the colonies by settlers. Some even argue that the flow of compensation to British investors was so large that it fueled the railway boom in Britain (Reed [1975]). Other studies also got interested in the importance of credit in the colonial economic system, and the central role of slave ownership as collateral to access the credit market, both as borrower and lender (Fourie and Swanepoel [2018]).

On the French side, very few quantitative research has been done so far, probably due to the lack of accessibility to data. The existing literature mainly focus on the political and practical process of emancipation and compensation (Beauvois [2011], who adopted in addition a comparative point of view between French and British parliamentary debates and produced many statistics at a macro level), the political and economic concerns relative to compensation (Buffon [1986], Ernatus [2009]) or the juridical characteristic of the compensation law (Blériot [2000]). Recent research also brought information about the sociological profile of indemnity beneficiaries. Balguy [2020] showed that a significant part of compensated person were women (usually widows of settlers and single women who had a few enslaves) and "free of colors" (emancipated slaves or their descendants). The latter represent at least 30% of the beneficiaries in Martinique. The REPAIRS project globally displays a large heterogeneity regarding the economic profile of the compensation claimants (plantation owners, investors, speculators etc.).

Despite this research, no one has undertaken quantitative comparisons between French and British compensation at the individual level. The current thesis aims at providing a modest contribution to fill this gap in the literature by using simultaneously the REPAIRS and LBS databases, which respectively make an inventory of 30,999 French compensations and 46,287 British claims. The objective is to draw some comparative statistics between both compensation process in order to evaluate the distribution of awards across individuals and families. Besides, I will also rely on a network analysis to shed lights on the credit relationships that structured the colonial economy, both in the French and British Empire. More broadly, this paper intends to provide elements of understanding in the compensation and economic structure of the colonial system as revealed by the compensation processes.

I found that compensations were globally proportional to slave ownership. However, depending on British colonies, important discrepancies between slave ownership and awards earned can be observed. The data prove quantitatively that slave holding was highly concentrated in the richest 10% and 1% in both colonial empires. Besides, I confirm the historiographic result that small slave owners were the most indebted in French colonies at the time of the abolition. Consequently, a large share of compensation securities were handed over to mortgagees in order for them to pay their debt back. Finally, I show through the network analysis that credit contracts between slave owners whose wealth was held in different colonies are very common, supporting the hypothesis that slave owners were mostly financial investors stayed in the metropolis. I also point out that contrary to the British credit structure, the French one is very diffuse across agents.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I will first present in section 2 the historical context in which the abolition and compensation occurred in France and Britain, as well as the terms and conditions adopted by both countries. In section 3, I will present the data and provide their sources and descriptive statistics. Then, section 4 analyses the distribution of compensation in French and British colonies, section 5 explored the credit relationships in both colonial empires and finally, section 6 concludes the paper.

## 2 Historical background: a brief history of slavery, abolition and compensation

### 2.1 The Atlantic slave trade

Before dealing with the compensation processes in depth, it is worth having in mind the colonial context and the long political processes that led to the final compensation. Since the 16th century, French and British powers expended their colonies on the American continent. Following the settlement process, Europeans started to import free labor force from the African coast in order to develop their agricultural activities.

According to the most consensual historical and demographic assessments, almost 12 millions of African were deported by the Europeans during the Triangular Trade between the 16th and 19th century (Lovejoy [1989]). Among them, it has been assessed that 65% were male while 35% were female (Geggus [1989], Lovejoy [1989]). Lovejoy also estimates that 10% to 20% of slaves exported by Europeans died in the Middle Passage i.e. only 9.6 - 10.8 million slaves arrived alive into the Americas. He considers the slave trade led to "the emergence of a system of slavery that was basic to the political economy of many parts of the continent".<sup>5</sup> Many kingdoms on the West coast depended directly on this trade. Slaves were mostly bargained against fabrics, weapons and powder (Inikori [1977]), as well as alcohol and few manufactured goods coming from Europe. Some authors even talk about a *gun-slave cycle*: African slave merchants received weapons giving them a military advantage to subjugate their enemies and capture new slaves, which were sold at their turn etc. Although Emmer [2005] contests this "virtuous" cycle, arguing that sold weapons were usually unusable and powder less reliable in the tropics, quantitative evidence have been found showing that the gun-slave cycle existed and intensified the British slave trade in the first half of the 18th century (Whatley [2014]).

### 2.2 The abolition and the emancipation process

Abolitionism was born in France and the United Kingdom during the 18th century under the influence of the Enlightenment. Stanziani [2020] explains that in the United Kingdom, the issue was partly legal and concerned the uniqueness of English law. Slave owners were opposed to uniqueness for fear of having their slaves seized when they traveled with them to the mainland, while abolitionists were in favor of it. In the end, it was the Somerset decision of 1772 that set the precedent and offered emancipation to all slaves who set foot on British soil, thus confirming the non-uniqueness of English law. In France, the legal question was less central insofar as slavery and serfdom both reflected an extreme deprivation of freedom. An edict of 1716 clearly describes the obligations that the master must observe if he wants to keep the property of his slave in the metropolis on pain of emancipation, but some institutions such as the Admiralty of Paris did not recognize it.

The abolition debates of the time were also based on socio-economic considerations. In the United Kingdom, Adam Smith described slavery as an unproductive system. For Jeremy Bentham, it was unlimited compulsory service that was the essence of slavery, which differentiated it from serfdom or Greek-antique slavery. But for Thomas Malthus and Edmund Burke, if slavery is blameworthy, it is also necessary to prohibit vagrancy and to force workers to work. Coercion and surveillance must be introduced since "the poor man knows little incentive to improve his action except hunger and deprivation".<sup>6</sup> This argument will be recurrent in the parliamentary debates discussing the abolition. In France, abolitionists were opposed about the profitability of slavery. Besides, the anti-abolitionists put forward a humanitarian argument: the slave trade would save Africans from starvation and certain death, and abolition would generate pauperisation among the freedmen while favoring the competing powers.

The mobilisation of the abolitionist movements, as well as the revolts of slaves such as the Great Jamaican Slave Revolt of December 1831, progressively led to the abolition. On 4 February 1794, the French First Republic abolished slavery in the

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<sup>5</sup>Lovejoy [1989], *The Journal of African History*, vol. 30, no 3, p. 365

<sup>6</sup>Joseph Townsend, « A Dissertation on the Poor Laws » (1786), cited in John R. McCulloch, *A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Economic Tracts on Money*, Londres, Lord Overstone, 1859, p. 404.

colonies without any compensation. But the revolutionary and geopolitical context slowed down its implementation, and under the Consulate, Napoleon Bonaparte repealed the abolition decree on 20 May 1802. On 25 March 1807, the United Kingdom abolished the slave trade. In France, Napoleon Bonaparte decreed the abolition of slave trade in 29 March 1815.

Finally, the United Kingdom proclaimed the abolition of slavery through the Slavery Abolition Act on 28 August 1833. Around 800,000 enslaved are freed (Draper [2007]). In France, enslavement is abolished for the second time by the decree of 27 April 1848, by the provisional government of the Second Republic. 250,000 slaves are freed in the French colonies.<sup>7</sup> However, the emancipation process was far from being immediate.

In the British Empire, the abolition act came only into effect on 1st October 1834, and did not "extend to any of the Territories in the Possession of the East India Company, or to the Island of Ceylon, or to the Island of Saint Helena."<sup>8</sup> Besides, the conditions of enslavement of the former slaves were extended through an "apprenticeship" period during which they remained largely dependent on their masters. The freed slaves, called "apprentices", learned more to "behave" as free persons than a real occupation, and had to work forty-five hours a week for their former masters, who owed them food, lodging and maintenance. The forty-five hours were to be divided into five nine-hour workdays, so that apprentices can earn wages on Saturdays as free laborers. Any unjustified absence and failure to meet production targets were to be punished by an extended apprenticeship or by higher production targets. Corporal punishments, banned since the 1820s, were reintroduced, and children under six years of age were not covered by the new system. Finally, magistrates were appointed to ensure that both parties respected the law. Apprenticeship was finally abolished earlier, in 1838. Nevertheless, Stanziani [2020] recalls that many abuses from the planters were recorded.

In the French colonies, the abolition laws of 1848 provided for the adoption of rules to monitor and control workers mobility in order to prevent "social disorder and anarchy". In particular, vagrancy was prohibited: any freedman had to be able to prove that he had a stable job, as in metropolitan France. However, the repression of vagrancy became more radical, justified by the "natural indolence" of the blacks and because, as they were not considered fit to pay taxes, they were obliged to pay them by working. Vagrants were dragged into "national workshops", similar to British workhouses. In addition, decrees created "discipline workshops" for workers who refused to work (Buffon [1986]). The daily working time was re-established at twelve hours in September 1848, encouraging the colonists to ignore all measures related to working hours. Finally, since in metropolitan France philanthropy and mutual aid associations were the only assistance solutions adopted, the planters refused to pay pensions to freedmen and new immigrants (Stanziani [2020]).

These difficulties were compounded by the lack of prospects for former slaves to become materially emancipated from their former masters through access to property. In fact, in the French colonies, the administration imposed heavy taxes on uncultivated sugarcane land in order to prevent freedmen from settling (Ernatus [2009]). The freedmen were forced to be re-employed by the white settlers, and also faced competition from immigrant workers. In the British colonies, access to land ownership was more or less easy depending on the colony. In Barbados, the owners rented out their land to the slaves, who thus remained in their former place of work. In Jamaica, Trinidad and British Guiana, although slaves had broad access to land ownership, they were heavily indebted and often returned to work on their original plantation (Stanziani [2020]).

On top of that came the question of compensation for slave owners. As we will see, neither France nor Britain implemented a compensation for the former enslaved.

### 2.3 The compensation process in France and Britain

The Abolition Slave Act provided in its article 24 that £20 million had to be paid to the former British slave owners, which represented 40.8% of the government's total annual expenditure and 4.5% of the annual national wealth (Beauvois [2011]). The act established Commissioners of Arbitration (also known as the "Slave Compensation Commission"). As explained in Draper [2007]:

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<sup>7</sup>Figure reported by the De Broglie commission in March, 1843. Cf Buffon [1986].

<sup>8</sup>The law text is available at [https://www.pdavis.nl/Legis\\_07.htm](https://www.pdavis.nl/Legis_07.htm).

*"The Commission was charged with unpicking the various types of claims of ownership or entitlement amongst different colonial and metropolitan parties which had accreted over specific slaves or groups of slaves."*<sup>9</sup>

The Commission managed over 45,000 claims. Draper reports that accretion led to many disputes between claimants attached to the same slave property. It was the role of the Commission to arbitrate disagreements. In total, 3,500 awards were formally contested according to Draper. The Commission stopped to gather claims in 1840. A substantive part of them are recorded in the *Accounts of Slave Compensation Claims*<sup>10</sup>, requested by the Irish MP Daniel O'Connell in 1838. These accounts draw the number of slaves recorded in the colonies which are reported in table 1. The records of the Commission especially show that slave owners do not always fill the idealized image, i.e. a planter who owns slaves and lives in his plantation. Instead, Draper shows that "across the Caribbean colonies as a whole more than half the compensation awarded can be traced to owners or other recipients in Britain."<sup>11</sup>

The compensation terms and conditions were set as follow. Enslaved were first divided into two "divisions": praedial and non-praedial. Then, each category was itself subdivided into "classes", i.e. task- or skill-based groups. Finally, "Children under six years of age on 1st August 1834", and "Aged, diseased, or otherwise non-effective" constituted the two last classes. Each slaves entitled to a compensation depending on the colony and the class he belonged to. An example of classification is available in the appendix (Figure 13). These appraised value were themselves based on the average sale value of slaves at auction from 1822 to 1830, which are gathered in table 2. It appears that the compensation rate is equivalent to 42%–48% of the average slave market value, depending on colonies, meaning that the compensation was in average built to cover less than half of the slave market value.

In France, the decree of abolition provided in its article 5 that "The National Assembly will pay the quota of the compensation to be granted to the settlers".<sup>12</sup> The terms of the compensation were then set by the law of 29 January, 23 and 30 April 1849, and by its decree of application on 24 November 1849.<sup>13</sup> The law grants 126 million francs to slave owners, divided in an immediate payment of 6 million francs and an annuity of 6 million francs spread over twenty years. One eighth of the annuities of more than 1,000 francs was however dedicated to the creation of colonial banks in Martinique, Guadeloupe and Reunion, whose shares were given to the settlers compensated. In total, the compensation represented 7.1% of the French annual government's expenditure, and 0.7% of the annual national wealth (Beauvois [2011]).

The decree of 24 November 1849, created commissions in each colony where slave owners had to submit their claims. Unlike the British compensation process, which adapted the awards to slaves' occupation, the French compensations were unique in each colonies. The per capita compensations value are reported in table 3. The awards value represented around 40% of the slave market value (Blériot [2000]), which is equivalent to the compensation in the British Empire. Besides, contrary to the United Kingdom, the French parliamentarians did not provide any compensation measures for enslaved children under six years of age and elderly over sixty years of age. These terms and conditions caused a lot of discontentment amongst slave owners since slaves were appraised 910.90 francs in Martinique and 1,337.70 francs in French Guiana from 1838 to 1848 (Buffon [1979]). Many dysfunctions were also reported. For instance, according to Ernatus [2009], some small illiterate slave owners were not able to make the administrative procedures and lost their award, increasing the discontentment.

These first observations confirm that in both countries, it was not question of buying the slaves back by paying the full enslaved value, but rather to buy the cooperation of the white settlers and to preserve the colonial economic system as well as the proprietary regime after the emancipation.

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<sup>9</sup>Draper [2007], *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 64, Issue 1, p. 81.

<sup>10</sup>Document available at <https://archive.org/details/ukslaveownercompensation/page/n1/mode/2up>

<sup>11</sup>Draper [2007], *History Workshop Journal*, Volume 64, Issue 1, Abstract.

<sup>12</sup>"L'Assemblée nationale réglera la quotité de l'indemnité qui devra être accordée aux colons.", the original decree is available at [https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/evenements/2016/abolition-de-l-esclavage-1794-et-1848#node\\_32577](https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/evenements/2016/abolition-de-l-esclavage-1794-et-1848#node_32577)

<sup>13</sup>Texts available at <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k486123h/f428.item> and <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5512591n/f409.item>

Table 1: Number of slaves by date in the British colonies

Colonies	Year of return	Number of slaves	Percentage
Anguilla	1834	2,375	0,37
Barbadoes	1834	82,807	12,94
Bermice	1834	19,359	3,03
Bermuda	1834	4,203	0,66
Caymanas	1834	985	0,15
Dominica	1829	14,824	
	1832	14,384	2,25
Grenada	1832	23,411	
	1833	23,536	3,68
Honduras	1834	1,920	0,3
Jamaica	1832	310,707	48,56
Montserrat	1831	6,335	0,99
Nevis	1834	8,722	1,36
St. Christopher	1834	18,285	2,86
Tobago	1833	11,767	
	1834	11,621	1,82
Trinidad	1831	22,359	3,49
Virgin Islands	1831	5,108	
	1834	5,192	0,81
Mauritius	1832	63,164	9,87
Seychelles	1830	5,449	0,85
Cape of Good Hope	1833	38,427	6,01
TOTAL		639,830	100

*Note:* When the number of slaves is given for two years, the total computation only keeps the most recent number of slaves.

*Source:* Accounts of Slave Compensation Claims (p.2) and own calculations.

## 2.4 The reasons of compensation

According to Beauvois [2011], three main reasons for the compensation can be enumerated. First, the abolition introduces a pure legal question: if enslaved are a property, how is it possible to legally abolish slavery without compensating slave owners? Two visions are opposed in the parliamentary debates in the first half of the 19th century. On the one hand, the *legalists* considered indeed that the law has recognized during centuries that slaves were goods possessed by their master. Consequently, in the emerging regime of "quasi-sacralization of private property" (Piketty [2020]), the abolition corresponds to an expropriation entitling to a compensation. On the other hand, the abolitionists called *humanists* think that slaves cannot be considered as goods insofar as they are human beings. Thus, slave ownership is considered as a crime against the laws of nature, the laws of religion, and the human laws, and then cannot be compensated for. The legal issue is thus focused on the concept of property and the nature of slaves, and opposed a materialist view to a human rights view.

Second, the abolition must entitle to a compensation since slave ownership was a source of income. Both supporters

Table 2: Account of the average slaves value in the years prior the abolition and rate of compensation per capita in British colonies

Colony	Averages of sales of slaves from 1822 to 1830 (£)	Rate of compensation per slave (£)	Coefficient
Bermuda	27.25	12.52	0.46
Bahamas	29.94	12.72	0.42
Jamaica	44.76	19.77	0.44
Honduras	120.23	53.34	0.44
Virgin Islands	31.81	14.14	0.44
Antigua	32.64	14.61	0.45
Montserrat	36.89	16.18	0.44
Nevis	39.2	17.13	0.44
St. Christopher's	36.34	16.65	0.46
Dominica	43.43	19.44	0.45
Barbadoes	47.06	20.68	0.44
Grenada	59.3	26.07	0.44
St. Vincents	58.33	26.53	0.45
Tobago	45.6	20.18	0.44
St. Lucia	56.93	25.17	0.44
Trinidad	105.22	50.06	0.48
British Guiana	114.57	51.86	0.45
Cape of Good Hope	73.5	34.58	0.47
Mauritius	69.71	31.53	0.45

*Note:* The coefficients are obtained by dividing the third column cells by the second column cells.

*Source:* Accounts of Slave Compensation Claims (p.4) and own calculations. Conversion from £ s d to decimal coinage is made by the author.

Table 3: Value of the compensation per capita in French colonies

Colony	Value of the compensation per capita for the annuity part (F)
Reunion	671.79
Guadeloupe	447.28
Guiana	589.32
Martinique	409.98
Senegal	315.15
Sainte-Marie	72
Nosy Be	69.93

*Source:* REPAIRS website and Ernatus [2009]

of slavery and abolitionists are agree on the economic importance of colonies. The parliamentarians in both countries are worried work and production stop after the abolition if slave owners are not compensated to give them the financial resources to pay the former enslaved become free workers. They are also worried about the new cost wages would induce in the sugar crisis context and in the debt context of settlers. Even if abolitionists support a financial help, they explain however that abolition is necessary insofar as forced labor is more costly than free labor: first, French and British government support the imports of Caribbean cane sugar by import taxes on foreign sugar, which increases the sugar price paid by the mainlander consumer; second, the risk of slave revolt or war requires a permanent military presence, costly in human and financial means; third, forced labor is considered as less productive than free labor. As a consequence, one of the fundamental objective of the compensation was, as reminded by the French Ministry of Marine and Colonies, the "preservation of labor and production".<sup>14</sup>

Finally, the compensation appeared to be required to ensure the colonial cooperation. The supporters of slavery and the colonial lobby considered the abolition was an interference in the colonial business and denied the metropolis the right to legislate in the settlements. The abolitionists refute the non-interference principle, despite the (legal) freedom of decision actually enjoyed by the colonies. They argue that the parliamentary power is lawful to intervene in the colonial prerogatives, thus to abolish slavery. Nevertheless, the abolitionists knew the abolition would not be implemented without the settlers cooperation. This justified a more gradual emancipation through the apprenticeship period in the case of the British colonies. This period is also thought as a transition measure during which slaves will be "educated" and "moralised", in order to maintain public order (settlers in particular were worried about potential revolts and reprisals after the abolition). But as we saw in section 2.2, the "gradualism" showed its limits since settlers abused of the apprenticeship and delayed the effective abolition of slavery. The compensation was then progressively thought as a way to buy the cooperation of slave owners for an immediate abolition. To this extent, compensation appears less as a measure of solidarity with the colonists than a way of carrying the colonial system on (Ernatus [2009]).

## 2.5 A compensation to curb colonies indebtedness: special focus

*"Ne croyez pas, Messieurs, que, possesseurs de grandes fortunes, ils puissent supporter le dommage qui résulterait pour eux d'une indemnité incomplète. Non, Messieurs, les colons possesseurs de grands ateliers sont presque tous grevés de dettes énormes [...]."*

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Minutes of the session of July 10, 1839 in the Chamber of Deputies - Statement by Mr. de Saint-Georges, delegate of Bourbon Island, about the proposal of Mr. de Tracy concerning the abolition of slavery.

### 2.5.1 The state of colonial indebtedness on the eve of abolition

At the time of the abolition, the colonial economy was to a great extent a credit-based economy (Ernatus [2009]). The construction of a plantation required a high amount of initial capital, both in land and slaves, in particular in the case of cane sugar. Few settlers had the financial resources to start such agricultural activity. Besides the maintenance of a plantation required continuous investments in new slaves since the natural demographic growth rate was often insufficient. The resort to credit was then common, either between settlers, or with merchants who supplied the colonies with manufactured products from the metropolis.

Moreover, the lack of cash flows in the colony favoured the resort to credit, in particular when plantations were bought since the cost was out of range of most buyers. Buffon [1979] argues that the lack of cash was in particular due to the transfers to the absentees and merchants stayed in the metropolis. Consequently, planters rarely paid their expenditures

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<sup>14</sup>Explanatory memorandum and draft decree on the settlement of the indemnity, 23 August 1848, cited in Buffon [1986].

in cash, but rather received advances from the sellers. The future harvest had to pay it back. However, the natural hazards under the tropics, and slaves insurrections, led sometimes to bad harvests which were insufficient to reimburse. Thus some settlers amass large amounts of credit called "cargo debts"<sup>15</sup> to be able to face up to their due date.

The absenteeism also worsen the colonial indebtedness. Since many slave owners did not live in their colonial plantations (usually children of planters who went to the metropolis to get a better instruction and never came back in America but inherit of the plantations of their father), they entrust the management to local administrator against a commission of 5% to 6 % of the net product of the estate. This extra administrative cost, and the bad management of the agents who only have interest to maximise the benefits of the plantations in the short run increases the debt of the owners.

In addition, the indivisibility of colonial property involved that, in case of seizure of an estate by a creditor, the latter takes all the debts of its debtor on. Thus, few creditors seized the plantations of their debtors in case of outstanding debt, and prefer postpone the repayment. The law also provided favourable adjustments to debtors through the "equity of redemption", which increased the due dates.

Finally, the commercial and institutional context in the first half of the 19th century decreased the profitability of Caribbean sugar plantations. Indeed, the cane sugar price fall in particular due to the competition of European beet sugar. Besides, from the 1820's, reforms increased the life and work slaves conditions which increased the maintenance price of the labor force.

Regarding the interest rates, the previous factors explained their high level. Beauvois [2011] reports that before 1834, the interest rates fluctuated from 6% to 8% in the British territories. But in some territories, it could reached 12% like in Mauritius. In addition, planters had to pay the varied commissions of the commercial intermediaries. In the French colonies, interest rates is usually at a minimum of 16%. The absence of local colonial banks before the act of abolition forced the planter to borrow at high interest from metropolitan merchants. Such interest largely accelerated the spiral of indebtedness. In 1830-1840, the French colonial debt globally reached 210 million francs according to the debates in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>16</sup> The amount of debts in the British colonies are unknown before the abolition, but are set to 70 million pounds in 1791 by the Jamaican planter Penrhyn.<sup>17</sup> It is likely that the indebtedness kept increasing until the abolition in 1833.

## 2.5.2 An insufficient compensation to save indebted slave owners

In section 2.3, we saw that in both French and British Empire the compensation value was less than a half of the market slave value at the time. This choice was especially motivated by the lack of budgetary resources. Indeed, in France, the De Broglie Commission appointed in 1840 considered to offer 1,200 francs by slave in average. Since the number of slaves recorded in the French Empire was about 250,000, it would have cost 300 million to the government's budget (Buffon [1986]).<sup>18</sup> Such compensation was impossible to finance for the French government, which proposed a total compensation of 90 million in 1848, increased to the final 126 million after the colonial lobby pressures (Ernatus [2009]).

As long as the French colonial debt was around 210 million francs in 1830-1840, it is clear that the 126 million francs compensation was underestimated to face the indebtedness issue. The direct consequence is the bankruptcy of many settlers after the liberation of slaves. According to Jules Ballet, the creditors of Guadeloupe lost 37,059,660.97 francs despite the repayment of settlers and received only 10,587,925.01 francs from them after the compensation.<sup>19</sup> Heavily indebted, the most modest owners had to sell their compensation to speculators, usually at a loss, to get cash flows and pay their

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<sup>15</sup>Christian Schakenbourg, *Histoire de l'industrie sucrière en Guadeloupe*, p. 125, cited in Beauvois [2011].

<sup>16</sup>Rapport fait au nom de la Commission chargée d'examiner la proposition de M. de Tracy relative aux esclaves des colonies, p. 23.

<sup>17</sup>Hansard, to the year 1803, vol. XXVIII, 12 mai 1789, Penrhyn, p. 78, cited in Beauvois [2011].

<sup>18</sup>The Commission computed based on the price surveys in notaries' offices that each slave whatever his sex and age entitled to F 1,102.43 in Guadeloupe, F 1,200 in Martinique, F 1,361.99 in French Guiana, and F 1,600 in La Reunion.

<sup>19</sup>Cited in Buffon [1979], p. 235, note 4.



creditor back, or even used them as a last resort currency.<sup>20</sup> At the end, only the richest slave owners benefited from the compensation. Even the creation of colonial banks were unfavourable to small owners. Indeed, 55.8% of the capital of the bank of Guadeloupe was owned by the 150 first shareholders, representing 1.7% of the persons compensated (Buffon [1986]). Consequently, small planters had difficulties to borrow the amounts they need, as well as former slaves who had no opportunities to settle. The compensation process is thus a pointer of the importance of credit in the colonies. It also reveals the credit relationships across slave owners, which is one of the topics of analysis of this thesis.

## 3 Data

### 3.1 French data

The French data are drawn from the REPAIRS data base.<sup>21</sup> It contains 30,999 French compensations in four colonies: Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, and Senegal. Most of the available data comes from the K series of the French *Archives Nationales d'outre-mer*. An example of the archive is displayed in the appendix (figure 14). In particular, these archives inform, for each compensation, about the first holder (*titulaire*), the second holder (*porteur*, which can be the same individual, or a creditor), the nature of the compensation (*indemnité* or *collocation*) and the compensation value.

In the following, I will refer to the French *indemnités* with the word "indemnity". I will refer to *collocation* with the same word. Both indicate the nature of a given compensation. It is worth having in mind the definition of these two compensation types. An indemnity is a compensation whose first holder is a slave owner. This owner can earn the value of the compensation himself, or pass it on to another individual (the second holder) to pay a debt back for instance. A collocation is an old term no more used nowadays. It is an amount of money that is owed to the holder in place of the slave owner to whom the title is attached. The holder is then called a *collocataire*. This equity gives its holder the right to collect the compensation instead of the original slave owner, who sold or gave it to the holder. Besides, like indemnities, collocations could be passed to another individual (typically, a creditor or a speculator), who is thus viewed as the second holder of the collocation. A diagram is available in the appendix for a more visual explanation (figure 15).

Among the 30,999 observations, very few of them affects banks (ex: "Banque coloniale de la Guadeloupe", "Banque coloniale de la Martinique" etc.), colonial administrations (ex: "Administration de l'enregistrement") or public estate (ex: "Domaine colonial de l'île de la Réunion") rather than individuals. Due to the focus on individuals this paper aims at, the coming analysis does not keep them. Besides, the database contains a significant amount of small companies. Since these firms are usually associated with a name (ex: "Bardon Servant et cie", "Brumant et cie" etc.), and are part of the owner's wealth, these observations have been changed to match the name they are related to. The final database totals then 29,413 compensations, including 12,498 first holders and 7,529 second holders (whose names can appear in several compensations). Some descriptive statistics are available in Table 4.

### 3.2 British database

On the British part, the present paper uses the Legacy of British Slavery (LBS) database. It contains 58,839 observations including 46,287 claims drawn from the T71 series of the Slave Compensation Commission records. An example of the Accounts of Slave Compensation Claims is available in the appendix (figure 16). The claims concern all British colonies affected by the Abolition Slave Act. 47,677 slave owners or persons associated to the claims are counted.

The LBS database is much more valuable than the REPAIRS database. Indeed, it displays many more information about the persons compensated, in particular occupations, marriages, but also the claimant type (mortgagee, executor, heir-at-law...) which gives precious information about the reasons that link an individual to a given claim. A list of these categories and their definition is available in the appendix (table 15). Nevertheless, we have no information about the category for

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<sup>20</sup>Cf REPAIRS website

<sup>21</sup>Data available at/ <https://esclavage-indemnitees.fr/public/>

Table 4: Summary statistics of the French data

	Guadeloupe (N = 7584)	Martinique (N = 10,823)	Reunion (N = 10,500)	Senegal (N = 506)	Overall (N = 29,413)
<i>Compensation type</i>					
Collocation	5,447 (72%)	5,561 (51%)	2,990 (28%)	328 (65%)	14,326 (49%)
Indemnity	2,107 (28%)	5,262 (49%)	7,505 (71%)	178 (35%)	15,052 (51%)
Unknown	30 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	5 (<0.1%)	0 (0%)	35 (0.1%)
<i>Compensation value</i>					
Sum	19,265,634	24,774,017	35,925,215	367,142	80,332,007
Mean	2,543	2,289	3,426	727	2,733
Minimum	0	2	1	10	0
Q1	401	359	471	165	410
Median	808	798	942	330	827
Q3	1,957	1,861	2,827	742	2,188
Maximum	177,166	172,192	436,750	12,483	436,750
(Missing)	7	0	14	1	22
<i>Slaves</i>					
Sum	43,073	60,427	53,477	1,165	158,142
Mean	6	6	5	2	5
Minimum	0	0	0	0	0
Q1	1	1	1	1	1
Median	2	2	1	1	2
Q3	4	5	4	2	4
Maximum	396	420	650	40	650
(Missing)	7	0	14	1	22
<i>Sex</i>					
Men	65.1%	50.8%	60.3%	24.73%	57.43%
Women	31.41%	41.81%	36.03%	38.46%	37.01%
Unknown	3.49%	7.39%	3.67%	36.81%	5.56%

*Note:* The number of slaves was derived by dividing the compensations value by the corresponding per capita compensation value displayed in table 3. Such computations sometimes led to a decimal number of slaves between 0 and 1, which explain the zero minimum values in the *Slaves* category. The numbers have been rounded to the nearest integer. The values of the *Sex* category are drawn from the REPAIRS website since no information about gender was available in the data set I used.

*Source:* REPAIRS database and website, own calculations.

84% of the observations. Few descriptive statistics are available in table 5. The data also display information about the number of *absentees*, i.e. the slave owners who did not live in the colonies, as opposed to *residents*.

It is worth having in mind that an individual may be associated with several claims, and that a claim may be associated

with several individuals. I refer to this as *common ownership* as opposed to *individual ownership*. When this is the case, it is impossible to determine the division of slaves ownership and therefore the distribution of the compensation across individuals associated with the claim. Individual ownership is majority: 68% of observations are claims associated with a single individual, the remaining 32% are claims associated with at least two different beneficiaries. 40,217 individuals can be list in the individual ownership category, while 18,622 persons are counted in the common ownership category.

Table 5: Summary statistics of the British data

	Anguilla (N = 259)	Antigua (N = 1,720)	Bahamas (N = 1,191)	Barbados (N = 6,413)	Bermuda (N = 1,123)	British Guiana (N = 3,860)	Cape of Good Hope (N = 8,047)	Caymanas, Jamaica (N = 117)	Dominica (N = 1,071)	Grenada (N = 1,434)	Honduras (N = 329)
<i>Compensation value</i>											
Sum	60,479	1,684,949	150,105	2,960,561	50,907	12,633,116	1,822,578	19,409	522,705	1,921,011	128,111
Mean	234	980	126	462	45	3,273	226	166	488	1,340	389
Minimum	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	13	2	9	30
Q1	39	30	26	35	16	102	47	49	29	41	66
Median	96	132	57	84	31	292	116	108	91	125	142
Q3	244	1,843	124	264	58	3,699	283	193	534	2,319	359
Maximum	2,131	6,287	4,333	8,558	329	83,530	3,376	916	5,646	10,914	11,453
<i>Slaves</i>											
Sum	3,802	115,287	11,965	143,489	4,067	248,733	52,855	993	26,534	73,994	2,482
Mean	15	67	10	22	4	64	7	8	25	52	8
Minimum	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Q1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1
Median	6	9	5	5	3	6	4	5	5	5	3
Q3	16	124	10	13	5	73	9	10	27	88	7
Maximum	135	492	377	410	31	1,598	83	50	260	437	237
(Missing)	0	2	1	18	0	0	817	0	0	1	0
<i>Sex</i>											
Men	150 (58%)	1,174 (68%)	805 (68%)	3,966 (62%)	699 (62%)	2,703 (70%)	4,429 (55%)	84 (72%)	636 (59%)	906 (63%)	194 (59%)
Women	108 (42%)	525 (31%)	369 (31%)	2,384 (37%)	410 (37%)	1,053 (27%)	1,063 (13%)	32 (27%)	366 (34%)	476 (33%)	127 (39%)
Unknown	1 (0.4%)	21 (1.2%)	17 (1.4%)	63 (1.0%)	14 (1.2%)	104 (2.7%)	2,555 (32%)	1 (0.9%)	69 (6.4%)	52 (3.6%)	8 (2.4%)
<i>Absentees</i>											
Absentee	9 (3.5%)	606 (35%)	16 (1.3%)	789 (12%)	3 (0.3%)	1,085 (28%)	2 (<0.1%)	0 (0%)	184 (17%)	420 (29%)	19 (5.8%)
Resident	29 (11%)	266 (15%)	55 (4.6%)	1,038 (16%)	7 (0.6%)	704 (18%)	27 (0.3%)	26 (22%)	182 (17%)	142 (9.9%)	87 (26%)
Unknown	221 (85%)	848 (49%)	1,120 (94%)	4,586 (72%)	1,113 (99%)	2,071 (54%)	8,018 (100%)	91 (78%)	705 (66%)	872 (61%)	223 (68%)

*Note:* The categories *Men* and *Women* aggregate individuals whose gender have been identified with certainty or not. The category *Absentee* aggregates British slave owner who lived (or probably lived) in Britain as well as foreign (or potentially foreign) owners. *Resident* aggregates also people classified as resident of the colonies but with uncertainty. Numbers have been rounded to the nearest integer.

*Source:* LBS database, own calculations.

Table 5: Summary statistics of the British data (continued)

	Jamaica (N = 16,810)	Mauritius (N = 8,505)	Montserrat (N = 397)	Nevis (N = 460)	St Kitts (N = 1,023)	St Lucia (N = 1,096)	St Vincent (N = 1,174)	Tobago (N = 610)	Trinidad (N = 2,827)	Virgin Islands (N = 373)	Overall (N = 58,839)
<i>Compensation value</i>											
Sum	12,670,789	2,984,833	409,526	423,107	751,251	665,603	1,934,541	809,055	2,066,719	204,580	44,873,935
Mean	754	351	1,032	920	734	607	1,648	1,326	731	548	763
Minimum	0	0	9	4	0	8	3	5	10	3	0
Q1	50	38	51	45	28	67	59	62	74	33	47
Median	133	96	300	176	74	151	232	498	192	99	119
Q3	610	266	1,846	1,844	1,030	612	2,577	2,177	650	471	429
Maximum	14,597	14,448	6,231	4,886	5,065	7,494	17,753	7,564	12,065	8,661	83,530
<i>Slaves</i>											
Sum	656,072	94,457	25,445	24,817	44,933	26,686	76,344	41,060	41,739	14,114	1,729,868
Mean	39	13	64	54	44	24	65	67	15	38	30
Minimum	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Q1	2	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	3	2
Median	6	4	19	11	4	6	9	23	4	7	5
Q3	30	10	113	111	67	22	97	113	13	31	17
Maximum	704	474	375	297	328	288	704	421	234	606	1,598
(Missing)	48	1,042	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	0	1,939
<i>Sex</i>											
Men	10,306 (61%)	793 (9.3%)	277 (70%)	283 (62%)	694 (68%)	580 (53%)	716 (61%)	403 (66%)	1,580 (56%)	236 (63%)	31,614 (54%)
Women	6,315 (38%)	477 (5.6%)	111 (28%)	173 (38%)	311 (30%)	415 (38%)	429 (37%)	189 (31%)	1,104 (39%)	115 (31%)	16,552 (28%)
Unknown	189 (1.1%)	7,235 (85%)	9 (2.3%)	4 (0.9%)	18 (1.8%)	101 (9.2%)	29 (2.5%)	18 (3.0%)	143 (5.1%)	22 (5.9%)	10,673 (18%)
<i>Absentees</i>											
Absentee	3,838 (23%)	40 (0.5%)	142 (36%)	171 (37%)	288 (28%)	110 (10%)	384 (33%)	299 (49%)	473 (17%)	71 (19%)	8,949 (15%)
Resident	2,821 (17%)	98 (1.2%)	68 (17%)	74 (16%)	166 (16%)	220 (20%)	154 (13%)	47 (7.7%)	442 (16%)	54 (14%)	6,707 (11%)
Unknown	10,151 (60%)	8,367 (98%)	187 (47%)	215 (47%)	569 (56%)	766 (70%)	636 (54%)	264 (43%)	1,912 (68%)	248 (66%)	43,183 (73%)

*Note:* The categories *Men* and *Women* aggregate individuals whose gender have been identified with certainty or not. The category *Absentee* aggregates British slave owner who lived (or probably lived) in Britain as well as foreign (or potentially foreign) owners. *Resident* aggregates also people classified as resident of the colonies but with uncertainty. Numbers have been rounded to the nearest integer.

*Source:* LBS database, own calculations.

## 4 The concentration of compensation in French and British colonies

The historiography showed how the colonial societies were societies of high inequality between masters and enslaved of course, but also across slave holders themselves. Contemporaries knew the large gap between richest and poorest slave owners. In the French Chamber of Deputies, the delegate of Bourbon Island (Reunion) Mr. de Saint-Georges stated in July 10, 1839:

*"In Bourbon, out of five thousand four hundred and twenty-nine heads of family, we have four thousand sixty-three [that is 75%] who have only one to ten slaves. The greater part of the colonists therefore have as their only resource, for themselves and their families, the work of five or six slaves."<sup>22</sup>*

In the present French data, I computed that the 75% poorest slaves owners owned one to eight slaves, which is quite consistent with this statement.

Then, the compensation of slave owners after the abolition should reveal this very unequal wealth structure across colonies. This section is thus about analysing the concentration of compensation in the French and British colonies. To reach this goal, I will proceed by distinguishing between individuals and families. I judge that analysing data at the family level (i.e. after regrouping observations by family name only instead of family name and first name) offers a better comparative quality between French and British case.

Indeed, the LBS database is perfectly clean. The REPAIRS database, on the other hand, displays some irregularities regarding the first names. Thus, the same individual may appear several times (if he held several compensation securities), but often with a forename that is not correct. For example, ARTIS Jean-Hyacinthe will appear under this pseudonym, but will appear on the next line under the pseudonym ARTIS J.-Hyacinthe, then on the next line ARTIS J.-H., etc. This causes the following problem: the analysis by individuals (after grouping by family name and first name) is biased and the values systematically underestimated, since the program will count ARTIS Jean-Hyacinthe and ARTIS J.-H. as two different individuals, whereas they are objectively the same. They are therefore not grouped together, and the number of slaves and the individuals' compensation are underestimated. Finally, for many observations, first name is not available. Surnames are much less prone to this kind of spelling hazard, which reduces the risk of bias by grouping by surname. I was able to manually correct first names for only 11% of the French observations.<sup>23</sup>

I see however two possible limits to this strategy. On the first hand, one can imagine that the families of British owners (or vice versa) were more numerous than the French families, and if their members owned slaves in common (which is the often the case as seen previously in Section 3.2) then the English families could artificially own more slaves than the families of French settlers. On the other hand, two different families can have identical surnames. In the LBS database, for instance, there are ten different Thomas Smith, who would be grouped together with the 321 other individuals bearing the surname "Smith" even though they are not from the same family. However, by grouping individuals by colony, this should limit the bias (it is unlikely that Thomas Smith from Jamaica is the same as Thomas Smith from British Guiana, unless the latter is an absentee).

### 4.1 Concentration analysis at the individual level

Table 6 presents the distribution of slave ownership in the French and British empire at the individual level. The number of slaves in French colonies is derived by dividing the value of indemnities received by a first holder individual, with the per capita compensation value available in table 3. Slave ownership is instead already displayed in the LBS database. On the British side, only individual ownership has been retained in order to make the comparison with the French case possible. Thus, the table displays the value for the 9,701 French first holder of indemnities I have been able to count. Table 16 in the appendix reminds all the sub-sample sizes the French data can list. The British data includes the 40,217 beneficiaries of the

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<sup>22</sup>Minutes of the session of July 10, 1839 in the Chamber of Deputies, p. 97.

<sup>23</sup>NB: as I write this essay, the REPAIRS database has been updated and no longer displays duplicated first names of compensation recipients. The database I rely on is therefore dated.

individual ownership sub-sample.

According to the statistics drawn, French slave owners held in average 10 slaves against 24 for their British counterpart. Slave holding was much more concentrated in the British Empire. Indeed, the bottom 50% held in average 2 slaves in the British colonies and 6 slaves in the French ones, while the top 10% and top 1% held in average respectively 8.21 and 35 times more slaves than the total average in the British colonies, against 6 and 20 times in the French Empire. Individual average slave holding reaches sometimes huge values like in Antigua (1,724) or Jamaica (1,062). The reader should also keep in mind that these figures are probably underestimated since they do not include common property held by many individuals in addition to their individual property. None French colonies shows such amount of "wealth". These figures finally reveal large fluctuations in slave holding across colonies.

Table 7 displays summary statistics regarding the distribution of indemnities. Notice that in the French cases, since the number of slaves is directly derived from the indemnities values, the coefficients should be the same. The fact that they are not is only due to the calculation method: in table 6, coefficients have been computed after rounding the number of slaves to the nearest integer. This causes sometimes purely artificial discrepancy between coefficients in both tables for the French case. In the British case, however, since slave ownership and awards are displayed independently, it allows us to check if the distribution of slave holding matches the distribution of compensations. From the global point of view, coefficients are indeed very close from the coefficients displayed in table 6, meaning that slave owners globally received an amount of compensation proportional to the enslaved they owned. For the bottom 50% and the top 10%, coefficients of both tables are also close from each other. The difference between them never exceed 0.66 (and -0.26 for the negative gaps). However, for the top 1%, some colonies display very large gaps between coefficients. In Tobago, the top 1% received 32.81 times more compensation in average compared to the total average, while it owned in average 37.77 times more slaves, meaning that slave owners "should have" received 4.96 (37,77 – 32,81) times more compensation. The gap reaches 3.34 for Antigua, 2.22 in Mauritius, and 1.84 in Grenada. Sometimes, compensation value are in average relatively less important than slave ownership. Trinidad and the Virgin Islands indeed display discrepancy of -1.59 and -1.39 respectively, meaning that slave owners received more compensation that they "ought to". These results do not confirm the traditional historiography, supporting the idea that the richest benefited more from the compensation process. This could depend on the colonies.

Discrepancies in coefficients could be explained by the appraisal method used by the British administrators. It could be that the majority of slaves in Trinidad and the Virgin Islands are high classes slaves, which entitled to higher awards according to the classification of the Slave Compensation Commission. Conversely, Tobago, Antigua, Mauritius and Grenada could have colonial economy mostly based on low skill slaves, entitling to lower awards. Ekama et al. [2021] found out discrepancies between the slaves appraised values and the compensation values actually paid across the Cape districts. They wrote:

*"Each slave-owner thus received for each slave the average amount for all slaves in a class, not even the average appraised value, let alone the specific appraised value assigned to each slave in the appraisers' lists. As an example, a slave-owner by the name of Van Blerk received £178 for his seven slaves, though they had been valued at £569 by the Cape appraisers. The method of calculation used, which Liebenberg frankly calls unfair, led to at least two perverse, surely unexpected, outcomes. The first was at the class level. In one class, those designated as 'head people on wharfs' were given a lower average value than 'inferior people on wharfs', which was surely an inversion of the logic behind the categorisation. This led to the compensation paid out for slaves in the 'inferior' class being higher than for those in the 'head' class, a difference of more than £2 on average (Liebenberg, 1959: 148–9). The second perverse outcome, the result of averages being used to determine the amount to be paid out, meant that some slave-owners received more than the appraised value of their slaves. Liebenberg (1959: 152) cites complaints about the way owners of low-value slaves profited from the compensation process while owners of high-value slaves lost out."*<sup>24</sup>

In the current data, the gap between coefficients for the Cape of Good Hope are 0, 0.02 and -0.7 for the bottom 50%, the top 10% and the top 1% respectively, meaning that the top slave owners received in average more compensation than they

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<sup>24</sup>Ekama et al. [2021], *Explorations in Economic History*, vol. 81, p. 3

owned slaves compared to the total average. This results does not match the Ekama et al. [2021], which could be due to the omission of common slave ownership, causing an underestimation of the Cape slave holders' property.

The reader have to keep in mind that the French results are underestimated for the reasons explained above. To get around this problem, we are now going to study the distribution of slave ownership and indemnities at the family level.



Table 6: Summary statistics of the concentration of slaves across individuals in the French and British Empire

	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>French colonies</i>							
Guadeloupe	10	1	0.10	61	6.10	181	18.10
Martinique	9	1	0.11	52	5.78	164	18.22
Reunion	11	1	0.09	69	6.27	236	21.45
Senegal	4	1	0.25	19	4.75	47	11.75
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>20</b>
<i>British colonies</i>							
Anguilla	13	2	0.15	67	5.15	104	10.4
Antigua	41	2	0.05	365	8.90	1,724	42.05
Bahamas	12	2	0.17	70	5.83	335	27.92
Barbados	25	2	0.08	189	7.56	778	31.12
Bermuda	5	1	0.20	22	4.40	68	13.60
British Guiana	34	2	0.06	280	8.24	998	29.35
Cape of Good Hope	5	1	0.20	22	4.40	44	8.80
Caymanas, Jamaica	9	3	0.33	33	3.67	48	5.33
Dominica	22	2	0.09	157	7.14	417	18.95
Grenada	20	2	0.10	157	7.85	553	27.65
Honduras	9	1	0.11	50	5.56	144	16.00
Jamaica	46	2	0.04	378	8.22	1,062	23.09
Mauritius	8	1	0.12	55	6.88	195	24.38
Montserrat	30	2	0.07	242	8.07	601	20.03
Nevis	22	2	0.09	149	6.77	272	12.36
St Kitts	23	2	0.09	185	8.04	332	14.43
St Lucia	26	2	0.08	217	8.35	921	35.42
St Vincent	20	1	0.05	154	7.70	444	22.20
Tobago	22	1	0.05	177	8.05	831	37.77
Trinidad	16	1	0.06	126	7.88	483	30.19
Virgin Islands	13	2	0.15	63	4.85	188	14.46
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>8.21</b>	<b>840</b>	<b>35</b>

*Note:* The number of slaves has been rounded to the nearest integer. The *Coefficient* columns always display the division of the previous column with the *Total average* column. The table compares French first holders of indemnities with British owners from the sub-sample of individual ownership. *Source:* LBS and REPAIRS databases, own calculations.

Table 7: Summary statistics of the concentration of indemnities across individuals in the French and British Empire

	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>French colonies (F)</i>							
Guadeloupe	4,341.56	652.56	0.15	27,130.83	6.25	81,007.33	18.66
Martinique	3,667.6	589.01	0.16	21,496.21	5.86	67,321.38	18.36
Reunion	7,182.51	777.22	0.11	46,568.33	6.48	158,383.92	22.05
Senegal	1,223.33	192.07	0.16	5,954.25	4.87	14,673.17	11.99
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,218.8</b>	<b>2,832.04</b>	<b>0.54</b>	<b>33,274.09</b>	<b>6.38</b>	<b>115,984</b>	<b>22.22</b>
<i>British colonies (£)</i>							
Anguilla	213.70	44.83	0.21	959.57	4.49	1,667.64	7.80
Antigua	671.80	25.78	0.04	6,006.72	8.94	26,005.53	38.71
Bahamas	148.96	27.63	0.19	849.15	5.70	3,969.25	26.65
Barbados	527.86	42.29	0.08	4,010.14	7.60	16,328.85	30.93
Bermuda	55.70	16.86	0.30	239.59	4.30	728.90	13.09
British Guiana	1,697.80	97.03	0.06	13,935.42	8.21	49,201.04	28.98
Cape of Good Hope	165.35	33.58	0.20	724.54	4.38	1,570.15	9.50
Caymanas, Jamaica	175.53	54.32	0.31	622.00	3.54	879.63	5.01
Dominica	427.26	33.22	0.08	2,967.17	6.94	7,585.29	17.75
Grenada	497.55	40.82	0.08	3,924.33	7.89	12,841.55	25.81
Honduras	470.66	73.41	0.16	2,626.26	5.58	8,001.35	17.00
Jamaica	921.03	50.76	0.06	7,508.33	8.15	21,231.05	23.05
Mauritius	261.38	31.09	0.12	1,631.68	6.24	5,791.69	22.16
Montserrat	481.06	33.45	0.07	3,919.77	8.15	9,743.36	20.25
Nevis	369.30	34.72	0.09	2,542.58	6.88	4,629.90	12.54
St Kitts	394.33	35.27	0.09	3,198.50	8.11	5,449.61	13.82
St Lucia	672.09	50.30	0.07	5,453.57	8.11	23,493.15	34.96
St Vincent	506.64	43.34	0.09	3,918.62	7.73	11,201.73	22.11
Tobago	456.21	39.74	0.09	3,570.67	7.83	14,967.18	32.81
Trinidad	802.60	77.17	0.10	6,104.56	7.61	25,507.54	31.78
Virgin Islands	170.21	29.11	0.17	869.33	5.11	2,698.55	15.85
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>586.95</b>	<b>41.39</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>4,628.74</b>	<b>7.87</b>	<b>20,388.09</b>	<b>34.74</b>

*Note:* The *Coefficient* columns always display the division of the previous column with the *Total average* column. The table compares French first holders of indemnities with British owners from the sub-sample of individual ownership.

*Source:* LBS and REPAIRS databases, own calculations.

## 4.2 Concentration analysis at the family level

Table 8 displays some figures measuring the concentration of slaves across families in the French and British colonies. As before, the number of slaves in French colonies is derived by dividing the value of indemnities received by a first holder individual, with the per capita compensation value available in Table 3. As before, only individual ownership has been retained for the British data. This time, I have been able to count 5,854 first holder families of indemnities in the French data, while I counted 17,703 different families in the British individual ownership sub-sample.

The French top 1% families held in average 21.25 times more slaves than the total French families. On the British side, they held in average 16.3 times more slaves than the total average. Interestingly, after grouping individuals by family name, the French top 1% owned more slaves than its British counterpart. Again, this results is subject to some bias since common ownership could not be included in the British sample.

Like in the individual level analysis, table 9 displays total coefficients very close to their counterpart in table 8. Some gaps are also observable across British colonies when comparing the coefficients in both tables. Again, Tobago displays the higher discrepancy between slave and indemnity coefficients. Indeed, the top 10% and 1% shows gaps of 1.39 and 2.04 respectively, meaning that families holding slaves in Tobago received on average less compensation than their slave ownership entitled them to. Other colonies such as Honduras and Jamaica display high discrepancy across coefficients (1.67 and -1.64 respectively). The reasons that could explain these difference are the same already exposed in the previous section. Further research should however be done to explain why some colonies display negative gap while others show positive ones.

Despite the possible bias that could infirm our results (in particular the impossibility to know how common ownership awards were divided across owners associated to the same claims), it is clear that the analysis of French and British records demonstrates in a quantitative way that colonial societies were highly unequal across slave holders themselves, with large degree of concentration in the top of the compensation distribution.

A more direct point of view is summarised in figures 1 and 2, both for the individual and family cases. In the French case, the distribution of slave holding and indemnities are consistent at the individual and family level: the top 10% and top 1% owned respectively around 62-67% and 20-24% of the servile masses, and earned an equivalent share of indemnities. Conversely, in the British case, the concentration of slave holding and compensation appears to be lower at the family level. Indeed, the British top 10% and top 1% owned respectively around 79% and 35% of the servile masses at the individual level, while these shares reduce at 61% and 15% for the top 10% and 1% families.

Table 8: Summary statistics of the concentration of slaves across families in the French and British Empire

	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>French colonies</i>							
Guadeloupe	13	2	0.15	83	6.38	235	18.08
Martinique	14	2	0.14	80	5.71	227	16.21
Reunion	22	2	0.09	146	6.64	503	22.86
Senegal	4	0	0.00	23	5.75	54	13.50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>6.38</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>21.25</b>
<i>British colonies</i>							
Anguilla	113	34	0.30	327	2.89	327	2.89
Antigua	50	4	0.08	381	7.62	1,539	30.78
Bahamas	60	9	0.15	251	4.18	374	6.23
Barbados	174	29	0.17	796	4.57	2,338	13.44
Bermuda	46	11	0.24	216	4.70	264	5.74
British Guiana	72	5	0.07	485	6.74	1,129	15.68
Cape of Good Hope	104	22	0.21	336	3.23	475	4.57
Caymanas, Jamaica	66	9	0.14	190	2.88	190	2.88
Dominica	41	4	0.10	227	5.54	417	10.17
Grenada	34	3	0.09	239	7.03	514	15.12
Honduras	16	3	0.19	88	5.50	239	14.94
Jamaica	289	20	0.07	1561	5.40	3,071	10.63
Mauritius	51	7	0.14	217	4.25	501	9.82
Montserrat	43	6	0.14	231	5.37	601	13.98
Nevis	53	8	0.15	238	4.49	257	4.85
St Kitts	38	5	0.13	197	5.18	313	8.24
St Lucia	32	3	0.09	267	8.34	928	29
St Vincent	32	3	0.09	212	6.62	487	15.22
Tobago	24	2	0.08	175	7.29	316	13.17
Trinidad	29	2	0.07	210	7.24	576	19.86
Virgin Islands	26	5	0.19	124	4.77	286	11.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>850</b>	<b>6.16</b>	<b>2,250</b>	<b>16.3</b>

*Note:* The number of slaves has been rounded to the nearest integer. The *Coefficient* columns always display the division of the previous column with the *Total average* column. The table compares families of French first holders of indemnities with British families from the sub-sample of individual ownership. *Source:* LBS and REPAIRS databases, own calculations.

Table 9: Summary statistics of the concentration of indemnities across families in the French and British Empire

	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>French colonies (F)</i>							
Guadeloupe	5,913.98	818.41	0.14	36,999.39	6.26	104,980.92	17.75
Martinique	5,541.58	765.64	0.14	32,721.52	5.90	92,894.30	16.76
Reunion	14,683.09	1,316.26	0.09	98,347.97	6.70	338,032.28	23.02
Senegal	1,400.5	157.06	0.11	7,347.41	5.25	17,023.36	12.16
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,585.43</b>	<b>2,478.95</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>57,096.54</b>	<b>6.65</b>	<b>207,510.2</b>	<b>24.17</b>
<i>British colonies (E)</i>							
Anguilla	1,791.90	558.66	0.31	5,333.04	2.98	5,333.04	2.98
Antigua	721.53	58.52	0.08	5,672.86	7.86	22,423.81	31.08
Bahamas	757.05	120.08	0.16	2,944.79	3.89	4,485.97	5.93
Barbados	3,559.69	564.37	0.16	17,131.43	4.81	50,259.28	14.12
Bermuda	578.74	141.07	0.24	2,389.35	4.13	3,202.86	5.53
British Guiana	3,704.36	233.37	0.06	25,447.62	6.87	59,309.35	16.01
Cape of Good Hope	3,526.41	771.86	0.22	11,678.26	3.31	17,077.66	4.84
Caymanas, Jamaica	1,285.03	187.15	0.15	3,566.12	2.76	3,566.12	2.76
Dominica	775.28	71.82	0.09	4,191.69	5.41	7,942.97	10.25
Grenada	894.73	80.83	0.09	6,229.44	6.96	13,395.97	14.97
Honduras	871.86	133.05	0.15	4,751.33	5.45	11,571.76	13.27
Jamaica	5,864.87	419.58	0.07	31,360.68	5.35	71,389.66	12.17
Mauritius	1,643.48	223.28	0.14	6,707.83	4.08	1,5240.82	9.27
Montserrat	705.41	122.53	0.17	3,689.27	5.23	9,743.36	13.81
Nevis	889.09	127.26	0.14	3,948.13	4.44	4,585.33	5.16
St Kitts	659.56	98.38	0.15	3,228.89	4.90	5,220.15	7.91
St Lucia	822.78	82.67	0.10	6,383.65	7.76	23,635.62	28.73
St Vincent	850.28	95.74	0.11	5,565.30	6.55	12,991.52	15.28
Tobago	538.88	67.44	0.13	3,178.08	5.90	5,999.27	11.13
Trinidad	1,466.44	126.00	0.09	10,744.76	7.33	28,766.01	19.62
Virgin Islands	346.88	59.13	0.17	1,762.63	5.08	4,089.51	11.79
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3246.27</b>	<b>251.18</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>18,868.67</b>	<b>5.81</b>	<b>49,285.46</b>	<b>15.18</b>

*Note:* The *Coefficient* columns always display the division of the previous column with the *Total average* column. The table compares families of French first holders of indemnities with British families from the sub-sample of individual ownership. *Source:* LBS and REPAIRS databases, own calculations.




Figure 1: Extreme inequality in slave holding and compensation across individuals in French and British Empires

Note: in each trio of bars, I represent the shares for the bottom 50%, the top 10% and the top 1% respectively.

### 4.3 A high concentration in the second holders' hands

The French data include the flow of compensations between first and second holders. It is thus also possible to draw the distribution of compensation received by the creditors of first holders, both after grouping observation by individual and families. Table 10 shows these results.

For the same reasons explained above, we will focus on the family level results. It appears that debts were also very concentrated into the hand of top families. The top 1% of second holder families holding indemnities as debts received 22.17 times more than the total average. For collocations, this number reaches 16.95. Conversely, the bottom 50% of second holder families shared only 30% of the total average of indemnities and collocations passed on.

## 5 The credit relationships in French and British colonies

### 5.1 Indebtedness of small slave owners: a confirmation of the compensation historiography

We reminded in section 2.5.2 that the most heavily indebted settlers were usually small slave owners according to the historiography. Thus, we should expect that the smallest slave owners were also the ones who passed their awards on. It is possible to test this hypothesis with the French data, since they reveal credit bilateral relationships. If the name of the first holder is different from the name of the second holder for a given award, it means that the compensation was handed over. Table 11 shows some summary statistics for the sub-sample of observations displaying different first and second holders, that is 5,755 observations. By comparing these results to Table 4, we observed that slave owners who abandoned their awards to creditors held in average almost twice less enslaved. 75% of observations owned less than three slaves against four for the whole sample, and 90% of them held less than seven slaves against twelve for the entire sample.




Figure 2: Extreme inequality in slave holding and compensation across families in French and British Empires

Note: in each trio of bars, I represent the shares for the bottom 50%, the top 10% and the top 1% respectively.

## 5.2 Matching across first and second holders: the large flows of French compensations

Another question could be to know the share of indemnities and collocations that were passed on to creditors. Table 12 answers to this question. I have been able to match or unmatch first and second holders, both for indemnities and collocations.

On the one hand, overall, 43% of indemnities were actually held by their first holder, while 45% were passed on to creditors. Besides, 14% of indemnities were handed over from first holders to second holders of the same families (other than the first holder himself), meaning that a significant proportion of credit relationships were between members of the same family. In some colonies like Martinique, very few compensation titles were kept by their first holders: 56% of indemnities were handed over, meaning again that a large proportion of first holders were indebted or needed liquidity at the time of abolition. The share of indemnities which circulated in the same families than the first holders fluctuates from 11% to 18% across the four colonies.

On the other hand, collocations display lower transmissions from first to second holder. For Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion and Senegal, respectively 60%, 49%, 71% and 91% of collocations were kept by the first holders, against 40%, 29%, 54% and 39% for indemnities. These large gaps suggest that first holders of collocations were probably less indebted than first holders of indemnities. The proportion of collocation which were handed over within families is also greater, except for Reunion and Senegal. Overall, in the French Empire, 17% of collocations were passed on from first holders to second holders of the same family, which confirms the importance of in-families credit relationships for a significant part of the sample.

Table 17 in the appendix finally draws the same kind of figures but without distinguishing between indemnities and collocations, and by classifying compensations by quantile (bottom 50%, top 10% and top 1% compensations value). The figures show that small compensations were more often handed over compared to high compensations. Indeed, overall, 39% of the compensations in the bottom 50% were passed on to creditors, 22% for the top 10% and 15% for the top 1%. This means that richest first holders of indemnities and collocations were indeed less indebted than poorer slave holders, and

Table 10: Summary statistics of the French second holders of indemnities and collocations (individuals and families)

Individual second holders data - Indemnities							
	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>Colony (F)</i>							
Guadeloupe	6,362.24	852.95	0.13	37,207.47	5.85	94,364.27	14.83
Martinique	6,876.9	934.87	0.14	39,783.01	5.79	121,451.07	17.66
Reunion	11,513.31	1,146.63	0.10	72,659.1	6.31	229,539.40	19.94
Senegal	2,093.53	360.77	0.17	8,976.03	4.29	15,874.04	7.58
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,712.3</b>	<b>3,704.98</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>53,916.97</b>	<b>6.19</b>	<b>173,895.9</b>	<b>19.96</b>
Family second holders data - Indemnities							
	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>Colony (F)</i>							
Guadeloupe	8,888.24	1,160.41	0.13	50,898.42	5.73	144,109.85	16.21
Martinique	10,179.45	1,304.27	0.13	58,885.16	5.78	150,398.11	14.77
Reunion	21,705.15	1,943.62	0.09	140,932.39	6.49	234,537.84	10.81
Senegal	2,507.07	338.03	0.13	11,607.88	4.63	23,918.15	9.54
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,950.09</b>	<b>4,151.8</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>88,628.42</b>	<b>6.35</b>	<b>309,286.1</b>	<b>22.17</b>
Individual second holders data - Collocations							
	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>Colony (F)</i>							
Guadeloupe	8,960.15	1,256.32	0.14	48,873.04	5.45	144,109.85	16.08
Martinique	8,659.81	1,083.43	0.13	48,257.78	5.57	150,398.11	17.37
Reunion	9,875.66	907.44	0.09	64,349.98	6.52	234,537.84	23.75
Senegal	7,812.80	1,047.27	0.13	22,709.58	2.91	23,918.15	3.06
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9,018.92</b>	<b>4,392.1</b>	<b>0.49</b>	<b>51,724.62</b>	<b>5.74</b>	<b>168,064.4</b>	<b>18.63</b>
Family second holders data - Collocations							
	Total average	Average among the bottom 50%	Coefficient	Average among the top 10%	Coefficient	Average among the top 1%	Coefficient
<i>Colony (F)</i>							
Guadeloupe	14,208.11	1,903.62	0.13	78,698.09	5.54	144,109.85	10.14
Martinique	12,839.71	1,534.95	0.12	72,682.54	5.66	150,398.11	11.71
Reunion	14,959.51	1,297.50	0.09	96,975.35	6.48	234,537.84	15.68
Senegal	9,114.93	2,013.45	0.22	22,709.58	2.49	23,918.15	2.62
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,755.52</b>	<b>4,255.22</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>79,558.55</b>	<b>5.78</b>	<b>233,108.6</b>	<b>16.95</b>

Note: The *Coefficient* columns always display the division of the previous column with the *Total average* column.  
Source: REPAIRS database, own calculations.

actually earned the compensations they were entitle to. It corroborates the previous findings in section 5.1.

### 5.3 A network analysis of credit relationships

The French data has the great advantage of displaying the circulation of compensation across agents. On the British side however, only 782 observations report individuals classified as "mortgagees". It thus possible to draw some network analysis to study the structure of credit relationships in the French and British Empire. In particular, it will have to know whether the credit chains ended up in the hands of a small proprietarian elite, or whether they were diffuse.



Table 11: Summary statistics about slave ownership for observations displaying different first and second holders (French data)

	Guadeloupe (N = 1,063)	Martinique (N = 2,246)	Reunion (N = 2,427)	Senegal (N = 19)	Overall (N = 5,755)
Average	3	3	3	3	3
Minimum	0	0	0	0	0
Q1	1	1	1	1	1
Median	2	1	1	2	1
Q3	3	3	3	4	3
D9	7	7	7	8	7
Maximum	127	263	156	10	263

*Note:* The number of slaves was derived by dividing the compensations value by the corresponding per capita compensation value displayed in Table 3. Such computations sometimes led to a decimal number of slaves between 0 and 1, which explain the zero minimum values. The numbers have been rounded to the nearest integer.

*Source:* REPAIRS database, own calculations.

### 5.3.1 Credit relationships in the French colonies

#### Analysis at the individual level

As usual, we are going to draw our analysis at the individual and family level. At the individual level, I counted 5,755 observations for which awards were passed on from first to second holders. Amongst these compensations title, I counted 4,018 different first holders and 1,045 different second holders linked with each other. Figure 3 draws the global network for this sub-sample. A first and important conclusion is that around a relatively small population of well tied agents, most credit relationships were bilateral relationships. Few individuals were indebted to more than one person. Besides, amongst the central nodes, few of them reach 100 edges. Another observation is that having many connections does not necessarily implies a large amount of compensation received. Many nodes in bilateral relationships concerned high award value (that is big credit contracts), while many vertices receiving many edges did not earn relatively more. Figure 4 shows the same graph but after filtering nodes with degree higher than 3,<sup>25</sup> i.e. after zooming on the central part of figure 3. We observe that individuals belonging to credit chains longer than three persons form different related components, independent from each other, and more or less densely connected. Finally, figure 18 in the appendix displays the same network but within colonies.

However, these first graphs do not display any information about the potential links between slave holders owning slaves in different colonies. Figure 5 draws a network where nodes represent the colony to which the individual is attached. Interestingly, we observe credit connections across slave owners who owned slaves in different colonies. This means that to some extent, slave holders were able to borrow money to other owners holding enslaved somewhere else. The reader should have in mind that the place of residence is not reported in the REPAIRS database. Thus, we cannot distinguish between resident and absentee owners. This graph could then be a clue indicating that some slave holders were absentees, living in the metropolis, allowing them to sign credit contracts in a simpler way than if they were geographically separated by residing in different colonies. The observations are also in line with the historiographic story pointing out that the absence of local colonial banks before the abolition led settlers to borrow to metropolitan merchants. Nevertheless, further research would be required in order to know the exact features of these borrower and lender slave owners (place of living, occupation...).

<sup>25</sup>NB: The degree of a node corresponds to the number of edges it receives.

Table 12: Summary statistics of the matching across first and second holders for each observation

Matching across first and second holders - Indemnities					
	Guadeloupe (N = 2,107)	Martinique (N = 5,262)	Reunion (N = 7,505)	Senegal (N = 178)	Overall (N = 15,052)
<i>Matching by surname</i>					
Matched	1,186 (56%)	2,417 (46%)	4,842 (65%)	101 (57%)	8,546 (57%)
Unmatched	921 (44%)	2,845 (54%)	2,663 (35%)	77 (43%)	6,506 (43%)
<i>Matching by first name and surname</i>					
Matched	852 (40%)	1,515 (29%)	4,062 (54%)	69 (39%)	6,498 (43%)
Unmatched	945 (45%)	2,921 (56%)	2,755 (37%)	78 (44%)	6,699 (45%)
(Missing)	310 (15%)	826 (16%)	688 (9.2%)	31 (17%)	1,855 (12%)
<i>Proportion of in-families flows</i>	16%	17%	11%	18%	14%
Matching across first and second holders - Collocations					
	Guadeloupe (N = 5,447)	Martinique (N = 5,561)	Reunion (N = 2,990)	Senegal (N = 328)	Overall (N = 14,326)
<i>Matching by surname</i>					
Matched	4,265 (78%)	3,941 (71%)	2,419 (81%)	328 (100%)	10,953 (76%)
Unmatched	1,182 (22%)	1,620 (29%)	571 (19%)	0 (0%)	3,373 (24%)
<i>Matching by first name and surname</i>					
Matched	3,252 (60%)	2,724 (49%)	2,126 (71%)	298 (91%)	8,400 (59%)
Unmatched	1,227 (23%)	1,819 (33%)	657 (22%)	0 (0%)	3,703 (26%)
(Missing)	968 (18%)	1,018 (18%)	207 (6.9%)	30 (9.1%)	2,223 (16%)
<i>Proportion of in-families flows</i>	18%	22%	10%	9%	17%

Note: Missing values appear when the first name of at least one of the holder is unknown. The *Proportion of in-families flows* is derived by subtracting the surname match percentage to the surname and first name match percentage.  
Source: REPAIRS database, own calculations.

Besides, it is possible to quantify the assortativity degree of our networks.<sup>26</sup> I measured assortativity coefficients with respect to colonies and centrality degree.<sup>27</sup> The results are displayed in table 13, as well as the coming results for the family

<sup>26</sup>According to McNulty [2022]: "The assortativity is the tendency of vertices to connect or 'attach' to vertices with similar properties in a graph." (<https://ona-book.org/similarity.html>)

<sup>27</sup>According to McNulty [2022]: "The assortativity coefficient of a graph is a measure of the extent to which vertices with the same properties connect to each other. [...] The assortativity coefficient of a graph ranges between  $-1$  and  $1$ , just like




Figure 3: Credit relationships across French individuals

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree higher than 0. The *Compensation value* gradient goes from 1 to 10. The compensations values have been classed by decile after rounding them to the nearest integer, such that Index 1 = [2,149] (149 being the first decile of the distribution), Index 2 = [140, 304], Index 3 = [305, 410], Index 4 = [411, 534], Index 5 = [535, 672], Index 6 = [673, 943], Index 7 = [944, 1330], Index 8 = [1331, 1957], Index 9 = [1958, 3588], Index 10 = [1958, 3588]. Values are in francs.

*Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.

level analysis. As expected given the looks of previous figures, coefficients are closed to 0. This confirms that our credit networks are neutral assortative, both for all and large credit relationships. We deduce that there is no particular probability that nodes from the same (or different) colonies are connected, suggesting that geographic proximity (or distance) between colonies was not a criteria to lend or borrow money. Again, this corroborates the observation of figure 18: it could be that many French slave owners were in fact absentees, living in the metropolis, allowing them to borrow from each other to invest in remote land and slave property.

Moreover, it is possible to compute degree assortativity coefficients.<sup>28</sup> The coefficients are respectively -0.03 and -0.04 for the whole and large relationships sample, meaning that in both cases, networks are neutral assortative with respect to degree. There is no particular probability that densely connected nodes are connected to other densely (or weakly) connected nodes. In other words, the credit chains were perfectly diffuse between agents: being a slave owner with many

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a correlation coefficient. Assortativity coefficients close to 1 indicate that there is very high likelihood of two vertices with the same property being connected. This is called an assortative network. Assortativity coefficients close to -1 indicate that there is very low likelihood of two vertices with the same property being connected. This is called a disassortative network. Networks with assortativity coefficients close to zero are neither assortative nor disassortative and are usually described as having neutral assortativity."

<sup>28</sup>According to McNulty [2022]: "A high degree assortativity is a measure of preferential attachment in organizations, where highly connected vertices are connected with each other and a large number of vertices with low degree make up the remainder of the network."




Figure 4: Credit relationships across French individuals (large relationships only)

Note: The network displays only nodes with degree equal or higher than 3. The *Compensation value* gradient goes from 1 to 10. The compensations values have been classed by decile after rounding them to the nearest integer, such that Index 1 = [2,149] (149 being the first decile of the distribution), Index 2 = [140, 304], Index 3 = [305, 410], Index 4 = [411, 534], Index 5 = [535, 672], Index 6 = [673, 943], Index 7 = [944, 1330], Index 8 = [1331, 1957], Index 9 = [1958, 3588], Index 10 = [1958, 3588]. Values are in francs.

Source: REPAIRS database, own figure.

credit contracts does not increase (or decrease) the probability of borrowing and lending to other slave owners holding many debt agreements. Finally, we cannot detect any individual or group of individuals aggregating the credit chains of settlers at the time of the abolition.

Table 13: Assortativity coefficients for the French network analysis

	Individual level analysis		Family level analysis	
	Whole sample	Large relationships sample	Whole sample	Large relationships sample
Categorical assortativity with respect to colony	-0.005	0.006	-0.009	0.037
Degree assortativity	-0.03	-0.04	0.001	-0.021

Source: REPAIRS database, own calculations.

### Analysis at the family level

On the family side, I counted 9,890 observations for which the family name of the first holder is different from the one of




Figure 5: Credit relationships across French individuals (large relationships only)

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree equal or higher than 3. *Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.

the second holder. Amongst these observations, 4,171 display distinct first holders while 1,210 are distinct second holders. Figure 6 shows the network for the whole sample. As before, we observe a multitude of small bilateral credit contracts, but these connections are rarer than in the individual level analysis. This is a direct consequence of the aggregation of individuals by family. Obviously, the network is much more dense in terms of edges since each node is a family aggregating several individuals connected to many others. The diversity of compensation values received by individuals, independently of the number of connections, reflect directly at the family level.

Figure 7 draws the same network but for large relations only (only nodes with degree higher than 5 are kept). Compared to figure 4, the network is much more dense for the same reasons explained above. We observe that many independent credit chains starts in a bilateral relationship before converging towards more central nodes, aggregating very diverse compensation values. The same network structure is observable within colonies (figure 8). The case of Senegal is less representative because of the small number of observations available (506 families listed, but only 26 in relation, those shown on the graph). The number of credit links falls drastically in the case of Reunion, even though the number of connected families is almost as high ( $n = 1477$ ) as in Guadeloupe ( $n = 1545$ ). However, the families from Reunion exchanged more high value securities (more yellow nodes).

Besides, figure 19 and 20 in the appendix sheds some lights on the credit relationships between colonies, both for the entire and large relationships samples. The results are obviously the same than for the individual level analysis: French colonies appear to be integrated into a global credit market, allowing families to borrow and lend from each other, despite the geographical distance. Again, this could suggests that many of them were actually absentee families.

Finally, the assortativity coefficients display similar results in the family level analysis. For categorical assortativity with respect to colonies, the coefficients reach -0.009 for the whole sample and 0.037 for the large relationships sub-sample (table 13). As before, this means that there is no particular probability for the same colonies (or different ones) to be connected to each other. Geographical proximity (or distance) does not play any role in the credit chains structure. Regarding de-




Figure 6: Credit relationships across French families

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree higher than 0. The *Compensation value* gradient goes from 1 to 10. The compensations values have been classed by decile after rounding them to the nearest integer, such that Index 1 = [2, 157] (157 being the first decile of the distribution), Index 2 = [158, 304], Index 3 = [305, 410], Index 4 = [411, 534], Index 5 = [535, 718], Index 6 = [719, 958], Index 7 = [959, 1414], Index 8 = [1415, 2127], Index 9 = [2128, 4000], Index 10 = [4001, 110758]. Values are in francs.

*Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.

gree assortativity, the coefficients are 0.001 for the whole sample and -0.021 for the large relationships sub-sample. This corroborates the fact that even between families, credit chains were diffuse.

### 5.3.2 Credit relationships in the British colonies

On the British side, data display common slave ownership. Among individuals holding shared claims, some are categorised as *Mortgagee* i.e. "a creditor who had secured his or her debt on the estate and the enslaved by way of a deed of mortgage entered into with the owner" (cf table 15). Since the initial database was organised by individuals (one observation corresponds to one individual), contrary to the French database which displayed the transmissions of compensation securities across individuals (one observation corresponds to one award), I had to reorganise the data in order to make credit chains appear. I have thus be able to count 2,535 relationships involving mortgagees. These relationships involve distinct 1,236 individuals. Contrary to the French case, it is impossible to disentangle who was the mortgagee and who was the debtor for a given relationships. Moreover, as explained in section 3.2, for common ownership it is impossible to disentangle the share of the awards earned by the different parties associated to a given claim. Thus, I cannot draw the compensation values as I did in the French network analysis. I finally study both the whole sample (nodes with strictly positive degree, namely 1,236 nodes) and the large relationships sub-sample (nodes with degree equal or higher than 2, namely 706 nodes).

Figures 9 and 10 show the British credit networks across colonies for the whole and large relationships samples respectively. British territories seem to be highly integrated into the between colonies credit market. The assortativity coefficients



Figure 7: Credit relationships across French families (large relationships only)

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree equal or higher than 5. The *Compensation value* gradient goes from 1 to 10. The compensations values have been classed by decile after rounding them to the nearest integer, such that Index 1 = [2, 157] (157 being the first decile of the distribution), Index 2 = [158, 304], Index 3 = [305, 410], Index 4 = [411, 534], Index 5 = [535, 718], Index 6 = [719, 958], Index 7 = [959, 1414], Index 8 = [1415, 2127], Index 9 = [2128, 4000], Index 10 = [4001, 110758]. Values are in francs.

*Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.

(0.058 and 0.102 respectively) close to zero confirm the graphic view (cf table 14): geographical proximity (or distance) did not favour credit relationships between colonies. Again this support the Draper [2007] results, that is a significant part of slave owners were absentee rather than resident settlers, which could have favoured the credit relationships across agents.

This intuition is corroborated by figure 11. We do observe that almost all individuals connected to claim involving mortgagees were absentees. The assortativity coefficients (0.021 and 0.035) remain very close to zero, meaning that there is neither higher probability for absentees to be connected to other absentees, nor higher probability for absentees to be connected to residents.

Besides, as in the French case, small bilateral or trilateral relationships are common. However, at the individual level, we do observe a convergence of credit chains from weakly connected vertices to strongly connected ones (cf figure 9). Again, no one can know whether mortgagees with many connections received systematically more in terms of compensation value. But it is reasonable to think that the ability to sign many credit contract (thus to be highly connected with others) is positively correlated to slave ownership wealth (thus to high compensation values). Moreover, the vertices appear to be much more densely connected compared to the French case. For large relationships however, we get back to a more split pattern, with many small independent connected components. The assortativity coefficients of 0.708 and 0.704, relatively close to 1, mean that densely (respectively weakly) connected nodes are more likely to be connected with each other. This stylised fact is a real difference with the French case, where degree assortativity coefficients were very close to 0. Thus it appears that contrary to the French case, the British credit chains were concentrated: claimants weakly connected borrowed and lent with each other, while claimants with many relationships signed credit agreement with each others.






Figure 8: Credit relationships across French families by colonies

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree higher than 0. The *Compensation value* gradient goes from 1 to 10. The compensations values have been classed by decile after rounding them to the nearest integer, such that Index 1 = [2, 157] (157 being the first decile of the distribution), Index 2 = [158, 304], Index 3 = [305, 410], Index 4 = [411, 534], Index 5 = [535, 718], Index 6 = [719, 958], Index 7 = [959, 1414], Index 8 = [1415, 2127], Index 9 = [2128, 4000], Index 10 = [4001, 110758]. Values are in francs.

*Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.

Table 14: Assortativity coefficients for the British network analysis

	Whole sample	Large relationships sample
Categorical assortativity with respect to colony	0.058	0.102
Categorical assortativity with respect to absenteeism	0.021	0.035
Categorical assortativity with respect to occupation	0.217	0.233
Degree assortativity	0.708	0.704

*Source:* LBS database, own calculations.

Finally, figure 12 displays the same networks but with respect to occupation of claimants. The assortativity coefficients with respect to occupation are 0.217 and 0.233 for the whole and the large relationships samples. Consequently, there is







Figure 10: Credit relationships across British colonies (large relationships only)

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree equal or higher than 2. *Source:* LBS database, own figure.

a small probability that claimants with the same occupation borrowed and lent money with each other at the time of the




Figure 11: Credit relationships between British absentees and residents

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree higher than 0. *Source:* LBS database, own figure.

abolition.




Figure 12: Credit relationships between occupations in the British sample

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree higher than 0. *Source:* LBS database, own figure.

## 6 Conclusion

The present study brings quantitative insights at the individual level to understand the distribution of slave ownership, compensations and the credit structure of the French and British colonial economic system at the time of the abolition of slavery. The data analysis reveals that in both cases, slave holding was very unequally distributed, leading to an unequal distribution of compensations across slave owners. Depending on British colonies, richest slave holders received more or less compensations they ought to. However, these results could unfortunately be biased by the impossibility to include common slave ownership in the compensation counting. Concentration of awards was also very high in the French final holders category. The network analysis confirms that the colonial economic system was broadly based on credit. French and British colonies seem to be integrated in a inter-colonial credit market, which could be explain by the importance of the absenteeism phenomenon, broadly documented in the British case but more hypothetical in the French case so far. In the French case, exclusive bilateral relationships were very common, and the networks display high diversity in the value of compensations received. Bilateral relationships exist but are rarer in the British territories, and individuals are more densely connected with each other. Consequently, the credit network was much more diffuse in the French case than in the British case, except for large credit chains, where many independent related components coexist.

Further research should intend to find the reasons explaining why inequalities in the compensations received are more or less important depending on colonies. Besides, improving the data cleaning of the REPAIRS data base to harmonize first names would help to reduce the bias in the slave ownership and compensation counting when grouping observations by individuals. A better knowledge regarding the identity of French persons compensated would also be very valuable.

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# Appendices

**JAMAICA.**

DIVISIONS.	CLASSES.	Average Value of a Slave as appraised by the Sworn Valuers.			Compensation per Slave.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Prædial attached	Head people	78	4	1½	31	-	6½
	Tradesmen	78	17	8	31	5	11½
	Inferior tradesmen	52	2	11	20	13	9½
	Field labourers	67	1	5½	26	12	2½
	Inferior field labourers	32	5	9½	12	16	2½
Prædial unattached	Head people	78	4	10	31	-	10
	Tradesmen	79	11	-	31	11	2½
	Inferior tradesmen	52	13	4½	20	17	11
	Field labourers	66	19	7½	26	11	6
	Inferior field labourers	33	6	2½	13	4	3½
Non-prædial	Head tradesmen	78	-	7	30	19	2
	Inferior tradesmen	51	17	-	20	11	5
	Head people employed on wharfs, shipping, or other avocations.	76	6	1	30	5	5½
	Inferior people of the same description.	57	3	7½	22	13	8½
	Head domestics	73	9	9½	29	3	1½
	Inferior domestics	49	5	1½	19	10	10½
	Children under six years of age on 1st August 1834.	13	17	-½	5	9	10½
Aged, diseased, or otherwise non-effective.	10	18	5½	4	6	8	

Figure 13: Appraised value of slaves in Jamaica according to their classification

**ÉTAT DES RÉGLEMENTS DÉFINITIFS.**

DATE DU DÉVOT.	NOMBRES du titre.	NATURE du TITRE.	NOMS DES TITULAIRES.	NOMS DES PORTEURS.	VALEUR DU TITRE.	nombre de la transmission.	DATE DE LA REMISE de l'inscription.	OBSERVATIONS.
4 août	2510	Coll.	Ducaron peu	REPORT	255.70	21	22.7h	
"	2564	"	"	"	5145.	"	"	
14 juil	5818	"	Dumont St. Basile	"	18,554.58	"	"	
22 août	166	Inde	Duperrac (Chimthei)	"	256.28	"	6.8h	
14 " id	255	"	Labre ni Dupré	"	7256.08	"	3.9h	
4 "	2929	Coll.	Dupuy (D. Sébastien)	"	886.88	"	15 Dec	
"	2708	"	Duhamel & Co	"	7810.29	"	26 Jan 32	
17 juil	5767	"	Uvié (Gustave)	"	5010	"	22 1/2 h	
10 juil	1306	Inde	Douaquinon hister	"	16,046.09	"	25 1/2 h	
4 août	565	Coll.	Favreud (Antoine Jérôme)	"	5167.95	"	23 "	
14 "	5120	"	Fisher (John)	"	2082.09	"	29 1/2 h	
"	5138	"	"	"	4,575.	"	"	
"	5643	"	"	"	4,294.67	"	"	
24 juil	529	"	Foucard (Louis Laurent)	"	500	"	25 "	

Figure 14: An example of the French K series archive




Figure 15: Explanatory diagrams for French indemnities and collocations (*Source: REPAIRS website*)

Table 15: Claimant categories in the LBS database (*Source: Hall et al. [2014]*)

Category	Definition	N = 58,839
Administrator	In Britain, the person granted letters of administration to control a deceased person's estate when that person has died intestate (i.e. without leaving a valid will). In Jamaica, the local agent or representative of executors in Britain was referred to as the administrator.	114 (0.2%)
Annuitant	The beneficiary of a specified annual income the payment of which was secured on a specified estate and represents a prior charge on that estate. If the income was not paid in a given year then the arrears are rolled forward as a debt secured on the estate.	69 (0.1%)

Table 15: Claimant categories in the LBS database (*Source*:Hall et al. [2014])

Category	Definition	N = 58,839
Assignee	A person appointed by the creditors as a body empowered to administer the assets of a bankrupt individual or firm on behalf of the creditors. This is a role more recently fulfilled by the trustee in bankruptcy.	294 (0.5%)
Attorney	A legal representative or an estate manager	26 (<0.1%)
Committee	The person legally empowered to act on behalf of another person who had been judged to be incapable by a Commission of Lunacy.	4 (<0.1%)
Executor	Man or woman appointed under the terms of a will by the testator to carry out the terms of the will.	1,011 (1.7%)
Guardian	The person legally empowered to act on behalf of a minor (a child who had not reached the age of majority, normally 21 but sometimes set by a testator's will at 25 or even 28).	88 (0.1%)
Heir-at-law	The next of kin (closest blood relative) where a person had died intestate.	19 (<0.1%)
Judgement Creditor	A creditor who had secured the debt on the estate by means of a court judgement (as opposed to a mortgage deed entered into with the owner).	291 (0.5%)
Legatee	The beneficiary of a specific bequest under the terms of a will.	308 (0.5%)
Mortgagee	A creditor who had secured his or her debt on the estate and the enslaved by way of a deed of mortgage entered into with the owner.	782 (1.3%)
Mortgagee-in-possession	A creditor who had moved to foreclose on a mortgage but where the equity of redemption (i.e. the right to redeem the mortgage and regain ownership) remained in the hands of the original owner.	29 (<0.1%)
Official assignee	An assignee appointed by the bankruptcy court to work alongside the creditors' assignee to oversee the realisation of assets in bankruptcy. These were permanent officials who were required to have had previous commercial experience	14 (<0.1%)
Owner-in-fee	The unqualified beneficial owner.	5,274 (9.0%)



Table 15: Claimant categories in the LBS database (*Source*:Hall et al. [2014])

Category	Definition	N = 58,839
Receiver	The person responsible to the court for the protection of the assets of an estate that was subject to proceedings in the Court of Chancery.	110 (0.2%)
Residuary Legatee	The beneficiary of the balance of an estate after all the specific bequests had been honoured.	3 (<0.1%)
Sequestrator	The title given to the person carrying out the functions of the assignee in certain jurisdictions, notably Scotland and British Guiana.	26 (<0.1%)
Tenant-for-life	Under the system of entail, which transmitted estates to the next generation while precluding the sale of those estates by that generation, a tenant-for-life enjoyed the unencumbered income from the estate but could not dispose of the estate itself without Parliamentary consent to break the entail.	40 (<0.1%)
Tenant-in-tail or Remainderman	The man or woman who was specified in the entail as the next beneficiary after the tenant-for-life.	29 (<0.1%)
Trustee	A person appointed under the terms of a legal construct of a trust to implement the stated purpose of the trust. The trust might have been established under a marriage settlement, under a will, or for the benefit of creditors. In addition, under the rules of the Commissioners of Slave Compensation trustees were to be appointed where the compensation monies 'belonged to or be vested in any married woman, infant, lunatic, or person of insane or unsound mind, or person beyond the seas, or labouring under any other legal or material disability... for the protection of whose interests it may be necessary to make provision'.	925 (1.6%)
Unknown		49,383 (84%)

PARISH OF ST. CATHERINE, COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX.

Date of Award.	No. of Claim.	Name of Party to whom the Payment is Awarded.	No. of Slaves.	S U M.	Date of Award.	No. of Claim.	Name of Party to whom the Payment is Awarded.	No. of Slaves.	S U
28 Sept. 1835	1	Curtis Phillip Berry	1	£. s. d.	9 Apr. 1836	81	Alexander Mitchell	16	£. 309-1
---	2	George Reeves Gauntlett	5	79 4 7½	28 Sept. 1835	82	Elizabeth Thomas	1	19-1
---	3	George Reeves Gauntlett	3	58 12 6½	---	83	- [Litigated Claim]	5	---
---	4	J. Goodwin & Helen his wife	3	58 12 6½	28 Sept. 1835	84	Edward Massias	2	39-
---	5	James Derbyshire	0	122 7 9½	---	85	Margaret Brown	1	19-1
---	6	Anthony Davis	2	23 17 0½	---	86	- [Litigated Claim]	7	---
---	7	Eloise Clare	2	48 13 11½	28 Sept. 1835	87	Robert Vidal	2	48-
14 Mar. 1836	8	Esther Delapenha & Isaac Pinto, jun.	3	54 3 10	---	88	Alexander Mitchell	19	293-
28 Sept. 1835	9	Caleb Depass	1	19 10 10½	---	89	Mary Ann Hunter	3	44-
---	10	Jane James	7	108 14 -¾	---	90	Sarah Allen	2	39-
11 Jan. 1836	11	David Saa	67	1,431 9 5	---	91	Mary Wotton Stanbury & Sarah Stanbury	11	172-
28 Sept. 1835	12	Letitia Bennett	2	39 1 8½	---	92	John Stanbury	13	249-
---	13	- [Litigated Claim]	7	---	---	93	Francis Bryant	1	19-
28 Sept. 1835	14	Sarah Jane Stanbury	0	117 5 1½	---	94	Elizabeth Ann Shirley	1	19-
---	15	Thomas Thomson	8	158 17 -	---	95	Hanna Harbot	2	25-
---	16	Bronetta Jarrett	2	39 1 8½	---	96	Catherine Oueterlony	13	193-
---	17	James Richard Taylor	2	39 1 8½	---	97	Rebecca Vaz	12	216-
---	18	Moses Sanguinetti	8	107 3 7½	29 Feb. 1836	98	Moses Vaz	3	58-
---	19	Mary Jane Ellick	1	19 10 10½	---	99	Abraham Vaz & Rebecca Vaz	2	39-
---	20	Jac. J. & Moses Sanguinetti	9	192 2 3½	28 Sept. 1835	100	Moses Vaz	1	19-
---	21	- [Litigated Claim]	5	---	---	---	Rachael R. Deleon	1	---
---	22	- [Litigated Claim]	8	---	---	---	---	---	---

Figure 16: An example of the British records of the Slave Compensation Commission

Table 16: Number of observations across French sub-samples

	Individuals		Families	
	First holders (titulaires)	Second holders (porteurs)	First holders (titulaires)	Second holders (porteurs)
Indemnities	9701	5820	5854	3612
Collocations	4281	3253	2805	2118

Source: REPAIRS database, own calculations.

Table 17: Summary statistics of the matching across first and second holders for the bottom 50%, top 10% and top 1% observations

Matching across first and second holders - Bottom 50%					
	Guadeloupe (N = 3,810)	Martinique (N = 5,961)	Reunion (N = 4,535)	Senegal (N = 394)	Overall (N = 14,700)
<i>Matching by surname</i>					
Matched	2,749 (72%)	3,262 (55%)	2,945 (65%)	333 (85%)	9,289 (63%)
Unmatched	1,061 (28%)	2,699 (45%)	1,590 (35%)	61 (15%)	5,411 (37%)
<i>Matching by first name and surname</i>					
Matched	2,151 (56%)	2,250 (38%)	2,524 (56%)	289 (73%)	7,214 (49%)
Unmatched	1,102 (29%)	2,837 (48%)	1,683 (37%)	62 (16%)	5,684 (39%)
(Missing)	557 (15%)	874 (15%)	328 (7.2%)	43 (11%)	1,802 (12%)
Matching across first and second holders - Top 10%					
	Guadeloupe (N = 678)	Martinique (N = 929)	Reunion (N = 1330)	Senegal (N = 7)	Overall (N = 2,944)
<i>Matching by surname</i>					
Matched	561 (83%)	710 (76%)	1,077 (81%)	7 (100%)	2,355 (80%)
Unmatched	117 (17%)	219 (24%)	253 (19%)	0 (0%)	589 (20%)
<i>Matching by first name and surname</i>					
Matched	378 (56%)	412 (44%)	922 (69%)	7 (100%)	1,719 (58%)
Unmatched	118 (17%)	253 (27%)	265 (20%)	0 (0%)	636 (22%)
(Missing)	182 (27%)	264 (28%)	143 (11%)	0 (0%)	589 (20%)
Matching across first and second holders - Top 1%					
	Guadeloupe (N = 75)	Martinique (N = 70)	Reunion (N = 149)	Senegal (NA)	Overall (N = 294)
<i>Matching by surname</i>					
Matched	68 (91%)	61 (87%)	131 (88%)	NA	260 (88%)
Unmatched	7 (9.3%)	9 (13%)	18 (12%)	NA	34 (12%)
<i>Matching by first name and surname</i>					
Matched	41 (55%)	35 (50%)	114 (77%)	NA	190 (65%)
Unmatched	7 (9.3%)	16 (23%)	20 (13%)	NA	43 (15%)
(Missing)	27 (36%)	19 (27%)	15 (10%)	NA	61 (21%)

*Note:* The classification by quantile has been done with respect to compensations value. The table does not distinguish between indemnities and collocations. *Missing* values appear when the first name of at least one of the holder is unknown.

*Source:* REPAIRS database, own calculations.




Figure 18: Credit relationships across French individuals by colonies (large relationships only)

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree higher than 3. The *Compensation value* gradient goes from 1 to 10. The compensations values have been classed by decile after rounding them to the nearest integer, such that Index 1 = [2,149] (149 being the first decile of the distribution), Index 2 = [140, 304], Index 3 = [305, 410], Index 4 = [411, 534], Index 5 = [535, 672], Index 6 = [673, 943], Index 7 = [944, 1330], Index 8 = [1331, 1957], Index 9 = [1958, 3588], Index 10 = [1958, 3588]. Values are in francs.

*Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.




Figure 19: Credit relationships of French families across colonies

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree higher than 0. *Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.




Figure 20: Credit relationships of French families across colonies (large relationships only)

*Note:* The network displays only nodes with degree equal or higher than 5. *Source:* REPAIRS database, own figure.